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
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SPECIAL SESSION OF THE SENATE OF 1859.

IN EIGHTEEN VOLUMES.

- Volume 1 contains No. 1 part 1, (President's Message and Report of Secretary of Interior.)
Volume 2 contains No. 1 part 2, (Report of Secretary of War, 1st part.)
Volume 3 contains No. 1 part 3, (Report of Secretary of War, 2d part.)
Volume 4 contains No. 1 part 4, (Reports of Secretary of Navy and Postmaster General.)
Volume 5 contains No. 1 part 5, (maps.)
Volume 6 { (part 1) contains No. 2 (Finance) and No. 1 special session.
 { (part 2) contains No. 3 to No. 6, and No. 2 special session.
Volume 7 contains No. 7 to No. 28, except 14 and 22, parts 1 and 2.
Volume 8 contains No. 22 part 1.
Volume 9 contains No. 22 part 2.
Volume 10 contains No. 29 to 48, except 37, 46, 47, parts 1, 2, 3, and 4.
Volume 11 contains No. 47 part 1, Patent Office—Mechanical.
Volume 12 contains No. 47 part 2, Patent Office—Mechanical.
Volume 13 contains No. 47 part 3, Patent Office—Mechanical.
Volume 14 contains No. 47 part 4, Patent Office—Agricultural.
Volume 15 contains Report on Commerce and Navigation.
Volume 16 contains No. 14, in quarto.
Volume 17 contains No. 37, in quarto.
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MESSAGE

OF THE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TO THE

TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS

AT THE

COMMENCEMENT OF THE SECOND SESSION

OF

THE THIRTY-FIFTH CONGRESS.

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MESSAGE

PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

TWO HOUSES OF CONGRESS

COMMENCEMENT OF THE SECOND SESSION

THE THIRTY-FIFTH CONGRESS

INTRODUCED BY SENATOR

WASHINGTON
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WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, December 6, 1858.

SIR: The authorized strength of the army, as posted, is 18,165; but the actual strength, on the 1st of July, was 17,498. These troops compose the whole numerical force of our army, distributed throughout the States and Territories of the entire confederacy, manning all the fortifications occupied by troops, holding all the posts now garrisoned, defending all our extended frontiers, and protecting, as far as possible, the different routes extending across the continent from the Mississippi valley to our possessions on the Pacific.

The absolute demands for men in the various posts, stations, &c., as well as for what might be termed the police operations of the army, left only thirteen regiments for actual service in the field. And upon this small force, numbering little over eleven thousand men, devolved the arduous duty of prosecuting all the Indian wars, which have extended this year from the British possessions on the Pacific to the border settlements of Texas; as well as of crushing the rebellion in Utah, which, from its vindictive spirit and large numbers, threatened at its outset to become, and indeed was, very formidable.

The labors performed by the army since my last report will very fully appear from the reports of the different bureaus, herewith transmitted, and to which I call your particular attention. It may be safely asserted that no army of the same size ever before performed, in such a length of time, marches and movements of such extent, surmounting in their progress such formidable obstacles.

These regiments have accomplished within the year a march, averaging for each, the extraordinary distance of twelve hundred and thirty-four miles. These marches, in the main, have been made through the uninhabited solitudes and sterile deserts which stretch away between the settlements of the Atlantic and Pacific coasts, upon routes which afforded nothing to facilitate the advance, except only the herbage which the beasts of burden might pluck by the way-side.

Every item of supply, from a horse-shoe nail to the largest piece of ordnance, has been carried, from the depots, along the whole line of those tedious marches, to be ready at the exact moment when necessity might call for them. The country traversed could yield nothing. The labor, foresight, method, and care requisite to systematize, and the energy, activity, and persistence to carry out such operations by the different departments, deserve the attention of the country and, in my opinion, its commendation too. No disaster has befallen the army throughout its immense ramifications; and the privations, hardships, toils, and dangers to which it has been continually subjected, have been borne without a murmur.

There has been for a long time much exhibition of an insubordinate and hostile spirit among the Indian tribes of Washington and Oregon

Territories, and during the past spring and early part of summer it broke out into open hostility. A very large force of Indians attacked a comparatively small party of our people, who, after an ineffectual resistance and the loss of some brave officers and men, were forced to retreat. This was the signal for a general rising of the tribes, and an alliance was speedily formed between the powerful tribes of Spokanes and Cœur d'Alenes, together with many straggling warriors from amongst the Palouses and other tribes. Immediately upon this outbreak, Brevet Brigadier General Clark, in command of the department of the Pacific, with great promptness, and with a wise forecast, concentrated, in a masterly manner, the widely scattered forces under his command, and precipitated them into the heart of the Indian country, where a powerful Indian force was already assembled to meet him. The campaign was prosecuted with great activity and vigor by Colonel Wright, of the 9th infantry, who gave battle to the Indians on several occasions, always routing them completely. After beating their forces, capturing many prisoners, and destroying large amounts of property, and laying waste their country, the Indians surrendered at discretion, with their wives and children, and sued abjectly for peace. The criminal offenders amongst them, heretofore guilty of murder and rapine, the chief instigators of all dissatisfaction amongst those tribes, and the immediate cause of the recent hostilities, were surrendered, tried, and executed.

A permanent peace has been established by treaties entered into with them, and the army has been already distributed to points where the presence of a force was greatly needed. The officers and men of this command deserve the thanks of the country for the efficient and soldierly manner in which they have borne themselves in the prosecution of the campaign.

The forces employed in the Territory of New Mexico have been called upon also to repel Indian aggressions and chastise the formidable and war-like tribe of the Navajos. These savages have for some time evinced a spirit of insubordination and discontent, which at last broke out into an open defiance of our authority, and was followed by the murder of a negro man within the precincts of the camp.

The declining health of Brevet Brigadier General Garland necessitated his return to the States, which devolved the command of that department upon Colonel Bonneville. This officer promptly and with very proper foresight put on foot the expedition against the Indians, and the campaign has, up to the last advices, been conducted with skill, ability, activity and courage. The enemy has been met on several occasions, and always routed, although our disparity of numbers has always been very great. Our troops have succeeded, also, in taking a considerable amount of the Indian property, consisting of cattle and grain. This war is still prosecuted with vigor, and the Indians show no disposition to abandon their warlike attitude or ask for peace. The Navajos are very rich in herds and flocks, and possess considerable quantities of grain, enough at least to enable them, for some time, to keep up resistance and prosecute the war. They can probably number about three thousand mounted warriors, an extremely formidable force, particularly in the wild and remote country they inhabit. There

shall be no relaxation in prosecuting this war until the savages are brought absolutely under the yoke.

In the State of Texas and upon its borders, there has been, and still is, at this time, raging an Indian war between our troops and that most formidable of all the tribes, the Camanches of the plains, and their kinsmen and allies, the Kiowas. These people have, for a long time, been committing petty outrages upon the inhabitants of our frontiers and travellers upon the roads leading in the vicinity of their haunts. These depredations brought on at last a fight between our troops and their warriors, which for fierceness and determination was very remarkable in Indian warfare. The Indians were routed with considerable loss of killed and wounded by our troops, most efficiently commanded by Major Van Dorn, who also succeeded in capturing a number of their horses.

This war we may look upon as just begun, and the probabilities are that it will be one of fierceness, and may be one of considerable duration. Every means will be taken to prosecute it with vigor and to terminate it with all possible speed.

You will see, sir, from this rapid narrative, that our little army has been called upon, during the last year, to carry on a war extending over nearly the whole space embraced between the parallels of 32° and 48° of north latitude, and extending over a space of more than fifteen hundred miles. It is not, then, a matter of surprise that our thirteen regiments, engaged in these wars and the Mormon rebellion, should have been called upon, in the performance of these arduous services, to accomplish the extraordinary feat of marching an average distance of nearly thirteen hundred miles.

In addition to the operations above spoken of, troops have been moved upon the northwestern frontier and stationed in such manner as to afford protection, as far as possible, to the border settlements of that region. Much apprehension, from the hostile manifestations of the savages beyond the confines of Iowa and Minnesota, has been felt by the frontier settlements of those States, and I regret to say our force is not sufficient to spare troops in such numbers as will quiet altogether these alarms.

MAP OF POSTS AND ROADS.

I have caused a map to be made, which accompanies this report. It shows at a glance all the military posts occupied by our troops and the roads to be travelled in passing to them. Such of these posts as are garrisoned must be supplied with everything, and these supplies must be transported to them whenever and wherever they are needed, regardless of all obstacles. If these posts were permanently occupied by fixed numbers of troops, it would be easy to furnish an exact estimate of cost, both for supplies and their transportation. But it is very far otherwise, when the supplies are contingent upon the accidental number of troops which the exigencies of the service may require, at a given point, and the season of the year when they are to be moved. The number of posts and their positions exhibited by the map, and the extraordinary distances traversed by our troops, demonstrate that both economy and the proper efficiency of the army require an increase of it. Whilst I have no recommendation to make

upon the subject, knowing, as I do, the action of Congress upon this subject at the last session, yet I feel constrained to lay these facts before you and the country, that any apparent lack of efficiency in the army in giving complete protection to our frontiers may be set down to the want of numbers, and not to any want of activity on the part of our troops

Upon this point I beg leave to call your attention to the views of the general-in-chief.

UTAH.

The operations of the army in connexion with the Territory of *Utah*, since the date of my last report, deserve particular notice. They have been in themselves important, and fraught with most important results.

With the inception and progress of the Mormon rebellion, up to the meeting of Congress last year, the country is familiar. It is familiar also with the importance ascribed to it by Congress, with the reasons assigned by that body for appropriating the large sums of money necessary for crushing the treason at a single blow. The preparations at first made to accomplish this object I have heretofore reported. But the final preparations for fitting out the expedition, and the actual movement of the troops upon that remote and difficult Territory, have not until now been made the subject of official communication, nor have the highly beneficial consequences resulting from the policy of that movement been as yet brought to your notice or to that of the public.

After the open acts of war perpetrated by the Mormon people against the United States, in seizing the provision trains of our army, and destroying them with fire; and in stealing and driving off the herds of cattle and horses belonging to the command, although these were essential, as everybody supposed, to the maintenance of our troops and their protection against starvation; these people continued to manifest every proof of a fixed determination to push their treason to the extremity of bloodshed and war. They not only proclaimed martial law in that Territory without a pretext, but against every principle of justice, of law, and of the Constitution; they embodied their whole force of effective men and kept them constantly drilled and under arms, hovering about our encampment, seeking a favorable moment, if one should ever offer itself, to cut off and destroy the whole command. They fortified the narrow mountain passes leading towards the town and chief settlements where they reside, and collected from remote neighborhoods all the deluded people belonging to their sect. Every preparation which indicated a spirit of determined hostility, of rebellion, of treason and war, characterized these people in every action, and nothing but menace and defiance towards the United States authorities ever fell from the lips of their chief impostor or any of his confederates.

When a small force was first sent to Utah, the Mormons attacked and destroyed their trains, and made ready for a general attack upon the column. When a sufficient power was put on foot to put success beyond all doubt, their bluster and bravado sank into whispers of terror and submission.

This movement upon that Territory was demanded by the moral sentiment of the country, was due to a vindication of its laws and constitution, and was essential to demonstrate the power of the federal government to chastise insubordination and quell rebellion, however formidable from numbers or position it might seem to be. Adequate preparations, and a prompt advance of the army, was an act of mercy and humanity to those deluded people, for it prevented the effusion of blood.

These people, however, still evince a spirit of insubordination and moody discontent. They keep up strictly their organization, which has for its object and end the complete exclusion of federal authority from all participation in the governmental affairs of the Territory, beyond a mere hollow show. The head man or chief of their sect rules the people with absolute power, and under his dictation the temper they manifest towards the government and the army is that of a conquered people towards a foreign enemy. The necessity which called for the presence of troops in Utah will require a strong force still to be kept there. The reports from the commissioners sent to Utah for the purpose of ascertaining the exact condition of things are already in your hands, and are at once useful and interesting. Nothing could be more praiseworthy than the just and impartial manner in which those gentlemen discharged their delicate and responsible duties.

The conduct of both officers and men attached to the army of Utah has been worthy of all praise. The commander, Brevet Brigadier General A. S. Johnston, who joined his command at a time of great trial and embarrassment, with a calm and lofty bearing, with a true and manly sympathy for all around him, infused into his command a spirit of serenity and contentment which amounted to cheerfulness, amidst uncommon hardships and privations which were unabated throughout the tedious and inclement season of the winter. The destruction of our trains by the Mormons, the disasters which necessarily flowed from it, drove General Johnston to the necessity of sending a detachment of men to New Mexico for supplies essential to preserve the whole command from the greatest extremity, and to enable him to prosecute his march with all practicable despatch.

This expedition was intrusted to Captain R. B. Marcy, of the 5th infantry; and, without intending to make an invidious comparison between the services of officers where all are meritorious, it is but just to bring the conduct of this officer and his command to your especial notice. It may be safely affirmed that, in the whole catalogue of hazardous expeditions scattered so thickly through the history of our border warfare, filled as many of them are with appalling tales of privation, hardship, and suffering, not one surpasses this; and in some particulars it has been hardly equalled by any.

Captain Marcy left Fort Bridger on the 24th day of November, 1857, with a command of forty enlisted men and twenty-five mountain men, herders, packers, and guides. Their course lay through an almost trackless wilderness, over lofty and rugged mountains, without a pathway or a human habitation to guide or direct, in the very depth of winter, through snows for many miles together reaching to the depth of five feet. Their beasts of burden very rapidly perished until

failure of the expedition ; (for unless it started early in May the march could not be made before fall of snow and the destruction of the grass,) to anticipate and make the movement before funds were supplied, necessitated the assumption of a grave responsibility. But with failure on one side and censure on the other, I felt there was no room for doubt or hesitation. It became necessary in this posture of affairs, to supply the requisite funds from private sources to answer the requirements of the service. This I felt more bound to do after the sense of Congress relative to the Mormon rebellion had been expressed, and when it became pretty certain that money for the expedition would be voted at some time or other.

The authority of the department to purchase supplies for the army by contract, to be paid at a future time, under the act of May 1, 1820, was the legitimate resort in that state of things, and, although I hesitated for a long time before exercising that authority, I found there was no alternative left but to take measures for the supply of all the necessities for the army, or to fail in the expedition. This was done in a manner heretofore partially communicated to Congress under calls by that body upon this department ; but until now a final statement of the transactions could not be made.

I refer you, particularly, to the report of the chief of the quartermaster's bureau for a detailed statement of all operations connected with it. They will be found interesting and very satisfactory. I take this occasion to say, and I cannot but express my great gratification at the fact, that the disbursements have resulted in furnishing larger supplies of articles essential for the march of the army, many items of which were of a decidedly better quality, and bought at *cheaper rates*, than have ever been purchased through that bureau since the commencement of the Mexican war.

The disbursements, amounting to nearly \$10,000,000, have been made through this bureau during the last year, and every transaction has been finished, every account closed, every voucher filed, with the exception of \$28,000, not yet received, owing to the great distance of the disbursing officers from the seat of government. Not one dollar will be unaccounted for, and not one cent misapplied. This simple fact is the highest commendation that can be bestowed upon the fidelity, efficiency and worth of the officers of this corps.

This bureau expends by far the heaviest amount of any in the army, and it is frequently made the subject of animadversion by those who do not know that whilst the payments are necessarily made through this bureau, yet the bureau has no voice whatever in directing when, how, or to what amounts these expenditures shall be made. Whenever an order is given by any officer of the United States army having a right to give it for the purchase of an article or the disbursement of money, the Quartermaster must make the purchase and foot the bill, however much his judgment might lean against the expenditure. The Quartermaster's Department is responsible for the honest and faithful disbursement of money, but not for the objects to which it may be applied. Hence it will be readily perceived that there are no data and can be none by which the estimates of this bureau can be anything more than mere approximate estimates of the probable expenditures.

COMMISSARY'S BUREAU.

The operations of the Commissary Department have been very satisfactory during the past year. The appropriations for supplies being sufficient there was money in hand to make all necessary purchases; and supplies of a better quality have been purchased and for lower rates than at any previous time for many years. When contracts were necessarily given they have been made on very advantageous terms. The supply of beef for the army in Utah and the intermediate posts has cost less than the ruling prices in New York or any of the Atlantic cities at the same periods. The beef delivered in Utah cost no more than eight dollars and fifty cents per hundred, *nett*, at Fort Laramie seven dollars and a half per hundred, *nett*, whilst the supply delivered at Fort Leavenworth, of the fattest and most superior quality of corn fed beef, cost only six dollars and twenty-five cents per hundred, *nett*.

NATIONAL DEFENCES.

The accompanying report of the Chief Engineer will inform you of the progress which has been made during the past year in the construction of our fortifications.

The purposes and nature of these have been fully set forth in former communications from this department, and I therefore deem it unnecessary to advance any reasons in support of my recommendation that appropriations may be granted for the works at Willett's Point and Fort Richmond.

In limiting my recommendations to these, and a general appropriation for keeping in repair completed works, I have been guided by the consideration that the scale on which our defences are projected is so great that the expense of completing them should not be imposed upon the present generation, but should rather be distributed over a long term of years, especially as the annual burden will be comparatively lighter as the country increases in wealth.

Besides, as national circumstances change, and in correspondence with the development and improvement in the appliances of warfare, our fortifications must, in order to fulfill their original design, be modified in regard to the scale or the system; for example, it is possible that the Engineer Bureau may, in future plans incline towards some combination of earth-work batteries in preference to the masonry forts of the present system. For these reasons, and because our sea ports are already reasonably secure against *direct attack, by guns afloat*, I am averse to precipitation in completing the works now in hand.

But if we are thus warranted in relaxing our solicitude with regard to the danger which engrossed the attention of the Engineer Board, which forty years ago planned the present system, we have cause for fresh apprehension from a method of warfare from which distance and uncertainties of the sea no longer protect us. In view of the prodigious development in the marine of the first powers of Europe, and of the increased range at which their steam navies enable them to exert the utmost strength of their land armies as well as floating forces, I am in favor of making some provision against descents upon our coasts of hostile armies co-operating with steam fleets.

In proportion as our sea ports increase in wealth, they will increase the incentive which would incline our maritime rivals to resort, in case

of war, to a revival upon our shores of the system which they pursued at Sevastopol, Kinburn, Odessa, Sveborg, and Bomarsund, with such destructive effect.

In my last report I alluded to the militia as the proper reliance against similar attempts; but much depends upon the maturing and providing for beforehand, at each probable point of attack, of some plan of action which shall enable them to compete on equal terms with the veteran armies of Europe. Our railroads are indeed capable of transporting, to the scene of action, great bodies of men, but beyond certain limits the very numbers of raw troops become disadvantageous, and 50,000 militia would do better service, if managed so as to profit by the marksmanship and intelligence of the individuals, than 100,000 of the same who should attempt to outmanœuvre a well disciplined regular army.

For example, we may reasonably apprehend that New York might be the object of an expedition, which would debark a large army on Long Island; the enemy could then march on Brooklyn, and, if victorious, could either bombard that city and New York, and destroy the navy yard, or exact a heavy contribution. A line of field works around Brooklyn would, however, obviate such a calamity, for it would compensate its defenders for their inferiority in the habit of war; and such a line could be thrown up and armed in a few days.

It must be considered, however, that the growth of the city has already overspread the positions which the original topography of the vicinity indicated as most advantageous for such a line, and that at the present rate the only ones which remain available may be found, when the emergency arrives, similarly occupied.

I therefore recommend Congress to take steps to secure the key points, at least, of the really fine position in question, by reserving a few plats of ground, to be occupied, when the occasion requires, by redoubts.

Similar views to the above are advanced more elaborately in memoirs which have been submitted to this department, among others in one on the defences of New York, which has been addressed to me by Lieutenant Morton, of the engineer corp, and which I recommend for your consideration; the plan it proposes for the location and combination of the defensive works around Brooklyn appears to be practical and judicious.

MILITARY ROADS.

The military road from Fort Smith to the Colorado river by way of Albuquerque is in progress of construction with every promise of its being executed with promptness and skill. The work done upon that portion of it lying west of Fort Defiance last year, begins already to demonstrate the benefits to the country of the appropriation and the work. Large numbers of emigrants bound for California have passed over this route during the past season, and unusually large herds of cattle have been driven that way, because of the abundance of grass and water met with upon it. For all the purposes of a military road, this route possesses many very striking advantages. The line is a straight one nearly from Fort Smith to the Colorado of the west; the surface over which it passes is excellent for a road, whilst there is on almost the entire line an abundance of grass and water.

The position, being on the 35° of north latitude, renders grazing abundant at a very early period in the spring and late in the autumn. For this reason a force might be marched over this road at a period so late or so early that other routes northward, would be impassable from frosts and snows. The altitude of the mountain range prevents that aridity in summer which characterizes some of the more southern routes.

This route derives security from the peculiarity of the conformation of the country lying to the north of it, from the western limit of the Navajo tribe to the Colorado river. The corrugation of the country north of this route, by immense cañons or chasms, renders it both uninhabitable and impassable, so that a perfect barrier against all possibility of Indian attacks from the north, for a distance of several hundred miles, must exist forever. This doubtless constitutes a very great recommendation to the route as one for emigration and transportation of stock.

In another point of view this route is important. In the construction of military posts to keep in subjection the marauding bands of Camanches, Kioways, and other tribes, the topography of the country presents points for them very near to this line of road, so that it will be protected by a line of posts along it from the borders of the friendly Indian settlements to Albuquerque. With a judicious location of two other posts between that point and the Colorado river, travelling will be as secure upon that line of road throughout its whole extent, as upon any territorial road in the United States. I think it would be advisable to make an appropriation for still further improving this road.

Great improvements have been made in the roads through the Territory of Utah since the march of the army thither. A new route has been opened from Fort Bridger to the present encampment of the army near Utah lake, by what is called the Valley of the Timpanogos, which diminishes the distance to California in comparison with that usually travelled by Soda Springs, two hundred and fifty miles; and is shorter by one hundred and thirty miles than the present route through Salt Lake. An appropriation of a moderate sum to be expended on the road west of Utah lake or Rush Valley towards Carson Valley, would no doubt be both judicious and beneficial. It would open and materially improve a route which may be very essential at some time in transporting supplies from the Pacific side to any troops stationed in Utah.

EXPLORATIONS AND SURVEYS.

Every season is developing the great advantages to the public which enure from appropriations made for military explorations and surveys. The large and almost wholly unknown region of country lying between our Atlantic and Pacific frontiers is becoming every day more familiarly understood by means of information gained through these explorations and surveys. Some important expeditions have been consummated since my last report. Important additions to our geographical knowledge have been made by these surveys, and extensive information upon many scientific subjects has been procured at the same time. The public interests are much promoted by this expenditure. I ask special

attention to the report of the officer in charge of the office of exploration and surveys. It embraces the results of the expeditions heretofore fitted out to examine the hitherto unknown regions of the Colorado of the west, as well as the Black Hills lying west of the Nebraska Territory. Important and very valuable information has been furnished by both expeditions. That of Lieutenant Ives, among other things of great interest, exhibits one of the most remarkable topographical phenomena ever met with. He discovers that the waters of the Colorado river, in all their various ramifications of brooks, creeks, and rivers, make their way to the main stream through cañons or clefts in the solid rock at a depth of from one thousand feet, where the cañons first commence, to that of six thousand towards the head waters of the streams below the surface of the earth. These cañons present, for the most part, perpendicular faces of solid rock, and give to the whole country an aspect of wild desolation, without a parallel, or an approximation on the American continent. These reports will constitute a valuable addition to science, and will be found very interesting.

A very large and I think important portion of our territory, lying north and west of the Black Hills, towards the sources of the Missouri and its tributaries coming in from the south side of it, is almost wholly unknown. It ought to be thoroughly explored. I have but little hesitation in saying that a most important line of intercommunication between the Mississippi valley and the river Oregon will yet be opened, and probably, at no distant day, either through the country spoken of or a little further north, upon a line extending from Lake Superior along upon the waters of the upper Missouri to those of the Oregon. At all events, we need much information about this country, which nothing but a careful exploration can give. There are strong grounds to believe that between the navigable waters of the Missouri and those of the river Oregon a portage of not more than four hundred miles intervenes. If this should turn out to be true, and the ground should prove suitable for the construction of a road, this route will be eventually one of the most important yet discovered between the Atlantic and Pacific for military purposes. Other regions of interest and importance, of which we know next to nothing, require to be explored.

There is a large amount of important scientific information in the bureaus of this department which could be made valuable to the general interests of the country if it were properly presented to the public. It ought to be done through means of a geological map. Such a map is a public necessity, and no equal sum of money could be expended which would confer so many valuable benefits upon the country as the amount necessary for the preparation of such a map.

The extensive deposits of precious metals throughout our vast dominion, in search for which such immense sums are annually expended, would be accurately marked; whilst the great articles of national wealth and prosperity, iron, coal, and salt, would be so clearly defined that no money need ever be thrown away in fruitless search for them in localities where they do not exist. Such a map would direct wisely the expenditures of money and labor, and would restrain losses likely to arise from ignorance or willful misrepresentation.

CAMELS.

The entire adaptation of camels to military operations upon the plains may now be taken as demonstrated, whilst their great usefulness and superiority in many particulars is equally certain.

A very heavy expense is necessarily incurred every year by the Quartermaster Department in furnishing transportation for troops whilst engaged in expeditions against the roving tribes of the plains. In all these movements camels could be used, no doubt, to very great advantage. In the space of three days a well appointed command could set out and traverse a space of one hundred and fifty miles without difficulty or much fatigue, and fall upon any Indian tribe perfectly unawares. They would be able to carry all necessary supplies for the campaign, and traverse the arid plains without any inconvenience from want of water. The superiority of the camel over the horse would soon become so manifest for all movements upon the plains and deserts, that hostile Indians in those regions would soon come to understand the hopelessness of escape by flight, and the folly of marauding where chastisement was certain.

The camel lives and thrives upon what would not sustain the hardiest mule, and consequently the item of forage, one now of enormous cost, would be almost saved, if the supply of camels was sufficient to answer the demands and requirements of our frontier service.

It could not fail to be a measure of wise economy if Congress would authorize the purchase of a thousand camels for the purposes spoken of. This could be done at comparatively small cost, if a suitable vessel of the navy was detailed to transport them.

As this subject is attracting much attention, I take the liberty of transmitting, herewith, a brief treatise on the camel, written with great care, and describing with minuteness the proper mode of raising, training, and treatment of them. It is the work of Hekekyan Bey, of Cairo, Egypt, and was prepared at the instance of our active and efficient consul general of Egypt, who has interested himself upon this subject, and has furnished much valuable information concerning these animal. The publication of this little manual will, no doubt, confer a decided benefit upon those who are turning their attention to this new and important branch of husbandry.

ASYLUM AT HARRODSBURG, KENTUCKY.

This property cannot be sold except at a ruinous sacrifice, but it can be converted into an establishment of usefulness, indeed of the greatest possible importance to the service. One of the greatest evils entailed upon discipline and the efficiency of our forces when called on for active duty in the field, arises from the large number of entirely raw recruits continually sent forward to fill up the ranks. These men, for the most part, have no earthly idea of the duties they will be called on to perform, or of the discipline they will be required to undergo. And when to the arduous duties of a frontier campaign they are subjected to the discipline of drill and the routine of a soldier's life, they find it more than any ordinary exertion will accomplish, and, consequently, they desert. If they were thoroughly drilled before joining their regiments, the discipline itself would fit them to overcome those

very difficulties with comparative ease, which, without it, causes them to desert.

Under our present system a dragoon recruit may be sent to his regiment, immediately marching against the Indians of the plains, whilst his skill in riding is not sufficient to sit a horse at an ordinary trot without extreme difficulty. The arms about the person of such a man are as useless as if they were safely stored away in one of the Atlantic arsenals. The man's condition is one of torture to himself and his horse; his horse is speedily broken down, and he, himself, deserts. Examples of this sort are extremely numerous and of perpetual occurrence.

These and a great many other evils resulting from sending untrained men to the mounted service can all be avoided by authorizing the public property at Harrodsburg, Kentucky, to be converted into a CAVALRY DEPOT and school for the mounted service. It will entail no additional expense. The houses are sufficient now for every purpose, and the stables are ample for such horses as would be necessary for drill and all other purposes. The grounds attached to the establishment, I believe, are admirably adapted to cavalry drill, being extensive and well situated.

If this measure is sanctioned, it will not only fill the regiments with men skillful and efficient in the management of their horses and the use of their arms, but it will be a measure of economy, and prove a great saving in money to the public service.

Harrodsburg has striking advantages besides those enumerated; it is situated in a rich healthy grain producing country, where forage can always be purchased in abundance and at fair prices, and the horses of that region are of the very best sort. It is very accessible and sufficiently near the frontiers of the west for the recruits to reach speedily, by railroads and steamboats, any of the posts at which the mounted regiments would probably be stationed.

The frontier service requires that every possible means should be resorted to, to make our little army thoroughly efficient, and no measure, I am confident, would contribute more to it than the one now proposed.

SCHOOL OF ARTILLERY.

The Artillery School of Practice at Fort Monroe, so long an object desired amongst the military men of the country, has been established, and bids fair to realize all the benefits to the service which its friends anticipated. It will give to the service, presently, a corps of officers and men certainly equal to those of any other service in the world. The officers, under whose charge it is at present, are thoroughly competent and fully imbued with an anxious desire for complete success in the school.

There is a small tract of land in the vicinity of the fort which ought to be purchased for the purpose of giving a sufficient range for practice with heavy guns. With this land a large saving could be made by the recovery of balls used in practice in the course of time. The range without this land is inadequate to the wants of the service and the interests of the school. The reports upon this point, to which I

refer, will give in detail the particulars upon which this recommendation is predicated.

INSPECTOR GENERAL.

The duties of inspector general are among the most useful and important of any pertaining to the service. Through these officers all abuses and defects of the service are ascertained and made known to the department, and from him that sort of information is derived which would, in fact, be impracticable through any other source.

Our immensely extended Territories render this sort of inspection of our numerous military posts and depots, a matter of vital importance, and it is quite impossible that those duties can be properly performed without the addition of another inspector general to the two already authorized by law. I therefore recommend that the appointment of an additional inspector general be authorized by law.

STAFF.

I call again your special attention to the recommendations I submitted in my report last year upon the subject of the staff. Another year's experience has convinced me more than ever of the great benefits which would flow from the adoption of the suggestions and recommendations therein set forth.

ENGINEERS.

There are two corps of engineers attached to the army, designated as Engineers, and Topographical Engineers. This division of corps was accidental somewhat at first, and has been persisted in from mere habit. In my judgment it is useless and uncalled for, and ought at once to be abolished.

The present arrangement is founded in no good reason whatever, and is productive of no benefit to the service, whilst it entails a considerable expense upon the department, altogether useless and unnecessary. It is derogating nothing from the Corps of Engineers to say that the Topographical corps is quite their equal. By this proposed union of the corps, it would always furnish a sufficient number of this staff to accompany troops in the field. This, in turn would tend to the reformation of what is growing into an abuse—the absence of so many staff officers from all service with troops in the field.

Nothing, in my judgment, would result in greater benefit to the service, than to require all staff officers, from the heads of bureaus down to the youngest brevet second lieutenant, to serve periodically with troops in the field. Any officer who remains for many years absent from duty in the field, comes to have very faint perceptions of what is useful and necessary for troops in actual service in the field. He can only know what is needful through information derived from others. It is obvious, then, that those best informed, should be the ones entrusted with the staff duties.

BRIGADIER GENERALS.

Wherever two regiments are brought together in a brigade, a general of brigade should be in commission to command it. If our whole army were now organized for the field, we should need nine generals of brigade; and in the necessary arrangements of peace, the three in commission are not sufficient to command on the frontiers and in the military departments. These brigade commands, therefore, in our army are generally devolved on the senior regimental officer, who is thereby withdrawn from the proper duties of his own appointment and commission. But as regimental officers are not, by right of seniority, to be commissioned generals, neither ought they, by such rule, to exercise the functions of generals. In all armies generals are selected for commands by government. A sufficient number should always be in commission for that purpose not attached by law or their commissions to specified commands as regimental officers are. The assignment of brevet officers to brevet commands does not always serve the purpose, and where it does, it is only by conferring two commissions and two offices on one officer who can only discharge the duties of one; the expense to government is the same whether the officer exercises command by a brevet or by a proper commission. There is a great need of three additional brigadier generals to those now in commission, and I recommend their appointment.

WASHINGTON ARSENAL.

The grounds heretofore purchased for extending the accommodations of the Washington Arsenal, have been delivered to the government and are enclosed with a slight temporary fence. Suitable buildings for more extensive operations at this place ought to be erected, and it is proper that the plans should be at once adopted which could be gradually completed in the progress of time. Some of the workshops now in use there were erected upon ground reclaimed from the water and are very unsubstantial. The walls are giving way and the roofs are sustained in places with props. These buildings are insecure and will become dangerous.

The reports of the Engineer will exhibit the state of things at the Military Academy, and in relation to other matters especially under the charge of that bureau.

The report of the officer in charge of the Capitol extension and Post Office, will give a detailed statement of the progress of the work for the last year.

The reports from the different bureaus and officers in charge of particular works, are referred to as calculated to give full information upon the respective subjects embraced in them.

VOLUNTEERS.

I call your particular attention to the necessity of providing, by law, for payment of the claims brought against the government by

different States and Territories, for services heretofore rendered by volunteer forces in suppressing Indian hostilities. These claims are numerous, and amount in the aggregate to a very large sum. Where they are just, every principle of equity and fairness requires their payment. If any should prove, upon strict examination, to be without foundation, to pronounce this judgment promptly, and settle the question definitely, would bring relief to those presenting the claims, and to this it would seem they are at least entitled.

EXPENDITURES OF THE ARMY.

I desire to call particular attention to the subject of army expenditures. I think there is some misapprehension in the public mind upon this point, which can be removed by a succinct statement of facts.

The disbursement of money through the War Department embraces many subjects entirely disconnected with the army proper, but all of which is in general apprehension ascribed wholly to the army. All work done upon fortifications along the sea coast, in which many millions are spent, has in fact no more to do with the operations of the army than the ships-of-war which are built at the navy yards. Nor has the army, as such, any thing to do with the expenditures of money annually appropriated for rivers and harbors; so too of the buildings and works of a public character put in charge of army officers for construction. It is certainly not just to charge to the army the millions spent upon the aqueduct for bringing water into the city of Washington, when in all probability not one platoon of soldiers will ever, in the course of any one year, be solaced with a drink of water from those capacious fountains.

The fair and legitimate expenses of the army are embraced within comparatively a few items. The pay of the officers and men is regulated by law; not one dollar more or less can be expended upon that object. So too with their rations and clothing. Nothing would be easier, and nothing in the future would be more certain, than to estimate exactly what would be the cost to the country of maintaining our whole army, or any portion of it, at any fixed and permanent post for a year. But when the movements of troops depend upon the uncertain temper and disposition of savages upon a frontier line of more than four thousand miles in extent, some latitude must be allowed in calculating the probable cost of making such movements as those precarious contingencies may necessitate. The season of the year and the locality where the marches are to take place enter materially into the computation of expenses, all of which is too obvious to require any illustration. So much for the general proposition about army expenditures. I have attempted as far as possible to meet your just wishes in reducing the expenditures of the army, and the estimates of the next fiscal year are less than the appropriations of the last by the sum of \$9,160,488 32. They are less than the estimates laid before you at the last session of Congress by the sum of \$2,735,408 55. They amount in the aggregate to \$18,010,090 28, and I entertain a strong hope that the expenditures may be still further reduced in the course of another year.

It affords me pleasure to say that notwithstanding the Indian wars in Washington, New Mexico, and Texas, all of which were unforeseen and unexpected, still, unless there shall be further and larger demands for expenditures in suppressing other Indian hostilities, additional to those already incurred in Washington Territory, New Mexico, and Texas, there will be no necessity for asking appropriations in the shape of a deficiency bill.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD,

Secretary of War.

The PRESIDENT of the United States.

List of documents accompanying the Report of the Secretary of War.

- I. General orders No. 22, from army headquarters, respecting combats with Indians.
- II. Affairs in Utah.
- III. Affairs in the department of Florida.
- IV. Affairs in the department of Texas.
- V. Affairs in the department of New Mexico.
- VI. Affairs in the department of the Pacific.
- VII. Indian disturbances near Fort Arbuckle.
- VIII. Colonel Sumner's report of his expedition on the plains.
- IX. Colonel Smith's report of his expedition to the Red River of the North.
- X. Mr. De Leon to the Secretary of War, May 6, 1858, enclosing a treatise on dromedaries.
- XI. Major Ramsay to the Secretary of War, respecting the condition of the workshops at Washington arsenal.
- XII. Memoir on the dangers and defences of New York, by Lieutenant Morton.
- XIII. Report from the Office of Explorations and Surveys.
- XIV. Report on the Capitol extension, new dome, and Post Office extension.
- XV. Report of the Commanding General.
- XVI. Statements from the Adjutant General.
- XVII. Report of the Commissioners of the Military Asylum.
- XVIII. Report of the Quartermaster General.
- XIX. Report of the Commissary General.
- XX. Report of the Paymaster General.
- XXI. Report of the Surgeon General.
- XXII. Reports from the Engineer department.
- XXIII. Report of the Chief Topographical Engineer.
- XXIV. Report of the Chief of Ordnance.
- XXV. Map showing lines of march passed over by troops during the year ending June 30, 1858.

I.

GENERAL ORDERS No 22.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
New York, November 10, 1858.

The following combats with hostile Indians—in which the conduct of the troops, including volunteers and *employés* in the United States military service, is deserving of high praise for gallantry and hardships—have occurred, or been brought to the notice of the General-in-Chief, since the publication of General Order No. 14, of 1857, viz:

I. *May 24, 1857.*—The northern column of the Gila expedition, commanded by Colonel W. W. Loring, mounted riflemen—having under him company I and detachments from companies C and D, mounted riflemen: company B and a detachment from company E, 3d infantry; a band of friendly Navajo Indians, and Captain Manuel Charvez's company of spies and guides—after a march, by the main body, of twenty-four days from Albuquerque, New Mexico, and four from the depot on the Gila, overtook, in a most difficult pursuit over a broken and mountainous country, at the Cañon de los Muertos Carneros, in the Mogollon mountains, a band of the Mogollon Indians who had been committing depredations on the settlements of the upper Rio Grande. The result of the action which ensued was seven Indians killed, among whom was the notorious Mogollon chief, Cuchillo Negro, and two wounded. The families of the Indians were taken prisoners; their camp equipage captured, and a flock of about a thousand sheep and a small herd of cattle retaken.

The officers engaged under Colonel Loring were:

Medical staff.—Assistant Surgeon J. Letherman.

Mounted riflemen.—Brevet Captain J. P. Hatch, 1st Lieutenant G. W. Howland, 1st Lieutenant and Adjutant Roger Jones, and 2d Lieutenant C. H. McNally.

3d infantry.—Brevet Major O. L. Shepherd, 1st Lieutenant J. W. Alley, and 2d Lieutenant R. V. Bonneau, the latter commanding the Navajo Indians.

Company of spies and guides.—Captain Manuel Charvez.

II. *August 26, 1857.*—Captain W. H. Kendrick, Florida mounted volunteers, with twenty-five men, followed the trail of a party of Seminoles for two days, and came upon them in a thickly overgrown swamp near Lake Istokpogo, killing one warrior, and capturing a quantity of Indian property.

III. *October 29, 1857.*—2d Lieutenant C. Van Camp, 2d cavalry, with a few men of company D, of his regiment, from Camp Verde, Texas, after a vigorous pursuit of two days, overtook a small party of Comanches who had been depredating on the settlements, and after a hot chase of six miles over a country so broken and rocky that it disabled many of his horses, the sharp rocks tearing the shoes from their hoofs, wounded two Indians, and captured most of their property.

IV. *November 8, 1857.*—2d Lieutenant J. B. Witherell, 2d cavalry, with a small detachment from companies C and K, of his regiment, left the post of Fort Clark, Texas, in pursuit of a party of Comanche Indians who had the day before robbed the mail party of a number of mules. After a pursuit of four days he came upon the marauders at a place near seventy miles to the northwest of the head of the west branch of the Nueces. They had in their possession all the stolen animals, except one mule, which had been killed for food. After a short and severe contest the Indians were routed and fled, leaving one of their party dead, and all the animals and their own property behind.

Lieutenant Witherell was slightly, and privates Gehrung, of company C, and Charles Morris and Patrick Conneil, of company K, were severely wounded. In their flight the Indians had made their first march of ninety miles without stopping.

V. *November 21, 1857.*—Captain W. H. Cone, of the Florida mounted volunteers, with his own company and a detachment from his regiment, amounting in all to one hundred and fifteen men, whilst scouting on the west of Oke-loa-coochee, south of Fort Doane, Florida, surprised a party of the hostile Seminoles in the Big Cypress, killing one warrior, and capturing eighteen women and children and large quantities of their provisions.

VI. *November 28, 1857.*—Captain Parkhill, with 1st Lieutenant and Adjutant W. S. Harris, 1st Lieutenants DaCosta, and John Canova, and seventy-five men of Colonel S. St. George Rogers' regiment of Florida mounted volunteers, having landed from Chocolisko key, Florida, and penetrated the country to the north and west through swamps and thickets, discovered, on the third and fourth days of his search, a village and several fields belonging to the hostile Seminoles, and destroyed a large quantity of their supplies. Taking with him a few men for the purpose of completing the destruction of their hiding places, he was attacked whilst crossing a stream, bordered on each side by cypresses and thick undergrowth, by a party of Indians, who fled after the first fire. The loss of the enemy not known. Captain Parkhill was killed, and privates M. M. Mason, John A. Stevens, and Thomas Posey, of his company; privates A. McAlphin and O'Neil, of Captain Hardee's company severely though not dangerously wounded.

VII. *November 30, 1857.*—Captain W. Stevens, Florida mounted volunteers, with a detachment of ninety-one men of his own, Captains Stewart's and Harrington's companies, with Lieutenants Crews and Stevens, started in pursuit of a party of Seminole Indians who had a few days before killed thirty-six of his horses whilst out grazing near Depot No. 1, Florida. On the fourth day's pursuit he came upon the Indians, and, after the loss of one of his men, he succeeded, by a sagaciously planned and well executed ruse, in drawing them into an ambuscade, killing five, wounding two, and capturing their arms and ammunition.

In noticing the services in Florida, the occasion is taken to mention favorably those of Jacob E. Mickler, in charge of a party of *employés* of the quartermaster's department, who succeeded, on the 15th of

August, 1857, in capturing fifteen women and children near the Kismisee river.

VIII. *December 7, 1857.*—2d Lieutenant William Averell, with a detachment from company F, accompanied by 2d Lieutenant W. H. Jackson, all of the mounted riflemen, surprised a party of six Kiowa Indians, not far from Fort Craig, New Mexico, who had been killing the cattle and committing other depredations on the inhabitants. After capture, they succeeded in breaking loose from the guard and attempted their escape, but through the activity and energy of their captors not one of them succeeded. The chief was wounded and recaptured, and the others were killed.

1st Sergeant McQuaide and the guide, José Miguel Jaramillo, are specially commended by their commander.

IX. *December, 1857.*—Sergeant Brady, commanding an escort of twenty men of company F, mounted riflemen, attacked a party of between forty and fifty hostile Apaches near Fort Buchanan, New Mexico, killed four and wounded several.

X. *January 28, 1858.*—1st Sergeant W. McDonald, of company D, 2d cavalry, with fourteen men of that company, was sent out from Camp Verde, Texas, to pursue and chastise some Indians who had been committing depredations on the San Jeronimo river. After a rapid, but cautious, pursuit of four days he succeeded in surprising the party, and immediately charged upon them, killing two and recapturing the horses of which they had robbed the settlers. He had privates Stroacher and Hughes severely, and private Tanny slightly wounded. The sergeant speaks in commendation of hospital steward Arnold Stubb. Great praise is due to the guide, Polycarpio Rodrigues, for his untiring exertions and sagacity in the pursuit.

XI. *May 16, 1858.*—At To-hots-nim-me, Washington Territory, companies C, E and H, 1st dragoons, and E, 9th infantry—aggregate 159—were attacked and overpowered by some twelve hundred of the Spokane, Pelouse, Cœur d'Alene, Yakima, and other Indian tribes. This unequal contest, which did not result in our favor, nevertheless furnished many instances of personal bravery and heroism which must not be lost. It was, moreover, marked by the loss of the tried, gallant and distinguished Brevet Captain O. H. P. Taylor, and of that most gallant and promising young officer 2d Lieutenant Wm. Gaston, both of the 1st dragoons.

The following non-commissioned officers and privates are mentioned for their conspicuously gallant conduct:

Company C, 1st dragoons.—1st Sergeant J. A. Hall; bugler R. A. Magan; farrier E. R. Birch; privates R. S. Montague, Alfred Barnes killed; Victor C. DeMay mortally wounded, (since dead).

Company E, 1st dragoons.—1st Sergeant William C. Williams mortally wounded, since dead; private R. P. Kerse, "who, with a few others, gallantly defended the body of Brevet Captain Taylor (lying mortally wounded) when the Indians made a desperate charge to get possession of it."

Company H, 1st dragoons.—1st Sergeant Edward Ball, who displayed the greatest courage and determination throughout the action, and with a few men repulsed the attempt of a large number of Indians at

one of the most important points; privates Frances Poisell, who assisted in rescuing and bearing off Captain Taylor under a heavy fire from the enemy; C. H. Harnish and James Crozet, company H, 1st dragoons, (both killed).

In addition to those mentioned above, the following were wounded:

Company C, 1st dragoons.—Privates James Lynch and Henry Montreville

Company E, 1st dragoons.—James Kelly (severely,) William D. Micon, Harriet Sneckster (severely,) James Healy, Maurice Henley, Charles Hughes, and John Mitchell.

Company E, 9th infantry.—Privates Ormond W. Hammond (severely,) and John Klay and Gotlieb Berger (slightly.)

XII. *August 15, 1858.*—A party of fifteen mounted men, commanded by 2d Lieutenant Jesse K. Allen, 9th infantry, sent out by Major Garnett, of that regiment, from the Yakima expedition, surprised a camp of hostile Indians on the upper Yakima river, Washington Territory, capturing 21 men, about 50 women and children, 70 horses, 15 head of cattle, and a quantity of other Indian property.

The success was dearly bought, for the gallant young leader lost his life, and the service one of its most valuable, zealous, and faithful officers.

XIII. *August 29, 1858.*—Captain McLane, mounted riflemen, commanding twelve men of his regiment and a company of fifty-two New Mexican guides and spies, was attacked by a party of 300 Navajo Indians near Bear Spring, New Mexico. The Indians were repulsed with a loss of seven of their number killed—number of wounded not known.

In this most unequal contest, highly creditable to all engaged, Captain McLane was severely though not dangerously wounded. Captain McLane's report not having yet been received from department headquarters, it is regretted the names of others who undoubtedly distinguished themselves in this contest are not known to the General-in-Chief.

XIV. *September 1, 1858.*—The expedition under Colonel Wright, 9th infantry, composed of companies C, E, H and I, 1st dragoons; A, B, G, K and M, 3d artillery; and B and E, 9th infantry—aggregate five hundred and seventy—with a company of thirty Nez Percés Indians, marched from fort Walla-Walla, Oregon, on the 7th and 15th of August; crossed Snake river on the 25th and 26th; established a post at the crossing, which was left in charge of Bvt. Major Wyse and his company D, 3d artillery; and after a march of nearly a hundred miles mostly over a forbidding country, during which they were twice attacked, came upon a large body of united Spokane, Cœur d'Alene and Pelouse Indians, of which some four hundred were mounted.

After securing his baggage and supplies by leaving them under the guard of company M, 3d artillery, with a mountain howitzer and a detachment of fifty-four men, commanded by lieutenants H. G. Gibson, G. B. Dandy and Lyon, the whole under Captain Hardie, 3d artillery, Colonel Wright moved with the rest of his force against the Indians, who had taken possession of a high hill and an adjoining wood and awaited his attack. They were driven by the foot troops

from both their positions into the plain, and then charged and utterly routed by the dragoons, with a loss of some seventeen killed and many wounded.

The troops sustained no loss in either killed or wounded.

Colonel Wright mentions the following as entitled to credit for their coolness and gallantry :

Bvt. Major Grier, 1st dragoons ; Captain Keyes, 3d artillery ; Captain Dent, 9th infantry ; 1st Lieutenant Mullan, 2d artillery, acting as topographical engineer and commanding the friendly Nez Percés ; 1st Lieutenant P. A. Owen, 9th infantry, acting assistant adjutant general ; Captain Kirkham, assistant quartermaster ; and Assistant Surgeon J. F. Hammond, medical department.

The following are also mentioned as having been highly commended by their immediate commanders :

Medical Department.—Assistant Surgeon Randolph.

1st Dragoons.—Lieutenants Davidson, Pender, and 2d Lieut. Gregg.

1st Sergeant James A. Hall ; Sergeants Bernard Korton and Patrick Byrne ; bugler Robert A. Magan ; and privates James Kearney and Michael Meara, company C.

1st Sergeant C. Goetz ; Sergeant J. F. Maguire ; and privates J. G. Trimbell, J. Buckley, Wm. Ramage, and T. W. Smith, company E.

1st Sergeant E. Ball ; Sergeant M. M. Walker ; and bugler Jacob Muller, company H.

1st Sergeant W. H. Ingerton, and Sergeant William Davis, company I.

3d Artillery.—1st Lieutenants Tyler, White and Ihrie, and 2d Lieutenant Kip.

9th Infantry.—Captain Winder and Lieutenant Fleming.

Nez Percés.—Hutes-E-Mah-li-kan, Captain John, Edward, and Weash-not.

XV. *September 5 to 15.*—Colonel Wright, 9th infantry, after defeating the united hostile tribes at the Four Lakes, in Washington Territory, on the 1st, (as noticed above, par. XIV,) continued to advance in the Indian country with the same force, and on the 5th of September was again met by the Spokane, Pelouse, and Cœur d'Alene Indians, who had been joined by the Pend d'Oreilles.

After a continuous conflict of seven hours, over a distance of fourteen miles, and a fatiguing march, in all, of twenty-five, the Indians were completely routed, with the loss of two chiefs, two brothers of the Chief Garey, and many others of lesser note killed or wounded. The troops had but one man—name not given—wounded, and he but slightly.

Colonel Wright bears witness to the zeal, energy, perseverance and gallantry of his officers and men. He especially mentions the following :

Brevet Major Grier, 1st dragoons, commanding squadron ; Captain Keyes, 3d artillery, commanding artillery battalion, acting as infantry ; Captain Winder and Lieutenant Fleming, 9th infantry, detached to support the howitzer battery ; First Lieutenant and Adjutant Owen, 9th infantry, acting assistant adjutant general ; Captain Kirkham, assistant quartermaster ; Assistant Surgeons J. F. Hammond and J.

F. Randolph; and First Lieutenant J. Mullan, 2d artillery, acting as engineer officer and commanding the friendly Indians.

The following officers are spoken of in the highest terms by their several immediate commanders, viz :

1st dragoons.—Lieutenant Pender.

3d artillery.—Company K, Captain E. O. C. Ord and Lieutenant Morgan; company G, Captain J. A. Hardie and First Lieutenant Ransom; company M, 1st Lieutenant Gibson and 2d Lieutenant Dandy; company A, 1st Lieutenant Tyler and 2d Lieutenant Lyon.

First Lieutenant White, commanding howitzer battery, composed of a detachment from company D, 3d artillery, and Second Lieutenant Kip, adjutant of Keyes' battalion.

Captain Dent, 9th infantry, with his company B, and First Lieutenant Davidson, 1st dragoons, commanding company E, together with the friendly Nez Percés, guarded the train effectually.

After resting on the 6th, Colonel Wright continued his pursuit of the Indians through their country, arriving at the Cœur d'Alene Mission on the 15th of September. During this march he had a skirmish with the enemy on the 8th of September, took from them some 900 horses, a large number of cattle, with quantities of wheat, oats, roots, &c.; all of which were converted to the use of the troops or destroyed.

Those severe blows resulted in the unqualified submission of the Cœur d'Alenes, the dispersion of the other tribes, and it is not doubted, ere this, in the subjugation of the whole alliance.

Results so important, without the loss of a man or animal, gained over tribes brave, well armed, confident in themselves from a recent accidental success, and aided by the many difficulties presented by the country invaded, reflect high credit on all concerned.

Colonel Wright is much to be commended for the zeal, perseverance, and gallantry he has exhibited.

To Brigadier General Clarke, commanding the department of the Pacific, credit is primarily and eminently due for the sound judgment shown in planning and organizing the campaign, (including Major Garnett's simultaneous expedition,) as well as for his promptness and energy in gathering, from remote points in his extended command, the forces, supplies, &c., necessary for its successful prosecution. In this merited tribute to the General his staff is included.

XVI. *September 9 to 15, 1858.*—Lieutenant Colonel Miles, 3d infantry, with A, F, and I companies of mounted rifles; B and C companies, 3d infantry; and Captain Blas Lucero's company of New Mexican guides and spies—in all 309 rank and file—made an expedition from Fort Defiance, New Mexico, in pursuit of the hostile Navajoes, during which, with parts of his force, he had several skirmishes; the results were six Indians killed, one man and eight women and children made prisoners, and a few horses and between five and six thousand sheep captured.

Bugler Ezekiel Fisher, of I company, mounted riflemen, was killed, and the following were wounded :

Company A, mounted riflemen.—Sergeant James Watson slightly, and private Manus Sweeney mortally—since dead.

Company I, mounted riflemen.—Private G. Dunn.

Company C, 3d infantry.—Private William Mauk, slightly.

The following were the officers under Lieutenant Colonel Miles, and of whom he speaks in the highest terms:

Captain Elliott and Brevet Captain Hatch, 1st Lieutenant Lane, and 2d Lieutenant Averell, mounted riflemen; 1st Lieutenant Whipple, and 2d Lieutenants Walker and Hildt, 3d infantry; and Assistant Surgeon McKee, medical department; Captain Blas Lucero, of the guides and spies.

The guide and interpreter, Mr. Edward Martines, is highly commended for his valuable services.

XVII. *September 25, 1858.*—Brevet Captain J. P. Hatch, mounted riflemen, with company I, of his regiment, and company B, 3d infantry; the latter, under 1st Lieutenant Whipple, 3d infantry, marched from Fort Defiance, New Mexico, in the night of the 24th of September, for the purpose of surprising a party of the hostile Navajo Indians, under Sarcillo Largo, their principal chief.

After marching the greater part of the night, and finding that he would not be able to conceal his march if he confined himself to the step of his foot troops, Captain Hatch reluctantly, but judiciously, left them behind, and, with fifty-two men of company I, pushed on with as much rapidity and caution as possible to a point about nine miles beyond Laguna Negra, where, by taking advantage of the irregularities of the ground, he succeeded in surprising the Indians, and, after a short but sharp conflict, in completely routing them, with a loss of six of their number left dead on the field, and a large number of wounded; among the latter the principal chief, Sarcillo Largo, supposed mortally. Over fifty horses and a large quantity of other Indian property was captured or destroyed.

It is greatly to the credit of Captain Hatch that in this handsome affair, after a night march of twenty-five miles and the combat in the morning, he returned the same day to Fort Defiance with all of his command, and in as good order as when he started.

The captain gives great credit to his men, all of whom behaved with gallantry and coolness. He mentions, particularly, the excellent conduct of First Sergeant McGrath, of company I, mounted riflemen.

XVIII. *October 1, 1858.*—Near the Wichita village, Brevet Major Van Dorn, captain 2d cavalry, commanding A, F, H, and K companies of his regiment, after a forced march of ninety miles in thirty-six hours, came, a little after daylight, upon the camp of the hostile Comanches, consisting of one hundred and twenty lodges, and between four and five hundred Indians. He immediately charged upon it, and after a most desperate struggle of an hour and a half, during which there were many bloody hand-to-hand conflicts, achieved a most decisive and important victory.

Fifty-six Indians were left dead on the field; one hundred and twenty lodges were burned; over three hundred animals taken; a large quantity of supplies appropriated or destroyed; and the surviving Indians dispersed among the mountains in a destitute condition.

With this victory it is painful to record the death of 2d Lieutenant Cornelius Van Camp, 2d cavalry, an active young officer of exceeding

promise, once before named in this order for his gallantry, who was shot through the heart with an arrow while charging the enemy.

Sergeant J. E. Garrison, of company F; privates Peter Magar and Jacob Echard, of company H, were also killed. Private Henry Howard, of that company, missing, supposed to have been killed.

The following were wounded:

Company A.—Brevet Major Van Dorn severely, four wounds; Corporal Joseph P. Taylor dangerously.

Company H.—Private C. C. Alexander severely; Sergeant C. B. McClellan, Corporal Bishop Gordon, and bugler M. Aborgast, slightly.

Company F.—Privates C. C. Emery and A. J. McNamara severely, and W. Frank slightly.

Company K.—Private Smith Hinckley slightly.

The sutler, Mr. J. F. Ward, was slightly, and the special agent in charge of the friendly Indians, Mr. S. Ross, was severely wounded. They had volunteered for the expedition, and are deserving of great praise for their gallantry in the action.

During the combat, Captain N. G. Evans, 2d Lieutenants Harrison and Phifer, each killed two, and Lieutenant Major killed three Indians in hand-to-hand encounters.

The other officers who were under Major Van Dorn are Captains Whiting and Johnson, 2d Lieutenant Porter, and acting Assistant Surgeon Carswell, all of whom, together with the non-commissioned officers and privates of companies A, F, H, and K, 2d cavalry, are entitled to great commendation for their gallantry.

The friendly Indians—Delawares, Caddoes, &c.—under Mr. Ross, rendered essential service both before and during the conflict.

XIX. Corrections and additions to the notices of combats in General Orders No. 14, of 1857.

Par. II. From the want of detailed information, since supplied, there were omitted the names of several officers of the expedition whose conduct was highly commended by their immediate commander, Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan, 4th infantry.

The following is a corrected list of the officers engaged, as supplied by him:

Medical staff.—Assistant Surgeons C. H. Crane, J. J. Milhau, in the field, and Assistant Surgeon R. Glisan, in the general hospital.

1st dragoons.—Captain A. J. Smith and 1st Lieutenant N. B. Sweitzer.

3d artillery.—Captain E. O. C. Ord; Brevet Major J. F. Reynolds; 2d Lieutenant (since 1st) J. G. Chandler, acting assistant adjutant general; 2d Lieutenant (since 1st) G. P. Ihrie, acting assistant quartermaster and assistant commissary of subsistence to the troops in the field; and 2d Lieutenant (since 1st) J. Drysdale.

4th infantry.—Captains C. C. Augur, DeL. Floyd Jones, and 1st Lieutenant R. Macfeely, acting assistant quartermaster and commissary of subsistence at the depot.

Lieutenant Colonel Buchanan also notices, especially, the non-commissioned officers by companies, their names omitted, and acknowledges the valuable services of Joel Palmer, esq., superintendent

of Indian affairs, and of Messieurs Olney and Wright, of the Indian department, and of acting Assistant Surgeon Hillman.

Sergeant Smith, of B company, 3d artillery; privates Garry and Kennedy, company E, 4th infantry, mentioned by name as wounded, the former mortally.

Par. VIII. Colonel G. Wright, 9th infantry, should have been announced as the commander of the force which repulsed the attack of the Indians at the Cascades, Washington Territory, on the 27th and 28th of March, 1856—incorrectly stated (from a report of the department commander) to have occurred on the 28th of April.

In this attack private Thomas McGrath, of company E, 9th infantry, and private Thomas S. Barton were killed, and private Martin Welsh wounded.

Par. XX. Same order of 1857, among those to whom "great credit had been given by their commanders" the names of 1st Lieutenant T. K. Jackson and 2d Lieutenant J. R. Cooke, 8th infantry, were omitted.

Par. XXII. There was an omission to mention that 2d Lieutenant E. W. H. Read, 8th infantry, was of the detachment sent from Fort Lancaster against the Indians who attacked the mail escort.

By command of Brevet Lieutenant General Scott.

L. THOMAS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

II.

AFFAIRS IN UTAH.

- No. 1. Circular from Army Headquarters, January 18, 1858.
- No. 2. General-in-Chief to Colonel Johnston, January 23.
- No. 3. Same to General Garland, January 23.
- No. 4. Same to Colonel Johnston, February 4.
- No. 5. Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters, January 4, enclosing letters from Major Lynde, December 2, and Colonel Cooke, December 31, 1857, and Major Lynde, January 4, 1858.
- No. 6. General-in-Chief to General Garland, March 1.
- No. 7. Same to Adjutant General, March 1.
- No. 8. Colonel Hoffman to Army Headquarters, February 27.
- No. 9. Captain Marcy to Adjutant General, January 2.
- No. 10. Same to Army Headquarters, January 23.
- No. 11. Colonel Johnston to Department of New Mexico, January 10.
- No. 12. Major Porter to Captain Marcy, January 11.
- No. 13. Same to Colonel Bee, January 12.
- No. 14. Same to Colonel Alexander, January 12.
- No. 15. Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters, January 20, enclosing letters to Captain Reno, January 16, and from Lieutenant Burns, January 19.

- No. 16. Same to same, February 5, enclosing letters from Major Lynde, December 24, 1857, with enclosures; and to same, February 2, 1858.
- No. 17. Same to same, February 13.
- No. 18. Same to same, March 10, enclosing letters to Colonel Cooke, Major Sibley, Colonel Bee, and Captain Hawes, March 2, to 10; from Major Lynde, February 23 and 24; and to same, March 10.
- No. 19. Same to same, March 24.
- No. 20. General-in-Chief to Adjutant General, April 2.
- No. 21. Same to Colonel Johnston, April 2.
- No. 22. Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters, April 17, enclosing letter from Mr. Ficklin, April 15.
- No. 23. Same to same, April 22, enclosing letter from Governor Cumming, April 15, with enclosures; his reply, April 21, with enclosures and extracts from "Deseret News."
- No. 24. Brigham Young to Colonel Kane, March 9.
- No. 25. Colonel Johnston to Colonel Kane, March 15.
- No. 26. Colonel Kane to Colonel Johnston, March 14.
- No. 27. Same to same, March 15.
- No. 28. Colonel Johnston to Colonel Kane, March 15.
- No. 29. Colonel Kane to Colonel Johnston, March 16.
- No. 30. Brigham Young to Governor Cumming, April 16.
- No. 31. Governor Cumming to Mr. Cass, May 2.
- No. 32. Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters, May 7, enclosing letter from Governor Cumming, May 3, and reply, May 6.
- No. 33. Governor Cumming to Mr. Cass, May, 12.
- No. 34. Copy of Mormon pass, May 13.
- No. 35. General Johnston to Army Headquarters, May 21, enclosing subsistence orders, May 19; letter from Governor Cumming, May 21; and reply, same date.
- No. 36. Major Porter to Colonel Hoffman, May 22.
- No. 37. Governor Cumming to General Johnston, May 25.
- No. 38. General Johnston to Governor Cumming, May 26.
- No. 39. Major Buell to Colonel Andrews, April 27.
- No. 40. General Harney to Army Headquarters, May 27.
- No. 41. General-in-Chief to Captain Marcy, May 29.
- No. 42. General Johnston to Army Headquarters, June 4, enclosing letter from Colonel Loring, May 27.
- No. 43. Same to same, June 11, enclosing letters from Captain Marcy, June 10, and to Colonel Andrews, June 11.
- No. 44. Colonel Loring to the Adjutant General, June 12.
- No. 45. Proclamation of Governor Cumming, June 14.
- No. 46. Governor Cumming to General Johnston, June 15.
- No. 47. General Johnston to Governor Cumming, June 16.
- No. 48. Governor Cumming to General Johnston, June 17.
- No. 49. General Johnston to Governor Cumming, June 19.
- No. 50. Same to Army Headquarters, June 16, enclosing letter from Messrs. Powell and McCulloch, June 12; his reply, June 14, and proclamation same date.
- No. 51. Same to same, June 28.

- No. 52. Same to same, July 8.
- No. 53. Same to same, July 22.
- No. 54. Same to same, July 29, enclosing letter from Father Hoecken, June 17.
- No. 55. General Harney to Army Headquarters, July 15.
- No. 56. Same to same, August 3.
- No. 57. General Johnston to Army Headquarters, August 5.
- No. 58. Major Porter to Agent Hurt, August 6, enclosing letter from Colonel Hoffman, July 29, and reply, August 4.
- No. 59. Major Porter to Colonel Andrews, August 19, enclosing instructions to same, August 2, 5, 10, and 14.
- No. 60. Governor Cumming to General Johnston, August 30, enclosing affidavit of Mr. Mayfield.
- No. 61. General Johnston to Governor Cumming, September 1.
- No. 62. Major Porter to Captain Hawes, September 2.
- No. 63. Same to Captain Simpson, August 24.
- No. 64. Captain Simpson to Major Porter, September 3.
- No. 65. Major Paul to Major Porter, September 22.
- No. 66. Major Whiting to Major Porter, September 22.
- No. 67. Captain Simpson to Major Porter, September 30.
- No. 68. Governor Cumming to General Johnston, September 25.
- No. 69. Same to Agent Hurt, September 25.
- No. 70. Major Paul to Utah Headquarters, October 3, with enclosure from Agent Hurt, same date.
- No. 71. Major Porter to Colonel Morrison, October 4.
- No. 72. Same to Major Paul, October 4.
- No. 73. Governor Cumming to General Johnston, October 4.
- No. 74. General Johnston to Governor Cumming, October 5.
- No. 75. Major Porter to Colonel Morrison, October 5.
- No. 76. General Johnston to Army Headquarters, October 12.
- No. 77. Major Paul to Utah Headquarters, October 17, with enclosure from Agent Hurt, October 14.
- No. 78. Secretary of War to Messrs. Powell and McCulloch, April 12, enclosing letters from Mr. Buchanan to Colonel Kane, December 31, 1857, and certificate of office.
- No. 79. Messrs. Powell and McCulloch to Secretary of War, April 25.
- No. 80. Same to same, May 3.
- No. 81. Same to same, June 1.
- No. 82. Same to same, June 12.
- No. 83. Same to same, June 26.
- No. 84. Same to same, July 3.
- No. 85. Same to same, August 24.
- No. 86. Colonel Hoffman to Army Headquarters, June 10.
- No. 87. Colonel Loring to Army Headquarters, June 11.
- No. 88. Captain Marcy to Major Porter, June 12.
- No. 89. Captain Newton to Major Porter, July 17.
- No. 90. Colonel Andrews to the Adjutant General, July 11, enclosing report from Lieutenant Bryan.
- No. 91. Same to same, August 5, enclosing reports from Lieutenant Bryan, July 19 and 22.
- No. 92. Captain Marcy to Secretary of War, November 25.

No. 1.—Circular from Army Headquarters.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
January 11, 1858.

The General-in-Chief, with the sanction of the War Department, issues the following instructions to be promptly executed by the chiefs of the respective staffs departments, in connexion with General Orders No. 1, of the 8th instant:

1. According to said order, the troops to be put in march this spring to reinforce the army of Utah from Fort Leavenworth, &c., filled up to the maximum standard, will be as follows:

	Officers.	Men.	Aggregate.
1st cavalry	35	855	890
2 companies 2d dragoons	6	170	176
2 light companies 2d artillery	8	172	180
6th infantry (7 companies)	25	592	617
6th infantry (1 company at Fort Kearney)	3	84	87
6th infantry (2 companies at Fort Laramie)	6	168	174
7th infantry (8 companies)	28	676	704
7th infantry (2 companies at Fort Laramie)	6	168	174
Staff officers	16	-----	16
Total	133	2,885	3,018

2. The force now in Utah under Colonel Johnston, (eight companies 2d dragoons, 5th and 10th infantry, Phelps' light battery, 4th artillery, and Reno's heavy battery,) if up to the maximum standard, would amount to 118 officers, 2,470 men—2,588 aggregate. It is estimated that these troops require 850 recruits, which number will be put at Fort Leavenworth to accompany the reinforcement, with 44 officers.

3. The entire force to be provided for on the march is 177 officers, 3,735 men—aggregate, 3,912. The whole army of Utah, (reinforcement included,) to be supplied with subsistence, is 251 officers, 5,335 men—5,606 aggregate.

4. All disposable recruits will be put in march for Fort Leavenworth as early in the spring as practicable. The number required for the 7th infantry can be sent to Jefferson Barracks from the nearer rendezvous.

5. The troops to march from the points indicated must be supplied with three months' subsistence for consumption on the route, and one year's supply for the entire army of Utah will be sent with them. A reserve supply of eight months to be thrown forward to Fort Laramie before the setting in of winter. Three days' bacon and four days' fresh beef in the week will be issued. Beef cattle to be sent on the hoof. In addition to the ordinary ration, there will be allowed two extra rations per week of tea and sugar, and two of desiccated vegetables.

6. The eight companies of 7th infantry will halt at Jefferson Barracks only a sufficient time to receive recruits and equipments, and then proceed to Fort Leavenworth for transportation and subsistence.

7. A full complement of disbursing and medical officers will be immediately designated by the chiefs of the respective departments concerned, the senior in each case to be an officer of rank and experience, and also an officer of ordnance and two of topographical engineers.

8. Besides the necessary trains and supplies, the quartermaster's department will procure fifty tents of Sibley's pattern; also such number of storage tents as may be necessary.

9. The surgeon general will provide the necessary medical supplies.

10. The colonel of ordnance will furnish such ordnance stores, including travelling forges, as may be necessary.

11. The 1st cavalry and the two companies 2d dragoons, in Kansas, will be supplied with horses and equipments for the full organization.

12. Requisitions for transportation will be made as early as possible, to enable the quartermaster general to comply therewith in season.

By command of Brevet Lieutenant General Scott.

L. THOMAS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 2.—*General-in-Chief to Colonel Johnston.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, January 23, 1858.

SIR: The General-in-Chief directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches, with copies of orders, &c., to November 30, 1857, inclusive, and to add, in his name, as follows:

Your conduct in command, as set forth in the reports, meets with full and hearty approval, united with sympathy for those difficulties which you have so manfully conquered, and which it is clearly perceived no act or omission of yours had any part in creating. The General-in-Chief desires likewise to tender, through you, to the officers and men of your expedition the expression of his high appreciation of the noble energy, patience, and spirit which they have displayed. The achievement of Colonel Cooke in bringing up his regiment to join you, in such comparatively good condition, at so late a season, appears specially worthy of commendation.

In this tribute to yourself and to the troops the War Department cordially concurs.

The Adjutant General will communicate to you the formal approval by the War Department of your orders to Captain Marcy for purchase of animals, &c., and also of your mustering volunteers into the service.

General Garland will be instructed to afford the aid and support asked for in your letter to him of November 25, 1857, including a return escort for Captain Marcy's expedition. He will be directed to furnish, from the regiment of mounted riflemen, for this purpose, a force not exceeding four companies.

Ample measures are in progress for your reinforcement at the earliest possible period of the spring.

The General-in-Chief himself will set sail for the Pacific coast, in the steamer of the 5th proximo, clothed with full powers for an effective diversion or co-operation in your favor from that quarter. It is not desired, however, that this information shall modify the instructions heretofore given you in any degree, or delay your movements.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE W. LAY,
Lieutenant Colonel, Aid-de-Camp.

Colonel A. S. JOHNSTON,
2d Cavalry, Commanding Army of Utah.

No 3.—*General-in-Chief to General Garland.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, January 23, 1858.

SIR: The General-in-Chief has received from Colonel Johnston, commanding the army of Utah, a copy of that officer's letter to you of November 25, 1857. The request therein conveyed to you for aid and support to Captain Marcy, in carrying out the purpose of his expedition, is approved, and you are desired to lend the assistance asked for as far as within your power.

The General-in-Chief directs that you furnish from the regiment of mounted riflemen, as a return escort for Captain Marcy, four companies, if so large a force be desired and can be afforded.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE W. LAY,
Lieutenant Colonel, Aid-de-Camp.

Brevet Brig. Gen. JOHN GARLAND,
Commanding Department of New Mexico.

No. 4.—*General-in-Chief to Colonel Johnston.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
Washington, February 4, 1858.

SIR: I am desired by the General-in-Chief to inform you that it is no longer probable that he will go to the Pacific coast, or that any expedition against or towards Utah will be despatched from that quarter.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE W. LAY,
Lieutenant Colonel, Aid-de-Camp.

Colonel A. S. JOHNSTON,
Commanding Department of Utah.

No. 5.—*Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, January 4, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor herewith to transmit a return of the troops in the field in this department, under my immediate command, for the month of December, 1857.

Not an incident of any military importance has transpired since my last communication, and I have the pleasure to acquaint you with the excellent condition and fine health of the troops.

Accompanying this communication, I send a copy of a letter, dated 2d ultimo, at Fort Laramie, from the commander, Major Lynde. You will perceive, from a perusal of it, that there is serious cause to apprehend that there will be a great, if not an entire, deficiency of draught animals to bring on the three months' supply at that post intended for the army of Utah, and due here by the 1st of June, though it is expected that the rations on hand will last some ten or fifteen days beyond that date.

It is desirable that those supplies should reach here by the 15th of May, to enable the army, if then prepared in other respects, to advance with a good supply of provisions on hand, at least enough to last until the annual supply can reach the main body.

I will order Major Lynde to report directly to general headquarters, by this express, what proportion of the draught oxen of Russell & Co. (contractors) can be relied upon for the transportation of supplies to us in the spring; and should there be a deficiency, it can only be supplied *in time* from Fort Leavenworth in this way, and there must be activity in the agents of the quartermaster's department to accomplish it. The requisite number of mules (not two-year old or three) must be purchased and sent forward as soon in the month of March as possible. Each team of six mules should haul the subsistence from Leavenworth necessary to sustain it and two other mules, (to Laramie,) which latter will be useful to replace sick or tired mules. At Laramie, on their arrival, they will have exhausted their forage, but it is hoped some may be had there; if not, that the grass will then be sufficient to sustain draught animals for short marches through to this place or to headquarters. And I recommend, not for this service only, but whenever public teams are sent out to the frontier, that at least two extra mules shall be sent with each team. With such means of relief to lame, sick, or tired mules, many valuable animals can be preserved for the public service which, without a provision of this kind, would be lost.

The greater number of soldiers now on the sick report have been rendered unfit for duty by "frost bite," a source of suffering to which those who, in this climate, have no other covering for the feet than leather shoes, are very liable when on guard or marching in snow. I have thought that, in view of preserving the efficiency of the soldiery during the winter months, as well as to prevent much suffering, that the government ought to provide a pair of buffalo overshoes for

each man serving in this climate, and have accordingly approved of the admission of that item in the annual estimate of the chief quartermaster, and also of a full allowance of Sibley tents, as a means of protection to the troops against the inclemency of the winter season, and of health and comparative comfort. The Sibley tent is a good substitute for a hut, with the advantage of using it in localities well sheltered from cold and prevailing winds.

Herewith I send you a drawing of the field-works thrown up, under the direction of Lieutenants Webb and Kensil, for the protection of the depot at Bridger's Fort. The zeal, perseverance, and skill displayed by them in the execution of the works, under unfavorable circumstances, and the cheerful alacrity of the non-commissioned officers, and men under them, in the performance of their duties during severely cold weather, is worthy of much praise.

I have just learned that a soldier who was then acting as hospital steward of the 10th infantry, and was taken prisoner by the Mormons early in October, and who has been released and permitted to return to this camp, has brought the information that the Mormons are organizing a force to "stampede" or capture the horses and mules it is expected Captain Marcy will bring out in the spring from New Mexico.

I have already requested that an escort may be sent with Captain Marcy, but the amount of force will be best determined by the knowledge that an attack may be expected; and I deem it of the greatest consequence, as regards the mobility of this force, that a sufficient force should be sent with Captain Marcy to enable him to reach here unmolested. He will probably leave New Mexico by the 20th March, and I have to request that the General-in-Chief will at once authorize the commander of the department of New Mexico to send a force with Captain Marcy to cover his movement. And I have also respectfully to request the attention of the commanding general to the great length of the line of communication of this army, and to the necessity of providing means of defending the supplies which must be sent forward in early spring, as well as during the summer, on the route, more especially that portion liable to be attacked by the Mormons. I have ordered that three of the companies at Fort Laramie shall constitute the convoy, (to the trains which must leave in March;) but this amount of force I deem insufficient, and recommend that four companies of cavalry or *other mounted* force be added to the force intended to protect the trains. It is four hundred miles to Laramie from this place—too great a distance to detach any part of this mounted force with any reasonable expectation, in its present condition, that it could even reach Laramie. It would, besides, be improper to divide the force here.

I have not yet received the first line from general headquarters, or from the War Department, and would respectfully suggest that, when any communications are sent, the commanding officer at Fort Leavenworth be instructed to send them forward by two or three persons accustomed to frontier life in a cold climate, with authority to obtain facilities at Kearney and Laramie, if needed; and to get a

letter to the commander of New Mexico, the same means must be employed. No reliance can be placed on the mails, and no large party will probably get through.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d Cavalry, Commanding.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT LARAMIE, N. T.,
December 2, 1857.

SIR: The express that left the headquarters "army of Utah" on the 15th of November arrived here on the 29th. By it I received an order to send a train of pack mules; and, in obedience to that order, a train of thirty mules, loaded with thirty hundred pounds of salt, will start from this post to-morrow for that headquarters. The salt sent is taken from a supply received for this post a few days since, not another pound except this supply being on hand here; there is, however, sufficient, and some more to spare. All the mules at this post have been left here by different trains in passing and in bad condition, and consequently those sent are not in as good condition as I could wish. After those thirty mules, with the additional number required to carry rations, &c., have left, there will be but few serviceable mules left at the post. Of the trains expected here with forage, but one has arrived, and Colonel Cooke took a large share of that. One train is at Ash Hollow, and two at O'Fallen's Bluffs, and their cattle are so much broken down that they will not attempt to come further this winter. We shall be out of forage long before spring, and will not be able to recruit our broken-down mules, though I hope to keep most of them alive till the grass starts in the spring. All the ox trains in the country are much broken down, and but few can be hired, and it is as much as we can do to supply the post with wood from day to day; I fear that but few ox teams can be started from this post at an early day in spring. I have not yet sent the ambulances ordered to be sent to Fort Kearney, as I supposed this pack train of more importance; but as soon as it is off I shall send them if I can find mules that I think can carry them through.

Colonel Hoffman took the four best teams at the post, and his teams broke down before he reached Kearney. It is reported that the snow is two feet deep at Ash Hollow and below, though there is none here now.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. LYNDE,
Major 7th Inf'y, Commanding Post.

Chief of the ADJUTANT GENERAL'S DEPARTMENT,
Headquarters Army of Utah, en route to Salt Lake City.

HEADQUARTERS, SECOND DRAGOONS,
Camp on Henry's Fork, U. T., Dec. 31, 1857.

SIR: Finding there was too much snow in the great basin of the heads of this stream, I moved down six miles on the morning of the 27th instant. There was as much snow there as above; but the tall bottom grass being partly uncovered, I stopped the 28th to rest the animals, also to meet my provision train and issue twenty days' rations to the company, near that camp, in charge of the cattle, and also to another company which I determined to leave; deeming the squadron commanded by First Lieutenant Holliday sufficient protection at this season for that herd.

The 29th I continued my march accordingly with two squadrons, about eight miles to this place, "Burnt Fork," reported by the guides as the last resort on the river for such numerous herds.

I found little bottom and shelter here, and about three inches of snow; thus, with a storm of wind and slight snow showers, I was much discouraged.

The wind continued yesterday, but warm, with sunshine, and has taken off much of the snow; and, on examination of the vicinity, I conclude that, if the weather be not severe, we may do well here for six or eight weeks, depending chiefly on the hill grass.

At the last camp it was my opinion, and the general one, that the cattle were doing well there; and I directed Lieutenant Holliday, in case of more snow making it necessary, to consult with Simpson, in charge of cattle, and to move down. I was much surprised yesterday by Simpson's reporting he was on the way down. He saw at once it was no place for his cattle, and I directed him to return immediately to meet his herds, to graze them a short time along the narrow bottom of the stream, until he could return to the old place, where, doubtless, the snow is sensibly decreasing; he fully assented to the necessity and advantage of it; the squadron had remained above.

I enclose a field return for a month.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

P. ST. GEORGE COOKE,

Lieut. Col. 2d Dragoons.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Army of Utah, Camp Scott.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., January 4, 1858.

SIR: The colonel commanding wishes you, by the source you receive this, to forward to the headquarters of the army a report of the means of transportation at your post applicable for the command ordered to join this force, and also the condition of the contractors' animals, and ability to transport to this point in early spring the supplies at your post for this army. It is very desirable, if there is a deficiency, the fact shall be known, that, if practicable, the means may be supplied in proper time. A copy of your report he wishes forwarded to these headquarters at the earliest moment.

He also wishes you to bring into operation every resource within your reach to carry into effect the instructions given to you—instructions, the successful execution of which is of vital importance to this army. You are authorized to purchase horses or mules to enable you to accomplish it, and to mount a portion of the force to be employed as escort to the train and guard to the animals herding.

If you have not sent the ambulances to Fort Kearney, as directed, one only need be sent; and the colonel commanding leaves the time of sending it to your discretion, not wishing to cripple your powers in any degree, but to keep in view the main point, the early departure from your post of the supply trains for this point.

Direction was given you to send four mountain howitzers with the train. If you have not them, any other four light pieces will answer the purpose. The howitzers are preferred, as very light and easy to transport the ammunition.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER.

Major J. LYNDE,

7th Infantry, Commanding Fort Laramie, N. T.

No. 6.—*General-in-Chief to General Garland.*

[Per Telegraph.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
New York, March 1, 1858.

The commanding officer at Fort Leavenworth will send the following to General Garland, New Mexico, by express :

Colonel Johnston, commanding in Utah, reports the Mormons intend intercepting Captain Marcy on his return from New Mexico with the mules and horses he was ordered to obtain in your department. Notify the captain of this, and see that he is strongly escorted on his return march, and well provided with whatever he may require that you can spare.

By command of Brevet Lieutenant General Scott.

IRVIN McDOWELL,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Brig. General J. GARLAND,

Commanding Department of New Mexico,
Santa Fé, N. M.

By command of Brevet Lieutenant General Scott.

IRVIN McDOWELL,
Assistant Adjutant General.

The COMMANDING OFFICER,

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

NOTE.—To be delivered to the messenger from Fort Leavenworth, now at Boonville, Missouri, for the commanding officer of Fort Leavenworth, and message to be telegraphed back from Boonville.

J. McD.

No. 7.—*General-in-Chief to the Adjutant General.*HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
New York, March 1, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to forward herewith Colonel A. S. Johnston's letter of January 4, 1858, with enclosures.

The despatches from the army of Utah, brought by Mr. A. G. Brown, were made into packages, each tied with tape or strings. The upper communication in two of the bundles was addressed to me. The others to the Quartermaster General at Washington. On breaking the tapes it was seen that packages for Forts Laramie, Kearney, and Leavenworth, had been tied up with and under those for these headquarters.

Mr. Brown is not considered by the General-in-Chief accountable for this error. For this reason the letter of Colonel Johnston, of January 4, to Major Lynde, commanding at Fort Laramie, a copy of which is herewith, has not reached him, and of course the report therein required has not been made. Enough is known, however, from Major Lynde's letter of December 2, to leave no doubt as to the insufficiency of the present means at Fort Laramie for transporting the three months' supplies to Colonel Johnston's command. As it is a matter of absolute necessity that these supplies should reach him by the first of June, measures have been taken, as will be seen in Special Order No. 32, of yesterday, (sent by telegraph,) to send forward a mule train from Fort Leavenworth; and to insure it from being cut off, an addition has been made to the escort ordered from Fort Laramie by Colonel Johnston of two companies of cavalry and two of infantry.

General Garland has heretofore (January 23) been instructed to give an escort of four companies of mounted riflemen to Captain Marcy on his return.

See also copy of telegram to him of this date.

I have the honor to be, Colonel, very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

IRVIN McDOWELL,
*Assistant Adjutant General.*Colonel SAMUEL COOPER,
*Adjutant General of the Army, Washington, D. C.*No. 8.—*Col. Hoffman to Army Headquarters.*

[Per Telegraph.]

FORT LEAVENWORTH, *February 25, 1858.*
Via BOONVILLE, February 27.

A letter from Captain Dickinson, assistant quartermaster United States army at Colonel Johnston's headquarters, has been received by the quartermaster at this post, reporting that the contractors'

cattle at Fort Laramie will not be in a condition to take out the supply trains for the army of Utah, and he further writes that Colonel Johnston has requested that a mule train may be ordered from this post to take out those supplies. Shall I wait here to take out that train? One hundred and seventy-five wagons could be started from here about the 10th of March. It would carry forty-five days' rations for 2,000 men, besides rations and baggage for the escort of four companies.

Two companies of the sixth infantry could form the escort to Fort Laramie, to be joined by the two companies of the 6th now there, if so ordered. A messenger will take this despatch to Boonville, to be transmitted by telegraph, and await there for a reply.

W. HOFFMAN,

Major and Brevet Colonel 6th Infantry.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

United States Army, Headquarters Army.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

New York, March 1, 1858.

Official :

IRVIN McDOWELL,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 9.—*Captain Marcy to the Adjutant General.*

TAOS, NEW MEXICO,

January 2, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report, for your information, that I arrived at this place last evening, with an escort of thirty-nine enlisted men of the 5th and 10th regiments of infantry.

I have been ordered to New Mexico, from the headquarters of the army for Utah, to procure horses and mules, and expect to be able to set out on my return, with the animals required, early in March, so as to reach Camp Scott by the 1st of May.

I came directly across the mountains, through the "Kutch-e-tope Pass," to Fort Massachusetts, and for upwards of two hundred miles encountered deep snow. My men suffered much from the cold weather and storms and the severe labor required of them in breaking a track through the hard-packed snow.

One man (Serjeant William Morton, of the 10th infantry) died, and several others had their feet badly frozen upon the march. I shall take a different route in returning, crossing the mountains through "Bridger's Pass," near the sources of the North Platte river.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. MARCY,

Captain 5th Infantry.

Colonel S. COOPER,

Adjutant General, United States Army,

Washington, D. C.

No. 10.—*Captain Marcy to Army Headquarters.*TAOS, NEW MEXICO,
January 23, 1858.

SIR: In compliance with instructions from the colonel commanding, I have the honor to report that I arrived at this place last evening, from the headquarters of the army for Utah, having been fifty-seven days *en route*.

My track lies directly across the Uinta mountains, crossing Green river at the confluence of Henry's Fork and Grand river, near the junction of the Bunkasa and Emconipaligra, thence through the Couchetopa Pass, in the Rocky mountain chain, to Fort Massachusetts.

For two hundred miles I encountered from two to five feet of snow, requiring great labor on the part of the escort to break a trail for the animals, and for several days I only marched about three miles per day. In consequence of this, my rations were consumed ten days before I reached the valley of the Rio del Norte, and it became necessary to subsist my command upon mules that became exhausted and could perform no further labor.

One of my men, Serjeant William Morton, of the 10th infantry, (a most excellent soldier,) died from exposure and imprudence in eating. The remainder of the escort—thirty-nine men—came through, several having their feet badly frozen.

I have been ordered to New Mexico to procure animals for the use of the army for Utah, and, from the best information I have been able to obtain, I have much confidence in being able to purchase the number required.

I expect to set out on my return early in March, and to reach Fort Bridger by the last of April.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. MARCY,
*Captain 5th Infantry.*Major J. McDOWELL,
Assistant Adjutant General,
*Headquarters United States Army, New York, N. Y.*No. 11.—*Colonel Johnston to Department of New Mexico.*HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, January 10, 1858.

SIR: On the 27th of November, 1857, Captain R. B. Marcy, 5th infantry, was sent, under orders from these headquarters, to New Mexico, to purchase a large number of draught animals for the quartermaster's department and a re-mount for the dragoons and batteries. I then, in a communication to the general commanding the department of New Mexico, asked that a squadron of mounted rifles, or such force as the general should consider suitable, to constitute a sufficient escort to insure the safety of the animals in charge of Captain

Marcy, might be sent with him on his return. Since then I have learned that the Mormons meditate an attack on Captain Marcy's party, for the purpose of capturing or dispersing the government animals, and are now organizing a force, probably two hundred men, for that object.

If this information be true, and I have no reason to doubt it, an additional force, to thwart the design of the Mormons and to secure the march of the party, on their return here, from molestation, is indispensable; and I have to request that the general will order an adequate force.

The general is already aware how important it is to the public interest that there should be no failure in the arrival of these horses and mules, and I feel sure he will give Captain Marcy every desirable facility.

The troops in this department are in excellent condition and in fine health.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d Cavalry, Commanding.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL.

Department of New Mexico, Santa Fé, New Mexico.

No. 12.—*Major Porter to Captain Marcy.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., January 11, 1858.

SIR: The colonel commanding directs me to write to you as follows:

The bearer conveys to the headquarters, department of New Mexico, the reliable information that the Mormons are organizing a force with the view of intercepting your return, and capturing or dispersing the animals in your charge; also an application to the commander of that department to render additional aid to that previously asked, from the troops under his command, to insure success to your mission. You will, therefore, in carrying out your instructions, inform him without reserve of your wants; and, anticipating open resistance or attack, accept all the aid in material and force he may tender and you deem necessary.

Since you left this camp nothing of importance has occurred in the command or in our relations to the inhabitants of Utah Territory, unless it is, if doubt existed, that they are now in open rebellion to the government of the United States, and the most active and energetic measures and the co-operation of all loyal agents are requisite to suppress it and maintain the honor of our country.

The command is in excellent health, and cheerfully anticipating the period of your arrival to enable it to execute the orders of government and resume a march the rigor of the climate alone has checked.

The colonel commanding expresses to you his wishes for yourself and the success of your mission, which will reflect honor on your energy and judgment and the endurance of your little band.

I am, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Captain RANDOLPH B. MARCY,
Fifth Infantry, Santa Fé, New Mexico.

No. 13.—*Major Porter to Colonel Bee.*

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., January 12, 1858.

SIR: The colonel commanding wishes a party of one officer, four non-commissioned officers, and twenty privates, prepared by an early hour to-morrow morning for a scout, supplied with provisions for five days in their haversacks, and such cooking utensils as are needed and can be carried on a short journey. He desires men to be selected who have buffalo shoes or moccasins, or who can procure them, and all precautions taken to secure against frost bite.

When the party is prepared you will direct the officer to proceed to a thorough examination of the upper parts of Black's Fork, both branches, searching for and capturing any parties that may be concealed on that stream or its vicinity, and ascertaining by late trails from this fork to the head of Smith's Forks, or to the main road to Salt Lake City, whether communication is carried on above us. Should any late trails be discovered, the colonel commanding wishes them pursued to ascertain their source and termination.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel B. E. BEE,
Commanding Volunteers, Camp Scott, U. T.

No. 14.—*Major Porter to Colonel Alexander.*

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, January 12, 1858.

SIR: The colonel commanding wishes a party of one officer, four non-commissioned officers, and twenty privates, prepared by an early hour to-morrow morning for a scout, supplied with provisions for five days in their haversacks, and such cooking utensils as are needed and can be carried on a short journey. He desires men to be selected

who have buffalo shoes or moccasins, or who can procure them, and all precautions taken to secure against frost bite.

When the party is prepared you will direct the officer to have a thorough examination of the upper parts of Smith's Fork, searching for and capturing any parties that may be concealed on that stream, or its vicinity, and ascertaining by late trails from that fork to the head of this or Henry's Fork, whether communication is carried on above us.

Should any late trails be discovered, the colonel commanding wishes them pursued to ascertain their source and termination.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Colonel A. B. ALEXANDER,
Commanding 10th Infantry, Camp Scott, Utah Territory.

No. 15.—*Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, January 20, 1858.

MAJOR: I have nothing material to report since my last communication. Accompanying that I sent a file of the "Deseret News," containing the message of Brigham Young to the legislature of Utah. You have in that message and the resolutions of the legislature a full confirmation of the charge of their disloyalty to the Union heretofore made against this people. My information respecting their conduct since is, that their troops are organized to resist the establishment of a territorial government by the United States, and, in furtherance of that object, they have erected works of defence in the mountain passes and near Salt Lake City. Knowing how repugnant it would be to the policy or interest of the government to do any act that would force these people into unpleasant relations with the federal government, I would, in conformity with the views also of the commanding general, on all proper occasions have manifested in my intercourse with them a spirit of conciliation, but I do not believe that such consideration for them would be properly appreciated now, or rather would be wrongly interpreted; and, in view of the treasonable temper and feeling now pervading the leaders and a greater portion of the Mormons, I think that neither the honor nor the dignity of the government will allow of the slightest concession being made to them.

They should be made to submit to the constitutional and legal demands of the government unconditionally. An adjustment of existing difficulties on any other basis would be nugatory.

Their threat to oppose the march of the troops in the spring will not have the slightest influence in delaying it; and if they desire to join issue, I believe it is for the interest of the government that they should have the opportunity.

On the 11th of this month I sent an express to Santa Fé to acquaint General Garland with the design of the Mormons to intercept the caballada it is expected Captain Marcy will bring on from New Mexico, and to ask additional force to his escort. I will also take other measures to thwart them. I send herewith a letter of Lieutenant Burns on the subject of a transportation corps. As a question of the highest interest to the government, in respect to the mobility of our troops and economy of administration of the business of the quartermaster's department, it eminently commends itself to the attention of the General-in-Chief. It is of great importance that such a corps, properly organized, should be created, and it is with the view of asking the consideration of the subject by the commanding general that I forward the letter of Lieutenant Burns, who has much experience as an assistant quartermaster.

To make effective the field battery in charge of Captain Reno, and to retain in service at this time a number of soldiers whose period of service is about to expire, I have authorized him to enlist as many of them as will enable him to work the guns. If this act is approved by the commanding general, I request that he will ask for it the sanction of the Secretary of War, who, under the authority of the law of the 18th June, 1846, can *fix* the number of the ordnance corps.

The winter is not so cold as was anticipated from the severity of the beginning, and the healthfulness of the climate at this season is unsurpassed; there are but very few soldiers sick from climatic causes. The weather is neither so cold nor stormy as often to prevent the daily instruction of the troops of the different arms of service.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

Colonel 2d Cavalry, Commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*

Headquarters of the Army, New York.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, January 16, 1858.

SIR: You are aware, from conversations with the colonel commanding, how anxious he is to have your battery in an effective condition for active service the ensuing spring. He now directs me to write you as follows:

Many enlisted men are now being discharged for expiration of service who will not re-enlist in their own corps, but who may probably be secured as laborers in the Ordnance department, with the view of manning and driving your battery till such time as their services can be dispensed with. The few ordnance men with you are designed for other and important duties connected with the department, and their time cannot be taken for instruction in the battery. The company of infantry manning the battery is too small for its service, and will be much smaller; moreover, every foot soldier with

the army of Utah will be needed in his legitimate sphere when the army resumes its march, while your teamster drivers will be employed elsewhere in the places of others made vacant by discharges.

Many of these discharged soldiers will be as effective cannoniers as can be procured, and the discharged dragoons will make good drivers; all supplying that confidence which, in the event of an action, cannot be reposed in the hired men of the army.

From these exigencies and the diminished and rapidly diminishing number of enlisted men of the army, the colonel commanding is desirous of securing the services of these men to government in the only available branch in which they are likely to take service, and he therefore authorizes you to enlist for the battery as many men, not exceeding 116, as can be obtained; to be rated as laborers, and to be enlisted for five years, or till such time as their services can be dispensed with.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Captain J. L. RENO,

Ordnance Department, Camp Scott, Utah Territory.

CAMP SCOTT, UTAH TERRITORY,

January 19, 1858.

SIR : I have the honor to submit for your attention some facts and circumstances which have been developed on the march from Fort Leavenworth to this point, and the deductions which I have drawn therefrom, resulting, I think, if prosecuted, to the benefit of the service.

The 5th infantry left Leavenworth with a train of over one hundred wagons and six mule teams, conducted by five wagon masters, four assistants, and about one hundred and sixty teamsters. These men were hastily collected together from all trades and occupations, and for some *ulterior* object agreed to serve as teamsters for the trip to Salt Lake City. Many, perhaps the majority, wished a passage to California; indeed, that inducement was held out to them in the public notices.

By far the greater number of these men drove team for the first time, and were required to break in young and wild mules, which resulted, in many cases, in broken limbs or dead animals.

Thus was turned over to me a green train, without any of the elements of discipline, knowledge, or experience necessary for a march of twelve hundred miles.

I commenced at once the instructions required to bring this incongruous mass into order, some discipline, and a system of mutual responsibility for the public property in their charge. I soon found that order was maintained only while restraints were imposed, and broke into confusion whenever removed; that discipline was to them

a word held in universal contempt, "only fit for a soldier;" that public property was placed in their hands for their individual use, to be destroyed and neglected when irksome, or not for an immediate want; their responsibility being only to deceive me or my soldier agents as to the safety or care of property. Nearly all of them lacked fitness or interest for the service, experience in its details, regularity and industry in its duties, and honesty in its responsibilities. It is impossible for me to say that the losses of animals and property were not due in a great measure to the inability on my part to be at all times, with Argus eyes, watching the doings of individual teamsters as well as their irresponsible wagon masters.

My deductions, drawn from the facts and circumstances attending this march, are pointed irresistibly to the necessity of an organized nucleus of *enlisted* teamsters, who can be taught the care of animals and property, and the responsibility to the government for the faithful discharge of their duties.

If a corps of teamsters large enough to meet the demands for service at distant points of our extensive frontiers be too expensive, or their transportation from point to point impracticable, I would suggest that every company in the regular service upon frontiers be authorized to keep on hand one wagon and team, and muster an enlisted teamster to drive and care for it. This team, when the company serves at a post, or is consolidated with other troops, to be under the orders of the commanding officer for the good of the command; should an expedition be ordered, a nucleus will be thus had, or wagon masters well instructed at hand, for a corps of any size, forming, like old soldiers, a lever for the mass; and a system on principles well known will immediately spring up, which will save in one trip double the salary of these enlisted teamsters. The best men can be enlisted for, say, twenty dollars per month, five dollars per month for uniform clothing, and one ration per diem.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WILLIAM W. BURNS,

1st Lieutenant 5th Infantry,

Regimental Quartermaster.

Captain JOHN K. DICKERSON,

Assistant Quartermaster United States Army,

Chief Quartermaster's Department, Army of Utah.

I fully concur in the above recommendations and suggestions.

C. A. WAITE,

Lieutenant Colonel 5th Infantry,

and Brevet Colonel U. S. Army.

No. 16.—*Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, February 5, 1858.

MAJOR : I have the honor herewith to transmit a monthly return of the troops of this department under my immediate command, and to report their condition, in respect to health, discipline, and efficiency, entirely satisfactory.

I have also the honor to make known to you that I have seen your order of the *23d of October*, which is the latest date from general headquarters, but no copy of it has yet been received at these headquarters.

The transfer of the posts of Kearney and Laramie, directed in that order to the department of the west, and more especially Fort Laramie, I fear will result in great embarrassment to the service in this department. To prevent any delay in the earliest practicable advance of the troops from this place in the spring for the want of subsistence and other supplies, I transmitted, early in November, to Colonel Hoffman, then commander of Laramie, an order to move, with three companies of infantry as an escort, the whole force available there, as soon as a movement could be made in the spring, with the three months' supplies for the army of Utah, intended for its subsistence, and otherwise to provide for it until the arrival of the annual supplies. The effectiveness, and perhaps the safety, of the troops, four hundred miles in advance of the nearest depot, in a desolate region, depends greatly on the prompt and faithful execution of this order to Colonel Hoffman, and, indeed, upon all orders for the protection of the line of communication and the security of the depots established upon it. The order in question has left me powerless to count upon any result in reference to any operations on that line. I am not competent any longer to order anything that may depend for its execution upon the troops at Laramie, or east of it, on the line of communication. No little embarrassment was occasioned by the ordering away of Colonel Hoffman without my knowledge, when Laramie was under my command, and you can well conceive that there must be great anxiety, from the uncertainty whether the troops I have ordered, with the additional force I have requested and earnestly hope has been authorized to escort the supplies in the spring from Laramie, are still to be relied upon for that object, or will be permitted to march by the commander of the department of the west, as required by me. I hope that this order, (to which I respectfully ask his attention,) being brought to the notice of the General-in-Chief, he will so represent it to the Secretary of War as to induce its being countermanded.

Accompanying this letter I transmit a report of Mr. Bartletson, who is practically acquainted with the requirements of a good road for transportation by means of draught animals. His report, founded upon a careful examination of the route, is not sufficiently favorable to induce me to order the first supplies in the spring to be brought

by that route, as it would take more time to prepare the road than it would to make the journey by the South Pass road, to which there is no objection (I have rarely seen a better) after the spring is sufficiently advanced to allow of travelling upon it, other than that from Laramie. It is perhaps seventy-five miles further than the route examined by Bartletson, and is not open so soon in the spring. Lieutenant Bryan, I understand, says that the latter route to this place from Fort Kearney is one hundred and fifty miles nearer than the South Pass road. He also reports very favorable of the facility with which a good road can be made on this route. If this road could be established in time to transport upon it the public supplies which must come to this department next summer, there would be a vast saving of time and cost of transportation to the government. Lieutenant Bryan, if furnished with a sufficient corps of laborers, could have the route ready in time. He is no doubt from his experience on the route, as well as high qualification in other respects, more competent than any other person to accomplish the work proposed.

The road by Ash Hollow would be avoided by adopting the route by Cheyenne and Bridger's Pass. It is exceedingly difficult to get down into Ash hollow, and on account of the character of the road for the next fifty miles, in the direction of Laramie from Ash Hollow, is at times almost impassable, being very sandy.

With great respect your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d cavalry, commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,
Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Army, New York.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT LARAMIE, N. T.,
December 24, 1857.

SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of November 30, 1857, by Jeanise and Mr. Bartletson, who left your camp on the 1st of December, 1857, and arrived here on the 21st December, three days after the mail which left on the same day and came by way of the South Pass. I enclose a copy of a diary kept by Mr. Bartletson, which will explain the nature of the country through which they passed. They report that route impracticable for trains without expending a great deal of labor in making the road. Mr. Bartletson reports that in his opinion it would take 200 men twelve months to make a tolerable good road, and then there would be a distance of at least 100 miles without any water which is fit for the use of man or beast. The water of Bitter creek is so salt that fresh meat boiled in it could not be eaten ; and they report that they lost one mule from drinking the water, and it made all their animals sick. The road from Bridger's Pass to this place is good, with plenty of wood, water, and grass.

I enclose lists of subsistence stores and clothing, &c., which is in store here for the army in Utah, made by Lieut. S. P. Higgins, acting assistant quartermaster and acting assistant commissary of subsistence. Some of the clothing sent here for the army in Utah has been issued to this command, as that army drew all the most essential articles of clothing intended for this command when passing here. We have not a pair of stockings, drawers, or a shirt for issue to our men.

I enclose a list of field guns and ammunition at this post. We have not a team of mules at the post that I think would stand the journey from this place to Fort Bridger and haul one of these guns. We have some six or seven teams that we haul wood with, but they are very poor.

No mules can be purchased at this place at any price. There is a man living at the Sweet Water by the name of Louis Genard who is now here, and says that he has some twenty-five or thirty horses and mules, and some 80 head of cattle in good condition for beef. He says that he thinks that from 150 to 200 head of beef cattle might be bought in his vicinity, but he is not willing to drive them without knowing what he is to get for them. If they should be wanted an agent could undoubtedly get them by paying a large price for them.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

J. LYNDE,

Major 7th Infantry, commanding post.

CHIEF OF THE ADJUTANT GENERAL DEPARTMENT,
Headquarters Army of Utah,
En route to Salt Lake city.

FORT LARAMIE, *Nebraska Territory, December 26, 1857.*

SIR: I have the honor to state that the following commissary stores destined for Utah Territory, have been received at this post:

3,077 sacks of flour, weight 293,854.
442 bales of bacon, weight 46,265.
122 sacks of coffee, weight 20,130.
380 sacks of sugar, weight 38,947.
137 sacks of rice, weight 13,974.
148 sacks of beans, weight 25,296.
15 tierces of hams, 6,361.
113 half-barrels of vinegar, 23,161.
195 boxes of soap, 14,545.
56 boxes of candles, 2,673.
4 boxes of tea, 205.
20 half-barrels of molasses, 6,500.
5 barrels of dried fruit, 1,209.
3 salt kettles.

We have used of the above stores and turned over to the second dragoons 9,318 pounds of bacon, 315 pounds of hams, 16 bushels of beans, 1,200 pounds of brown sugar, 40 pounds candles, 516 pounds of soap.

Very respectfully,

L. P. HIGGINS,

Lieut. and Acting Assistant Quartermaster.

Lieut. A. B. HARDCASTLE, *Post Adjutant.*

List of field guns and ammunition at Fort Laramie.

2 12-pounder field howitzers and carriages, with implements and equipments.

4 12-pounder mountain howitzers with prairie carriage, with implements and equipments.

30 12-pounder field howitzers, canisters strapped.

72 12-pounder field howitzers, shells strapped.

81 12-pounder field howitzers, spherical case shot strapped.

20 12-pounder field howitzers, canisters fixed.

76 12-pounder field howitzers, shells fixed.

104 12-pounder field howitzers, spherical case shot fixed.

44 12-pounder mountain howitzers, canisters fixed.

88 12-pounder mountain howitzers, shells fixed.

240 12-pounder mountain howitzers, spherical case shot fixed.

414 12-pounder field howitzers, blank cartridges.

19 12-pounder mountain howitzers, blank cartridges.

137 12-pounder field howitzers, bursters.

305 fuzes filled, wood.

1867 fuzes filled, paper.

534 friction tubes.

92 port fires.

957 priming tubes.

90 yards slow match.

100 signal rockets.

J. LYNDE,

Major 7th Infantry, commanding post.

List of quartermaster's stores, camp and garrison equipage for transportation to Utah.

520 infantry uniform coats.

5 hospital tents.

4 hospital tents, flies.

200 hospital tents, pins.

2900 pair bootees, 35 (5,) 276 (6,) 372 (7,) 704 (8,) 884 (9,) 507 (10,)

62 (11,) 60 (12.)

1200 pair stockings.
 580 pair infantry trousers.
 60 pair dragoon trousers.
 372 cavalry jackets.
 60 artillery jackets.
 320 great coats for mounted men.
 45 stable frocks.
 30 cavalry hats.
 10 pair sergeant's chevrons.
 10 pair corporal's chevrons.
 10 clothing books.
 250 knapsacks and straps.
 100 tin canteens.
 100 canteens and straps.
 130 provision bags.
 200 mess pans.
 101 camp kettles.
 4 wagon covers.
 10 fifes.
 10 pair drum-sticks.
 10 bass and 10 snare heads.
 3 storm and 3 garrison flags, 3 halyards.
 Company "E," 2d dragoons, 14 boxes, No. 12, 13, 19, 4, 1, 15, 18, 2, 6, 17, 3, 14, 11.
 Company "H," 2d dragoons, 19 boxes, No. 12, 21, 25, 23, 10, 14, 15, 24, 22, 20, 9, 11, 16, 17, 18, 13, 26, 27, 19.

The above is a list of the Utah clothing actually on hand, as shown by the marks and numbers on the bales and packages.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. P. HIGGINS,

Lieutenant 6th Infantry.

Lieutenant A. B. HARDCASTLE,

Post Adjutant.

Diary of a trip from Fort Bridger, Utah Territory, via Bridger's Pass and Laramie Plain to Fort Laramie, Nebraska Territory, by Mr. John Bartletson.

Tuesday, December 1, 1857.—Left Camp Scott at 4 o'clock in the morning; travelled ten miles on the old road, stopping for breakfast; at 10 o'clock saddled up mules and travelled twenty miles, stopped on Ham's Fork.

Wednesday, December 2.—Left Ham's Fork at 7 o'clock, and travelled on the old road six miles; turned down Black's Fork, travelled twenty-five miles, and stopped for the night on the place we leave Black's Fork to go across to Green river; good practicable road to this place.

Thursday, December, 3.—Left Black's Fork at 7 o'clock; ascended

the ridge about five miles, then turned the ridge and travelled about the same distance to Green river; the road is very good; crossed Green river on the ice; the crossing is good; took breakfast at the mouth of Bitter creek; started at 2 o'clock P. M., and about one-half mile from the mouth of the creek crossed three ravines, which will require about one hour's work with twenty men to make it passable for wagons; crossed the creek twice in about one-half mile more, then left the creek and crossed a ridge about four miles; came down a steep hill which will require a little work; travelled about one mile and encamped for the night. The grass is very scarce both on the hills and bottom; the water is also very bad and scarce, it has a bitter, brackish taste; wood is scarce, nothing but greasbrush and small sage.

Friday, December 4.—Struck camp at daylight; travelled about two miles and crossed a deep ravine, which will require half an hour's work with twenty men to make it good; travelled about six miles further and crossed the creek and stopped for breakfast. Grass is very scarce. The road is level enough, but the soil is very loose, which would make it heavy. The water is not fit for a man to use, being at least one-eighth salt. Started again at 2 o'clock, and about one mile from camp crossed the creek twice, which will require some little work to make it passable; travelled about fifteen miles up the creek and camped for the night. We crossed some fifteen dry ravines which will require work to make them good. From the place where we nooned we took the right hand fork of Bitter creek, and about eight miles from the mouth of the creek found a splendid white sulphur spring, which is as good as I ever saw. We can find no water at all; we have to melt snow for cooking.

Saturday, December 5.—Left camp at 7 o'clock; morning very cold; in from one to five miles from camp crossed seven dry ravines, which are very deep with steep banks. We then took a second right hand fork; bottom of this creek is quite narrow, with high rough mountains on each side; there is no water in this creek; crossed several dry ravines which will require considerable work; we travelled this creek to the head; crossed a ridge, not very steep, and camped in a dry hollow, without water, which is a branch of Muddy creek; travelled about twenty-five miles; some bunch grass here on the hills, on this Bitter creek, throughout the whole extent. The soil is of a very loose, salty kind, your mules sinking to their pastern joints, which would be very bad for heavy wagons, particularly in wet weather, and also the water from Green river to Muddy, a distance of about one hundred miles, is not fit for the use of man or beast.

Sunday, December 6.—Left camp early; crossed several ravines in going a mile, and passed through a narrow cañon with high mountain to the right, and after travelling about one mile through this we came into a wide bottom with splendid grass; we crossed the branch here, and after travelling about eight miles we came to some sulphur springs, with fine grass, close to a high black butte on the right; we stopped here for breakfast; started at 2 o'clock, but here we went out on the ridge on account of the deep snow in the valley; travelled

about eight miles and camped on the head of a hollow, with plenty of bunch grass.

Monday, December 7.—Left camp early; travelled over a rolling, broken country but not too much so for a good road; none of the hills are steep, no ravines very bad; this has the appearance of a good grass country. After travelling about five miles we came into a more level country with large flat bottoms, which has the appearance of being lakes with water at some seasons of the year; there is no outlet from these lakes for water to escape, and I think when the snow melts that these contain plenty of water, of which we cannot find any in this country; travelled about twenty-five miles and camped for the night in a deep ravine, with plenty of large sage and good grass. This hollow has the appearance of having water sometimes.

Tuesday, December 8.—Left camp early; travelled over a rolling country, with plenty of grass on the hills and valleys and plenty of sage for wood, but no water. After travelling about five miles passed between two round butes with a range of mountains to the right; travelled about eighteen miles and passed a high point of a mountain to the right hand, and camped in a beautiful valley of grass, and sage brush for wood. This valley is very large and appears to have no outlet for water to escape, and I think there must be water here in the spring when the snow melts. This valley appears to run north and south from the dividing ridge to the Snake River mountains.

Wednesday, December 9.—Left camp at 7 o'clock; travelled south-east course over a level plain for about ten miles, when we came to some rolling ground but not very steep, and after travelling about ten miles over this hilly ground we found the creek we had been looking for so long. After we got to the creek we found that we struck the creek about three miles too high up. By looking we found that we would have had a smooth plain to come into the creek. It appears that there is a perfect level plain from this place to the head of Bitter creek and plenty of good grass, but not one drop of water at this time except one sulphur spring at the flat butte, which is not good.

Thursday, December 10.—Left camp early to travel up Muddy; we found that the snow was very deep on the hills and we had to keep in the bottom; we also found that the snow was from two to three feet in the bottom, which we found very difficult to travel, the ravines being all level with the snow.

After travelling about five miles we came to a cañon with high mountains on each side, which it would be impossible to pass. It would be very difficult to pass through, having to cross the creek three times in about half a mile, which has very steep banks and a deep muddy channel, which would have to be bridged to allow anything like a wagon pass. We found after about one mile through this cañon that the bottom got wider, with very tall sage brush, which is very bad to get through; crossed a great many bad ravines, and came to one in particular (a very bad one) which would have to be bridged; here we found the trail where Lieutenant Bryan turned back in 1855-'56; travelled up the bottom about five miles and came to a

place where the hills come down to the creek on each side, which it would be impossible to pass without bridging the creek twice, and there is no timber to make bridges with; camped for the night about one mile from this place; grass good, with plenty of sage for wood.

Friday, December 11.—Left camp early; snow very deep, and our animals getting very weak; crossed the creek three times in about a mile on account of the hills being too steep to cross; these crossings are very bad, the banks of the creek being about fifteen feet high, with two or three feet of water in the channel; bottom very miry; we there took the hill side for about two miles, which was very good. We then came to another cañon, where the high mountains came entirely down to the creek, where we would have to cross the creek again about ten or twelve times if we came up the cañon; but we found the crossing too bad to cross with pack mules, and we took along the mountain sides in a narrow lodge pole-trail which crosses very deep ravines every few yards; hill side very steep. It would require a great deal of work here to make this cañon passable. The creek would have to be bridged at every one of these crossings, which would require a great deal of work, and if there was a road to be made on the hill side it would require several bridges across the deep ravines, and a great deal of grading to keep wagons from turning over. I think it is about three miles through this cañon; when we got through this we found the creek forked; here we took the left hand fork; we also found here the wagon trail of Mr. Bryan, which is very plainly to be seen; we then took this trail, which we found to be a very good road; we travelled this to the summit of the dividing ridge, and camped for the night in a grove of quaking ash without water; good bunch grass. At this creek (Muddy) where bridges are required there is no timber anywhere to be seen that would be fit for making a bridge.

Saturday, December 12.—Left camp early; turned the dividing ridge, which is so level that it is hardly perceivable; we still follow the wagon trail, which is very good. I think this pass is better than the south pass. We travelled about five miles, and passed some good springs and grass to the right of the road, in a grove of timber; the road here passes over some rolling ground, but not very bad. We then came into a smooth plain; travelled in this plain about ten miles further, and came to a very pretty little creek called Camel's creek, with plenty of water and grass, and camped for the night.

December 13.—Started from camp early in the morning, still following the wagon trail, which is very good and plain. After travelling about five miles down the plain, we crossed the creek where there is a good bridge; we here took the ridge, which is a good road; travelled about eight miles; crossed the creek again on a good bridge made of pine logs. In about five miles further came to Platte river; the crossing good, with plenty of grass and wood; crossed over and camped for the night.

December 14.—Left camp at seven o'clock; the road here passes over some uneven ground, but not bad; the road is very straight and plain; travelled over a very nice plain about twelve miles, and crossed

a fine creek of water in the plain with fine grass but no wood. We here took up a nice little creek which leads to Medicine Butte, a high mountain to the right of the road; travelled about eight miles and camped on the head of this creek; good grass, water, and wood; road very good.

December 15.—Left camp early; found the road not so good, there being a good many ravines to cross, and on the hill sides it is very sideling; travelled about five miles and crossed the ridge, which is very rough, with large rocks in the road; travelled about five miles further through a beautiful valley of grass, with plenty of water along the foot of the mountain, and came to Medicine-bow creek, which is a very nice creek of water; plenty of grass and fine timber; crossing good; travelled about fifteen miles over the plain and camped at a small lake in the plain, with grass but no wood.

December 16.—Started early; travelled over rather rolling ground but very good for a road. After travelling about eight miles turned to the left hand in order to get to a branch of the Medicine-bow creek; after travelling about seven miles further came to the creek which has plenty of water and good grass, but no wood. We are here about the middle of the plains of Laramie. The country is mostly level and covered with good grass. We camped on the creek for the night; travelled about fifteen miles.

December 17.—Started at seven o'clock for Laramie Fork. The plain is level, with the exception of a few lakes which have the appearance of containing water in the spring of the year. After travelling about ten miles came to a fine spring of good water and fine grass; from here the plain is still level to the Laramie, which is about ten miles; got to this creek and camped for the night; good grass but no wood; travelled about twenty miles.

December 18.—Left the Laramie early; passed over a rolling prairie, and about ten miles struck the head of Wind creek, which passes through Sabilli's Hole. This creek passes through a narrow cañon for about fifteen miles; this cañon is very narrow in places, and it would be difficult to make it passable for wagons; there is plenty of water and good grass in this cañon; travelled about fifteen miles and camped for the night.

December 19.—Left camp early; passed out at the mouth of the cañon, which is tolerably narrow. We then travelled over a rolling prairie about five miles, and came into what is called Sabilli's Hole, which is a wide valley of good grass, plenty of timber, and a nice creek of water. This valley is about ten miles long; camped at the lower end of this valley; travelled fifteen miles.

December 20.—Left camp early; left Sabilli's Hole and crossed the plain to Chug creek, which is about eight miles. We then took the road for the old Bessinette houses on the Laramie; got to the houses and camped for the night; road good; travelled about twenty miles.

Bessinette's houses are about ten miles above this fort.

A true copy.

J. LYNDE,
Major 7th Infantry.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, February 2, 1858.

SIR: Mr. Bartletson's itinerary of a journey from this camp to your post *via* Bitter creek and Laramie river, kept in compliance with instructions from these headquarters, and enclosed in your letter of December 24, 1857, demonstrates the impolicy of attempting to conduct a train by that route to this point in the early spring. The colonel commanding therefore directs me to inform you that he expects to hear of the departure from your post of the convoy of supplies and its escort on the South Pass road as early in the spring as weather and grass will permit, and to notify you that the only obstacles to a continued journey—the ferries over Green river and Harris' Fork—will be secured, and boats put in operation for the arrival of the train on hearing of its departure. All other difficult crossings of streams as far as Green river, are bridged or can be avoided by taking the proper route (well known to the guide) after passing the Devil's Gate.

You have ample authority to purchase given in my letter of the 4th of January. No other authority is needed, and no assistance other than above promised can be furnished by the colonel commanding, either to move the command or guard the train; his means of transportation being too feeble to detach any assistance beyond Green river.

The draught of mountain howitzers on prairie carriages is so light that a portion of them may be drawn by a pair of mules. The remainder, indeed all four, with their ammunition, can be transported in the contractor's trains. Mules can be purchased at Platte bridge, if the offer made by Mr. Richard to the quartermaster here to drive some hundred of them to this place for sale can be relied upon, and there is reason to believe one of the traders in your vicinity will have others early in the spring; moreover it is hoped that your animals, if sent to the hay already cut, and guarded by a strong detachment and an officer, will be secured and sufficiently recruited for service.

The force designated in Special Order No. 41 is destined for the protection of the trains; but if four companies of mounted troops arrive in time to escort the supplies, or overtake them on the road, one of the companies of infantry designated will be authorized to return as part of the garrison of Fort Laramie. The deficiency, if any, in the strength of the garrison, for the time being, will be supplied by the prudence of the commander.

The colonel commanding is assured that you are aware how deeply involved are the integrity and interests of our country in the safety and success of this expedition, and he relies upon the energetic efforts of yourself and officers to accomplish what is essential to fulfil the expectations of our government.

I am, sir, very respectfully your obedient servant.

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Major ISAAC LYNDE,

7th Infantry, commanding Fort Laramie, N. T.

No. 17.—*Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters.*HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
February 13, 1858.

MAJOR: The mail which left Independence on the 1st of January ultimo, arrived here on the 8th instant, bringing November and December dates, but nothing whatever for me from the general headquarters of the army. I have only received the few communications acknowledged in my letters to you of the 30th November and 31st January ultimo, to yourself and the adjutant general, since I left Fort Leavenworth in September last. That other and important orders have been forwarded to the commander of this department cannot be doubted, and the conclusion is unavoidable that the mail has been tampered with somewhere on the route. I think the indication is too plain any longer to regard the mail on this route as a safe mode of conveyance for public letters, and I now beg leave to renew under the circumstances, my suggestion in a former communication in reference to the best mode of transmission of letters.

Since the forwarding of the report of Mr. Bartletson, of his examination of the route from this place to Laramie by Bridger's Pass, his itinerary has been carefully compared with Captain Stansbury's, by Major Porter, assisted by Mr. Bridger who accompanied Captain Stansbury, and who from a residence of 35 years in the Rocky mountains is familiar with the country. They are of opinion that Bartletson deviated (not designedly) considerably from the course of Captain Stansbury, and that he travelled over a country much less favorable for a road, than that travelled by Captain Stansbury's route. Bridger says the labor and expense of making the road will be small; if such be the case, the route from Fort Kearney should pass up Lodge-pole creek, through Cheyenne and Bridger's Passes to this place.

So much time will be gained and cost of transportation saved by adopting this route, that I hope an officer will be sent with a small body of laborers to make the road in time for the supplies of the army to be brought upon it here next summer.

I have nothing to report with regard to the troops differing from my report of the 5th instant, they are hardy, healthy, and efficient, and perform their duties cheerfully and faithfully.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

Colonel 2d cavalry, commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*

Headquarters of the Army, New York city.

No. 18.—*Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, March 10, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor herewith to transmit a return of the troops of the department of Utah, for the month of February ultimo, and to report them in excellent condition, and when we receive additional draught mules and a sufficient number of horses for a remount for the dragoons and batteries, their efficiency will be thorough.

The arrival of the horses and mules cannot be expected till towards the last of April.

Apprehensive that the trains containing three months' supplies for the army of Utah will be put in motion with an insufficient escort, and of their destruction by the Mormons, if they should be, I have, inasmuch as my application for additional escort of mounted force may not have reached you, ordered a squadron of dragoons mounted partly on mules under Captain Hawes, to march to Laramie and co-operate with the infantry of the escort for bringing them on safely. It is with reluctance that I have detached any portion of the force under my command to the rear, but as those supplies of provisions will be indispensable for the subsistence of the army of Utah, after the period of which you are apprised in previous communications, I felt it my duty as far as in my power, to make their arrival in time here certain.

This detachment, small as it is, takes from Colonel Cooke a large fraction of the mounted force for the guarding of the numerous herds of mules, &c., under his charge. I have received no communications either from the headquarters of the army or the War Department, since I left Washington city, about the 1st of September, except the few on ordinary business, the receipt of which I have acknowledged.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

Colonel 2d cavalry, commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*

Headquarters of the Army, New York city.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, March 2, 1858.

SIR: The colonel commanding directs that you equip for mounted service, and immediately put in the field, a squadron of dragoons, (say ninety men,) with directions to patrol the country between your camp and the Laramie road, embracing the rear of Major Sibley's camp, so as completely to protect the rear of this army and its vicinity from all molestation by the enemy. Should any trail of the enemy be discovered, any party appear, or the commander come to the knowledge of any such within a reasonable distance, he is to pursue

and punish the marauders. This force is to be in addition to that required for your own protection.

The colonel commanding believes that, with due care on the part of the commander, the animals can be as advantageously recruited on this expedition as by remaining in their present camp, and he therefore wishes the officers cautioned not to make long or harassing marches, but to combine care for the animals with an examination of the country, that if no enemy be found prowling in our rear the squadron may be as effective for another occasion as when it marches.

The squadron will move with fifteen days' provisions, without wagons, and as little trammelled as possible with company equipments, and the commanders will be directed to report by every opportunity to these headquarters.

The commander will require every one overhauled to account for himself by presenting his passport if from this camp, or, if coming to it, the officer can judge of the propriety of permitting him to pass.

The colonel commanding wishes you to draw nearer this command by slowly advancing up Henry's Fork, so as to be within a reasonable distance of this camp by the 15th of March. An examination of the country between Henry's Fork and this camp may disclose good grazing places, and this course is respectfully suggested to you. During the interval of time keep the country in your vicinity under complete observation, and should any party of the enemy appear have it pursued and punished.

A man from Salt Lake City was brought into camp yesterday by the volunteers. He reports that three companies, each one hundred strong, were to leave the city on marauding expeditions to our rear. Before this man was brought in parties of mounted men were reported to have been seen in our vicinity.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel P. ST. GEORGE COOKE,
2d Dragoons, Henry's Fork, Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, March 2, 1858.

SIR: If you have not yet established the advanced guards which you were verbally directed to do, the colonel commanding wishes you to despatch this day a non-commissioned officer and fifteen men to the Salt Lake road beyond Bridger's Fort several miles, with direction to post himself at a point suitable for grazing and watering his animals and concealing his party, at the same time observing the road and country adjacent and to the west. Let him be directed to keep a close watch for large and small parties and be prepared to pursue the latter, of course cautiously, and if the former appear and be too

large to successfully oppose, to withdraw, keeping the party in sight, giving notice as soon as practicable to the nearest guard.

A man from Salt Lake valley was yesterday brought to camp by the volunteers, who reports that three companies of Mormons (each about one hundred strong) were to leave Salt Lake valley on the 1st of March to commence marauding.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Major H. H. SIBLEY,
*Commanding Squadron 2d Dragoons,
Camp Quitman, Utah Territory.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., March 3, 1858.

SIR: I am directed to notify you for the information of the detachment you may place in advance on the Salt Lake road, in accordance with your verbal suggestions, that a mounted party of fifteen dragoons is posted on the Muddy, several miles beyond Fort Bridger, with directions to keep concealed, and every day a party of thirty infantry men will be sent from this camp in that direction. When your party is detached, the others will be informed of the fact, that no one may be led into error and cause false alarms or rumors.

The colonel commanding wishes you to caution your party against being led into any ambushade in pursuing any small party; and if the enemy appear in large force, to fall back cautiously upon the nearest guard.

Parties were reported to have been on the hills to the north and west before the finding the man from Salt Lake, reported by you yesterday, and it is desirable that such parties, evidently marauders, may be punished at an early day.

The colonel commanding is much pleased at the zeal displayed for the service by the members of your command.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel B. E. BEE,
Commanding Volunteer Battalion, Camp Scott, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., March 6, 1858.

SIR: The colonel commanding wishes you to continue your march slowly to Smith's Fork, ascending which in the vicinity of Fort Supply you will find sufficient and excellent grazing for all the animals for several weeks, and abundant means for making corrals.

He is desirous of collecting the herds and of grazing them for a few weeks on Smith's Fork, until the new grass shall have advanced sufficiently to admit of uniting the command in this vicinity. On that fork the guard can be easily supported from this camp.

Major Sibley will be directed to move to that stream, and ascend it by slow marches till he forms a junction with you.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel P. ST. GEORGE COOKE,
Commanding 2d Dragoons, Henry's Fork, Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., March 6, 1858.

SIR: The colonel commanding directs that you move on Monday morning, with all the animals in your charge, to Smith's Fork, and ascend that stream, availing yourself of the best places for grazing and protecting your herds. Wagons will be sent to you to-morrow afternoon.

Lieutenant Colonel Cooke is ordered to Smith's Fork, and will have control of the forces thereon. You will therefore, when within a reasonable distance, report to him.

The colonel commanding also directs that the detachment on the Oregon road be relieved by another of the same strength from your squadron, in time for the former to reach your camp before its supplies are exhausted. He desires that the detachment now posted be instructed to overlook the valley of the Muddy by its sentinels or a small party, and to report everything of importance immediately to these headquarters.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Major H. H. SIBLEY,
Commanding Camp Quitman, Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, March 10, 1858.

SIR: The colonel commanding directs me to write you as follows:

You will move to-morrow with your squadron, and proceed as rapidly as the nature of the roads and condition of your animals permit towards Fort Laramie, with the two-fold object of keeping the road clear of marauders and forming part of the escort to the supply trains for this command. Should the trains be met on the road and not united, you will, in virtue of these instructions and on their presentation, cause the

advance to be halted and remain with it to await the arrival of the rear, that all may receive the protection of the escort to this camp. If you reach Fort Laramie and hear of the near approach of additional escort, you will make known the wishes of the colonel commanding for the expedition to await its arrival, unless the trains will be soon overtaken, or by the delay they may not reach this point by the 15th of May.

The commander of Fort Laramie will be directed to turn over to you all the dragoon horses at the post and such equipment as you may need. The dragoons at the post will be united with your squadron.

You will treat as enemies all person interfering with or molesting your march, and take prisoners all persons known to be Mormons, or furnishing them with information of the army, or with supplies.

At Platte Bridge you will find two or three mail-bags, which on your march down you will take with you, the better to secure their delivery here.

Two guides, Ferguson and Martin, will accompany you; the former you will send in advance to Fort Laramie so soon as you can dispense with his services and deem it safe to detach him.

You will avail yourself of every opportunity to communicate with these headquarters; and on your return march the commander of the convoy is desired to give notice of the probable time of arrival at Green river, that the ferries of that river and Ham's Fork may be put in operation in proper time.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Captain J. M. HAWES,

Commanding Squadron 2d Dragoons, Camp Scott, U. T.

FORT LARAMIE, NEBRASKA TERRITORY,
February 23, 1858.

MAJOR: I am at a loss to determine whether your letter of the 5th instant was written with a knowledge of General Order No. 13 and Special Order No. 147, from the Headquarters of the Army, or not. For fear they may not have reached you, I send enclosed copies of those orders, which you can use or not as you may find necessary.

Your mails came here in through mail-bags, and the postmaster here is only supplied with keys for the way-bags, so that we cannot get at your mail. But sometimes there are packages which come to Fort Kearney by other routes, and come in the way-bags. When there are such I will send them by express.

The express that left here on the 26th of December, (Bordirai,) I understand, did not reach your camp until the 29th of January. There was no necessity for such delay, as he was furnished with two good mules and the weather and roads better than they have been since.

I shall keep Ely a day or two longer, and if the mail does not come

in shall start him back. *February 25.*—I hear nothing of the mail and shall start the express this morning.

Very respectfully, yours,

J. LYNDE,
Major 7th Infantry.

Major F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General, Camp Scott, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT LARAMIE, N. T.,
February 24, 1858.

SIR: Your messenger, Ely Dufour, arrived at this post on the 19th instant, and has been detained to await the arrival of the mail from below, which is expected to arrive soon.

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letters of the 2d and 5th of February. You allude in yours of the 5th instant to a letter of the 4th of January giving authority to purchase. That letter has not been received.

In yours of the 5th, you speak of the means of transporting the mountain howitzers and their ammunition, but I have received no order to send them, nor do I know what the colonel commanding wishes sent except by the intimation in that letter.

Mr. Richard who resides at the Platte Bridge has gone east, and from information which I have lately received I think he has only a few poor mules at this time, not more than eight or ten. If any can be purchased before the train starts I will have them bought and sent through. I think there will be at this post some sixty small mules and about thirty dragoon horses to be sent through that will be serviceable in the spring. They have been herded on grass all winter, as the supply of hay cut last season was not sufficient to feed the animals necessarily employed at the post. The hay has been all brought to the post and mainly all consumed.

They have been fed some corn, as the train that was at Ash Hollow has come up and brought a small supply of corn.

This command is destitute of the most essential articles of clothing, such as pants, shirts, drawers, and stockings, and there is not more than two months salt meat on hand. This deficiency is caused by the heavy drafts made on the supply for this post of clothing and provisions by the army of Utah in passing here.

No packages of supplies for Utah have been broken except from necessity, and there are none on hand to replace them.

The colonel commanding may rest assured that I shall do all in my power to meet his wishes, and to advance the success of the expedition under his command. The train will be started as early as possible in the spring.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. LYNDE,
Major 7th Infantry, commanding post.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Headquarters, Department of Utah.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., March 10, 1858.

SIR: The colonel commanding directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your two communications of the 23d and 24th ultimo, and to inform you that the instructions in my letter of the 5th of February were issued without a knowledge of general orders No. 13, and special orders No. 147, from the headquarters of the army; but their existence, if known, would have had no influence in issuing those orders, inasmuch as they were dictated by necessity and regard for the safety of this command and the honor of our country, and their fulfillment is of such importance as to permit of no delay for reference to higher authority. Moreover, he can but believe, since those orders were issued without a knowledge of existing difficulties, as soon as the condition of this command became known his action was sustained. He will continue to give you orders, but only such as are necessary for the good of the service, and he expects them to be obeyed as implicitly as when you were in this department, or if issued by the commander of the department of the west.

I am directed to enclose copies of my letters of the 13th of December, and the 4th of January; the former was in the possession of Mr. Irwin, the latter of Mr. Browne, and both enclosed in the assistant quartermaster's package to the acting assistant quartermaster of Fort Laramie.

As a substitute for the company of the 7th infantry, designated in special orders No. 41, of 1857, from these headquarters, but forming a portion of the "regular garrison" of Fort Laramie, in accordance with special orders No. 147, from headquarters of the army, a squadron of dragoons, (90 strong,) Captain Hawes, 2d dragoons, commanding, will leave this camp to-morrow. He will reach your post in case the trains have not been put in motion, and the colonel commanding wishes you to turn over to him all the dragoon horses at the post, and such equipment as he may need; the remainder you will have transported as directed in my letter of February 27. Enlisted men convalescent belonging to this command will be sent with the trains.

The colonel commanding regrets to hear of the deficiency of clothing at your post, which, to remedy and not draw too much on supplies now needed here, he authorizes you to issue from the stores for this army one pair of pants to each enlisted man; the stockings are too much needed here to spare; moreover, you will of these be supplied much sooner than this command.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

The COMMANDING OFFICER,
Fort Laramie, N. T.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., March 10, 1858.

SIR: To secure the government mails against marauding parties of Mormons, placed on the road to seize them, until the country becomes sufficiently filled with troops to drive such parties from it, the colonel commanding wishes you to cause the mails to be turned over to the postmaster at Laramie, till an escort which you deem sufficient can accompany them to their destination. If the contractor, or his agent, be then willing to move with the protection afforded, you will have the mail returned to him; but if otherwise, you will entrust it to some one in the military service, and, if necessary, furnish the means of transportation.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Major J. LYNDE,
Commanding, Fort Laramie, N. T.

No. 19.—Colonel Johnson to army headquarters.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., March 24, 1858.

MAJOR: By this mail, in another letter, I acknowledge particularly all orders, letters, &c., received from general headquarters. Since the departure of the last express I have broken up our winter camp, and now occupy a position on the open plain, having Bridger's Fort immediately on the right flank, and Black's Fork on the left. Nothing beside, worthy of mention, has occurred, and I have now nothing special to report. It will, however, be satisfactory to you to know, and I have great pleasure in acquainting you with, the excellent condition of the troops, both as respects health and discipline; and I only repeat what you know as well as I, that among the people of the Union there is no class of citizens more loyal and devoted to its interests than that composing its army.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d cavalry, commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army, New York city.*

No. 20.—General-in-Chief to the Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY, New York, April 2, 1858.

COLONEL: I am instructed by the General-in-Chief to transmit the enclosed letter to Colonel A. S. Johnston, 2d cavalry, with the request

that you will submit it to the Secretary of War, and then enclose it under cover to the commanding officer of Fort Leavenworth, with an order to the latter to cause it to be forwarded immediately by a trusty express messenger.

The general instructs me further to say that he has not yet been informed of the promotion, by brevet, of Colonel A. S. Johnston.

If not already done, he desires a notification of his promotion be sent Colonel Johnston, together with the enclosed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

IRVIN McDOWELL,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Colonel S. COOPER,

Adjutant General United States Army, Washington, D. C.

No. 21.—*General-in-Chief to Colonel Johnston.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
New York, April 2, 1858.

COLONEL: At this distance from the scene of operations, and on imperfect information, the General-in-Chief instructs me to say he doubts whether you will have sufficient numbers to force the passes to Salt Lake and establish yourself in that valley before you receive the larger part, if not the whole, of the reinforcements now under orders to join you.

It is not his object in expressing this doubt to apply the curb, but to relieve you from the impression—if you possibly should have entertained it—that your instructions impose upon you the necessity of advancing so soon as the season and the receipt of means of transportation for your present force will permit.

The general directs me to add that he has equal confidence in your judgment, discretion, zeal, and gallantry; and in the delicate and responsible duty with which you are charged he desires to leave you as little trammelled as possible.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

IRVIN McDOWELL,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Colonel A. S. JOHNSTON,

2d cavalry, commanding Department of Utah.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
New York, November 9, 1858.

Official:

L. THOMAS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 22.—*Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Black Fork of Green River, Camp Scott, April 17, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor herewith to transmit a monthly return of the troops of this department for the month of March, 1858; also a report of Mr. B. F. Ficklin.

The object of the journey made by him was to contract for beef cattle to be brought here early in the spring, and to induce the traders and Indians to bring Flathead horses suitable for the service. The service required of Mr. Ficklin was important, and appears to have been faithfully performed by him under circumstances of great privation and exposure.

Although he failed in accomplishing the object of the journey, it will have the effect to direct the attention of the Flathead and other Indians on the head waters of the Missouri to this department as affording a market for their horses, which are said to be better adapted for the service of the cavalry in this region than any other breed.

The troops of the different arms of service, the battalion of volunteers included, are healthy, efficient, and well instructed in their various duties.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d cavalry, commanding.

CAMP SCOTT, UTAH TERRITORY, *April 15, 1858.*

SIR: I left this camp on December 9, 1857, with my party of ten men, twelve horses, six mules, and thirty days rations, for the Flathead country, with instructions to contract for the delivery at this point of five hundred head of beef cattle by April 1, 1858; also to induce the mountaineers and Indians to bring in any horses they might wish to sell.

The route to be travelled was left to my choice. In order to avoid collision with any party of Mormons I selected the route up Ham's Fork to the California emigrant route, followed that to the Soda Spring, on Bear river, thence due north across the mountains to Snake river, to a point twenty-five miles northeast of Fort Hall, arriving at Snake river on December 27, a distance estimated at above two hundred miles.

At the time of leaving this camp there was only about one inch of snow, but it gradually increased, until before arriving at the California emigrant route it was of an average depth of two feet, and in many places so much drifted that it was necessary for the men to open a trail for the horses to pass through. Travelling was very slow and laborious, both for animals and men.

No incident worth mentioning occurred, except in descending the mountain to Snake river; I found it necessary to follow the side of a

steep hill to avoid the snow drifts; a pack mule slipped and rolled to the bottom, (about two hundred feet,) and died a few days afterwards in consequence of its injuries.

I was induced to seek a new route across the Snake River mountains, because it was more direct than the route by Fort Hall. Perhaps it was fortunate that I did so, as I afterwards learned that about fifty Mormons had, in October last, made a settlement on Snake river, at the mouth of Blackfoot creek, immediately on the Fort Hall trail; had, during the fall, built a fort, saw mill, &c., and had prepared grounds for this year's crop, but in the latter part of January the settlement had been broken up and the party returned to Salt Lake City.

After getting into the valley of Snake river the snow was from nine to eighteen inches in depth. Believing it hardly possible that I could cross the mountains directly into the Flathead country, I concluded to go by the Beaver Head, on the Jefferson Fork of the Missouri, (the wintering ground of a number of mountaineers,) and the Hell's Gate pass. Following Snake river forty miles northeast, thence north fifty miles by an Indian trail, arrived at the foot of the mountains which divide the waters of Snake and Missouri rivers; was three days in crossing this mountain; on the third day was overtaken in a snow storm; had to make a forced march of thirty miles to get off the mountain; was compelled to abandon a horse and two mules. After the storm was over sent back for them, but only found one mule alive, the other having frozen to death.

After getting on the head waters of the Missouri the snow entirely disappeared. On the fourth our rations were exhausted, but I was not uneasy, as I expected to arrive soon at the Beaver Head, a point on the Jefferson Fork of the Missouri fifty miles above the Three Forks of the Missouri, and one hundred east of the Mormon settlement on Salmon river, a popular wintering ground of the mountaineers, on account of their stock.

To my surprise, on arriving at Beaver head, I found all the evidences of the mountaineers having left recently, and hastily, and taken the trail in the direction of Flathead valley. As I had no reasonable expectation of overtaking them soon, had to kill a broken down horse to eat.

On the 10th overtook the camp of Mr. Herriford, where I obtained a supply of beef, and learned from him that about December first they had heard of the burning of the supply trains by the Mormons, and of threats uttered by the Mormons at Salmon river fork, against the mountaineers at Beaver Head. Fearing for the safety of their stock, they had started for the Flathead valley, as a more distant and secure point.

On account of the jaded condition of my animals, I left my party at Mr. Herriford's camp, and with one man started for the Flathead valley.

At the Deer's Lodge overtook another party of mountaineers, with whom I made a contract for the delivery of three hundred head of beef cattle, by April 16th, at ten dollars per hundred, also to bring

down about one hundred head of horses. Afterwards proceeded to the Flathead valley, where I could have a contract for two hundred head of cattle, but their fear of the Mormons was so great that no price would induce them to undertake to deliver them here. Several were making preparations to move their stock to Fort Walla-Walla this spring, in order to be beyond the reach of the Mormons.

Horses are very scarce, on account of the large number sold in the last few years, and a distemper which killed large numbers last summer.

Great uneasiness was felt by the traders and Indians, on account of the Mormons.

I spent several days at St. Ignatius mission, (situated on one of the branches of Clark's Fork of Columbia, on forty-seventh parallel,) established by the Catholics, for the benefit of the Flatheads, Pend d'Oreilles and Hootenais.

The Flatheads are undoubtedly the best Indians in the mountains. They often boast of never having shed the blood of a white man. Under the direction of the priests they are improving rapidly in agriculture. This year they will sow about three hundred bushels of wheat; they raise large quantities of vegetables, especially potatoes, cabbage and beets.

Their horses are superior to all other Indian horses, in size and power of endurance. The tribe, about sixty lodges, own about one thousand head of cattle.

There were about fifty lodges of Nez Perces in the Flathead valley, returning from a buffalo hunt. They had caught the small pox from the Crows. Many had died, but the priests had succeeded in stopping it by vaccination.

As it was impossible to buy stock in Flathead valley, on conditions contemplated in my instructions, on March 3d I started for Deer Lodge, expecting to start immediately on my arrival with what stock I had contracted for at that place.

The contractors refused to deliver their beef at this place, but offered to deliver it there, as they were afraid of being robbed by the Mormons on the road.

The Bannock Indians had, about March 1st, attacked the Salmon river fort, killed two Mormons and wounded three; had also killed and run off all their cattle (about three hundred), and most of their horses.

The cause of this outbreak on the part of the Indians, is not known; but it is known that these Indians were extensively engaged in stealing stock from emigrants on the McIsle and Humboldt, and selling them to the Mormons. An express was sent from this fort to Salt Lake, and a party was sent to their relief. The settlement on Salmon river was broken up, and all returned to Salt Lake; one portion being two days ahead of me on my return, and the balance, with three days' bread, behind me.

Buying a few animals, to replace those lost, started on March 12th to return, with thirty days' provisions, expecting to be able to make the trip in fifteen days.

The new grass was beginning to grow finely before I started, on Jefferson fork; contrary to my expectation and information I had received from the oldest mountaineers, found the snow in the mountains, between Missouri and Snake river, from three to six feet deep for a distance of twelve miles; were three days in making eight miles. At the end of that time the horses were unable to go further; four of my men were helpless from being snow-blind; a heavy blow had filled up the trail, so as to make it as difficult to return as to go forward. For the next two days had a heavy snow storm; two Indian horses died from hunger and cold. On the third day the men were sufficiently recovered to be able to travel. Luckily for me, by two o'clock a warm sun had softened the snow, so that I was able to make two miles that day and two the next, which brought us out into the valley, when before reaching Snake river the snow had entirely disappeared.

The animals were so reduced by the suffering on the mountain that I had to travel very slowly. The men did not suffer very much; one man had his toes frozen.

After crossing the mountain from Snake river, found the snow from one to two feet deep, until I arrived at Pherni's fork of Bear river; after leaving that point it soon disappeared.

On the seventh my rations were exhausted. Some of my horses were so much jaded, that I left one man and four horses on Bear river, with some Indians, whose arrival I am hourly expecting. With the balance I pushed forward, and arrived at this camp on the tenth.

The weather, on my return, was very unfavorable, either raining or snowing twenty-six days out of thirty.

Respectfully submitted by

B. F. FICKLIN.

Major F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General, Army of Utah.

No. 23.—*Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, April 22, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor herewith to transmit a letter, with its inclosures, from Governor A. Cumming, dated 15th instant, in which he announces that he has been received and recognized as governor of Utah, and also a copy of my reply, with copies of papers accompanying it.

Having no other information in connexion with his reception and recognition than that contained in his letter, I am bound to presume that there has been some stipulation or promise on the part of the Mormons to disband, in obedience to the governor's proclamation, as I do not perceive how the position of affairs here would be changed in a material point of view without such immediate action on their part. If such promise has been made by Mormon leaders, there has been no compliance up to the date of my last information from their

from the fatigue of my mountain journey to receive company. In subsequent interviews with the ex-governor he has evinced a willingness to afford me every facility which I may require for the efficient performance of my administrative duties. His course in this respect meets, I fancy, with the approval of a majority of this community. The territorial seal, with other public property, has been tendered me by William H. Hooper, esq., late acting secretary *pro tem.*

I have not yet examined the subject critically, but apprehend that the records of the United States courts, territorial library, and other public property, remain unimpaired.

Having entered upon the performance of my official duties in this city, it is probable that I will be detained for some days in this part of the Territory.

I respectfully call your attention to a matter which demands our serious attention. Many acts of depredation have been recently committed by Indians upon the property of the inhabitants; one in the immediate vicinity of this city. Believing that the Indians will endeavor to sell the stolen property at or near the camp, I send herewith the brand book (incomplete) and memoranda (in part) of stock lost by citizens of Utah since February 25, 1858, and two letters addressed to me on the same subject by William H. Hooper, esq., late acting secretary *pro tem.*, which may enable you to secure the property and punish the thieves.

With feelings of profound regret I have learned that Agent Hurt is charged with having incited to acts of hostility the Indians in Uinta valley. I hope that Agent Hurt may be able to vindicate himself from the charges contained in letters (inclosed) from William H. Hooper, late secretary *pro tem.*, yet they demand thorough investigation. I shall probably be compelled to make requisition upon you for a sufficient force to chastise the Indians alluded to, since I desire to avoid being compelled to call out the militia for that purpose.

The gentlemen who are intrusted with this note, Mr. John B. Kimball and Mr. Fay Worthen, are engaged in mercantile pursuits here, and are represented to be of the highest respectability and have no connexion with the church. Should you deem it advisable or necessary, you will please send any communications intended for me by them. I beg leave to commend them to your confidence and courtesy. They will probably return to the city in a few days. These gentlemen are well known to Messrs. Gilbert, Perry, and Barr, with whom please communicate.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah Territory.

A. S. JOHNSTON, *Colonel of cavalry,*
Commanding army for Utah, Fort Scott, Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., April 21, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE, UTAH TERRITORY,
Great Salt Lake city, April 13, 1858.

SIR: Agreeably to your request I submit the following facts relative to recent Indian difficulties in this Territory, as I have learned them from reliable sources. Of the escort of Indians who accompanied Dr. Hurt, the Indian agent, to the advance of the army for Utah last fall, some were influential chiefs in the Utah tribe of Indians. Between these and the Indians of the tribe remaining in and around our settlements communication was opened from the time that the army halted in the Territory, and Indian expresses were in constant employ for that purpose during the winter. Numerous messages were sent to Arrapeen, the Utah chief, offering him large presents if he would join the troops with his people and engage with them in the assault upon the Mormons in the spring. The messages were invariably accompanied by the unqualified assurance that the troops would wipe the Mormons out. Although no serious difficulty transpired during the winter beyond petty annoyances, insolence, trespass and threats on the part of the Indians, yet rumors numerous and uncontradicted were current among them, that they would be employed by "the soldiers" to drive off the cattle and horses of the Mormons so soon as the passes to Bridger were practicable. On the 25th February last a descent was made upon the herds of one of our most northern settlements by two hundred and fifty Shoshones and Barraks. Two settlers were killed and five wounded; two hundred and twenty head of cattle and thirty-five horses were driven off. These Indians had been living, hunting, and fishing in the vicinity of this settlement from its commencement. Innumerable acts of kindness had been extended to them by the citizens, nor had there ever existed the slightest misunderstanding between them until (as a Shoshone chief, Snagg, states) a small detachment of "soldiers" or men from the camp of the soldiers at Bridger came to Beaver Head to buy stock; and that from the camp of this detachment a white man named J. H. Powell came to the lodges of the Barraks and Shoshones two days previous to the massacre herein referred to, and incited the Indians, giving them his aid and participation in the affair. The chief Snagg further states that subsequent to the massacre a quarrel occurred among the Indians, whereupon Powell left, and, after appointing a meeting with the Barraks at Soda Springs, or Bear River lake, from whence he would conduct them with their stolen stock to the camp of the troops, accompanied the detachment to Bridger. This information I derived from parties present at the scene of the difficulties and is confirmed by affidavits on file with the probate court of this county.

About the 1st of March a descent was made upon the herds of the settlers in Rush valley and a considerable number of cattle and horses were driven off; among them quite a number belonging to Mr. Thos. Box, late of Texas; for brands and descriptions of these, as of other stock referred to in this letter, I refer you to the accompanying memoranda. This was done by a detached party of a mixed band of

Shoshone and Utah Indians, who have for years lived in the immediate vicinity of our central settlements, and always friendly and recipients extensively of the kindness and substance of the citizens. The chief of the band was a Shoshone, commonly named Little Soldier. The Indians assert that a big captain among the white men at Bridger had employed them to steal the cattle and horses of the Mormons and drive them to them. It is a well known fact that communication between this band and Fort Bridger has been kept up all winter. On or about the 9th or 10th of March, this same party made a second descent upon the herds of Rush valley and drove off some fifty head of horses and mules, thirty of which belonged to Mr. Wm. Bringham, a resident of this city. Having myself a large herd of cattle in Scull valley, some 20 miles west of Rush valley and 70 miles from this city, on learning of these depredations I sent out to bring in my stock, and succeeded in securing it although the men were charged upon and fired at by the Indians while collecting it. On the 7th of this month about a hundred head of horses and mules were driven from the range at the north end of Utah lake, the property of John C. Neal. The depredators were supposed to be Utahs and a portion of Tintic's band, Tintic himself having left with Dr. Hurt last fall, or about the same time, and, as I have learned, wintered at or near Fort Bridger. The result of these depredations has been a compulsory abandonment of our frontiers and a consolidation of all our settlements, forcing us to keep out large detachments of military in various parts of the territory to keep the Indians in check. This is the more aggravated and felt the more severely by the citizens, as, with the exception of occasional outbreaks from small predatory bands, easily checked, and for two years entirely stopped, the aborigines had been friendly and well disposed to the citizens until the arrival in our Territory of the troops now encamped at Bridger. Even the consolidations of our settlements is attended with much danger, and large parties of armed men had to accompany the moving families, as in the case of sending relief to the settlers who had been deprived of their teams by the massacre of the 25th February. A detachment of our men was fired upon by the Indians and one man (Bailey Lake) was killed. The accompanying list of lost stock and brands of same, though not complete, is as full as I have been able to procure; a great portion of the stock having belonged to nearly as many persons as there were animals taken.

All of which is respectfully submitted by your obedient servant,

WILLIAM H. HOOPER,

Secretary pro tem.

His Excellency A. CUMMING,

Governor of Utah, Great Salt Lake city, U. T.

A true copy.

A. CUMMING,

Governor of Utah.

Forwarded by Governor Cumming to A. S. Johnston, Colonel of 2d cavalry, commanding army of Utah, Fort Scott, Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, April 21, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE, UTAH TERRITORY,
Great Salt Lake city, April 15, 1858.

SIR: In the enclosed letter my hurry of business has permitted me to enter but briefly with the particulars of our recent Indian troubles. A few words in regard to the conduct of Agent Hurt may not be out of place, in addition to what I have already said. On or about the time that information was received of the organization and advance of an army for Utah, complaints began daily to come from the citizens of Utah county to the executive of the Territory that Dr. Hurt was gathering around him a large band of Utah Indians. Indians who had always been friendly, and exerted their influence to promote peace and good feeling with the citizens, became abusive and exacting, and threatening violence. This unusual movement of the Indians, without any apparent cause, very naturally excited much uneasiness on the part of citizens, and it became necessary to inquire the cause. Dr. Hurt assigned his personal protection as his reason for collecting the Indians around him. On learning this, and the determination of Dr. Hurt to leave the scene of his duties, Governor Young wrote to him, assuring him of personal safety and an escort to the advancing army. Immediately after this (about the latter part of September) Dr. Hurt left the settlements in the night with a party of Utah Indians, and, as I have since learned, joined the United States troops near the northeastern boundary of the Territory. The Indians employed as express carriers from Fort Bridger to the Indians in and around the settlements report that Dr. Hurt has spent the most of the winter in Uinta with the Indians there, and that he sent frequent messages to have all the Utahs come out and join in the onslaught upon the Mormons. These items, though but reports from Indians, are so substantially corroborated by existing facts that I felt myself bound, in the discharge of my duty, to submit them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. H. HOOPER,
Secretary pro tem.

His Excellency A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah, Great Salt Lake city, U. T.

A true copy:

A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah.

Forwarded by Governor Cumming to A. S. Johnston, colonel of cavalry, commanding Army of Utah, Fort Scott, Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, April 21, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, April 21, 1858.

SIR: I have received your excellency's letter of the 15th instant, and desire to express the gratification the information gives me that you have been received and recognized as Governor of Utah.

The Mormon force now occupying the cañons and other positions on or near the route to Salt Lake City, it is to be presumed, will now, as a consequence, be disbanded, and I beg leave to request that I may be informed when that will take place. It will afford me sincere satisfaction to be able to make known to the Department of War such additional manifestation of a desire on the part of the people of the Territory to be reconciled to the government. I regret to learn that acts of depredation have been committed by the Indians on the inhabitants of the valley.

I have inquired into the charge made against Dr. Hurt, and have satisfied myself that he has faithfully discharged his duty as agent, and that he has given none but good advice to the Indians. I herewith transmit his letter to yourself in reply to the letter of W. H. Hooper. Other hostile acts perpetrated on Salmon river and other places have been inquired into by me. Inclosed you will receive a letter from Dr. Forney, superintendent of Indian affairs; also the affidavits of B. F. Ficklin, John W. Powell, and C. Jackson, which show that no act of hostility or annoyance has been committed on Salmon river, or Bannack creek or any other place by the Indians in consequence of the instigations by any one connected with the army.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d cavalry, commanding.

His Excellency A. CUMMING, *Governor of Utah.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, April 22, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

CAMP SCOTT, UTAH, *April 21, 1858.*

SIR: I have been shown your official letter to Colonel A. S. Johnston, with accompanying documents. I do not feel myself answerable

to Mr. Hooper, in any capacity, for my official conduct, but, as your excellency has deemed it proper to take cognizance of these charges, I feel it due to myself to say that every material allegation and insinuation therein contained is false and unfounded, and he or they who originated them knew them to be so. If evil disposed persons who have heretofore tampered with the Indians would turn their attention to some lawful and useful avocation, and leave the Indians to my control and direction, I am not unwilling to guaranty the good conduct of those with whom I have been associated. At the proper time and place I shall be ready to confront my accusers, and expose their malicious chicanery.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GARLAND HURT,
Indian Agent.

His Excellency A. CUMMING, *Governor.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., April 21, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

CAMP SCOTT AT FORT BRIDGER, U. T.,
April 21, 1858.

DEAR SIR: My attention was to-day called to an "editorial" in the "Deseret News" of the 14th of this month. The article in question does injustice to the Indians with whom I have had intercourse, and very great injustice to those who are intrusted with the management of Indian affairs in this Territory. The policy adopted and strictly adhered to, in all my intercourse with Indians thus far, has been to avoid inciting them against the Mormons, either person or property. It is the manifest design of the person or persons who have fabricated the reports in question to impress upon the public that presents have been lavished upon the Indians, to incite them against the Mormons. I can speak confidently for the tribes inhabiting this portion of the Territory, that no such bribes were necessary to secure their loyalty to the government.

So far as the Indian department in this Territory is concerned, and legitimate representatives of the government, the article is false and slanderous.

Your excellency knows more about my actions among the Indians than any one else.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. FORNEY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs, U. T.

His Excellency A. CUMMING, *Salt Lake city, U. T.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., April 21, 1858,

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

FORT BRIDGER, U. T., *April 21, 1858.*

SIR: I find in the "Deseret News" of April 14, that a government party camping at Beaver Head are accused of being the cause of the massacre of some Mormons on Salmon river, about March 1. The only party in that section during the winter was under my charge. I left this camp December 9, 1857, with instructions from the commissary to contract for beef cattle for the use of the army; instructions from the quartermaster to procure horses, also, for the command; and instructions from Colonel Johnston to act on the defensive with any party of Mormons which I might meet: also, was furnished by the quartermaster with letters of introduction from Governor Cumming to the different Indian agents, and Father Hoken of the Saint Ignatius mission in the Flathead country. I did not *say* or *do* anything myself, neither did any man under my command, to induce any Indians to interfere with the Mormons in any manner; on the contrary, I took every opportunity to tell all Indians and whites whom I met with on my trip, especially the Fathers of Saint Ignatius mission, that Colonel Johnston did not desire, and would not permit, any interference from Indians. On March 1 I was in the Flathead country, three hundred miles distant by the route travelled in the winter. The attack on Salmon River Fort, by Bannacks and Snakes, was induced by the Mormons furnishing a party of Nez Percés arms and ammunition to make war on them, (the Bannacks and Snakes.)

The party of Mormons under B. F. Cummings attacked on Bannack's creek, March 31, had a rencontre with some Indians on March 28, on Camas creek, and took from them three horses, in corroboration of which I enclose you a copy of a letter from B. F. Cummings, picked up on the road.

Respectfully submitted.

B. F. FICKLIN.

Major F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General, Army of Utah.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, April 21, 1858.

D. R. ECKELS,
Chief Justice of Supreme Court, Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., April 21, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Monday, 29, 4 p. m.—All well. We have just taken three of the brethren's horses from Boor-wat, to wit: Brother Moore's and Margattse's, and one supposed to belong to William Taylor. We caught them on the way from Camash creek to Snake river. We tried to get him to pay for the cattle he has killed, but he refused, and got very angry, and as we did not feel authorized to resort to force we left them.

B. F. CUMMINGS.

Col. CUNNINGHAM AND COMPANY.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, April 21, 1858.

Official :

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

UTAH TERRITORY, *Green River County.*

John W. Powell, being duly sworn, upon his oath deposeth and saith: That he came into the Territory aforesaid in July, 1855; his life has been threatened by the Mormons, but, with the exception of the loss of property, he has never been injured by them. He left the Territory of Utah in August, 1856, with an outfit of Indian goods, for the purpose of trading with the Bannack and Shoshonee Indians. He was at Fort Limhi, on Salmon river, in February, 1858; there he found six Bannack and some Shoshonee lodges. These Indians stated that a war party of Nez Percés Indians had been at the Mormon fort in search of them, the Bannacks; that the Mormons had furnished this war party with arms and ammunition; had fed them on the products of their (the Bannacks') lands; that subsequent to this the horses belonging to the Bannacks and Shoshonees were stolen by the Nez Percés; that they had never received any compensation from the Mormons for the land occupied by them; and they were on this account enraged at the Mormons, and would drive off their stock. The Bannacks inquired of him if the government of the United States would accept of their services and allow them to join them in fighting the Mormons; he told them that the United States was strong, and would not allow them to join them in their difficulties with the Mormons. The Indians then determined to attack the Mormons. He warned the Mormons, and told them to guard their stock; he was not engaged in the affair in any manner. Six Indians attacked the Mormons, killed two, and wounded others, drove off all of their cattle and some horses. He states that Brigham Young had endeavored to bribe these Indians who attacked the Mormons to join him in fighting the troops of the United States. He also says that he has seen cattle in possession of the Mormons which he knows to have been stolen

from emigrants. This is all he knows in relation to the Indian and Mormon difficulty at Fort Limhi; and further saith not.

JOHN W. POWELL.

Subscribed and sworn before me, April 21, 1858.

D. R. ECKELS,
Chief Justice of Superior Court, Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, April 22, 1858.

Official :

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

UTAH TERRITORY, *Green River county, ss.*

Craven Jackson, being duly sworn, upon his oath, deposeth and saith: That he came into the Territory aforesaid in the month of December, 1854, from Oregon Territory; that since that time he has visited the Mormon settlements every fall for the purpose of buying provisions and Indian goods; that during these visits he was well treated; that he has been trading since he has been in this country with the Bannack and Shoshonee Indians, principally with the former; that during the past winter he has been residing with these Indians at Beaver Head, in Nebraska Territory, on the headwaters of the Missouri river; that these Indians have complained for some two years past very much about the Mormons settling on their lands and building a fort on Salmon river. They represented to the deponent that when the Mormons first arrived they promised to pay the Indians for the land, but that this promise has never been fulfilled; that last winter they told him that these Mormons had furnished fire-arms and ammunition to their enemies, the Nez Percés Indians, for the purpose of fighting them, (the Bannacks,) and that when they (the Bannacks) went to the Mormons for the same purpose, that they were refused any assistance; and that after these Nez Percés Indians had been furnished with fire-arms that they came and stole all of their horses, and that not knowing who else to call upon for restitution, and having it out of their power to overtake the Nez Percés, they stole and drove off all of the Mormon stock from their fort, killing in the attempt two of the Mormons, and wounding several others. The deponent does not know these facts of his own knowledge, but the above statements were made to him by the Indians with whom he was living. Beaver Head is about 120 miles from Fort Limlie, the Mormon fort on Salmon river; and deponent further states, on oath, that last fall he started to go to Salt Lake City for the purpose of purchasing his goods, &c., as was his custom, but that he was stopped by the Mormons at their fort on the Malade river, in Salt Lake Valley, and was not allowed to go into the settlements, but was sent back;

that while he was at the Malade fort he purchased two oxen from a Mormon named John Barnard; that the said Barnard told him that he had bought these cattle from the Digger Indians, who live about the settlements, and who range as far as the Humboldt river, and that these Indians had stolen them from the emigrants on the road to California; these two were one yoke of oxen, out of five yoke which had been brought in at the same time; they were branded "T" on the left hip. The Indians told the deponent that said John Barnard had fifteen more, which had been stolen from the emigrants. Depo-
nent says further, on his oath, that he has never taken any part or participation in any difficulties between the Indians and the Mormons, but has endeavored to prevent such difficulties; and further saith not.

his
CRAVEN + JACKSON.
mark.

Subscribed and sworn to before me, April 21, 1858.

D. R. ECKELS,
Chief Justice of Superior Court, Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, April 22, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

CAMP SCOTT, UTAH TERRITORY,
April 28, 1858.

DEAR SIR: By a publication which appeared in the "Deseret News" of the 14th instant, Colonel A. S. Johnston, the commander of this army, is charged with having incited the Utah and Pan-nack Indians against the Mormons: the former through the agency of Dr. Hurt, Indian agent, the latter through Mr. B. F. Ficklin. We know that such has not been the policy of Colonel Johnston towards the Indians; for as early as October last he sought and obtained, through one of us, an intercourse with Wash-a-kee (the principal chief of the Shoshonee Indians,) the other acting as interpreter. On this occasion Colonel Johnston desired Wash-a-kee to go with his people to the Buffalo, and procure food and clothing, and not to connect himself and people with the difficulties that existed between the government and the Mormons. Wash-a-kee complained bitterly of the wrongs which had been perpetrated on his people by the Mormons, charging them with taking their lands from them, and driving their friends from the ferries on Green river. He also charged the Mormons with constantly attempting to prejudice him and his people against the government and all persons who were not Mormons; and that when

Brigham Young sent them any presents, they always told them that they were the gifts of the Mormons. He spent one night in Colonel Johnston's camp, and was accompanied by one of us to Fort Thompson, situated on the Popoagia, one of the tributaries of Wind river, when he joined his people and started in a few days in pursuit of the Buffalo, on Wind river, and has not since that time been either with this army or in its vicinity, or have there been any of his people on this side of the Wind River mountains this winter. On or about the 13th March we happened to meet in Colonel Johnston's quarters, when Ben Simons a native Delaware Indian, came in with Little Soldier, a chief of one of the bands of the Shoshonees, in company with some twenty of his principal men, to see and have a talk with Colonel Johnston. We were present during the whole of the interview, which lasted about two hours. They complained of the wrongs done them by the Mormons, and related the inducements held out by the Mormons to form an alliance with them against the government, offering a full share of the spoils if they would assist in capturing the supply trains intended for this army in the spring; assuring them that there was no danger attending the enterprise; that the Americans were cowards, and that they would run away at the first charge; that they were not men, and compared them to squaws.

Colonel Johnston advised them to have nothing to do with the existing difficulties; that the "Great Father" did not wish them to connect themselves in any way with this Mormon trouble; that he could attend to that matter himself; that they had been rebellious; and that he could attend to them himself, and make them respect the government and its laws without the assistance of any one. He told them that the Indians would not be allowed to participate in it at all; that they must keep outside and look on; if he should at any time require their services as guides, herders or scouts, he would send for them, and pay them for their services. He advised them to go back to their people and remain quiet. He also inquired of them if they had anything to eat; also if there was any game in their country. Ben Simons, who acted as interpreter, informed him that they had plenty at home, and that there was an abundance of game in the vicinity of their camp; that they wanted nothing but enough to eat for two days. This the colonel directed to be furnished to them. We feel free to say that, if Colonel Johnston had given either Wash-a-kee or Little Soldier the least encouragement, they would have at once commenced open hostilities against the Mormons. They regard them as their worst enemy, and only want an opportunity to make war upon them. Colonel Johnston's conduct on the two occasions alluded to, and his policy, as expressed to us on more than one occasion, forbids even the supposition that he is in any way guilty of the charge, or could have been in any way connected with the Utah's or Pan-nack's difficulties, complained of by the Mormons. Those acquainted with Colonel Johnston's policy towards the Indians will require some more respectable and reliable evidence than a mere editorial of the organ of the Mormon church, though emanating directly from Brigham Young himself, to convince them that he instigated or countenanced any depre-

dations committed on the Mormons by the Indian tribes in the Territory since he has taken command of the army of Utah.

We remain, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

W. M. F. MAGRAW.
JAMES BRIDGER.

Major FITZ JOHN PORTER.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 7, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

[From the "Deseret News," April 7, 1858.]

The California mail arrived on the 2d instant, and brought a larger number of papers than usual, but very few letters. The packages of New York Tribunes, Heralds, and Times, forwarded by our "Noisy Carrier" friend in San Francisco, were unusually liberal in size, complete in file, and very welcome. The news of any import, so far as time has permitted scanning it, will be found under the bee-hive, and among the selected articles; but there is not much of interest, except that the United States, with the President at the head, seems determined to rend the Union, through violating the Constitution, trampling upon rights, and substituting federal bayonets and gunpowder for candid investigation and just awards.

Public feeling East.—Wholesale murder of men, women and children, for no offence, except their mode of worship, does not appear, according to latest dates from the States, to be quite so popular as it was when James Buchanan ordered an army to escort civil officers to a region where their predecessors had ever been more courteously received and treated than many of them merited, and much more so than they would have been, with like conduct on their part, in any other portion of our country. The "sober, second thought," by those who in the *least* regard the rights of their fellows, is becoming disgusted that the trumpeted lies of a few base scoundrels should so far outweigh all true and honorable testimony as to entice the administration into so foul and unconstitutional a move as is the "expedition to Utah." Letter writers and editors are throwing out feelers to learn whether the nation is actually so far sunken as to allow pigmy demagogues, hireling priests, and rascally speculators to crush out the right to exercise freedom of conscience, so the worshipers are Latter-day Saints.

Pretended United States Court.—Letter writers in Colonel Johnston's camp have stated that Judge Eckels, or Eckles, (they spell the name both ways,) has been, and perhaps still is, holding a court in that camp. Has the judge, or have the letter writers, read a part of the 5th section of chapter cxxiv, United States Statutes at Large, as

follows? "*And be it further enacted*, That the judges of the supreme court in each of the Territories, or a majority of them, shall, when assembled at their respective seats of government, fix and appoint the several times and places of holding the several courts in their respective districts, and limit the duration of the terms thereof." When have the three judges, or a majority of them, assembled at the seat of government at Utah, and divided this Territory into three judicial districts, and appointed the times and places of holding courts therein? It has not been done by the present appointees, neither can it be done by them at present, if, as we are informed, only Judge Eckels has arrived in the Territory. Under what law is Judge Eckels holding a court in Utah? Or is that conduct only designed for a farce?

Mail-stopping.—Suppose that in a time of peace, and against a portion of American citizens who have committed no crime in law, the United States mail on the main route should be stopped, what would and should be done to the offender by the powers that be? Oh, that depends altogether upon whether a Colonel Johnston stops it, or a "Mormon." Should a "Mormon" commit such a crime, all hell, in the United States, England, and France, would boil for his extermination, without hearing or investigation, after the mode adopted by President Buchanan. Democratic, very—"over the left."

[From the "Deseret News," April 14, 1858.]

*Instructions by President Brigham Young; Tabernacle, March 28, 1858.
Reported by G. D. Watt.*

[Extract.]

The prospect of ancient "Mormonism"—of again leaving our homes—probably gives a spring to our feelings, especially since we for the first time have the privilege of laying waste our improvements, and are not obliged to leave our inheritances to strangers to enjoy and revel in the fruits of our labors.

It is a consolation to me that I have the privilege of laying in ashes and in the dust the improvements I have made, rather than those who would cut my throat, solely for my faith, shall inhabit my buildings and enjoy my fields and fruit. Heretofore I have often left my home and the fruits of my labors for others to enjoy.

Persecution is learning us to adopt a course for self-preservation, as you will readily understand from a few circumstances I will mention.

If we would only forsake our religion, our enemies would spare us and hail us as friends; but if we will not yield that point, they will endeavor to destroy us.

But the Lord Almighty rules in the heavens and controls our enemies, to a certain extent, and overrules their acts. He has his own purposes to accomplish, as much now as he ever had upon the face of the earth—as much as he had in the crucifixion of the Savior.

Could he have found a righteous man on the earth who would have betrayed his only Son? He could not. Would a man with his eyes open to see, and filled with the revelations of the Lord, have betrayed Jesus into the hands of Pilot? No. God overruled and selected a hypocrite—an ungodly, base, vile wretch—and placed him among the Apostles to accomplish that purpose, as much as he raised up Pharaoh.

God never hardened the heart of Pharaoh; he never ordained that wickedness should possess any man. Judas loved wickedness from his youth. Pharaoh was raised up to do what he did, because he was wicked from his youth: wickedness and hatred to every holy principle took possession of him, and God set him on the throne of Egypt to accomplish his purposes.

So it is with the men who are at the helm of our government. God has selected them to rule because the people are wicked and will not hearken to his voice. They have killed his prophets and many of his people, and he has placed corrupt, wicked men in office, to rule and bear sway—what for? To show forth his wisdom. The hand of God is in all this, and he lets loose those wicked creatures, in order to drive us to do that which his mercies fail to induce us to perform.

There is a great deal of inquiry as to whether we shall be under the necessity of burning. We are now under the necessity of preparing for it, and that is enough for the present.

I wish union; it is stronger than buildings, and will accomplish much more for us. And I hope the Lord will suffer us to pass through enough to cleanse sin and selfishness from us.

When I reflect upon it, it is almost discouraging that many who have been in this church a score of years, and have been in drivings, mobbings, death and affliction, are filled with covetousness, which is idolatry, and do not know what to do with blessings when they have them, nor know where they come from. I am not discouraged; but intend to persevere as long as I possess life.

The Lord is leading this people as he designs for the building up of his kingdom, and we need not worry ourselves about it. You were told last season, when we heard that an army was on its way here, that we would rather lay waste this Territory than yield our rights to men who have no regard for, neither understand, the constitutional rights of the people, and the people said amen to that purpose. We were able last fall to keep them from us, and we are well able to defend this city; how long I do not know.

If we love our improvements and property better than we love the lives of our brethren, the Lord will lead us in a way to waste us, instead of our property. Can you understand that it is better to lose property than the lives of men, women and children?

But if we are so wedded to our property that we would rather fight for it than sacrifice it, if required, for our religion, then we are in a condition to be wasted, and our property would go into the hands of our enemies.

We are able to defend the city and keep out our enemies; but if

we prove to our Father in heaven, and to one another, that we are willing to hand back to him that which he has given us, (which is not a sacrifice,) and that we love not the world nor the things of the world, he will preserve the people until they can become righteous.

You never heard me say that we would stick to this city, but we will defend ourselves against the floods of iniquity which our enemies wish to overwhelm us with by the introduction of a licentious and corrupted soldiery.

If we vacate the ground, that may satisfy them; but if they undertake to come in before we are ready, we will send them to their long home.

Some may marvel why the Lord says "rather than fight your enemies, go away;" it is because many of the people are so grossly wicked, that were we to go out to fight, thousands of the elders would go into eternity, and women and children would perish.

I am willing to leave this place if I am called upon, and to take joyfully the spoiling of my goods; it is all right. It is a trouble for us to take care of the property we have; and if I knew that it was just as pleasing to the Lord, I would rather reduce it to ashes. We can move chairs, bureaus, &c. "Shall we take out such articles first?" Charge your minds with this counsel, bishops and all elders of Israel; the articles of food are first to be moved to safe places. Take care of the eatables, and see that they are well secured; take care of our grain, &c., first, and see that the Indians cannot get our oxen and cows. Then we will take care of the people; and then, if we have time, we can move more or less of the valuable furniture, and cache our doors, lumber, &c.

Remember the counsel you have heard to-day, and prepare for burning.

May the Lord bless you. You have my prayers, good feelings and faith all the time; and I trust that the kindness and mercies of our Father in heaven are such that he will bear with us in our weaknesses, until we can learn truth and righteousness and practice it; which may God grant. Amen.

No. 24.—*Brigham Young to Colonel Kane.*

GREAT SALT LAKE CITY,

March 9, 1858—*Tuesday, 8 o'clock p. m.*

DEAR SIR: We have just learned, through the southern Indians, that the troops are very destitute of provisions.

Mr. Gerrish, a merchant, formerly of this place, and who is now supposed to be detained in Colonel Johnston's camp, has quite a herd of cattle here, and for which he would doubtless like a market. We know of none that would be equal to the army of the United States, now encamped within our borders. We have, therefore, concluded to send this herd, consisting of nearly two hundred head of cattle, a portion of which are tolerable good beef. In addition to the foregoing, we shall send out fifteen or twenty thousand pounds of flour to

the army, to which they will be made perfectly welcome, or pay for, just as they choose. All of which will be forwarded in a few days, so soon as the necessary arrangements can be made and the snow will admit. If, after your arrival, you learn that Colonel Johnston will not receive the flour, we will be obliged if you will be at the trouble of communicating the fact to those who attend you, that we may be saved the trouble.

I send this by my son, Joseph A., and George Stringham.

Trusting that you are rapidly regaining your health, and that success may attend you, I remain, most respectfully,

BRIGHAM YOUNG.

Colonel THOMAS L. KANE.

No. 25.—*Colonel Johnston to Colonel Kane.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Ter., March 15, 1858.

SIR: President Brigham Young is not correctly informed with regard to the state of the supply of provisions of this army. There has been no deficiency, nor is there any now. We have abundance to last until the government can renew the supply. Whatever might be the need of the army under my command for food, we would neither ask nor receive from President Young and his confederates any supplies while they continue to be enemies of the government. If Mr. Gerrish desires to have his cattle sent to him, I will interpose no obstacle, on condition, further than I desire that they may be delivered to him on the Muddy, ten miles in advance of this camp. President Young says Mr. Gerrish is "supposed to be detained in Colonel Johnston's camp;" the supposition is erroneous; Mr. Gerrish started for the eastern States some weeks since. He has at all times been at liberty to go wherever he pleased, as is every other American citizen, without question from any one, except to Salt Lake City, or some position occupied by an armed body of Mormons opposed to the government; all intercourse with the enemy being prohibited by the 56th and 57th articles of war.

However unfortunate the position now occupied by that portion of the citizens of Utah belonging to the sect of Mormons, it is of their own seeking, and it is one from which they can be relieved by the mere act of obedience to the proclamation of Governor Cummings. Having the question of peace or war under his own control, President Young would, should he choose the latter, be responsible for all the consequences.

I beg to ask of you the favor to communicate my reply to President Young.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d cavalry, commanding.

Colonel THOMAS L. KANE,
Eckelsville, Utah Territory.

No. 26.—*Colonel Kane to Colonel Johnston.*

CAMP SCOTT, GREEN RIVER COUNTY,
Utah Territory, March 14, 1858.

SIR: I have learned, I hope incorrectly, that since my arrival at this place a horseman, or a group of horsemen, discerned at a considerable distance from camp, were approached by a party of the soldiery under your command, and, without notice or question addressed them, fired upon. If you were not apprised of the fact before, permit me to state that there may be, at this time, a person or persons in waiting for your answer to the proposal of Brigham Young, of Great Salt Lake City, to furnish this army with provisions. I most respectfully pray, therefore, that you will be pleased to issue such orders as will prevent unnecessary bloodshed. I trust I am not indiscreet in adding that I regard this as of extreme importance at the present exigency.

Your very obedient servant,

THOMAS L. KANE,
of Philadelphia.

Colonel A. S. JOHNSTON,
United States Army, commanding the Army of Utah.

NOTE.—The truth of the above report has not been confirmed, nor has any party ever been fired upon under the circumstances mentioned.

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 27.—*Colonel Kane to Colonel Johnston.*

ECKELSVILLE, *March 15, 1858.*

SIR: With respect to the person or persons who may at this time be exposing themselves through a desire to communicate on business, &c., I am only able to state that the guide who accompanied me as far as the vicinity of what is called Muddy Creek, a distance of, I fancy, eleven or twelve miles from Fort Bridger, was a slightly built man of swarthy complexion, with dark eyes, and mounted upon a black Indian pony, slow of foot. His name given me was Lewis Robinson, and he is or was the reputed owner and late occupant of the premises at and around Bridger, for which reason I selected him to point me out my way. If this person, either alone or in the company of others, has been driven off from the vicinity of the Salt Lake road west of this by being fired upon, I have little hope that the effort which I am about to make to look him up will prove successful. But that it would be out of place on my part, I would express my regret at the strictness of your orders. I presume that I can only request, conformably to the offer contained in your letter of this morning, that you will give such orders as will insure protection to any one small party or single

individual not plainly seen to be armed, discovered at a considerable distance beyond your furthest outpost in the neighborhood of the high road west, and not observed to be approaching, or otherwise conducting himself or themselves in what may be deemed a suspicious and exceptionable manner.

I have been informed that I need a "countersign," to enable me to pass sentinels, &c., when desirous to "communicate," as proposed. Will you be good enough to give me what you think I should be provided with?

With great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS L. KANE.

Col. A. S. JOHNSTON,

U. S. Army, commanding Department of Utah.

No. 28.—*Colonel Johnston to Colonel Kane.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, March 15, 1858.

SIR: I have just received your note of this morning, informing me that a party of horsemen have been fired upon by a party of soldiers. I regret that the party in question, if a portion of your escort, did not come in with you, or was not reported to me. In that case, their safety would have been assured to them; and I now to have say to you, if the person or persons alluded to can be communicated with by you, or you can inform me where they can be found, I will give such orders as will insure their protection, and take care that they suffer no molestation. My orders are strict, and armed parties should be careful, in approaching, to make known, by signals or otherwise, that they desire to communicate on business.

I am, sir, with great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

Colonel 2d cavalry, commanding.

Colonel THOMAS L. KANE,

Eckelsville, Utah Territory.

No. 29.—*Colonel Kane to Colonel Johnston.*

ECKELSVILLE, *March 16, 1858—8½ a. m.*

SIR: At the request of his excellency Governor Cumming, I consent to bear the reply which you request me to communicate to President Brigham Young. I fear that it must greatly prejudice the public interest to refuse Mr. Young's proposal in such a manner at the present time. Permit me, therefore, to entreat you, most respectfully, to reconsider it; and, adverting to my offer made you orally on Sunday afternoon, ask permission to impart to you additional information with respect to the posture of affairs at Salt Lake City, if you

can encourage me to believe that by so doing I may yet hope to modify your views.

I beg not to hasten your determination. My horse will not arrive from the range in time for me to proceed in search of the Mormons before to-morrow.

If I adopt the opinion that a more particular reply is called for from me to those portions of your letter which do not, in my opinion, necessarily connect themselves with the subject-matter of Mr. Young's letter, I shall feel at liberty to offer it at a future day.

I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,

THOMAS L. KANE.

Colonel A. S. JOHNSTON,

U. S. Army, commanding, Department of Utah.

No. 30.—*Brigham Young to Governor Cumming.*

GREAT SALT LAKE CITY,
April 16, 1858.

SIR: Learning that you purpose sending an express to Colonel Johnston's camp, I avail myself of the opportunity of proffering, through your excellency, to Colonel Johnston and the army under his command, inasmuch as they are supposed to be measurably destitute, such supplies of provisions as we have, and they may need, prior to the arrival of supplies from the east.

Trusting that you will appreciate the sincerity of the motives prompting this courtesy, I have the honor to be, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

BRIGHAM YOUNG.

His Excellency Governor A. CUMMING.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, May 28, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 31.—*Governor Cumming to Mr. Cass.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, GREAT SALT LAKE CITY,
Utah Territory, May 2, 1858.

SIR: You are aware that my contemplated journey was postponed in consequence of the snow on the mountains and in the cañons between Fort Bridger and this city. In accordance with the determination communicated in former notes, I left camp on the 5th and arrived here on the 12th instant.

Some of the incidents of my journey are related in the annexed note addressed by me to Colonel A. S. Johnston on the 15th instant:

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, GREAT SALT LAKE CITY,
Utah Territory, April 15, 1858.

SIR: I left camp on the 5th, en route to this city, in accordance with a determination communicated to you on the 3d instant, accompanied by Colonel Kane, as my guide, and two servants. Arriving in the vicinity of the spring, which is on this side of the "Quaking Asp" hill, after night, Indian camp-fires were discerned on the rocks overhanging the valley. We proceeded to the spring, and, after disposing of the animals, retired from the trail beyond the mountains. We had reason to congratulate ourselves upon having taken this precaution, as we subsequently ascertained that the country lying between your outposts and the Yellow is infested by hostile renegades and outlaws from various tribes.

I was escorted from "Bear River valley" to the western end of Echo cañon; the journey through the cañon being performed for the most part after night, it was about 11 o'clock p. m. when I arrived at Weber station. I have been everywhere recognized as the Governor of Utah, and, so far from having encountered insults or indignities, I am gratified in being able to state to you that in passing through the settlements I have been universally greeted with such respectful attentions as are due to the representative of the executive authority of the United States in the Territory.

Near the Warm Springs, at the line dividing Great Salt Lake and Davis counties, I was honored with a formal and respectful reception by many gentlemen, including the mayor and other municipal officers of the city, and by them escorted to lodgings previously prepared, the mayor occupying a seat in my carriage. Ex-Governor Brigham Young paid me a call of ceremony as soon as I was sufficiently relieved from the fatigue of my mountain journey to receive company. In subsequent interviews with the ex-governor, he has evinced a willingness to afford me every facility which I may require for the efficient performance of my administrative duties. His course in this respect meets, I fancy, with the approval of a majority of this community. The territorial seal, with other public property, has been rendered me by William H. Hooper, esq., late acting secretary *pro tem*.

I have not yet examined the subject critically, but apprehend that the records of the United States courts, territorial library, and other public property, remain unimpaired.

Having entered upon the performance of my official duties in this city, it is probable that I will be detained for some days in this part of the Territory.

I respectfully call your attention to a matter which demands our serious consideration. Many acts of depredation have been recently committed by Indians upon the property of the inhabitants—one in the immediate vicinity of this city.

Believing that the Indians will endeavor to sell the stolen property at or near the camp, I herewith enclose the brand book (incomplete)

and memoranda (in part) of stock lost by citizens of Utah since February 25, 1858, and two letters addressed to me on the same subject by William H. Hooper, esq., late acting secretary *pro tem.*, which may enable you to secure the property and punish the thieves.

With feelings of profound regret I have learned that Agent Hurt is charged with having incited to acts of hostility the Indians in Uinta valley. I hope that Agent Hurt will be able to vindicate himself from the charges contained in the enclosed letters from William H. Hooper, late secretary *pro tem.*, yet they demand thorough investigation. I shall probably be compelled to make a requisition upon you for a sufficient force to chastise the Indians alluded to, since I desire to avoid being compelled to call out the militia for that purpose.

The gentlemen who are intrusted with this note, Mr. John B. Kimball and Mr. Fay Worthen, are engaged in mercantile pursuits here, and are represented to be of the highest respectability, and have no connexion with the church. Should you deem it advisable or necessary, you will please send any communications intended for me by them. I beg leave to commend them to your confidence and courtesy. They will probably return to the city in a few days. These gentlemen are well known to Messrs. Gilbert, Perry, and Barr, with whom please communicate.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. CUMMING,

Governor of Utah Territory.

A. S. JOHNSTON, *Colonel of Cavalry,*

Commanding Army of Utah, Fort Scott, Utah Territory.

The note omits to state that I met parties of armed men at Lost and Yellow creeks, as well as at Echo cañon. At every point, however, I was recognized as the governor of Utah and received with a military salute. When it was arranged with the Mormon officer in command of my escort that I should pass through Echo cañon at night, I inferred that it was with the object of concealing the barricades and other defences; I was therefore agreeably surprised by an illumination in honor to me. The bonfires kindled by the soldiers from the base to the summits of the hills of the cañon completely illuminated the valley and disclosed the snow-covered mountains which surrounded us. When I arrived at the next station I found the "emigrant road" over the Big mountain still impassable. I was able to make my way, however, down Weber cañon.

Since my arrival I have been employed in examining the records of the supreme and district courts which I am now prepared to report upon as being perfect and unimpaired. This will doubtless be acceptable information to those who have entertained an impression to the contrary.

I have also examined the legislative records and other books belonging to the office of the secretary of state, which are in perfect preservation. The property return, though not made up in proper form, exhibits the public property for which W. H. Hooper, late secretary of state, is responsible. It is, in part, the same for which

the estate of A. W. Babbett is liable, that individual having died whilst in the office of secretary of state for Utah.

I believe that the books and charts, stationery, and other property appertaining to the surveyor general's office will, upon examination, be found in their proper place, except some instruments which are supposed to have been disposed of by a person who was temporarily in charge of the office. I examined the property, but cannot verify the matter in consequence of not having at my command a schedule or property return.

The condition of the large and valuable territorial library has also commanded my attention, and I am pleased in being able to report that Mr. W. C. Staines, the librarian, has kept the books and records in most excellent condition. I will, at an early day, transmit a catalogue of this library and schedules of the other public property, with certified copies of the records of the supreme and district courts, exhibiting the character and amount of the public business last transacted in them.

On the 21st instant I left Great Salt Lake City and visited Tuilla and Rush valleys, in the latter of which lies the military reserve selected by Colonel Steptoe, and endeavored to trace the lines upon the ground from field notes which are in the surveyor general's office. An accurate plat of the reserve, as it has been measured off, will be found accompanying a communication which I shall address to the Secretary of War upon this subject.

On the morning of the 24th instant information was communicated to me that a number of persons who were desirous of leaving the Territory were unable to do so, and considered themselves to be unlawfully restrained of their liberty. However desirous of conciliating popular opinion, I felt it incumbent upon me to adopt the most energetic measures to ascertain the truth or falsehood of this statement. Postponing, therefore, a journey of importance, which I had in contemplation, to one of the settlements of Utah county, I caused public notice to be given immediately of my readiness to relieve all persons who were or deemed themselves to be aggrieved; and on the ensuing day, which was Sunday, requested the following notice to be read in my presence to the people in the Tabernacle:

NOTICE.

It has been reported to me that there are persons residing in this and in other parts of the Territory who are illegally restrained of their liberty. It is therefore proper that I should announce that I assume the protection of all such persons, if any there be, and request that they will communicate to me their names and places of residence, under seal, through Mr. Fay Worthen, or to me in person during my stay in the city.

A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah Territory.

I have since kept my office open at all hours of the day and night, and have registered no less than fifty-six men, thirty-three women,

and seventy-one children, as desirous of my protection and assistance in proceeding to the States. The large majority of these people are of English birth, and state that they leave the congregation from a desire to improve their circumstances, and realize elsewhere more money by their labor. Certain leading men among the Mormons have promised to furnish them flour and assist them in leaving the country.

My presence at the meeting in the Tabernacle will be remembered by me as an occasion of intense interest. Between three and four thousand persons were assembled for the purpose of public worship; the hall was crowded to overflowing; but the most profound quiet was observed when I appeared. President Brigham Young introduced me by name as the governor of Utah, and I addressed the audience from "the stand." I informed them that I had come among them to vindicate the national sovereignty; that it was my duty to secure the supremacy of the Constitution and the laws; that I had taken my oath of office to exact an unconditional submission on their part to the dictates of the law. I was not interrupted. In a discourse of about thirty minutes' duration I touched (as I thought best) boldly upon the leading questions at issue between them and the general government. I remembered that I had to deal with men embittered by the remembrance and recital of many real, and some imaginary wrongs, but did not think it wise to withhold from them the entire truth. They listened respectfully to all that I had to say, approvingly even, I fancied, when I explained to them what I intended should be the character of my administration; in fact, the whole manner of the people was calm, betokening no consciousness of having done wrong, but rather, as it were, indicating a conviction that they had done their duty to their religion and their country. I have observed that the Mormons profess to view the Constitution as the work of inspired men, and respond with readiness to appeals for its support.

Thus the meeting might have ended; but after closing my remarks I rose and stated that I would be glad to hear from any who might be inclined to address me upon topics of interest to the community. This invitation brought forth in succession several powerful speakers, who evidently exercised great influence over the masses of the people. They harangued on the subject of the assassination of Joseph Smith, jr., and his friends; the services rendered by the Mormon battalion to an ungrateful country; their sufferings on "the plains" during their dreary pilgrimage to their mountain home, &c., &c.

The congregation became greatly excited, and joined the speakers in their intemperate remarks, exhibiting more frenzy than I had expected to witness among a people who habitually exercise great self-control. A speaker now represented the federal government as desirous of needlessly introducing the national troops into the Territory, "whether a necessity existed for their employment to support the authority of the civil officers or not," and the wildest uproar ensued. I was fully confirmed in the opinion that this people, with their extraordinary religion and customs, would gladly encounter

certain death rather than be taxed with a submission to the military power, which they wrongfully consider to involve a loss of honor. In my first address I had informed them that they were entitled to a trial by their peers; that I had no intention of stationing the army in immediate contact with their settlements, and that the military posse would not be resorted to until other means of arrest had been tried and failed. I found the greatest difficulty in explaining these points, so great was the excitement. Eventually, however, the efforts of Brigham Young were successful in calming the tumult and restoring order before the adjournment of the meeting. It is proper that I should add that more than one speaker has since expressed his regret at having been betrayed into intemperance of language in my presence.

The President and the American people will learn with gratification the auspicious issue of our difficulties here. I regret the necessity which compels me to mingle with my congratulations the announcement of a fact which will occasion grave concern. The people, including the inhabitants of this city, are removing from every settlement in the northern part of the Territory. The roads are everywhere filled with wagons loaded with provisions and household furniture, the women and children, often without shoes or hats, driving their flocks they know not where. They seem not only resigned but cheerful. "It is the will of the Lord," and they rejoice to exchange the comforts of home for the trials of the wilderness. Their ultimate destination is not, I apprehend, definitely fixed upon. "Going south" seems sufficiently definite for most of them, but many believe that their ultimate destination is Sonora. On the afternoon of Sunday last President Brigham Young is reported to have spoken in the Tabernacle as follows:

"I have a good mind to tell a secret right here; I believe I will tell it any how; they say there is a fine country down south there; Sonora is it, is that your name for it? Do not speak of this out of doors if you please."

Young, Kimball, and most of the influential men have left their commodious mansions, without apparent regret, to lengthen the long train of wanderers. The masses everywhere announce to me that the torch will be applied to every house, indiscriminately, throughout the country, so soon as the troops attempt to cross the mountains. I shall follow these people and attempt to rally them. Numbers whom I have met appear to be in dread of the Indians, whom the distressed condition of the whites has encouraged to commit extensive depredations. I may at least quiet the apprehensions of these persons, and induce some of them to return.

Our military force could overwhelm most of these poor people, involving men, women, and children in a common fate; but there are among the Mormons many brave men, accustomed to arms and to horses—men who would fight desperately as guerrillas, and, if the settlements are destroyed, will subject the country to an expensive and protracted war, without any compensating results. They will, I am sure, submit to trial by their peers, but they will not brook the idea

of trials by "jurors composed of teamsters and followers of the camp," nor of an army encamped in their cities or dense settlements.

I have adopted means to recall the few remaining Mormons in arms who have not yet, it is said, complied with my request to withdraw from the cañons and the eastern frontier. I have also taken measures to protect the buildings which have been vacated in the northern settlements. I am sanguine that I will save a great part of the valuable improvements; then I shall leave this city for the south to-morrow. After I have finished my business there I shall return as soon as possible to the army to complete the arrangements which will enable me before long, I trust, to announce that the road between California and Missouri may be travelled in perfect security by teams and emigrants of every description. I shall restrain all operations of the military for the present, which will probably enable me to receive from the President additional instructions if he deems it necessary to give them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah.

Hon. LEWIS CASS, *Secretary of State, Washington, D. C.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory May 28, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY.

Delivered to General Johnston in person by Governor Cumming,
May 24, 1858.

No. 32.—*Colonel Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 7, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor herewith to transmit a return of the troops of this department for the month of April, 1858.

The sick report has increased slightly, in consequence of the unfavorable character of the weather since the last return, but there are no serious cases of illness. The equipment of the troops is complete and in good condition, with the exception of shoes, caps, and socks, of which articles there is a small deficiency of shoes, and a large one of socks and caps. I have ordered moccasins to be made and issued to those needing shoes.

I expect the arrival of Colonel Hoffman and Captain Marcy by the last of the month. The troops are in *excellent* condition, besides which I have nothing to report worthy of mention. Enclosed I send

a copy of the letter received from Governor Cumming yesterday, and also my reply. He gives me no information with regard to what he has been able to accomplish in the adjustment of the Mormon difficulties. My information from other sources is that the Mormons are moving away from the city and settlements north of it, and that they still hold their forces in position as heretofore.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d cavalry, commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army, New York city.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
Great Salt Lake City, U. T., May 3, 1858.

SIR: By the hands of Messrs. Lawrence and Hopkins, I send a mail including a communication to the Hon. Lewis Cass, Secretary of State, on official business of importance, which, with a few other letters enclosed, you will greatly oblige me if you will forward by express.

If there be any reason to prevent you furnishing the express facility, may I beg the favor of your communicating my wishes on the subject to Mr. Carter, of the firm of Livingston & Co. I leave for the south in a few moments, but will return to camp within ten days from this date, when I will have prepared for you a copy of my communication to Secretary Cass.

Messrs. Lawrence and Hopkins are represented to me as merchants residing in this city; they must be well known to merchants at camp. Permit me to bespeak your consideration for these gentlemen, and request that they may be made bearers of any communication to me.

A large number of persons are preparing to leave here for the States; they will, I trust, meet no cause of delay on passing your camp.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah Territory.

Colonel A. S. JOHNSTON,
*Colonel of cavalry, commanding Army of Utah,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 6, 1858.

Official :

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, May 6, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3d instant, and to inform you that the letters accompanying it will be forwarded by express to-morrow.

The persons mentioned in your letter who design to travel eastward will not be interrupted on their journey by the troops anywhere on the route.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d cavalry, commanding.

His excellency A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 6, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 33.—Governor Cumming to Mr. Cass.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
Great Salt Lake City, U. T., May 12, 1858.

SIR: I have returned from the south after having seen and conversed with large numbers of Mormons who are journeying in that direction. I have reasons to hope that my intercourse with these persons has contributed to allay fears on their part which are perhaps unreasonable. I regret to have been an eye witness however to scenes of great trial and suffering.

I have the gratification of authorizing you to announce that the road is now open between Missouri and California, and that emigrants and others adopting the usual precautions for their safety against the Indians, may pass through Utah Territory without hindrance or molestation. Parties will do well however to report themselves at Bridger, where any information which I may be possessed of, of importance for their guidance, will be communicated to them.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah.

Hon. LEWIS CASS,
Secretary of State.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 28, 1856.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 34.—*Copy of Mormon Pass.*

QUARTERMASTER GENERAL'S OFFICE, N. L.,
Great Salt Lake City, May 13, 1858.

SIR: You will please allow Kassisi to pass and repass to and from Fort Bridger.

LEWIS ROBINSON,
Quartermaster General, N. L.

Major FRANK WOLLEY,
Commanding at Echo Cañon.

May 20, 1858.

A true copy:

F. J. PORTER.

No. 35.—*General Johnston to Army Headquarters..*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 21, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of 2d ultimo. The opinion of the General-in-Chief communicated in your letter will be most carefully considered by me, and otherwise receive the respectful attention due to it on account of the source whence it emanates.

My present impression is, if there should be need to do it, that it will be quite practicable to turn the passes. The necessary reconnaissances will determine. The force under my command will be considerably augmented on the arrival of Colonel Hoffman and Captain Marcy.

The great quantity of snow which fell early in this month, from two to two and one-half feet deep, delayed Colonel Hoffman some days on the La Bonté, fifty miles this side of Laramie. The draught animals of the train of supplies under his charge were weakened by being deprived of grass for several days. He expected to resume his march on the 11th instant; his arrival here cannot be expected before the 10th proximo. I have ordered him to send forward in advance of him a train lightly laden with fifteen days' provisions, and to prevent any failure of arrival in time have this morning despatched Lieutenant Smith, 2d dragoons, with thirty men in charge of seventy-five mules, to replace animals broken down; he will probably meet the advance train at the South Pass. I suppose Colonel Hoffman is to-day at Horse creek.

The order of the chief commissary to his assistants regulating the subsistence allowance is forwarded herewith. Thus modified the rations will last till the 3d of June, by which time I feel certain supplies will reach us.

The horses and mules are daily improving in condition. Since November comparatively few have perished.

Governor Cumming returned to this place some days since. I am unable to inform you what has been accomplished besides his reception as governor, which has been made known to you. He will probably make a communication to me before the departure of the next express. A few families reached here day before yesterday, (there are twenty-nine persons) the greater portion of whom are children; more persons are said to be on the way. This movement I hear is in accordance with an arrangement made for them by Governor Cumming.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

Col. 2d Cavalry and Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.

P. S. In addition to the above I have the honor to transmit a copy of an official communication received this evening from Governor Cumming, and my reply thereto,

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

Col. 2d Cavalry and Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army, N. Y.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Scott, U. T., May 21, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

OFFICE OF THE COMMISSARY OF SUBSISTENCE, ARMY OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, May 19, 1858.

SIR: By direction of the general commanding, until further orders, commencing on the 21st instant the following arrangement of the ration is substituted for that promulgated in general orders No. 19, of March 31, 1858:

1½ lbs. fresh beef, ¾ lbs. of bacon, pork or ham, or ½ lb. of dried beef.

Ten (10) ounces of flour.

Beans to be issued six times in ten days.

Rice to be issued eight times in ten days.

Desiccated vegetables to be issued twice in ten days.

The other component parts of the ration to be issued as directed in the general orders above mentioned.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. F. CLARKE,

Commissary of Subsistence.

Addressed to the Acting Assistant Commissaries of Subsistence, through their respective commanding officers.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, May 21, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, CAMP SCOTT, U. T., May 21, 1858.

SIR: After a careful investigation I am gratified in being able to inform you that I believe there is at present no organized armed force of its inhabitants in any part of this Territory, with the exception of a small party subject to my orders in or near Echo Cañon.

I therefore respectfully request that no hindrance may hereafter be presented to the commercial, postal or social intercourse throughout the Territory.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah Territory.

Brevet Brigadier General A. S. JOHNSTON,
Commanding Army of Utah, Camp Scott, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, May 21, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, May 21, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, and have to say in reply that, with the assurance your excellency gives me of your "belief, after a careful investigation, that there is at present no organized armed force of its inhabitants in any part of this Territory," with the exception mentioned, it gives me great satisfaction to reply that the troops under my command will oppose no further obstruction to the carrying of the mails, or to the commercial pursuits, or to a free intercourse of the inhabitants of that Territory.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
*Colonel 2d cavalry, and Brevet Brigadier General,
United States Army, commanding.*

His Excellency, A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, May 21, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 36.—*Major Porter to Colonel Hoffman.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 22, 1858.

SIR: The commanding general, in consequence of the governor of Utah Territory informing him that, "after a careful investigation, I am gratified in being able to inform you that I believe there is at present no organized armed force of its inhabitants in any part of this Territory, with the exception of a small party subject to my orders, in or near Echo Cañon," wishes the mail and all parties peacefully pursuing their ordinary avocations to pass without interruption; but not on this account to relax the vigilance which should be exercised in an enemy's country to secure your trains and herds.

If you have any prisoners charged only with being on the road and holding correspondence with the Mormons, while maintaining a hostile attitude to the government of the United States, the general commanding wishes them released.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel WM. HOFFMAN,
Commanding escort to supply trains en route to Camp Scott, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 26, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 37.—*Governor Cumming to General Johnston.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
Near Camp Scott U. T., May 25, 1858.

SIR: Marshal P. K. Dotson has this day requested me to place such a posse under his command, as will enable him to serve writs upon Brigham Young and sixty-six others indicted for treason and other felonies by the grand jury in Green River county, Utah Territory. Please inform me whether you can furnish the military posse if specifically demanded by Marshal P. K. Dotson.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. CUMMING,
Governor Utah Territory.

Brigadier General A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel of Cavalry Commanding Army of Utah, Camp Scott, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 27, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 38.—*General Johnston to Governor Cumming.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 26, 1858.

SIR: I have just received your letter of yesterday's date, and I have to say in reply that, should a requisition be made upon me by the civil authority for troops to be employed as a posse to serve writs upon Brigham Young and others, indicted for treason and other offences, I will not at this time be able to comply with such requirement.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d cavalry, and Brevet Brigadier General
United States Army, commanding.

His Excellency A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., May 27, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 39.—*Major Buell to Colonel Andrews.*

HEADQUARTERS UTAH FORCES,
St. Louis, Missouri, April 27, 1858.

SIR: It is the order of the general commanding that the instructions which I am now directed to communicate to you in regard to your route, shall be kept secret until they develop themselves to your command as you progress.

You will conduct your command to Fort Bridger *via* Fort Kearney, Lodge-pole creek, and Bridger's Pass. Your route will follow generally the reconnoissances of Captain Stansbury and Lieutenant Bryan, but may be varied in minor particulars, so as to improve its quality, but without delaying your progress with prolonged explorations. The road is to be worked whenever that is necessary to render it conveniently passable for teams, and in this duty the infantry troops will assist the engineer company, whenever the labor is at all continuous, in order that your march be delayed as little as possible.

is is necessary both for the object of having your command early with the force now in Utah, and to get it out of the way of troops that will soon follow on the route.

Beyond Bridger's Pass, your route has not been passed over by any considerable train or body of men, and is represented to be very destitute of wood and grass. It is not intended to cramp your discretion in regard to the manner of conducting your expedition judiciously, and it will probably suggest itself to your own mind that it

will sometimes be found expedient to feel your way with the topographical engineer party and the engineer troops before putting the body of your command and train on an uncertain day's march. In this manner, the road being examined and prepared in advance, you may be able to take your train through from grass to grass without loss or great difficulty.

The topographical officer on duty with you will keep a minute diary of your progress, especially of that part of the route least known, showing the camping grounds, the distances, the nature of the road and the country through which it passes, the sufficiency or insufficiency of wood, water and grass, and generally all the facilities and difficulties which the route possesses for the movement of trains and bodies of troops upon it. This information, to which you will add your own observations, such other information as can be obtained without impeding the progress of the road concerning the Indians through which you pass, their tribes, numbers and disposition towards our people, will be communicated to these headquarters wherever they may be, and to the Adjutant General of the army, Washington.

These reports will be sent by expresses to the nearest military post, to be forwarded from at least three points on your route: one from Bridger's Pass, one on your arrival at Fort Bridger, and one from a point intermediate; and if your progress should disclose any serious difficulties to the movements of columns that may follow you, the information will be sent back to meet them.

The general deems it unnecessary to suggest to you any measures or precautions in the conduct of the command, which might be necessary to ensure its efficiency and safety, and the entire success of your expedition.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

D. C. BUELL,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel GEORGE ANDREWS,

6th Infantry, commanding.

No. 40.—*General Harney to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS UTAH FORCES,
Fort Leavenworth, May 27, 1858.

SIR: The second column of the troops destined for Utah left this post on the 21st instant; the third starts to-morrow, and the fourth Monday the 31st. I enclose herewith a return of the second column, and the acting inspector general's report of his inspections, which will give detailed information in regard to its strength and condition.

The expedition thus far starts under favorable auspices. I expect the leading supplies to reach Camp Scott by the last of July, and by the 10th of August, one entire division, about two hundred and fifty wagons carrying about four hundred and fifty thousand rations, will

have arrived with their escort, numbering about nine hundred men. By that time the first column under Lieutenant Colonel Adrews, sixth infantry, about three hundred strong, will also have arrived over the Bridger's Pass route, making the force present, including the troops already there, about three thousand men. Whatever military operations may be necessary can then be commenced with vigor and tolerable efficiency. I shall be at Camp Scott myself in advance of the first troops. Of the eighteen hundred or two thousand wagons which will carry out the year's supply, only about twelve hundred and fifty are by the present arrangement provided with escort, but I shall take timely measures to provide for the remainder, anticipating that the volunteer force which was expected to be called out cannot be calculated upon for this purpose. This provision will probably involve the use of a considerable cavalry force on the road; and for the winter dispositions, the return and establishment of a considerable force in the district of the Platte, where they will be subsisted more cheaply, diminish the draw upon the supply in Utah, and be ready for convoy service in the spring if necessary.

It would be premature at this time to go more into detail in regard to these matters, or to anticipate what military operations may be necessary after my arrival; but I shall keep the General-in-Chief promptly advised on the subject as circumstances may determine it. The copies of my orders forwarded regularly to your office and the Adjutant General's Office, will give the current details of my command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. S. HARNEY,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
City of New York.

Official copy:

D. C. BUELL,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 41.—*General-in-Chief to Captain Marcy.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
New York, May 29, 1858.

SIR: I am instructed by the General-in-Chief to say to you in reply to your letter of the 29th of March, that the unconquerable energy, patience, and devotedness to duty displayed by yourself and the command intrusted to your skilful guidance and direction, have been highly appreciated by himself, and that the unusual sufferings and hard labor to which the troops were exposed in accomplishing their arduous march in the depth of winter has been made known to the

whole country by the public press. It is impossible, under such circumstances, that your name should be dissociated from the efficient aid rendered to the army of Utah by the return of the expedition which you so successfully conducted. But the General-in-Chief, upon information communicated by General Johnston, of a probable attempt on the part of the Mormons to cut off the expedition, deemed it proper to instruct General Garland to reinforce your escort, and the extent of that reinforcement perhaps necessarily involved the addition of an officer senior in rank to yourself, to take charge of the troops thus detached from the department of New Mexico after their connexion with your expedition shall cease.

The General-in-Chief will not fail to commend your admirable conduct to the special notice of the War Department.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. W. LAY,

Lieutenant Colonel and Aid-de-Camp.

Captain R. B. MARCY, *5th Infantry.*

[Endorsed.]

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

New York, May 29, 1858.

Respectfully submitted for the information of the Secretary of War, and I beg leave to add that, in my opinion, Captain Marcy has again richly earned by gallantry and good conduct, the rank of major by brevet.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

No. 42.—*General Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Scott, U. T., June 4, 1858.

MAJOR: Yesterday I received a despatch from Colonel Loring, commanding the escort to the public animals and train in charge of Captain Marcy. Colonel Loring crossed the North Platte nearly east of this place on the route through Bridger's Pass on the 27th ultimo, and would march on the 28th. We estimate the distance to the North Platte at the point he crossed at two hundred and twenty-six miles. His marches will average twenty miles per day. He should, we think, cross Green river to-day, if he continues his march to the ford at the mouth of Bitter creek. If, believing the river too high to allow of fording, he turns towards the ferry on the route to South Pass, he will march there to-day, fifty-eight miles hence. Colonel Hoffman with two of the trains of supplies, we suppose will arrive to-day at Green river. The oxen of the other two trains not being able to travel at the pace of the advanced trains, were left behind with an escort under the command of Captain Hendrickson, and will not reach

Green river as soon as the trains with Colonel Hoffman by three or four days.

The commissioners, Governor Powell and Major McCulloch, arrived here on the 29th ultimo, and left here on the 2d instant. Governor Cumming left on the 3d. The commissioners have conferred freely with me, and acquainted me fully with the object of their mission. I have given them all the information in my possession to enable them to estimate the probable time of the completion of the preparations for the march, which depends upon so many contingencies that I could not fix the day. I have said to them that I do not doubt that I shall be able to march well prepared to execute the orders of the government between the 15th and 20th instant. Since receiving the report of Colonel Loring and information of Colonel Hoffman's progress, I feel quite certain that we shall be ready to advance by the 10th instant, before which time they will have effected (as they believe) all that can be done in accordance with their instructions. The health of the troops is excellent, their discipline and instruction are thorough, and they are in fine spirits.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

Col. 2d cavalry and Brevet Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*

Headquarters of the Army, New York city.

NORTH FORK OF THE PLATTE,

May 27, 1858.

SIR: We arrived here on the 26th and will leave on the 28th.

The strength of the command, 346; the number of citizen employés, 162; rations for the entire command, 20 days; animals in good condition; march when camps can be made, 20 miles.

Respectfully your obedint servant,

W. W. LORING,

Colonel Rifle Regiment, commanding, &c.

Major F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General Army of Utah.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Scott, U. T., June 4, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 43.—*General Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Scott, U. T., June 11, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report the arrival of Colonel Hoffman on the 8th instant, with a portion of his command and the first

division of the supply train from Fort Laramie. and Captain Hendrickson on the 10th instant with the other portion of the escort and the remainder of the supply trains, with subsistence and clothing for this command, which the chief commissary estimates will last for two months, by which time other supplies will reach the command. Colonel Loring and Captain Marcy reached here on the 9th instant, having come on in advance at my request. The escort and trains encamped on the Muddy, eighteen miles hence, on the same day and arrived here this morning; their march from the Muddy was probably delayed or retarded by the snow which fell for several hours yesterday; (to-day the weather is fine.) The troops of Colonel Loring's and Colonel Hoffman's commands are healthy and efficient, and the same remark applies to the whole force here.

The horses of the cavalry and riflemen are in good condition, and also of the trains and mules and horses driven in herds. This division of the army of Utah will march about the 13th instant, which will be as soon as the preparation for the march can be made. Colonel Loring, Captain Marcy, and Colonel Hoffman have executed their orders for the service assigned them in the most satisfactory manner; their delay was from unavoidable causes. Every season in these mountains has its peculiar embarrassments for military operations. An earlier movement would have enabled us to avoid high waters, but as we shall be prepared with floats made of iron beds of wagons and materials made ready under the directions of the chief quartermaster to be put together for a good ferry-boat, the march will not be much checked by Bear river or Weber, should their beds be full, which we must expect, as the snow on the mountains twelve or fifteen miles to our left (looking westward) is beginning to melt rapidly.

Herewith I transmit a sketch by Captain Marcy of a portion of the return route from New Mexico; it embraces only that portion between Platte and Green rivers, accompanied by a brief itinerary by which you will learn that this route is quite practicable and will be travelled in the spring and part of the summer in preference to any other, and I have no doubt but that the route through Bridger's Pass, a few miles south of Marcy's and a few miles shorter, will be made practicable by Colonel Andrews at all seasons of the year.

With great respect your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON, *Colonel 2d Cavalry,*
Brevet Brigadier General United States Army, commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*
Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., June 11, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

CAMP SCOTT, *Utah*, June 28, 1858.

MAJOR: In conformity with the directions of the general commanding, I have the honor to submit the following memorandum of that portion of the route I travelled on my return from New Mexico, lying between the crossing of the North Fork of the Platte and Green river.

This route strikes the Platte upon the Cherokee trail about two miles above Bryan's crossing, and is decidedly preferable for the season; that the bluffs upon the east side are much lower and the approach march much more shallow at the Cherokee crossing. It was when I passed, about seventy yards wide and four feet deep; was rising and I dare say it is now above a fording stage. We left a flat-boat upon the high bank on the west side which has sufficient capacity to carry the largest wagon with its load.

Good grass and wood are abundant here.

From the Platte the road passes over a rolling country without grass until it strikes a branch of Sage creek (twelve miles,) where there is a limited supply. Sage is found everywhere along the road, and constitutes the only fuel between the Platte and Green rivers.

Camping places may be found upon all the three branches of the Sage creek, but the grass is rather scarce for a large number of animals.

Bryan's road passes up the most westerly branch and leaves our route.

The first camping place after passing Sage creek is upon a small branch running to the east, thirteen miles from Sage creek. There is a sparse growth of bunch grass near the stream, but two miles further upon the old road there is a spring branch, along the borders of which is a good supply of excellent grass. Following down the branch about a mile below the crossing into a cañon there is a large spring.

Our train leaves the emigrant road at this place and bears to the left around the mountains, passing over a very barren section for ten miles, when it enters a valley through which runs a small creek; upon which we found very good grass. The water here is sweet and palatable.

Our next day's march was over fine ground but without water, until we arrived near camp. Here we found some brackish ponds of muddy water which I am informed by our guides can always be depended upon in the dryest seasons.

The grass is abundant and good in the hills to the north of these ponds. We again intersected Evans' trail at this point. It makes a very great bend to the north around the mountains, and our guides who have traveled both, are of opinion that our road is some fifty miles shorter.

From thence we followed Evans' road, passing two ponds at about three and eight miles from our last camp, and encamped on the eastern border of an extensive flat where there are several ponds of brackish water, with good grass in the adjoining hills; indeed in all the hills upon this part of the road there is abundance of grass.

The flat is destitute of grass, with a red clay soil which was firm

and smooth when I passed it, but would probably become soft and boggy in a wet season. It is six miles across this flat by the road, and there are several ponds of water near the western border, with good grass near.

From thence to the next water the distance is fifteen miles. This is a small spring branch that runs into Bitter creek, and at the head of it has sufficient water for the largest government trains. The water is slightly brackish but quite wholesome.

Our route strikes Bitter creek at the mouth of this creek, eight miles from its sources, thence down the right bank of Bitter creek four miles to our camp.

Bitter creek is a narrow and deep stream with high abrupt clay banks, making it very difficult to cross or approach with animals. The water is brackish but animals drink it eagerly. There are but few places in the creek bottom where any grass is seen, and it is only here and there that it can be found in the adjacent hills. Our camp near the rocky bluffs that come near the creek is the last accessible grass until reaching a low range of grassy hills which slope down to the creek upon the opposite side. Here there is a good crossing for animals, and by camping at this place the best grass would be secured.

From thence to our camp is seventeen miles along the bank of the creek. Here we found only tolerable grass in the hills on the south side of the creek. There is a fine sulphur spring near the road, at the point where we leave the creek. Thence our road passes around the hills and at four miles crosses two small spring branches which issue from very elevated hills upon the right. The water from these springs is excellent and the grass here cannot be surpassed. The road from thence turns again into the valley of Bitter creek, which it follows to its confluence with Green river.

Bitter creek is enclosed upon both sides by very elevated bluffs that are cut up into numerous cañons and arroyas rendering it almost impracticable to pass with wagons except directly upon the north bank where the road already runs.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. MARCY,
Captain 5th Infantry.

Major F. J. PORTER,
*Assistant Adjutant General Army of Utah,
Camp Scott, Utah.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., June 11, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, June 11, 1858.

SIR: By direction of the commanding general I enclose a copy of an itinerary of the route pursued and opened by Captain Marcy, between the crossing of the North Fork of the Platte and Green rivers, and also a sketch of that route united to the one through Bridger's Pass. The bearers are two of Captain Marcy's guides, one (Murry) is represented as being thoroughly acquainted with the country from the crossing of the South Platte up Lodge-pole creek to this place, and can be relied upon. They are directed to point out the best crossing (Marcy's) of the North Platte, where Marcy's boat, and one five miles below, can be found.

Captain Marcy has opened an excellent road through a country furnishing at this season, an abundance of grass and water in single camps, even for his large number of animals, (fifteen hundred.) But it is feared that it will not be so favorable for travel in mid summer and fall, on account of scarcity of grass and water. The commanding general therefore sends you these guides and this sketch that you may open the Bridger Pass road, which furnishes what is essential for summer travel, and for the large trains which may be sent that way.

The advantage of this route, and the importance of its passing this season over the proper ground, are so well known and appreciated by you and your command that the commanding general relies upon every energy being exerted and no steps untaken to carry out the wishes and expectations of government.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel GEORGE ANDREWS,
Commanding 6th Infantry, &c., en route to Camp Scott.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, Utah Territory, June 11, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 44.—*Colonel Loring to the Adjutant General.*

CAMP SCOTT, *June 12, 1858.*

COLONEL: I have the honor to inform you that the command from New Mexico reached here yesterday all well and in good condition.

The animals in charge of Captain Marcy, and which were purchased in New Mexico for the army of Utah, were all in fine condition.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,
Colonel Rifle Regiment, commanding, &c.

Colonel S. COOPER,
Adjutant General United States Army, Washington.

No. 45.—*Proclamation of Governor Cumming.*

A. CUMMING, GOVERNOR OF UTAH TERRITORY.

To the inhabitants of Utah and others whom it may concern :

Whereas James Buchanan, President of the United States, at the city of Washington, the sixth day of April, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight, did by his proclamation offer to the inhabitants of Utah who submit to the laws a free and full pardon for all treasons and seditions heretofore committed; and

Whereas, The proffered pardon was accepted, with the prescribed terms of the proclamation, by the citizens of Utah;

Now therefore I, Alfred Cumming, governor of Utah Territory, in the name of James Buchanan, President of the United States, do proclaim that all persons who submit themselves to the laws and to the authority of the federal government are by him freely and fully pardoned for all treasons and seditions heretofore committed. All criminal offences associated with or growing out of the overt acts of sedition and treason are merged in them, and are embraced in the "free and full pardon" of the President. And I exhort all persons to persevere in a faithful submission to the laws and patriotic devotion to the Constitution and government of our common country.

Peace is restored to our Territory.

All civil officers, both federal and territorial, will resume the performance of the duties of their respective offices without delay, and be diligent and faithful in the execution of the laws. All citizens of the United States in this Territory will aid and assist the officers in the performance of their duties.

Fellow citizens, I offer to you my congratulations for the peaceful and honorable adjustment of recent difficulties.

Those citizens who have left their homes I invite to return as soon as they can do so with propriety and convenience.

To all I announce my determination to enforce obedience to the laws, both federal and territorial.

Trespasses upon property, whether real or personal, must be scrupulously avoided.

Gaming and other vices are punished by territorial statutes with peculiar severity, and I commend the perusal of these statutes to those persons who may not have had an opportunity of doing so previously.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and caused the official seal of the Territory to be affixed, at Great Salt Lake City, in the Territory of Utah, this fourteenth day of June, one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, and of the independence of the United States the eighty-second.

A. CUMMING.

By the governor:

JOHN HARTNETT, *Secretary.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp between Big and Little Mountain, June 25, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Asst. Adjutant General.

No. 46.—*Governor Cumming to General Johnston.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
Salt Lake city, Utah Territory, June 15, 1858.

SIR: I left Camp Scott on the 3d of June and arrived here on the 8th instant, having been detained on the road by accidents to my wagons.

On the 11th and 12th of June a conference was held between the president and leaders of the church of Latter Day Saints and the peace commissioners. I was present at the conference, by invitation, and heard a statement made by President Young to this effect: that he had evidence of your intention to advance the army on the 14th or 15th of this month, without waiting for communications from the commissioners or myself.

To this statement I gave a prompt and positive denial, alleging that General Johnston would not violate a pledge made by him to the commissioners and to myself, on the 30th of May, at Camp Scott.

Secretary Hartnett, who left Fort Bridger on Friday, the 11th, being the first day of the conference at Great Salt Lake City, arrived here on Sunday, the 13th instant, and, to my great surprise, informed me that you had requested him to inform the commissioners and myself of your intention to take up the line of march for this city on the 15th of June.

At the time when this communication was made to Secretary Hartnett the conference had only commenced, you could therefore not have received any communication from the commissioners or myself. We should necessarily wait to know the result of the conference before communicating with you. I earnestly request that you will make such disclosures as may be made without detriment to the public service which may enable me to reconcile the apparent discrepancy between my statement and that recently communicated through Mr. Hartnett.

I am aware that you will probably have received communications from the commissioners announcing the termination of the conference previous to the day appointed for your departure from camp, but this does not affect the question. I stated to President Young that you were pledged not to march until you had received communications from the commissioners or myself, that you had told me that you would issue a proclamation setting forth your intentions. Now it is obvious that, without some explanation on your part, I may be suspected of duplicity in regard to my statement to President Young, and be compelled to resort to some means of defence and explanation. I must, therefore, endeavor to impress upon you the necessity of furnishing me with the desired information to combat the distrust which may otherwise arise in the minds of the people.

Very respectfully,

A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah Territory.

General A. S. JOHNSTON,
Commanding Army of Utah.

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HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Yellow creek, June 19, 1858.

Official :

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 47.—*General Johnston to Governor Cumming.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Bear river, June 16, 1858.

SIR: At the request of the Commissioners of the United States to Utah, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a few remarks it was thought desirable I should publish, to relieve that portion of the people from any uneasiness, who are said to be apprehensive of ill treatment from the army, that your Excellency may, if you deem it necessary, cause to be circulated.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
*Colonel 2d cavalry and Brevet Brigadier General
United States Army, commanding.*

His Excellency A. CUMMING,
*Governor of Utah Territory,
Great Salt Lake city.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Bear River, June 16, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 48.—*Governor Cumming to General Johnston.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
Great Salt Lake city, June 17, 1858.

SIR: I have this moment received your note of the 16th instant, covering your address to the people of Utah under date of the 14th June. I will cause your address to the people to be as generally circulated as circumstances will admit.

The present excited condition of the public mind demands the utmost caution on your part in approaching this valley.

The houses in this city and the northern settlements are closed and abandoned; the population have gone south with the exception of a small civil police. The fields and gardens are insufficiently protected.

The grazing grounds or commons are indispensable to the comfort of the people. The introduction of a mass of hired followers of your camp would cause unnecessary irritation.

In short, with a full knowledge of the condition of affairs in the Territory, whilst I desire that you should continue your march as soon as you are in possession of such facts as will enable you to select and occupy suitable camps, yet it is my duty to protest against your occupancy of positions in the immediate vicinity of this city or other dense settlements of the population.

Should you resolve to act in opposition to my solemn protest, you may be assured that it will result in disastrous consequences, such as cannot be approved by our government.

Very respectfully,

A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah Territory.

General A. S. JOHNSTON,
Commanding Army of Utah, en route.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Yellow creek, U. T., June 19, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 49.—*General Johnston to Governor Cumming.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Yellow creek, U. T., June 19, 1858.

SIR: Your letter of the 15th instant was received to-day. At the conference with the commissioners at your tent—it being understood that I could not commence the march from Fort Bridger before the arrival of the supplies, and that the preparation for the march, depending upon their arrival, could not probably be made before the 15th or 20th instant, and understanding from them that they believed before that time they would be able to ascertain the result of their mission—I *did say*, as represented by you, that “I would delay the march of the troops until I heard from them;” but by no means did I intend to give to what I said the binding force of a pledge, should it be in conflict with a good military reason for pursuing a different course, nor did I suppose the commissioners and yourself so understood it. As I used the language asserted by you to President Young, the distrust, if any is incited, should rest upon me; and I now disclaim any intention of misleading any one.

The instructions of the President to the commissioners were positive that the army should occupy the Territory of Utah, and my orders do not allow the discretion of making delay, unless reasons should be offered for so doing which should appear to me sufficiently cogent.

It was not foreseen by me that the supplies would arrive as soon

as they did, and that the grass in every direction within convenient reach would be so rapidly consumed. The last circumstance alone made it necessary to move; and had it been expedient to halt, marching as slowly as it is necessary to do on account of the very large train indispensable at this distance from the source of supply, it I thought could easily be made known to me. It was designed by me, and I so informed you, that I would give notice of my march from Fort Bridger. But as commissioners were appointed to confer directly with the people, I did not deem a formal notice necessary, and thought the message sent by Mr. Hartnett would subserve every purpose.

I have the honor also to acknowledge the receipt of your excellency's letter of the 17th instant. I beg leave to say in reference to the subjects mentioned that, in the execution of my orders, I have only to select suitable military sites for posts; such as are healthy and have good water, plenty of wood and grass.

It is not essential to a good selection that it should be contingent to a city or near any settlement, nor would it be desirable to those in command. In marching through any part of the Territory the greatest care will be taken that no one is improperly treated or injury to their property sustained.

The commissioners I understand intend to meet the army at the camp we expect to make between the two mountains. I would be glad, if you can do so, if you will make the visit with them, and to receive the information you have of different parts of the valley, which I am sure will be valuable to me.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON, *Colonel 2d cavalry*
and Brevet Brigadier General U. S. Army, commanding.

His Excellency A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah Territory.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Yellow Creek, Utah Territory, June 19, 1858.
Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 50.—*General Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Bear river, U. T., June 16, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that the march of the army of Utah commenced on the 13th instant. The advance, composed of the 2d dragoons, commanded by Colonel Cooke, the volunteer battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bee, and Phelps' light battery, arrived here on the 14th instant. The 5th infantry, Colonel Waite commanding, and Reno's heavy battery on the 15th, accompanied by

a part of the supply train. To-day the 10th infantry, commanded by Colonel Alexander, and a battalion composed of one company of cavalry, one company of mounted rifles, three companies of the 3d, two companies of the 6th, and one company of the 7th infantry, commanded by Colonel Loring, will arrive with the remainder of the supply train. The river rises during the night, but can be forded in the afternoon; the crossing therefore of the dragoons, volunteers, and trains was not effected till yesterday evening. An old bridge above the ford was sufficiently repaired to enable Captain Phelps to pass his pieces and caissons over by hand. This evening Captain Reno's battery will be crossed in the same way. The 5th infantry and trains will cross this evening, and, if there is time afterwards, the 10th infantry. Colonel Loring's battalion and trains will also cross, and the march will be resumed to-morrow in the order directed by my order of this date herewith. The march to the valley will be made in five days.

On the day of my arrival at this place I received a communication from the United States commissioners, the Hon. L. W. Powell and Major B. McCulloch, of which the inclosed is a copy. I have the honor to transmit a copy of my reply, and also a copy of a few remarks which it was thought I should address to the people to allay an unfounded apprehension prevailing among them.

Captain Newton, of the engineer corps, was detached yesterday with an escort of an officer and thirty men, and the most experienced guide of the mountains, James Bridger, to examine thoroughly the country from this point to the head of Muddy creek, which flows into Bear river.—(See map.) I believe the elevated table land between this and the western end of Cache valley can be ascended by easy gradations, and that the opposite side can be descended into Cache valley without difficulty. If a good road should be found practicable, as I expect, I would respectfully suggest that the commander of the forces here may be authorized to order its construction immediately. The only communication between important districts should not long be allowed to continue through long and difficult cañons easily obstructed. The health of the troops continues excellent.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

*Colonel 2d cavalry and Brevet Brigadier General,
United States Army, commanding.*

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp on Bear river, U. T., June 16.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 30.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Bear river, U. T., June 16, 1858.

The army will commence the march to-morrow, and daily hereafter till arrival in Salt Lake valley, in the following order, each command being followed immediately by its train and a proportion of the supply train.

Brevet Colonel C. F. Smith's battalion, constituting the advanced guard, at 5 a. m.

10th infantry and Phelps' battery at 5.15 a. m.

5th infantry and Reno's battery at 5.45 a. m.

Colonel Loring's battalion of mounted riflemen, 1st cavalry, 3d, 6th, and 7th infantry at 6.15 a. m.

Volunteers at 6.30 a. m.

2d dragoons, constituting the rear guard, at 7 a. m.

Commanders of regiments and battalions will order the guard for their respective trains.

The headquarters will be with the advance.

By order of Brevet Brigadier General A. S. Johnston.

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

GREAT SALT LAKE CITY, U. T., *June 12, 1858.*

DEAR SIR: We have the pleasure of informing you that after a full and free conference with the chief men of the Territory we are informed by them that they will yield obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States; that they will not resist the execution of the laws in the Territory of Utah; that they cheerfully consent that the civil officers of the Territory shall enter upon the discharge of their respective duties; and that they will make no resistance to the army of the United States in its march to the valley of Salt Lake or elsewhere. We have their assurance that no resistance will be made to the officers, civil or military, of the United States, in the exercise of their various functions, in the Territory of Utah.

The houses, fields, and gardens of the people of this Territory, particularly in and about Salt Lake City, are very insecure. The animals of your army would cause great destruction of property if the greatest care should not be observed in the march and in the selecting of camps. The people of the Territory are somewhat uneasy for fear the army, when it shall reach the valley, would not properly respect their persons and property. We have assured them that neither their persons or property would be injured or molested by the army under your command. We would respectfully suggest, in consequence of this feeling of uneasiness, that you issue a procla-

mation to the people of Utah, stating that the army under your command would not trespass upon the rights or property of peaceable citizens during the sojourn in, or the march of your army through, the Territory. Such a proclamation would greatly allay the existing anxiety and fear of the people, and cause those who have abandoned their homes to return to their houses and farms.

We have made enquiry about grass, wood, &c., necessary for the subsistence and convenience of your army. We have conversed with Mr. Ficklin fully on this subject, and given him all the information we have, which he will impart to you. We respectfully suggest that you march to the valley as soon as it is convenient for you to do so.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

L. W. POWELL,
BEN. McCULLOCH,
Commissioners to Utah.

General A. S. JOHNSTON,
Commanding Army of Utah, Camp Scott, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Bear river, U. T., June 15, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Bear river, June 14, 1858.

GENTLEMEN: Your communication from Salt Lake City was received to-day. The accomplishment of the object of your mission entirely in accordance with the instructions of the President, the wisdom and forbearance of which you have so ably displayed to the people of the Territory, will, I hope, lead to a more just appreciation of their relations to the general government and the establishment of the supremacy of the laws.

I learn with surprise that uneasiness is felt by the people as to the treatment they may receive from the army. Acting under the twofold obligations of citizens and soldiers, we may be supposed to comprehend the rights of the people, and to be sufficiently mindful of the obligations of our oaths not to disregard the laws which govern us as a military body. A reference to them will show with what jealous care the general government has guarded the rights of citizens against any encroachment.

The army has duties to perform here in execution of the orders of the Department of War, which, from the nature of them, cannot lead to interference with the people in their various pursuits, and if no obstruction is presented to the discharge of those duties there need not be the slightest apprehension that any person whatever will have cause of complaint against it. The army will continue its march from

this position on Thursday, 17th instant, and reach the valley in five days. I desire to encamp beyond the Jordan on the day of arrival in the valley.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d cavalry, and Brevet Brigadier General
United States Army, commanding.

Hon. L. W. POWELL,
Major B. McCULLOCH,
United States Commissioners to Utah.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Bear river, Utah Territory, June 16, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

To the people of Utah.

The commissioners of the United States, deputed by the President to urge upon the people of this Territory the necessity of obedience to the Constitution and laws as enjoined by his proclamation, have this day informed me that there will be no obstruction to the administration and execution of the laws of the federal government, nor any opposition on the part of the people of this Territory to the military force of the government in the execution of their orders. I therefore feel it incumbent on me, and have great satisfaction in doing so, to assure those citizens of the Territory who, I learn, apprehend from the army ill treatment, that no person whatever will be in anywise interfered with or molested in his person or rights, or in the peaceful pursuit of his avocations; and, should protection be needed, that they will find the army (always faithful to the obligations of duty) as ready now to assist and protect them as it was to oppose them while it was believed they were resisting the laws of their government.

A. S. JOHNSTON,
Colonel 2d Cavalry and Brevet Brigadier General,
commanding.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp on Bear River, June 14, 1858.

No. 51.—General Johnston to Army Headquarters.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH.
Camp near Great Salt Lake city, U. T., June 28, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report my arrival at this camp on the 26th instant with this command, the strength of which is shown in the

field return forwarded June 16. I found the city abandoned, except by a few persons engaged in guarding the property and keeping the gardens in good order. I understand that the citizens will return in a few days.

By the arrival of reinforcements the escort to Captain Marcy, from New Mexico, under Colonel Loring, will be relieved and directed to return to New Mexico by the southern route, passing by Lake Utah on to Green river, up the White river, &c.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

*Colonel second cavalry, and Brevet Brigadier General
United States Army, commanding.*

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp near Great Salt Lake city, U. T., June 28, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 52.—*General Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

North end of Cedar Valley, 36 miles south of Salt Lake city,

July 8, 1858.

MAJOR: I have established the camp of the army of Utah at this place, and design to make it permanent should the resources of the valley not become exhausted. The valley is situated three miles west of Utah Lake, with a low range of mountains intervening; is eight miles in width and twenty-five miles in length, estimated distances.

The population of this Territory is located chiefly at the western base of the Wasatch range, and others which constitute the eastern rim of the Great Salt Lake Basin as it originally existed.

By an examination of the maps of this region, which are quite accurate of the valley, you perceive that the position selected in this valley which debouches in the direction of Great Salt Lake City by two routes, also by two towards Provo and into Tintic in the direction of Fillmore City, that this is a commanding position, and the force, if called for, can be promptly applied either in the direction of Salt Lake City or Provo, which latter city is represented as not inferior in importance to the former. Salt Lake City is thirty-six miles north of this camp, and Provo about the same distance southeasterly. I depend mainly for the subsistence of the horses, mules, and beef cattle, on the grass of this valley, Rush and Tintic valleys, both of which communicate with it.

A large amount of hay should be put up, at least one half a ton for

each animal, to provide for them at such times as the ground may be so deeply covered with snow as to prevent grazing. I fear a sufficiency for that purpose cannot be obtained, but as much as possible will be, and we must disperse our herds in other districts. A great abundance might be obtained in Cache valley and others north, but the risk of losing the animals by severe cold and deep snow is very great, and unless compelled by deficiency of hay in this quarter, I will not send our stock there.

These dispositions are, of course, made subject to the approval of General Harney, and such changes as he may direct. I have made no arrangements whatever with regard to the force on the route as designated in general order No. 8, headquarters of the army, and general order No. 3, headquarters Utah forces, as no part of it is under my orders, but would respectfully suggest that no greater force can be stationed in this district on account of the great difficulty of obtaining subsistence for animals. I have not learned that any appropriation has been made for the erection of quarters for troops or store houses. I will, notwithstanding, immediately cause contracts to be made for material for the latter, as they will be indispensable for the security of the supplies.

As soon as the sixth regiment arrives, I will order Colonel Loring to return to the department of New Mexico with his command, exploring the country to obtain a more southerly route to Leavenworth by the way of Bent's fort, on the Arkansas—a result, if obtained, of great practical importance.

At the same time I shall order the volunteer battalion to Leavenworth to be disbanded, both because they would, if disbanded here, be without the means of procuring transportation or subsistence home, and because it would be inexpedient with regard to the interests of the government to turn loose a large body of men without means, who might produce disturbance in the communities, although it may be truly said of them that the government never had a better regiment of volunteers. Yet some might, when released from the restraints of discipline, misbehave.

The 2d dragoons, Colonel Loring's battalion, and Phelps' have arrived, and are now encamped here. The 5th infantry, the 10th infantry, the battalion of volunteers, and Reno's battery will arrive to-morrow. The troops continue in excellent health, and are in all respects efficient.

On the arrival of General Harney or Colonel Sumner, I desire to be ordered to join my regiment. If that cannot be granted, I request that the general will grant me a furlough for four months, with leave to apply for an extension. I have had no relaxation from duty, not for a day, for more than nine years.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. J. JOHNSTON, *Colonel 2d cavalry*
and Brevet Brigadier General U. S. A., commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*
Headquarters of the Army, West Point, N. Y.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp in Cedar Valley, U. T., July 8, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General

No. 53.—*General Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, Cedar Valley, July 22, 1858.

MAJOR: You were acquainted by my letter of the 8th instant with my intention to order to New Mexico Colonel Loring's battalion, which had been temporarily detained on duty in this department by the consent of General Garland, commanding that department, and also to order the volunteer battalion, commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Bee, to Leavenworth, to be disbanded there as soon as the 6th regiment of infantry should arrive here. Learning through Colonel Hoffman that the 6th regiment would be detained in completing the road through Bridger's Pass longer than was expected, and that their arrival here ought not to be expected before some days shall have elapsed in August, I did not deem it judicious to delay any longer the march of either corps. Both corps, therefore, in accordance with my orders, took the route to their respective destinations on the 19th instant.

The return route designated in the accompanying order to Colonel Loring is several hundred miles nearer to New Mexico than that pursued by him in coming to this department, and is represented by his intelligent guide, Larue, as quite practicable as a wagon route, and I do not doubt that the battalion will accomplish the march on its return in greatly less time than would have been required by the other route. Besides this consideration, it will bring within comparative proximity a source of abundant supplies of many articles of subsistence for the troops of this department.

With regard to the order given for the march of the volunteer battalion to Leavenworth and its discharge, I have to say that the term of their service will soon expire, and that should their discharge here be ordered without pay, or without subsistence or transportation, their return would be with the most of them impossible; and their destitution, if so discharged, it is to be apprehended, would lead to acts of aggression upon the inhabitants. The avoidance of this contingency even of such a result, by dispensing with their service in time, I do not doubt will meet the approval of the General-in-Chief.

If an appropriation has been made for the payment of this battalion, there will be time before its arrival at Leavenworth for the pay department to arrange for its payment on its arrival there. This faith-

ful body of men would be greatly relieved from embarrassment should the payment be made at that place.

Measures will be immediately taken to erect, at the position selected for a winter camp near the centre of this valley, heretofore mentioned, temporary store-houses for the supplies for the troops. Proposals for furnishing material have been invited by advertisement, but I am not encouraged to believe that the prices asked can be allowed; should they be exorbitant or more than just, the bids will be rejected and a resort had to such means as are in our power to put up suitable structures.

The subsisting of our herds of horses, mules, and cattle, during the coming winter, is a subject of much anxiety.

Grass abounds in this valley, in the adjacent valleys, and on the hills and mountains, which is of an excellent quality, and retains its nutrition, though desicated; but it grows in bunches so detached that large herds graze over a great space in a few days. Our herds must be widely dispersed, occupying distant valleys, and great labor and vigilance on the part of the troops and herders will be required to prevent loss by robbery and other causes.

They have been found wanting in neither the one nor the other heretofore, and I trust will not be during the ensuing winter. I desire to obtain hay to be fed to the herds when the ground is too much covered with snow to allow of grazing, which I understand does not often happen in this region.

The people will provide all the hay they can, but having neglected to burn the old grass, find much difficulty in cutting it, and it is said would demand a price that should not be allowed. Everything possible will be done to winter our animals in good condition, and I hope for a good result.

In selecting a site for our winter camp, I was desirous, if possible, to avoid proximity to the dense settlements, or any settlements, if possible; but this was not practicable, for every suitable position where there is water is occupied.

In this valley there are two small settlements, the one close by the place selected for the camp, where there is a spring of water, and contains perhaps ten families; we shall occupy opposite sides of the stream, and I will see that they suffer no inconvenience from us.

The soil everywhere, except in small moist localities, is exceedingly pulverulent, and by the occupancy of any position for a few days only it becomes beaten into a fine dust, which rises in clouds by the slightest disturbance.

With every desire to exercise all the different arms in the evolutions of the line, I find it impossible without great danger to the lungs of men and animals. I do not believe we can find any position for a camp or post free from this objection.

The people begin to come in freely with vegetables and other articles of marketing, and sell readily at high prices; but we believe that these, after a little greater competition, will be reduced.

We are without any information of the position of troops and trains on the route for this department.

In my communication of the 8th instant I omitted the time to which I wished my leave of absence extended; I now request the indulgence of an extension of eight months.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

Col. 2d cavalry, and Bvt. Brig. Gen. U. S. A., commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, Cedar Valley, U. T., July 22, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 54.—*General Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., July 29, 1858.

MAJOR: I have, with respect to this command, nothing of importance to report, but enclose to you a copy of a letter written by the Rev. A. Hoecken, a Catholic priest of great excellence of character, now residing among the Flathead Indians, containing the sad details of the onset made by a large body of Indians upon the small command of Colonel Steptoe. I do not doubt that the whole of the force has been destroyed; all the officers, I suppose, were killed in the first attack. News of this disaster has, I presume, reached the headquarters of the army; this letter is, however, particularly interesting, from containing reliable particulars, which would not probably ever be otherwise known.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

*Colonel 2d cavalry and Brevet Brigadier General,
United States Army, commanding.*

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

July 29.—The California mail which arrived in Salt Lake City last evening brings reports, current in Sacramento twelve days since, that only thirteen soldiers, and two officers of whom Colonel Steptoe was not one, were killed.

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

JUNE 17, 1858.

DEAR DOCTOR: Your kind favor, dated "Owen's Fort," was handed to me a few days ago. I am much obliged for the interesting good news which you communicate in it. I would be glad if I could reciprocate and give you some good news from below, as I see your intention is to go down to Walla-Walla; but alas! what I can say is of the contrary kind.

Early this spring (February 17) I got a letter from B. H. Lansdale, in which he tells me that the whole country below the Flathead valley is liable to break into open hostilities, and unsafe for a white man. Unhappily he has foretold the truth; since that time some white men have been killed; cattle have been stolen of the troops in Whitman's valley; which facts, with probably additional ones, have induced Mr. Owen and party to retrace their steps, being advanced on his route as far as the Spokans. He is now in the vicinity of Colville, where I do not believe him out of danger. But the most afflicting was still to follow. The 8th of June I received a letter of Rev. J. Joset, dated Cœur d'Alene, May 24. The very exordium of his letter made me shudder: "*Jamais encore depuis que je manie la plume, je n'ai eu de si mauvaises nouvelles à communiquer, je descend en bas, pour savoir quellas seront les consequences de la folie des sauvages; puisse je effacer leur crime de mon sang.*" As I believe the full relation will be interesting to you, I will give you a translation of it in my broken English: "An unhappy event has taken place which will produce sad consequences, as it will be told in all shapes. I hasten to inform you of it; I do not think any one has seen the case as nearly as your servant."

Since the union which took place at the Spokans on the return of Governor Stephens from the Blackfeet country, it has been a general voice among the Indian chiefs, to ask that the troops would not cross the Nez Percés river; they seemed to foresee that it would be impossible for them to keep in their people. Last winter a faithful Indian said to me: "Only the sight of an armed force would be enough to make all the Indians of the country take up arms." When the troops established themselves in the Yakama country, Cama Yakem and his party returned to his band, the Galousses, and has till now never ceased to excite the Indians; he has particularly tried to gain over the Cœurs d'Alenes, who are more prompt, and are better armed than the Fisher Indians. Cama Yakem, among others, has worked at this the whole winter. There is no kind of false rumor which has not been spread concerning Americans and missionaries. The chief and all who reflect soundly have not been ensnared, not even one open proselyte has been made; but many bad impressions have been made—probably many suspicions of all those falsehoods.

Towards the end of April I undertook the route of the Dalles. I proposed to inform Colonel Steptoe of this fermentation of spirits. At the Gamache prairie I met an express sent by the Cœur d'Alene chief, to tell me to return home, though my young men asked to continue our route down. I did not wish to reject entirely the advice of

the chief. I answered that, unless the chief came himself to explain the reasons of his prohibition, we would continue down; that we would wait three days to give him time to come; in fact he arrived. "The Nez Percés and Galousses," said he, "are amazed that we do not want to join them against Americans; they have just stolen cattle of the troops; they have killed two Americans on their route to Colville. The Spokans and Cœur d'Alenes have testified their discontentment; it might happen that we come to hostilities with them; all kind of rumors are afloat—that a great number of soldiers are coming; a white man has said that this spring the troops will pass the Nez Percés river to destroy the Indians; another has said that first 500 would come to station themselves at Colville; next 500 more; then 500 more, till, seeing themselves strong enough, they will chase all the Indians out of the country. The Galousses and Nez Percés have the country full of spies; they will do you no harm, but they will let you return on foot, and will secretly kill the young men when they go to the horses; next they will make it to be believed that the Americans have killed them; then there will remain no means to keep in our people."

Fearing this, I returned home Saturday, the 15th of this month; a new express announced the troops near the camp of Indians, who were digging roots; of course I hastened to run there; from all parts Indians arrived in bands; I arrived Sunday evening; the troops were camped a few miles further; the chief had a great deal to do to restrain his people; the sight of cannon had chiefly enraged them; whilst Vincent (the chief) sent his people off one way, a Galousse murderer brought them back another. As soon as I arrived the chiefs met together; I explained to them the principles of war: "Whosoever kills by his private authority is a murderer; whosoever engages a battle without the order of his chief is guilty of all the evil which flows from it; it is the duty of the chief to examine when he has to wage war for his own defence." I reminded them it was Sunday, which many might have forgotten. After prayers it was announced that one of the slaves of Americans (a Nez Percés Indian guide to the troops) had just arrived. According to him, the chief of the soldiers had said: "You Cœur d'Alenes, you have fair play; your lands, your women are ours." I told our people not to believe this; that next morning I would go to see the officer and learn his intentions. Ishequitsetias (Calispee Indian) just tells me: "I come from the chief of the troops; whilst I was there a Galousse told him the black gown comes to bring powder to his people, and has told them to kill the Americans." It is true that he had said so. Colonel Steptoe confirmed this to me the next morning; in this manner do the Galousses work to sow discord; accusing the Spokans and Cœur d'Alenes with the Americans, and *vice versa*.

The 17th day was of sorrowful memory. As soon as I could get a horse I went on; the troops had moved and were returning. I had to gallop a good while before I could overtake them. I was determined to see the officer on account of the calumny heard the day previous. Colonel Steptoe received me most politely, calling me by

name though he had never seen me. He told me he was astonished to see the Cœurs d'Alene and Spokans coming to him with guns as they had done; that having received a letter from Colville, in which the whites complained of their difficulties with the Indians, he had resolved first to examine in person, with a small escort, the place; but that hearing that the Galousses were ill disposed, he had believed it necessary to take a larger escort, (it was far from being sufficient.) I explained to him all I knew concerning the dispositions of the Indians, and how I had been prevented, when I started to inform him of it. "If I had known this," said he, "I would not have ventured so far without having conferred first with the Spokans and Cœurs d'Alene. I wish to have an interview with the chiefs; go to Colville and return by the other side of the river. Yesterday I thought we were going to fight; I am happy to return without bloodshed." I asked him if he did not desire to see the chiefs; he answered me that his pack animals were too wild to halt; I told him it was not necessary to halt. He said then he would see them willingly.

As I returned to bring them I found but Vincent, who accompanied me. The colonel spoke and satisfied him. Vincent was answering, when he was called back, as the Galousses were on the point of firing. I took leave of the colonel to go to speak to the Coeur d'Alenes. They received the news of the good disposition of the colonel with an evident joy. We were going to start, when Jean Giene and Victor said they would return directly home. Molkopsi, furious, (I do not know why,) insulted them both—struck them. One of his relations asked him, (as I heard since,) "What are you doing? You are striking our people; behold our enemies!" (pointing to the Americans.) They fired on the troops. Unhappily I had gone home with the two chiefs, and did not know what was going on. I had reached my camping place when the news arrived of the fight. It was too late when I could get a horse. I was on the road with a bad horse to go to the place when an Indian told me it was useless; that the Indians would not listen to me. I have since learned that the young men fired a good while before the troops fired. The number of the aggressors was insignificant, till Jacques Zachary being killed, and Victor mortally wounded, the rage of the Indians could not be restrained. Thirty Americans, among whom three officers, fell on the spot; the others skilfully withdrew during the night. I believe that the Indians were more than one thousand. The plan was not to leave them any rest to the Nez Percé river. The Spokans retired to return next morning with fresh animals. The troops left all their horses and mules tied at the camp, and concealed in this manner their escape. At midnight the Indians rushed on the camp, but found it deserted. They did not follow them. It is uncertain what has happened at the Nez Percé river. I fear they have all been murdered.

In the morning I stopped a moment to bury Zachary. I hastened to leave this place of horror. Vincent arrived. I asked him what provocation they had received. "None; all the fault is on our side." "You are the murderers of your people, not the Americans." "It is true. I would rather die as the Americans as our people are dead.

I had no intention to fight, but at seeing the corpse of my brother-in-law I lost my head. What will be the consequences? If we are pardoned, we will faithfully restore all that has been taken; if not, we will remain home, and if we are attacked we will defend ourselves to the last, and when we are all killed the Americans will have our lands. Fools that we are, we always doubted the truth of what the Father told us; now we have seen it. The Americans do not want to fight us."

Besides what I have related concerning the guides of the colonel, I have other reasons to believe they were traitors. Towards evening they cried to our people, "Courage! the Americans can do no more." Moreover, why, instead of taking the direct road to Colville and to avoid thus the Indians, why were they led to make a great detour, and brought just at a place where the Indians were gathered? They well knew that the Indians would become furious.

Behold the entire relation. Since that nothing has come to my knowledge. I wish you a happy journey to a better country than this.

With respect, I am your humble servant,

A. HOECKEN, *S. J.*

A true copy.

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 55.—*General Harney to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, UTAH FORCES,
Camp at Cottonwood Spring, July 15, 1858.

SIR: Captain Simpson, commissary of subsistence, arrived at my headquarters yesterday, with a copy of General Orders No. 17. The copy sent by mail had already been received on the 11th. The necessary orders in furtherance of them, with the exception of some minor details yet to be arranged, have been given, (see General Orders No. 7, Utah forces, and Special Orders Nos. 40 and following,) and I shall probably start for St. Louis day after to-morrow.

From the reports received from different sources, along with the telegraphic despatch apprising me of the approach of orders countermanding the reinforcements for Utah, I was induced to expect that I would be required to open communication with the Indian tribes that have hitherto been troublesome in this region—especially the Cheyennes—for the purpose of making a treaty which would give some prospect of peaceable behavior on their part in future. To facilitate that object if such orders should come, on leaving my camp seventy miles above on the 10th instant to return to this place, I sent Captain Pleasonton, 2d dragoons, under the guidance of a chief of the Cheyennes who had visited my camp, to the camp of one of the bands of that tribe on the Republican Fork, some forty or fifty miles distant. I am expecting his return now. The other principal band of the Cheyennes is said to be on the Arkansas. I have no doubt of

being able, with their present disposition, to make a treaty with this tribe which would be attended with good results, and I would recommend that authority be granted to make the effort next spring, with the presence of as considerable a body of troops as may be available. One of the objects of such an expedition should be to bring together and establish peaceable relations between the interior tribes and the Pawnees, as the forays of the former upon the latter, who are known to be friendly to the whites, in retaliation for thefts, are so frequently attended with depredations upon our people that the hostilities of these tribes towards each other may almost be said to be the cause of the depredations upon us.

I presume that the termination of the difficulties with the Mormons, which made it expedient to establish a distinct command in the district of the Platte to guard the communication with Utah, will result in its return to the department of the west at an early day. The reasons in favor of it seem so obvious that I deem it unnecessary to allude to them.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. S. HARNEY,
Brigadier General, commanding.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

No. 56.—*General Harney to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, UTAH FORCES,
Fort Leavenworth, August 3, 1858.

SIR : I have the honor to report my arrival at this post yesterday, and my relinquishment of the command of the "Utah forces." The troops comprising the original reinforcements for Utah have all been reorganized in accordance with my recent orders, (see General Orders No. 7,) and are proceeding to their respective destinations and duties, in pursuance of General Orders No. 17 from the headquarters of the army.

No official report has been received from the 1st column under Lieutenant Colonel Andrews, 6th infantry, which went through by Bridger's Pass, but I have been informed that it arrived at Camp Scott early in July. The 2d column, under Brevet Colonel Munroe, reached Fort Laramie on the 9th, and two companies of the 4th artillery belonging to it had on the 12th gone forward to occupy the Platte bridge. The orders halting the reinforcements were received at Fort Laramie on the 12th, and at that time the squadron of dragoons, under Brevet Major Graham, (company D, 2d dragoons, and a company of recruits for the same regiment,) was one day's march beyond. I learned also unofficially that at the same date the cavalry squadron, under Major Sedgwick, was five days' march beyond that post. The 3d column, as reorganized under Captain Campbell, 2d dragoons,

left its camp, 105 miles above Fort Kearney, on the 16th ultimo; the 4th column, under Lieutenant Colonel Morrison, left Cottonwood Spring, 89 miles above Fort Kearney, the same day; the 5th column, under Brevet Major Whiting, 7th infantry, made the second day's march from Fort Kearney on the 23d; and the 6th was to follow from that post on the 24th, the day I left.

The company of the 2d dragoons (K) and the company of the 4th artillery (F,) ordered to Fort Kearney from the 3d column as originally composed, arrived there on the 22d; and two companies of the 4th artillery, (L and M,) under Brevet Major Williams from the same column, awaited the orders of the district commander at Cottonwood Spring. Captain Barry's battery will reach this post to-day, and Brevet Major Hunt's probably a week or ten days later. Colonel Sumner, with six companies of the 1st cavalry, was to have marched from his camp, nine miles above Fort Kearney, on the 24th ultimo, upon the service assigned to him for the summer. He will probably take a route from the Platte, seventeen miles above Fort Kearney, across as directly as possible to Fort Atkinson on the Arkansas, and thence to this post.

It will be observed that I have made no provision for forwarding supplies to Utah by a government train, as contemplated in General Orders No. 17. My information from there, reliable though not official, rendered it unnecessary, as the stores on hand would be sufficient until the new supply was received; and at any rate it was not possible to execute the measure as early as the supplies would arrive by contract transportation, some of them being already well advanced beyond Fort Laramie. Forty-five or fifty trains of twenty-six wagons each are, I suppose, now beyond Fort Kearney; thirty-six had passed that point up to the 23d.

Captain Pleasonton, 2d dragoons, whom I reported in my communication of the 15th ultimo as having been sent to a band of Cheyennes on the Republican, was unable to reach their camp with his wagon, owing to the impracticable character of the country; but the chief who was with him brought to my camp at Cottonwood Spring four other chiefs and seven braves, all of whom expressed great anxiety to be at peace with the whites. I told them I could not then make a treaty with them, but that probably the President might authorize it next summer, if their future conduct gave assurance of sincerity in their present professions. I told them also that it was necessary they should discontinue their hostilities towards other tribes with which we were at peace. This they were willing to assent to, but said that a war party from their tribe was then out, which they could not get word to before it would have made an attack on the Pawnees, in retaliation for robberies which the latter had committed upon them; and, in fact, on my arrival at Fort Kearney I found that an attempt had just been made, with some success, probably by this party, to drive off the animals of a large band of Pawnees encamped a few miles below the post, resulting in a skirmish in which one Pawnee was killed and two or three were wounded.

These collisions, with which depredations upon the whites are

almost constantly connected, will continue inevitable until they are interdicted by a combined treaty of the various tribes with the government. The Pawnees, with whom I had a talk at Fort Kearney after the affair alluded to, expressed their willingness to enter into such an arrangement, and I take occasion to repeat the recommendation made in my previous communication, that authority be given for effecting it next summer. I shall start for St. Louis to-morrow to assume command of the department of the west.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. S. HARNEY,
Brigadier General, commanding.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

No. 57.—*General Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 5, 1858.

MAJOR: In obedience to General Orders No. 17, headquarters of the army, I have designated the 6th infantry for service in Oregon, and have ordered the commander to take the route to Benicia, California, and thence by steamers to the Dalles.

I have carefully collated information respecting the two routes, the one by Fort Hall direct to Walla-Walla, and the California route, and upon due consideration have adopted the latter.

By the latter the regiment will certainly reach its destination nearly if not quite as soon as by the former, without the risks to be encountered by the northern route by Fort Hall, Boissé, &c. Travellers report the grass on this route sufficient, but, ignorant of the wants of large herds, their information often misleads. Major Cross describes 300 miles of this route as affording absolutely nothing for the subsistence of animals, (see his itinerary, 29th August,) and all concur in the opinion that a command would probably encounter wintry storms which should leave this region as late as the 20th of August. I expect the arrival of subsistence and quartermaster's stores will enable Colonel Andrews to march by that time at the latest period. For these and other reasons, (as the march by the northern route would be through the country occupied by the hostile Indians,) I have chosen the California route. The regiment will thus, without doubt, be in position in winter quarters ready to operate early in the spring, before which, I presume, military operations in the mountainous region occupied by the Cayuses would be impracticable.

I have granted leaves of absence to a few officers of the different regiments, some of whom have served a very long time without any indulgence, and respectfully ask that the extensions in the several cases may be granted by the General-in-Chief.

The troops are healthy and efficient.

Preparations are now in active progress for providing temporary shelter for the troops for the coming winter, and I do not doubt that it will be passed in comparative comfort.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
*Colonel 2d Cavalry and Brevet Brigadier General,
United States Army, commanding.*

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army. West Point, New York.*

No. 58.—*Major Porter to Agent Hurt.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 6, 1858.

SIR: The commanding general directs me to furnish you a copy of a letter from Brevet Lieutenant Colonel William Hoffman, commanding Fort Bridger, communicating information of depredations committed by some Ute Indians, and the defiant attitude assumed by them; also his instructions to that officer, that you may see the course adopted for the punishment and prevention of Indian depredations in that quarter. He respectfully suggests that much good may be done this tribe by recalling them from the lands of another tribe of Indians, and representing to them the evils which must eventually result from a persistence in such conduct as that described by Colonel Hoffman. Such conduct must be corrected, or depredations will be punished; and this may bring on a war, which should be avoided, as the evils will fall as heavily upon the Indians as the government.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER.
Assistant Adjutant General.

Dr. GARLAND HURT,
Agent for the Ute Indians, Spanish Fork, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT BRIDGER, U. T.
July 29, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the night of the 26th four horses, one belonging to Lieutenant Bell, two to company K, 1st cavalry, and one to a citizen, and two mules belonging to the quartermaster's department were stolen from this post. There were good reasons to believe the theft was committed by some discharged Mexicans, who were about the post the day before, and on the following morning two parties were despatched in pursuit, one under

Lieutenant Bell and one under a non-commissioned officer, accompanied by the wagon master, Mr. Beiry. Trails were found near the post and the parties separated.

Lieutenant Bell with four men made a rapid pursuit, following the foot of the mountain along Henry's Fork to its mouth. As he progressed other trails came into the one he was following, showing a pretty strong party of mounted men, and various signs indicated that they were Indians. Towards sunset of the second day he came suddenly upon a small number of Indians, seven or eight, and he recognized in their possession two of the animals which had been stolen. From the fact that the Indians seemed to have no fear of him he was disposed to be a little cautious, and very soon some thirty Indians showed themselves, some on foot and some mounted. With such a force before him he had no alternative but to retire, and he very properly did so. At this there was a show of pursuit on the part of the Indians, more in bravado perhaps than with any serious intention of an attack. Some of them fired off their guns, shouted, and made other signs of defiance. They made two or three threats of a charge, but on Lieutenant Bell's facing them they kept out of his reach. After following him two or three miles they disappeared. They were no doubt Utes.

Some few days before this occurrence some ten horses were stolen from a Snake Indian, a few miles from this post, on Muddy. On the day previous and on the day before that, our party cutting timber some ten miles above, on Black's fork, was visited by parties of ten or more Utes who behaved very impudently, and helped themselves to the men's rations.

Lieutenant Bell saw trails showing the presence of a number of parties in this vicinity, and when he made his reconnoissance of Henry's Fork, a short time since, he also discovered Indian signs; all of which circumstances taken with the fact that none of them visited this post, lead to the conviction that they were here on a horse stealing expedition, and I propose to-morrow to send as large a mounted force as I can spare, thirty-five to forty men, to endeavor to recover the stolen animals. To let this pass without further effort to get them back would only encourage a repetition of the offence, and there would be no safety for our herds.

I will give instructions that if the party in possession of the stolen property is overtaken, no violence shall be used if they can be induced to give up the animals without it. I will have them invited to come in and see me, with a view to talk with them and to endeavor by admonitions to deter them from repeating the offence. A war with these people, who I am told are numerous, would embarrass us very much; would jeopardize persons and trains on the road, besides being attended by many other evils, and should only be entered upon as a last resort.

The army regulations are silent as to the duties of commanders of posts in their intercourse with Indians, and I am at a loss to know what is expected of them. I am very willing to rely on my own dis-

cretion, if that is intended, but I'll be very happy to carry out any instruction the general may please to give me.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. HOFFMAN,
Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel
6th infantry, commanding.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Headquarters, Department of Utah,
Camp Floyd, Cedar Valley, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 7, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, Utah Territory, August 4, 1858.

SIR: The commanding general directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 29th ultimo, reporting the "loss by theft of animals at your post, the defiant and threatening attitude of the Indian thieves when discovered by Lieutenant Bell, &c.," and to inform you that he approves of the course adopted by you as expressed therein.

The commanding general wishes immediate steps always taken to recover property taken from the post, and to chastise Indians committing depredations, using for the purpose the force at your command.

You are aware of the importance of maintaining peaceable relations with the Indians; it is therefore expected a sound discretion will be exercised in demanding restitution and securing the government from a repetition of it. In case of a collision there will be no doubt of the necessity and justice of resorting to a force of arms.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Lieut. Col. WILLIAM HOFFMAN,
Commanding Fort Bridger, U. T.

No. 59.—*Major Porter to Colonel Andrews.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, Utah Territory, August 19, 1858.

SIR: The commanding general directs me to furnish you with copies of orders and letters affecting the fitting out and movements of your

regiment, but the receipt of which is only to be inferred through other persons.

The commanding general relies upon your marching at the earliest practicable moment, and want of guides not detaining you. The road is well marked. The guide book and itinerary furnished will enable you to regulate your marches, and intelligent persons under you to select suitable camping places. You will however secure guides if possible.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel GEORGE ANDREWS,
Commanding 6th Infantry, Fort Bridger, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 19, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 2, 1858.

SIR: In pursuance of General Orders No. 17, of June 29, from headquarters of the army, the commanding general has assigned your regiment to proceed to Walla-Walla to strengthen the forces in Oregon and Washington Territories, and directs the regiment to remain in the vicinity of Fort Bridger, or return to that post if you have advanced this way, and await further orders.

For the government of the engineer company I am directed to enclose an extract from the General Order, directing the return of the company to West Point, which if not yet received by the commander, you are desired to communicate. The company will return to West Point.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

The COMMANDING OFFICER 6th Infantry,
Fort Bridger, or en route to Camp Floyd.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 19, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 5, 1858.

SIR: By direction of the commanding general I enclose you a guide book for a part of the route to be travelled by your regiment, and also an itinerary of the march of the regiment of mounted riflemen from Fort Bridger to Soda Spring, which will complete the route.

A guide, Mr. John Green, has been recommended to you, and if you have not provided yourself with a good guide, it is respectfully suggested that you employ him.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel GEORGE ANDREWS,
Commanding 6th Infantry, Fort Bridger, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 19, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Estimate of Transportation for the 6th United States Infantry, en route for Benicia, California.

90 days' rations for 584 officers and enlisted men, $584 \times 90 \times 2\frac{1}{4} =$	118,260 pounds.
90 days' rations for 117 men, 5 wagon masters, 5 assistant wagon masters, 2 blacksmiths, 2 car- penters, 123 teamsters, 24 ex-teamsters, and 10 herders	34,627 "
	152,387 "
Deduct five days' rations for 584 men, to be carried in company wagons	6,570 "
	146,317 pounds.

Transportation of subsistence stores	73 wagons.
" " hospital department	2 "
" " " "	3 ambulances.
" " field and staff, and band	4 wagons.
" " 6 companies, (each less than 50 men,) 3 wagons each	18 "
" " 4 companies, (each more than 50 men,) 4 wagons each	16 "

Transportation of quartermaster's and ordnance	
stores	4 wagons.
“ “ travelling forge.	1 “
	121 wagons.

This estimate is based on the actual strength of the regiment, as shown by the field return of the regiment and the monthly returns of the companies detached.

The weight of the rations, issuing bacon twice in seven days, falls short of $2\frac{1}{4}$ pounds.

Deducting the 3 ambulances and forge, leaves 117 wagons to be provided. After the engineer company has taken the 12 wagons with which it was supplied in coming out, Lieutenant Sawtelle will have 69 left on hand. Lieutenant Smith has 91, and Colonel Canby and Captain Lovell took from here 35, making 195 wagons at Fort Bridger. Lieutenant Sawtelle has 428 mules, after supplying the 12 engineer wagons. Lieutenant Smith has 276, and Colonel Canby and Captain Lovell 210; making 914 at the post.

Lieutenant Sawtelle will require 117 6-mule teams	702 mules.
Three ambulances and one forge, 4 mules each	16 “
Riding animals for wagon masters and assistants	10 “
Extra mules for the train	50 “
	778

I respectfully suggest that Lieutenant Sawtelle be authorized to select the wagons and mules from any that may be at the post. Colonel Canby's command can be supplied from here if the animals with him should not be in working condition.

But a small portion of the stores asked for can be furnished. All the quartermaster's stores in the department are at Fort Bridger, and but little can be procured from the merchants in the Territory.

Lieutenant Sawtelle should be authorized to take any stores at Fort Bridger that can be made available in fitting up his train.

JNO. H. DICKERSON,
Captain and Assistant Quartermaster.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 19, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 10, 1858.

The enclosed estimate for the transportation of the 6th infantry, and the recommendations of the chief quartermaster, are approved.

If the regiment be increased in strength by the arrival of recruits, the amount of transportation for provisions and baggage will be increased in the ratio of eleven wagons for one hundred men.

The commanding officer at Fort Bridger will render every assistance to hasten the fitting out of the train.

By order of Brevet Brigadier General A. S. Johnston.

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 14, 1858.

SIR: I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant with its enclosures, and to inform you that the transportation which will be furnished you on the estimate for the transportation of your regiment to Benicia, prepared at these headquarters and forwarded to you on the 10th instant, is considered ample.

The commanding general in that authorized you to select the prescribed transportation at Fort Bridger, and laid open to your call all the resources of the depot to render effective your equipment. Owing to the very limited supply of quartermaster's stores in this department, and the inability to supply deficiencies in this valley, articles which cannot be procured by purchase at Fort Bridger cannot be supplied. You are authorized to receive as many of the picket pins on hand at Fort Bridger as you require, but on account of the sparseness of grass on the route, except perhaps on Bear river, not permitting your animals to be picketed without soon breaking them down, the commanding general respectfully suggests that you have them herded and well guarded.

The commanding general is very solicitous for you to be on your journey that you may pass the mountains before the commencement of the season of storms, and reach your destination before the setting in of winter, and desires you to hasten your preparations, and delay not an hour longer than necessary your march.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel GEORGE ANDREWS,
Commanding 6th Infantry, Fort Bridger, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 19, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

CAMP FLOYD, U. T., *August 14, 1858.*

SIR: The quartermaster's stores required for Colonel Andrews' command that cannot be procured at Fort Bridger cannot be furnished. A number of the articles marked on the requisition as not on hand can be purchased from the sutler at that post, and others cannot be gotten either there or here, such as wagon timbers, open links, S-hooks, T's, sweat pads and leathers, lariat rope, black lead, axe helves, stone coal, &c.

Elk and deer skins can be purchased from the sutlers to make hame strings and repair harness. Axes, augers, and chisels I presume can also be gotten from the sutlers. The travelling forge now at Bridger can be turned over to Lieutenant Sawtelle, and the portable forge used at the post until it can be replaced. The stoves on hand will be indispensable for the troops employed in herding during the winter. The frequent changes of camp will require them to remain in tents, and they will be much more necessary here than they will with Colonel Andrews' command; a half a dozen however might be taken for the use of the hospital department on the march.

Should Colonel Andrews be joined by recruits before leaving Fort Bridger he will require additional transportation for the rations of the men and for the companies. I think any that may be needed can be drawn from Bridger and replaced here. Lieutenant Sawtelle should be authorized to take from the supply trains (if they come up in time) clothing to make up any deficiency that exists in filling the requisition of the regiment after exhausting the supply in store at Bridger.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. H. DICKERSON,

Captain and Assistant Quartermaster.

Major F. J. PORTER, *Assistant Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Floyd, U. T., August 19, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Floyd, U. T., August 14, 1858.

The suggestions of the chief quartermaster are adopted, and the commander of the 6th Infantry will be governed by them.

By order of Brevet Brigadier General A. S. Johnston.

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 60.—*Governor Cumming to General Johnston.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, *Salt Lake City, August 30, 1858.*

SIR: I herewith enclose the copy of an affidavit made by Mr. John Mayfield, confirming the statement in relation to the attack made by

Sho-Shonee and Bannock Indians near the Thousand Spring valley.

These Indians are reputed to be renegade from those respective bands, and not under the control of Wash-a-keek, or the Bannock chief. The affidavit recounts the loss of the mail, the mail wagon, mules, and all the private property belonging to the mail party except their arms.

I have conversed with Mr. John Mayfield, the mail conductor, and with Mr. Gilbert a passenger. I am satisfied from the statements of these parties that the presence of a military force consisting of at least one hundred mounted men, should be permanently stationed in the vicinity of the head of the Humboldt river, where there is an abundance of grass, wood, and water.

I therefore respectfully request that you will order the detachment to proceed to the point without delay, and establish a camp with a view of protecting the numerous emigration and the United States mail, which must be suspended unless it receives your prompt protection.

There is a large emigration now on the road. The superintendent of Indian affairs will visit Carson valley in a few days.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah Territory.

A. S. JOHNSTON,
*Brevet Brigadier General, Colonel of Cavalry,
Commanding army of Utah, Camp Floyd, U. T.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., September 1, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

TERRITORY OF UTAH, }
County of Great Salt Lake, } ss.

Be it remembered that on this twenty-ninth day of August, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty-eight, before me, E. Smith, judge of the probate court within and for said county, Territory of Utah, personally appeared John Mayfield, well known to me, who upon being sworn in due form of law, upon his oath saith: That he is one of the mail conductors on route 12,801, between Great Salt Lake City, Utah Territory, and Placerville, California, and that on the sixteenth day of August instant, he left Great Salt Lake City post office with the mail for California on the above mentioned route, in a four-mule coach, in company with two other men, Messrs. Daniel W. Thomas and Washington Perkins; that on Friday the twentieth instant, soon after camping for the night, about six miles below the first crossing of the Humboldt river, some three hundred miles from Salt Lake City, a party of Indians made an attack upon the mules,

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which had been turned out to graze, and drove them off, despite the efforts of deponent and his comrades, who being only three, could not prevent the Indians, who constituted a large party, from doing as they pleased in that respect; notwithstanding they fired upon the Indians and tried in that way to make them desist from their purpose.

And deponent further saith, that after these Indians had driven off the mules as before stated, he and his party remained in the same place one day and a half, waiting for the in-coming mail from the west, until the Indians had gathered about them in such numbers that they thought it unsafe to remain there longer; and then taking the mail, their blankets, and provisions enough to last them till they could reach the mail station on Goose creek, about one hundred miles this side of the point where the attack was made, they started back with the intention of reaching said post if possible, and saving the mail; that soon after he and his party started back for the station, the Indians followed them in large numbers, and pressed upon them so closely that they were compelled for safety to abandon the mail, leaving therewith their blankets, provisions, and everything but their arms, and taking advantage of the temporary halt of the Indians to dispose of the mail, blankets, provisions, &c., they had left, they took to the mountains during the night, thus evading the pursuit of the Indians, and succeeded in reaching the station on Goose creek on Wednesday evening, August 25th; and further deponent saith not.

JOHN MAYFIELD.

Sworn and subscribed to the day and year first above written.

E. SMITH, *Judge, &c.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., September 2, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 61.—*General Johnston to Governor Cumming.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., September 1, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter requesting that a force of one hundred men be sent to the crossing of the Humbolt river and permanently stationed there, for the purpose of holding under restraint the Indians inhabiting that district of the Territory, who have, I understand, frequently attacked emigrants on that route and recently captured the United States mail. A strong post in that direction should be established; and I have had the subject under consideration, but conclude that the preparations cannot

be made this autumn in consequence of the lateness of the season when the supplies may be expected, and the necessity for the available transportation for the establishment of a post in this valley, the work of which is now going on.

For the purpose of giving all needful protection as far as it can be given on that route until the winter sets in, when, from what I learn respecting the climate, the travelling must cease till April or May, I will order a force of one hundred dragoons and fifty infantry to march to the crossing of the Humboldt river and establish a temporary camp in a position within view of the road, and to keep the route from that place to the Goose Creek mountains under observation, to prevent, as far as possible, further depredations and to chastise the perpetrators. During the next spring a site for a post will be selected as soon as the necessary preliminary examination can be made.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON, *Colonel 2d Cavalry*
and Brevet Brigadier General U. S. Army, commanding.

His excellency A. CUMMING,
Governor of Utah.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., September 2, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 62.—*Major Potter to Captain Hawes.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., September 2, 1858.

SIR: It is represented to the commanding general that frequent depredations have been committed on the Humboldt river, on the California road, and that lately they have captured the United States mail and horses belonging to the mail party. For the purpose of giving protection to the mail and travellers on that route, and of punishing the perpetrators of these offences, the commanding general has directed a detachment of one hundred dragoons and fifty infantry to be placed under your command.

To effect these objects as far as practicable, the commanding general directs that you proceed to the first crossing of the Humboldt and establish a temporary camp in such a position that you may keep the road to the Goose Creek mountains under observation, prevent as far as possible further depredations and chastise offenders.

You will endeavor to ascertain to what band or tribe of Indians the robbers belong, represent to them that such offenders will be punished by the government, and demand of the chief restoration of the mail and other property stolen. A failure to comply with these demands, and an indication of hostility at any time, will cause you, if the

strength of your command permit, to punish them for the past offences, and in such a manner as to warn them against their commission in future. You will remain at the Humboldt sufficiently long to effect the object of your expedition and return to this camp on the 1st of November, but should the earlier approach of winter give warning of the closing of the roads over the Goose Creek mountains, you will remain only so long as you deem it safe to secure your party from being caught by the snows in the mountains.

A guide, Mr. Howard Eagan, well acquainted with the road and climate, and in addition an interpreter, will accompany you from Salt Lake City.

On proper estimates your quartermaster will be furnished with funds to procure subsistence for your animals while in the settlements.

The commanding general will be pleased to hear from you by every opportunity that may offer.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Captain J. M. HAWES,
*2d Dragoons, Commanding Detachment
en route to Humboldt river.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., September 2, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 63.—*Major Porter to Captain Simpson.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., August 24, 1858.

SIR: With a view of ascertaining the practicability of opening a wagon road to Fort Bridger, the commanding general directs that you proceed to-morrow to examine the route to that place known as the Provo or Timpanogos route. It is represented that the main obstacle to success has been overcome by the Mormons opening a road some eight miles up the Provo river. Little, however, of the features of the country beyond is known except through Lieutenant Beckwith's report, (a copy of which is furnished you,) so that your attention will be principally directed to the facilities and difficulties presented by the remaining portion of the route for the movement of trains (pack and wagon) and bodies of troops, camping places, as well as the resources of the country for fuel, grass, and water.

From the mouth of Morino Fork (White Clay creek) and the sources of Yellow creek the commanding general wishes you to push your examination to the main Salt Lake road, that, if found practicable and

your excursion meets with success, connecting roads may be opened, and if necessary the whole road, in part, used. Also, as soon as you cross the Muddy, he wishes you, instead of immediately taking the road due east to Black's Fork, to see if you cannot easily ascend to the table land and go direct to Fort Bridger by the south end of the large buttes west of that place.

The commanding general will be pleased to have your observations directed to the comparative heights of the ridges over which you will pass, that you may form some idea of the practicability of this route late in the fall and early in the spring for bringing back animals and herds of cattle into this valley.

You will probably find parties of the Indians in the vicinity of the Kansas prairies. As some of them visit that portion of the country in winter and early in spring you may obtain much information of the nature of the winters in those mountain valleys. The escort of one officer and twenty men will accompany you, supplied with fifteen days' provision, on pack mules.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Captain J. H. SIMPSON,

Corps of Topographical Engineers, Camp Floyd, U. T.

No. 64.—*Captain Simpson to Major Porter.*

FORT BRIDGER, U. T., *September 3, 1858.*

SIR: The mail for Salt Lake City goes out in a few moments, and I have only time to report, for the information of the general commanding, that I arrived here yesterday about noon, after having located a wagon route that is far superior to the old one in respect to grade, wood, water, and grass, and in distance about the same. It essentially lies as follows: From Camp Floyd, by the way of Lehi, &c., to the mouth of the Timpanogos; thence up the Timpanogos by an excellent grade, with very little work, to near its head; thence over a ridge of fair grade to the headwaters of Silver creek; thence down Silver creek four miles to its intersection by the Parley's Park Salt Lake City road; thence by this road to the mouth of White Clay creek; thence up this creek, with about six or eight miles of cutting of willows, to its head; thence across, with tolerable grades, to the Muddy, above the crossing of the same by the old road; thence down the valley of the Muddy six miles to a branch of the Muddy, three miles above the crossing of the old road; thence upon the east branch of the Muddy to its head; and thence across by the south of the Big Butte, about six miles west of Fort Bridger, to Bridger. In consequence of there being no water for the last twelve miles, it may be advisable to come in to the north of the Big Butte, so as to have the benefit of the water in that direction.

I expect to return to Camp Floyd to-morrow morning, and shall explore the country around in order to shorten or better the route, if possible.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. SIMPSON,

Captain, Corps Topographical Engineers.

Major F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General, Camp Floyd, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., September 7, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 65.—*Major Paul to Major Porter.*

HEADQUARTERS 6TH COLUMN UTAH FORCES,
Camp No. 75, on Timpanogos river, near Coral creek,
September 22, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt this day at 5 p. m. of your communication of the 17th instant, in reference to the new route from Fort Bridger, *via* the Timpanogos, Silver creek, &c.

On my arrival at Fort Bridger, this route having been so strongly recommended by Colonel Canby, from the representations of Captain Simpson, and the 5th column, under Major Whiting, having already preceded me in it, I concluded to take it also. I have had no reason to regret it, as I have found good camps every night, with water, wood, and grass, and my animals are generally in a thriving condition.

Should there be nothing to prevent it, I expect reaching Camp Floyd on the 25th instant.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. R. PAUL,

Captain 7th Infantry and Brevet Major U. S. A.,

Commanding 6th Column Utah Forces.

Brevet Major F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters

Department of Utah, Camp Floyd, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., September 25, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 66.—*Major Whiting to Major Porter.*

CAMP FIFTH COLUMN UTAH FORCES,
Near Timpanogos Cañon, U. T., September 22, 1858.

MAJOR: Your communication by express, dated 17th instant, directing me to continue the route to Camp Floyd by the new road marked out by Captain Simpson, topographical engineer, was received about 12 o'clock to-day.

I beg leave to say, for the information of the commanding general, that on arriving at Fort Bridger, from the information obtained upon the comparative advantages of the two routes, I concluded to pursue the trail of Captain Simpson, and accordingly, procuring a guide, (Mariano,) I left on the 12th instant.

Starting on nearly the track of Captain S., and finally striking it before reaching White Clay creek, I followed his course, as indicated on your enclosed map and in your letter, meeting Captain Simpson and party at our camp on Silver creek on the 20th.

Thus it will be perceived that the column has anticipated the desire and instructions of the commanding general by opening the road so far as the point of meeting with Captain Simpson.

This road will, of course, require further improvement; but considerable work was necessarily executed by my command to enable it to proceed, particularly on White Clay creek, some idea of which may be conveyed by the fact that five days were occupied in progressing through its cañon, a distance of twenty-seven miles and a half.

The road will be a very good one, especially after the subsequent passage and improvements contemplated by Captain Simpson, and is abundantly supplied with fine grass, water, and fuel.

Having no further cause of detention or delay by this fine Mormon road through Timpanogos cañon—having, in fact, been on a Mormon wagon road since leaving the Heber, after crossing which it was struck—I anticipate arriving at Camp Floyd with the fifth column in two more days, *i. e.*, on the 24th instant, being now encamped about thirty-four miles distant.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. P. WHITING,
Brevet Major U. S. A., Commanding.

Major F. J. PORTER, *Assistant Adjutant General,*
Department of Utah, Camp Floyd, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., September 28, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 67.—*Captain Simpson to Major Porter.*

LIEUTENANT JONES' CAMP ON UPPER CAÑON,
White Clay Creek, U. T., September 30, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that I yesterday received your communication of the 24th instant, at the hands of Major Prince, directing me to return to headquarters as soon as the duties entrusted to me will permit. The enclosed letters will show the progress of operations on the road, and that they are at this date so far advanced from both Camp Floyd and Fort Bridger as to enable me to leave the road and repair the Fort Bridger in the further prosecution of my duties in that quarter. I therefore start for Fort Bridger to-morrow morning, and shall return to headquarters as soon as I can set the survey of the reserve in the process of successful accomplishment.

The route taken by Major Whiting made much too great a detour to the south out from Fort Bridger, and did not come into mine short of ten miles to the east of Bear river; and from that point the hills over which it runs are so exceptionable in respect to grade as to have rendered a very large portion of his work useless, and necessitated us to work the road almost as much as if no troops had passed over any portion of it. The cause was doubtless, as was natural, on account of their anxiety to get through, their subsistence being but for a limited period, and because they had no guide to assure them of their *status* in respect to their exact *locale*, or what lay before them before they could reach their destination. I have been careful to get the best grades the country afforded, and the troops, particularly those under Lieutenant Forbert, have not been wanting in the necessary energy to accomplish a great deal of good and important earth work.

The road will prove, I have no doubt, far superior to the old one by Echo cañon, and will be the means of resuscitating and saving the lives of a great deal of stock which would otherwise perish. Besides the advantages of grade, grass, wood and water, which this route possesses over the other, the beautiful valleys and fine mountain streams along and across which it runs, abounding, as the latter do, in trout, and a considerable portion of the country in game, will still more enhance its character as a desirable route. In addition to all that, the remarkable hot springs, dwelling out from cones and hemispheres of their own formation, in the valley of the Timpanagos river, some of them obtaining a height of from forty to sixty feet, and the whole country for several miles around showing a substratum of from twenty to fifty feet, at least, in thickness, the product of the same kind of formation, cannot, with the coal which doubtless exists in the same valley and which I found of very tolerable quality in the valley of White Clay creek, fail still further to give interest to this route.

It may be proper, in order to an intelligent understanding of my letter to Lieutenant Colonel Canby of the 24th instant, to say that the colonel, on the 21st, not having seen anything of the

guide, Mr. Bullock, directed Lieutenant Jackson to go over the route travelled by Major Whiting, and take notes of what was still required to make the road a good one; and it was in the prosecution of this duty that he reported to me on White Clay creek,

Mr. Bullock arrived at Fort Bridger the day Lieutenant Jackson left, and immediately the necessary orders were given by Colonel Canby for the movement of the working party the next day.

It is very likely I shall be enabled to reach headquarters a day or two after this shall have been handed to you by Lieutenant Forbert.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. H. SIMPSON,

Captain Corps Topographical Engineers.

Major FITZ JOHN PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General, Camp Floyd, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Floyd, U. T., October 21, 1858.

Official :

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Itinerary of a new route from Camp Floyd to Fort Bridger, explored and opened by Captain James H. Simpson, Corps of Topographical Engineers, under instructions from the headquarters of the department of Utah, in the fall of 1858.

Localities.	Intermediate distances.	Wood.	Water.	Grass.
	<i>Miles.</i>			
Camp Floyd	0			
Bridge over Jordan	14			
Lehi, forage purchasable	2 $\frac{3}{4}$			
American Fork settlement, forage purchasable	3			
Battle Creek settlement, forage purchasable	3 $\frac{1}{4}$			
Mouth of Timpanogos river cañon	6 $\frac{1}{4}$	W	W	
Beautiful cascade	4 $\frac{1}{4}$			
First camping place for small command, grass on bench	$\frac{1}{4}$	W	W	G
First wide place where ox trains can corral	2	W	W	G
Good camping places at short intervals all along Timpanogos to one mile within upper cañon	18	W	W	G
End of cañon, no camping place in this distance	2	W	W	G
Last camp on Timpanogos	1	W	W	G
Across the divide to Silver creek	6	Willows & sage.	W	G
Parley's Park road	3 $\frac{3}{4}$	W	W	G
Across divide to Weber river	6	W	W	G
Good camping places all along Weber to mouth of White Clay creek	12	W	W	G
Good camping places all along White Clay creek to commencement of lower cañon	3 $\frac{1}{2}$	W	W	G
End of cañon, no camping places in cañon	$\frac{3}{4}$	W	W	G
Good camping places all along White Clay creek to commencement of upper cañon	15	W	W	G
Last camp in White Clay creek valley	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	Willows	Water in pools	G
Main branch of Bear river	9 $\frac{3}{4}$	W	W	G
Middle branch of Bear river, water not constant	2 $\frac{3}{4}$	Willow		G
East branch of Bear river	$\frac{1}{4}$	W	W	G
West branch of Sulphur creek, spring about three-quarters of a mile below	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	Willow		G
Middle branch of Sulphur creek	3	Willow		G
East branch of Sulphur creek, junction of Camp Supply road	$\frac{1}{4}$	Sage ..	W	G
First water in ravine going down to Muddy	5 $\frac{1}{4}$	Sage ..	W	G
Grass, sage, and willow fuel, all the way down the ravine to Muddy, and water at intervals				
Cedar on the bluffs of Muddy	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	Sage & Willow	W	G
Cañon branch of Black's Fork, grass in vicinity	7 $\frac{1}{4}$	W	W	G
Fort Bridger	6	Willow	W	G
Total	155			

Respectfully submitted, October 15, 1858.

J. H. SIMPSON, Capt. Corps Top. Engs.

Major F. J. PORTER, Asst. Adjt. Gen. Dept. of Utah.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH, Camp Floyd, U. T., October, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER, Asst. Adjt. Gen.

No. 68.—*Governor Cumming to General Johnston.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
Great Salt Lake City, U. T., September 25, 1858.

SIR: On the 10th instant the Utah Indians, supposed to belong to Pateet-neet's band, violated the persons of two females, (one a child,) in the vicinity of Spanish Fork. I requested the agent, Dr. Garland Hurt, to arrest them with a civil posse. I have this moment received a letter from him advising me that he has been unsuccessful, and the chiefs refuse to give up the offender. Under the circumstances, I consider it a matter of the utmost importance that the parties should be seized and punished.

I therefore request that you will place two hundred mounted men subject to the orders of Agent Hurt, who will hand this to you, and to whom I have given specific instructions, which he will exhibit to you if required.

I do not expect the command to enter the cañons; but, as they may be required to remain in the vicinity of the Indian farms, it will possibly be necessary to ration the command for seven or eight days.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. CUMMING,
Governor Utah Territory.

General A. S. JOHNSTON,
Commanding army of Utah, Camp Floyd, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., October 7, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 69.—*Governor Cumming to Agent Hurt.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
Great Salt Lake City, September 25, 1858.

SIR: I received yours of the 24th instant, and learn with regret that you have not succeeded in arresting the three Indians who so brutally violated the woman and child on the 10th instant.

Upon the receipt of this you will please assemble the chiefs of the various bands, and demand peremptorily the immediate delivery to you of the offenders; if they hesitate or refuse, you will break up the council, and, without advising any one of your intentions, proceed to Camp Floyd, and deliver to the general in command the enclosed requisition for (200) two hundred mounted men. Upon your return to the Indian camp, you will request the officer in command of the posse to make such disposition of his force as will enable you to sur-

round the Indians, and then repeat the demand for the offenders. If they still persist in refusing them, you will hold the chiefs responsible by detaining them, and, if in your judgment it seems desirable, will take them to Camp Floyd and request General Johnston to detain them as prisoners under an efficient military guard.

If, however, the chiefs allege that the criminals have escaped, and they give you their united promise to deliver the offenders, you will appoint the time for their delivery to you, and relieve the military posse from further service. When the prisoners are in your possession you will please be governed by my instructions of the 15th instant.

Very respectfully,

A. CUMMING,
Governor Utah Territory.

Dr. GARLAND HURT,
Indian Agent.

P. S. I do not want you to follow the Indians into the mountains.
A. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., October 7, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 70.—*Major Paul to Utah Headquarters.*

CAMP NEAR SPANISH FORK, U. T.,
October 3, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report the complete success of the expedition against the Indians residing on the public farm. My command arrived here at break of day on the 2d instant, having marched forty-five miles, and, immediately on its arrival, the Indian village was surrounded; and, as the Indians were attempting to escape, they were pursued and nearly all captured. One chief, "Pinteets," of Petetennt's band, was killed. There were not more than a dozen men in the village, the others having left for the mountains on the morning of the 30th of September. By detaining one chief and several of his band in custody, and releasing the others, they promised to bring in the guilty young men, which they did, and all were released except the two culprits. The *third* was not to be found; but it was conceded by all that, though present, he had nothing to do with the outrage committed.

I have just received the enclosed note from the agent, Dr. Hurt, desiring the command to remain in this vicinity for a few weeks longer, to allay the excited state of the citizens residing in the neighboring towns. I have conversed with many of them, and they all expressed the same dread of depredations by the Indians on the withdrawal of the troops. Should the commanding general comply with

this request of the agent, it will be necessary either to send provisions for two hundred and twenty men for ten days, or to send another command provided with about fifteen days' rations. The latter would be preferable, as the dragoon companies have no tents, and the infantry but few, and all are scantily provided with bedding and clothing.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. R. PAUL,

Capt. 7th Infantry and Brev. Maj., U. S. A., comd'g expedition.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Headquarters Department of Utah, Camp Floyd, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Floyd, U. T., October 6, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

UTAH INDIAN RESERVATION, *October 3, 1858.*

DEAR SIR: After consulting the people of this neighborhood I find that they apprehend danger of hostilities with the Indians, and have to communicate to you their desire, with my own, that you remain in this vicinity with your command a few weeks.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. HURT.

Major PAUL.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Floyd, U. T., October 6, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 71.—*Major Porter to Colonel Morrison.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Floyd, U. T., October 4, 1858.

SIR: For the purpose of sending supplies and tents to Brevet Major Paul's command, the depot quartermaster is directed to cause three wagons to be reported to you early to-morrow morning; the teamsters rationed up to the 18th instant, and supplied with forage for one day for their teams and eleven horses. Under the escort of one non-commissioned officer and ten men, (mounted,) the commanding general wishes to send in these wagons, to Major Paul, small rations for ten days, and bacon for two days, all for two hundred and thirty men,

(soldiers and teamsters,) three Sibley tents for each company of dragoons, and one for the officers belonging to it, and one tent to each company of infantry. It is desired that the wagons be as near equally loaded as possible. Requisitions for the provisions will, if necessary, be immediately made upon Captain Clarke. You will call upon Colonel Howe for the tents for the companies of his regiment, while those for the 7th infantry will be taken from their own companies. Beef for the command will be sent by Captain Clarke, independent of this party.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel P. MORRISON,

Commanding Camp Floyd, U. T.

No. 72.—*Major Porter to Major Paul.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Floyd, U. T., October 4, 1858.

SIR: The commanding general directs me to inform you that Colonel Morrison has been directed to send three wagons to you early tomorrow morning, loaded with small rations for ten days, and bacon for two days, all for two hundred and thirty men, eight tents for the companies of dragoons and their officers, and two for the infantry companies; beef for your command will be driven to your camp by direction of Captain Clarke.

The commanding general desires you to remain at the farm till you have expended all your supplies except sufficient to bring you to this camp, when you will return. Events of importance he expects you to report, and he will be pleased to hear from you by every favorable opportunity.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Major G. R. PAUL,

Commanding Detachment Indian Agency, U. T.

No. 73.—*Governor Cumming to General Johnston.*

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, GREAT SALT LAKE CITY,

October 4, 9 P. M., 1858.

SIR: I have this moment received a note from G. Hurt, Indian agent, dated at Utah Indian reservation, October 3, 1858, in which he informs me that "Pinteets (a chief) lost his life in an attempt to escape."

“ ‘Tintic’ (a chief) and three of his party were detained, but liberated on the 3d instant, on the delivery of two of the offenders.”

Agent Hurt states that “the inhabitants of the country are alarmed for their safety, and desire that the troops should remain in the vicinity of Spanish Fork for a few weeks.”

In the conclusion of his note the agent says: “I think myself there is danger of an outbreak, and if so it would, perhaps, be best to meet it promptly.”

It is to me a source of regret that it was necessary to take the life of an Indian in an effort to secure those who violated Mrs. Markham and her daughter, (a child nine years of age.)

Withdrawing the command now near Spanish Fork would, I am convinced, be productive of injurious results if done at the present time. I therefore request that you will furnish that command with ten (10) days’ additional rations, and order its officer to remain in the vicinity of Spanish Fork settlements until the 20th of October, for the protection of its inhabitants, and to act as a posse if required by the agent.

In addition to the troops above referred to, I request that you will order one hundred men to the vicinity of Springville, a village six miles from Spanish Fork; also, one hundred men to the vicinity of Pond Town, for the protection of the inhabitants of those settlements, and to act as a posse if required by the agent.

I desire that the two last named detachments should remain on duty at least twenty (20) days, unless Agent G. Hurt should express to you an opinion that their services may be dispensed with at an earlier period.

I desire that no aggressive movement be made upon the Indians, and that the troops be ordered to limit their service exclusively to the protection of the inhabitants.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. CUMMING,
Governor Utah Territory.

General A. S. JOHNSTON,
Commanding Army of Utah, Camp Floyd, U. T.

Agent Hurt encloses in his note a communication from Bishop Butler of Spanish Fork, who coincides with the agent in opinion.

A. C.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., October 7, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 74.—*General Johnston to Governor Cumming.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., October 5, 1858.

SIR: In compliance with your requisition of the 4th instant, I have ordered to Springville and Pond Town one hundred men to each, for the protection of the inhabitants and to act as a posse, if required by Dr. G. Hurt, Indian agent, with specific instructions with reference to the service to be performed, and to be provided with subsistence to include the 25th of October. They will march to-morrow morning, if the state of the weather shall not prevent.

Your request that the troops at the reservation should be ordered to remain there for a longer period than was first directed has been anticipated by my orders of yesterday's date, directing Major Paul to remain there until the exhaustion of his supplies would make it necessary for him to return, and by sending forward to him this morning ten days' provisions. Should it be necessary for him to remain longer, orders will be sent in time.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,
*Colonel 2d Cavalry and Brevet Brigadier General
United States Army, commanding.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., October 7, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 75.—*Major Porter to Colonel Morrison.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Floyd, U. T., October 5, 1858.

SIR: To fill a requisition from the governor of the Territory upon the commanding general for troops, to be stationed in the vicinity of Springville and Pond Town, for the purpose of affording protection to the inhabitants of those settlements in case of Indian hostilities, now apprehended, and of acting as a posse if required by the Indian agent, Dr. J. Garland Hurt, the commanding general directs that to-morrow you detach two companies of infantry, each raised by details from other companies of the regiments from which taken, one hundred strong, and at least two officers; one company to be located in the vicinity of Springville, the other near Pond Town. The companies will be rationed for twenty-five days, and remain at their location at least twenty days, unless the Indian agent should express an opinion that their services may be sooner dispensed with.

The commanding general desires the officers instructed to make no aggressive movement upon the Indians, and to limit their services in regard to the Indians exclusively to the protection of the inhabitants against them.

In order not to retard the completion of the company buildings, the commanding general respectfully suggests that companies now in quarters be taken in preference.

The necessary transportation and supplies will be furnished by the respective chiefs of the departments, on requisitions.

An assistant surgeon, to be designated by you, will accompany each party.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel P. MORRISON,

Commanding Camp Floyd, U. T.

No. 76.—*General Johnston to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Floyd, U. T., October 12, 1858.

MAJOR: Quiet prevails throughout this department. The troops here and at Fort Bridger are still busily engaged in building temporary quarters; they are here built of adobe, and covered with plank and earth; they are built of the cheapest material to be obtained; and although properly called temporary, will in fact last many years, and serve all the purposes of more expensive and more permanent structures. In a short time all will be domiciled in their new dwellings. The progress of the work is frequently delayed for want of plank, else they would have been finished before now.

Captain Hawes was detached last month with one hundred dragoons and fifty infantry to keep the route from the crossing of Humboldt river to the east of Goose Creek mountains open, and protect travellers, mail parties, &c., from predatory attacks of Indians. He writes from near the Humboldt on the 1st instant; he says the Indians he has met are friendly, and so reports the Indian agent, Dr. Forney, who has gone forty miles lower down on the Humboldt to meet them. On the following day, he expected to take the route back, which I approved, as the Goose Creek mountains might become impassable; they are very high, and the period of the year when they can no longer be passed is quite uncertain.

I despatched two hundred men, (one hundred dragoons and one hundred infantry,) on the 2d instant, under the command of Brevet Major Paul, in compliance with a requisition of the governor to that effect, to arrest two Indians who had been guilty of an atrocious crime at the Indian farm, forty-five miles hence. The arrest was made early the next morning, but not without the killing of one of

the chiefs, which is to be regretted, though I presume unavoidable, and a necessary consequence of the attempt.

This detachment and two others, of one hundred each, sent to the same neighborhood at the request of the governor and Indian agent, on account of the apprehensions of the people of hostilities on the part of the Indians, are to remain a short time. Their fears are I suppose groundless, but to allay their excitement, it is proper that they should remain there a few weeks.

The health of the troops is very good.

With great respect, your obedient servant,

A. S. JOHNSTON,

Colonel 2d Cavalry and Brevet Brigadier General U. S. A.,

Commanding.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, N. Y.

No. 77.--*Major Paul to Utah Headquarters.*

CAMP FLOYD, U. T., *October 17, 1858.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in compliance with special orders No. 37, Headquarters Camp Floyd, Utah Territory, September 30, 1858, I proceeded on the 1st instant to the Indian reservation on Spanish Fork in command of two companies of the 7th infantry and two of the 2d dragoons, to act as a "*posse comitatus*" to assist the Indian agent, Dr. G. Hurt, in arresting several Indians guilty of rape on a white woman and child.

The command left this camp at 8 o'clock, p. m., on the 1st and arrived at break of day on the 2d October at the Indian village, (distant forty-five miles,) which was surrounded and surprised and all the Indians it contained taken prisoners. They had previously obtained information that troops were about to visit them, and they had hurriedly fled to the mountains on the morning of the 1st instant, with the exception of two chiefs, Tintic and Pinteets, and ten others, with a number of women and children. The agent having informed me that it was necessary to arrest all the men in order to secure the chiefs, orders were accordingly given, and all were captured with but little difficulty except Pinteets, who refused to surrender and fled towards the mountains. He was pursued, and in the attempt to take him was shot at and killed. Two shots only were fired by the Indians at the troops, but without damage. Three of the prisoners were released (Tintic being still detained) on condition of their bringing in the criminals, and on the 2d one was brought in, and on the 3d the other. Tintic and his brethren were then released according to promise. On the 5th the culprits were delivered to the agent, who took them to Salt Lake City. Tintic and his band having through fear left the farm, and there being a great deal of excitement among the citizens

of the neighboring towns, it was thought best by the agent to retain the troops for a few days longer.

Frequent messages were sent by the agent and myself to Tintic and others, inviting them to come back, and assuring them that they should not be molested, but they declined doing so unless the troops left the farm.

On consultation with the agent, and with the discretionary power conferred on me, I left the Indian reservation with my command on the 15th, and arrived at Camp Floyd on the 16th instant.

I have the honor to enclose herein a communication dated October 14, 1858, which I received from Dr. Hurt previous to my departure.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. R. PAUL,

Capt. 7th Infantry & Brevet Major U. S. A., Com'g Detachment.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Headquarters Department of Utah, Camp Floyd, U. T.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Floyd, U. T., October 19, 1858.

Official :

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

UTAH INDIAN RESERVATION,

Spanish Fork, October 14, 1858.

DEAR SIR: As I learn this evening that your supplies of subsistence are short, and as it is impossible for me to say, positively, that the services of the troops will be required, I have no further reasons for detaining you.

Please accept my thanks for your efficient services, and the good order maintained among the troops during their stay in the vicinity.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. HURT,

Indian Agent.

Major PAUL.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,

Camp Floyd, U. T., October 18, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 78—*The Secretary of War to Messrs. Powell and McCulloch.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, April 12, 1858.

GENTLEMEN: You will proceed with all practicable despatch to the Territory of Utah, and it is hoped you will reach the forces com-

manded by General Johnston, before hostilities shall have been actually renewed. You will carry with you the President's proclamation to the people of Utah, dated on the 6th instant, and give such extensive circulation to it as you may be able to effect amongst them. This will clearly point out to them the unfortunate relations in which their present attitude places them towards the government and people of the United States.

The duties committed to you by the President are of great importance, though you are not authorized to enter into any treaty or engagement with the Mormons. It is the great object of the President to bring these misguided people to their senses, to convert them into good citizens and to spare the effusion of human blood. He relies much upon your high character, patriotism, and prudence to accomplish these results, by convincing them, should the opportunity offer, how desperate is their effort to resist the authority of the government, and how much in accordance it will be with their own true interests to return to their allegiance, and submit promptly and peaceably to the Constitution and laws of the United States upon the assurances contained in the President's proclamation.

To restore peace in this manner is the single purpose of your mission. To this end, you may place yourselves in communication with their recognized leaders, should this be deemed expedient under their circumstances, on your arrival in Utah.

Much must necessarily be left to your discretion and wisdom in any communication you may have with the Mormon people. You can repeat the assurances heretofore given by the President, that the movement of the army to Utah has no reference whatever to their religious tenets or faith. Whilst they obey the laws and perform their duty as citizens, no power in this country has either the right or the disposition to interfere with their religion. In the language of the proclamation addressed to the Mormons, "If you obey the laws, keep the peace, and respect the just rights of others, you will be perfectly secure, and may live on in your present faith, or change it for another at your pleasure. Every intelligent man among you knows very well that this government has never, directly or indirectly, sought to molest you in your worship, to control you in your ecclesiastical affairs, or even to influence you in your religious opinions."

It is the duty and determination of the federal government to see that the officials appointed and sent out by the President shall be received and installed, and due obedience be yielded to the laws and to their official acts. When this shall have been fully accomplished, a necessity will no longer exist to retain any portion of the army in the Territory, except what may be required to keep the Indians in check and to secure the passage of emigrants to California.

You will communicate freely with General Johnston and Governor Cumming, and act in concert with them. At this distance it is impossible to anticipate what may be the condition of affairs on your arrival in Utah, but the President was determined to leave no effort

unessayed to bring these rebellious people to a sense of their duty before it be too late.

In the month of December last Colonel Thomas L. Kane, of the city of Philadelphia, impelled thereto by ancient kind feelings for the Mormons, deemed it to be his duty to repair to Utah for the purpose of influencing that people to do their duty to the government of the United States, and, if possible to spare the effusion of blood. He acted under a deep conviction of duty, against the advice of his excellent father, Judge Kane, since deceased, and other members of his family. Having determined upon this course, the President, whilst he recognized him in no manner as a government agent, addressed him two letters under date of 31st December last, copies of which are now communicated to you. Colonel Kane is probably at this time in Utah, and if you should find him there he may render you essential service in accomplishing the object of your mission.

All orders for facilitating your journey shall be given to the officers in command of the troops and stations along the line.

I am, gentlemen, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.

LAZARUS W. POWELL and BEN McCULLOCH, esquires.

WASHINGTON CITY, *December 31, 1857.*

MY DEAR SIR: You furnish the strongest evidence of your desire to serve the Mormons by abandoning the comforts of friends, family, and home, and voluntarily encountering the perils and dangers of a journey to Utah at the present inclement season of the year, at your own expense, and without official position. Your only reward must be a consciousness that you are doing your duty. Nothing but pure philanthropy and a strong desire to serve the Mormon people could have dictated a course so much at war with your private interests.

You express a strong conviction, in which however I do not participate, that a large portion of the Mormons labor under a mistake as to the intentions of the federal government towards them. If this be so, my late message will disabuse their minds. My views therein expressed, as I have already informed you, have undergone no change. These sentiments were expressed in sincerity and truth, and I trust that your representations of them may meet with the success you anticipate. I hope that the people of Utah may be convinced, ere it is too late, that there exist no duties of higher obligation than those which they owe to their country. They cannot doubt your friendship, and the services which you have rendered to them in times past will conciliate their regard.

At the same time I deem it my duty to say that, whilst reposing entire confidence in the purity and patriotism of your motives, and entertaining a warm personal regard for yourself, I would not at the present moment, in view of the hostile attitude they have assumed

against the United States, send any agent to visit them on behalf of the government. If the case were otherwise, however, I know no person to whom I should more cheerfully confide such a mission than yourself.

With every sentiment of personal regard, I remain truly your friend,
JAMES BUCHANAN.

Colonel THOMAS L. KANE.

WASHINGTON CITY, *December 31, 1857.*

MY DEAR SIR: As you have been impelled by your own sense of duty to visit Utah, and having informed me that nothing can divert you from this purpose, it affords me pleasure to commend you to the favorable regard of all officers of the United States whom you may meet in the course of your travels. Possessed as you are of my confidence, and being well informed as to passing events, you may have it in your power to impart to them useful information from this side of the continent. I do not doubt that they will, in the exercise of whatever discretion their instructions may permit, render you all the aid and facilities in their power in expediting you on your journey, undertaken of your own accord, to accomplish the pacific and philanthropic objects you have in view.

Heartily wishing you success, I remain, very respectfully, your friend,

JAMES BUCHANAN.

Colonel THOMAS L. KANE.

WAR DEPARTMENT, *April 12, 1858.*

It is hereby certified that Lazarus W. Powell, of Kentucky, and Ben McCulloch, of Texas, have been authorized by the President to proceed to Utah to perform certain duties more particularly set forth in instructions of this date from the War Department. They are entitled to full credence in the premises.

In testimony whereof I, John B. Floyd, Secretary of War of the [L. S.] United States, have hereunto set my hand and caused the seal of the Department of War to be hereunto affixed.

JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.

No. 79.—*Messrs. Powell and McCulloch to the Secretary of War.*

FORT LEAVENWORTH,
April 25, 1858.

DEAR SIR: We reached this place without accident or delay. At St. Louis we selected five ambulances and harness which were

promptly purchased by Colonel Crossman, quartermaster at that place, and shipped the next day for this place. We have completed our arrangements and will start on the plains to-day. Our party consists of a sergeant and five dragoons, a wagon master, five teamsters and a guide. Our teamsters are armed; each ambulance is drawn by four mules, we take three saddle horses. Colonel Munroe, the commander at this place, Colonel Tompkins the quartermaster, and the commissary, promptly furnished us with everything we desired. The officers in every department of the service with whom we had business did everything in their power to facilitate our departure. We were most kindly received and hospitably entertained by Colonel Munroe, during our sojourn here.

We take very little baggage. The ambulances are so comfortable that we find it unnecessary to take a tent. We have been fortunate in procuring excellent teams. We can carry in the ambulances sufficient forage for our animals. We expect to make thirty-five miles a day. We will reach General Johnston's camp at the earliest possible moment.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

L. W. POWELL,
BEN McCULLOCH,
Commissioners to Utah.

Hon. J. B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

N. B. We will avail ourselves of every opportunity to advise you of our progress.

Respectfully,

L. W. POWELL,
BEN McCULLOCH.

No. 80.—*Messrs. Powell and McCulloch to the Secretary of War.*

FORT KEARNEY, *May 3, 1858.*

DEAR SIR: We reached this place yesterday evening at six o'clock. We left Fort Leavenworth at half past three on the evening of the 25th last month. We were seven days two and a half hours out from Leavenworth.

The Indians on the road are quiet, and have committed no depredations this spring. The grass is very good; we left one mule in consequence of lameness, at a trading post one hundred miles from this place. We changed four of our mules here, and took one to supply the place of the one left. We will remain here to-day to rest our animals and to have the wheel of one of the ambulances repaired, which was broken fifty miles before we reached this post. Our party have enjoyed excellent health and our animals have stood the trip well.

We will leave here in the morning, and expect to reach Fort Lara-

mie in eight days. Captain McCoun, the commander of this post received us with the greatest courtesy and kindness, and promptly furnished us with everything we desired. We would suggest that fifty good mules be kept at this post for the purpose of supplying defective teams, expresses, &c. Captain McCoun is of the opinion that if the number of mules indicated were kept here it would promote the efficiency of the service. We are informed that during the last winter the commandant at this post suggested the importance of keeping fifty mules here for the purposes above stated, and that no reply had been made to his letter.

We met two days since a party consisting of a merchant and others from Camp Scott, they informed us that they left General Johnston's command the 21st of March. They report General Johnston's army in good condition; they met Colonel Hoffman's command thirty-five miles this side of Fort Laramie. From information received from these gentlemen, we expect to reach Camp Scott by the time Colonel Hoffman does.

We were informed by these gentlemen that General Johnston would not advance until he was reinforced by Colonel Hoffman and Captain Marcy.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

L. W. POWELL,
BEN McCULLOCH,
Commissioners to Utah.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

No. 81.—*Messrs. Powell and McCulloch to the Secretary of War.*

CAMP SCOTT, U. T.,
June 1, 1858.

DEAR SIR: We have the honor to report that we reached this camp on the 29th of last month. We found General Johnston's command in good health and spirits.

The advance of Colonel Hoffman's command has arrived. Colonel Hoffman with the remainder of his command will reach this place in seven or eight days. General Johnston is of the opinion that the command of Captain Marcy will arrive in fifteen or twenty days; we have had full and free conference with General Johnston and Governor Cumming touching the object of our mission. Governor Cumming has recently returned from Salt Lake City; the governor is of the opinion that the military organization in Utah has been disbanded, with the exception of a few men that are under his control. Ex-Governor Brigham Young has so informed the governor. From information received from Mormons and others recently from the City of Salt Lake, we fear that the leaders of the Mormon people have not given the governor correct information as to the condition of affairs in the valley; Governor Cumming having communicated the

result of his visit to the Great Salt Lake City to the government we deem it unnecessary to state anything concerning it.

We will set out for Great Salt Lake City at ten o'clock to-morrow morning, accompanied by Governor Cumming. We expect to reach the city in three or four days, and place ourselves in communication with the recognized leaders of the Mormon people; we have strong hopes that the Mormons may be induced to submit quietly to the authority of the government. From information received from various sources we are confident that they have decided objections to the army entering the valley of Great Salt Lake. We would respectfully suggest that the presence of the army here, and the additional force that has been ordered here, will be the chief inducement that will cause this deluded people to submit quietly and peaceably to the civil authorities (in the event they should do so). They have abandoned their more northern settlements, and are moving their women and children and their supplies of provisions to the southern part of the Territory; this indicates in our judgment an intention on the part of the Mormons to leave the Territory, or to place themselves in an attitude to fight the army when it shall enter the valley. It may be their object to prevent their families from coming in contact with the army and the civil authorities that may be established in the Territory.

We are confident that the greatest difficulty we will have to encounter in the execution of our commission will be to cause them to submit quietly to the control of the army in the Salt Lake valley. We fear that they may attempt to delay an adjustment until the season of the year arrives when they will be able to burn the grass and harvest, or burn the growing crop before the army takes position in Salt Lake valley.

We deem it a matter of the first importance that the army advance to the valley of Salt Lake before the Mormons can burn the grass or harvest, or burn the growing crops; we will therefore use every exertion to put ourselves in communication with them, and learn their views and intentions as soon as possible.

General Johnston is of the opinion that the command of Colonel Hoffman and Captain Marcy will arrive in fifteen or twenty days, and that at the end of twenty days he will be ready to march to Salt Lake City; the general is confident that when the officers and reinforcements arrive he will have sufficient force to march to Salt Lake City should he be resisted by the best army the Mormons can bring into the field. We will use every effort to see and confer with the Mormon people, and to make known their intentions to General Johnston by the time he is ready to march.

It affords us pleasure to state that General Johnston most heartily and cordially co-operates with us, and has done everything in his power to facilitate the object of our mission. We find the best order and most cheerful feeling prevail in the command, and that the command have borne the severe trials and difficulties by which they have been surrounded in a manner becoming American soldiers.

From information received from Mormons and others recently

from Salt Lake City, we are induced to believe that great disaffection exists among the Mormons, and that large numbers of them would leave Utah were they not deterred by fear of injury from the Danite band; hence the necessity that such as wish to leave should have the protection of the flag.

We have the honor to be, respectfully, your obedient servants,

L. W. POWELL,
BEN McCULLOCH,
Commissioners to Utah.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

No. 82.—*Messrs. Powell and McCulloch to the Secretary of War.*

GREAT SALT LAKE CITY, U. T.,
June 12, 1858.

DEAR SIR: We have the honor to report that we reached this city on the 7th instant. We lost no time in placing ourselves in communication with the chief men of the Mormon people. After the fullest and freest conference with them we are pleased to state that we have settled the unfortunate difficulties existing between the government of the United States and the people of Utah. We are informed by the people and chief men of the Territory that they will cheerfully yield obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States. They consent that the civil officers of the Territory shall enter upon the discharge of their respective duties. They will make no resistance to the army of the United States in its march to the valley of Salt Lake or elsewhere. We have their assurance that no resistance will be made to the officers, civil or military, of the United States in the exercise of their various functions in the Territory of Utah.

The people have abandoned all the settlements north of this, and all the families have left this city, only about fifteen hundred persons remaining here to take charge of the property and to burn it if the difficulties had not been settled. The people from this city and north of it have gone south to Provo, fifty miles south of this and to points beyond.

We will visit Provo and the settlements south in a day or two, and see and confer with the people and inform them that the difficulties have been settled, and thus induce them to return to their homes. We have written to General Johnston by the messenger who will bear this, informing him of what has been done, and that he could march his army to the valley whenever he desired to do so. We intend to remain and visit the people and converse with them until General Johnston's army arrives. We think it important that we remain until the army is located in the valley. We have but a

moment to write as the express will start in a few moments. We will in a few days forward a detailed report.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants,

L. W. POWELL,
BEN McCULLOCH,
Commissioners to Utah.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

No. 83.—*Messrs Powell and McCulloch to the Secretary of War.*

GREAT SALT LAKE CITY, U. T.,
June 26, 1858.

DEAR SIR: In our hurried note of the 12th instant we had the honor to report that we reached this city on the 7th of this month, and at once put ourselves in communication with the recognized leaders and chief men of the Mormon people.

When we arrived ex-Governor Young and other chief men of the Mormon church were at Provo, a city fifty miles south of this, to which place and to points beyond, the inhabitants of the settlements north of this and the larger portion of the people of this city had gone with their families and personal property.

On our arrival we made known to the people here the object of our mission.

On the evening of the 8th we were waited on by a committee of three gentlemen who informed us that it was the desire of the people of the Territory that we confer with ex-Governor Brigham Young concerning the difficulties between the United States government and the people of Utah, we informed the committee that we would with pleasure confer with ex-Governor Young and such others as the people of Utah should indicate as their representatives, at such time and place as was convenient to them.

On the evening of the 9th we were informed by the committee that they had made known to ex-Governor Young and others that we were ready to confer with them, and that ex-Governor Young and other chief men of the Mormon church would be in this city on the evening of the 10th, and that they would be ready for conference on the morning of the 11th, at 9 o'clock.

On the evening of the 10th ex-Governor Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball, Lieutenant-Governor Wells, who constitute the first presidency of the church of Latter Day Saints, and several of the twelve and other chief men of the Mormon church, reached this city.

When advised of their arrival we addressed a note to ex-Governor Young informing him that we were ready to confer with him and such others as the people had indicated at such time and place as he might name, to which note we received a reply fixing the 11th, at 9 o'clock p. m., as the time, and the large room in the council-house in

this city as the place for conference. On the evening of the 10th we had an interview with ex-Governor Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball, and Lieutenant-Governor Wells, and explained to them the object of our visit. We met the three gentlemen last named and many other leading men of the Mormon people at the time and place named in ex-Governor Young's note.

We stated the object of our mission, and distinctly made known to them the views and intentions of the President concerning the people of Utah. We stated that we had no power to make any treaty or compact with them, the object of our mission was to make known to them the policy the President intended to pursue towards the people of Utah, and to induce them to submit quietly and peaceably to the authority of the United States.

We informed them that it was the determination of the President to see that the authority of the United States be maintained in Utah, and that the Constitution and laws of the nation should be enforced and executed in this Territory.

That the President would send the army of the United States to the valley of Great Salt Lake in such numbers, at such times, and to such places in the valley or other parts of the Territory as he might think the public interests demanded, and retain it there as long as he should think the interest of the United States required him to do so; that such military posts would be established in the Territory of Utah and in the valley of Great Salt Lake as the Secretary of War should think necessary to protect the emigration to and from the Pacific, prevent Indian depredations, and to act as a *posse comitatus* to enforce the execution of civil process should it be necessary.

We stated that the object of the President in sending a portion of the army to Utah was to enforce the execution of the laws and protect the civil officers of the government in the exercise of the duties of their respective offices; that, in the event the inhabitants of the Territory quietly and peaceably submitted to the execution of the laws of the United States, and would peaceably receive the officers of the government appointed for Utah, and permit them, without resistance, to exercise the various functions pertaining to their respective offices, there would be no necessity for the army to be used to enforce obedience to the civil authority. If they should refuse to receive in a peaceable manner the officers of the government, or should in any way resist the execution of the laws of the United States within the Territory, the President would employ, if necessary, the entire military power of the nation to enforce unconditional submission and obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States; if the civil officers of the Territory were peaceably received, and no resistance made to them in the discharge of their official duties, the army then in the Territory, or such portion of it as might hereafter be sent there, would only be used to protect emigrants and inhabitants from Indian depredations.

We informed them it was not the intention of the President in sending a portion of the army to the Territory to deprive the people of Utah of any of their rights, but to see that the authority of the

United States was respected and the civil officers protected, and obedience yielded to the Constitution and laws, as enjoined by the President in his proclamation; should they quietly and peaceably submit to the authority and laws of their country, the army will be used as promptly to protect them in all their constitutional rights as it would be to compel obedience to the authority of the United States.

We called their attention to the proclamation of the President which had been distributed among them. We stated that the President, in order to avoid the effusion of blood and to cause them to return to their allegiance to our common country, had deputed us to make known to them the designs and intentions of the government and the policy that would be pursued towards the people of Utah, which we had now done. We stated that the President asked nothing of them but what it was their duty as good citizens to perform, and that we trusted our mission would result in the restoration of peace, quiet, and order in the Territory.

We stated that we wished a free conference with them and were ready to hear what they had to say. Ex-Governor Brigham Young, Lieutenant-Governor Wells, Mr. Erastus Snow, Mr. Clements, and Major Hunt spoke. They expressed their gratification that the President had sent commissioners to Utah; they stated that they were attached to the Constitution and government of the United States; they spoke harshly of many of the officials who had held office in the Territory; they spoke of the wrongs and injuries heretofore done them; they said they desired to live in peace under the Constitution of the United States. They denied that they had ever driven any official from Utah, or prevented any civil officers entering the Territory; they admitted that they burnt the army trains and drove off the cattle from the army last fall, and for that act they accepted the President's pardon. All the charges that had been made against them, except the one last named, they denied.

After a session of several hours the conference adjourned until nine o'clock the next day; on the evening of the 11th, we had a lengthy conversation with ex-Governor Young, Heber C. Kimball and Lieutenant-Governor Wells, on matters touching our visit.

On the morning of the 12th, at 9 o'clock, we again met at the council house, a large number of citizens were present; Elder John Taylor, Colonel George A. Smith, General Furgison, and ex-Governor Young made speeches; they expressed attachment to the Constitution and government of the United States, said they desired to live in peace under the Constitution of the United States, spoke harshly of certain officials who had been in the Territory, denied all the charges that had been made against them, except burning the army trains, which they admitted. The general tone and sentiments expressed, were averse to the army coming to the valley of Salt Lake. We are pleased to state that the conference resulted in their agreeing to receive quietly and peaceably all the civil officers of the government, and not to resist them in the execution of the duties of their offices, to yield obedience to the authority and laws of the United States. That they would offer no resistance to the army; that the officers of the army would not be resisted or molested in the execution of

their orders within the Territory; in short, they agreed that the officers civil and military of the United States, should enter the Territory without resistance, and exercise peaceably and unmolested all the functions of their various offices. At the close of the conference, we made a short address to a large audience, expressing our gratification that the people of Utah had agreed to submit peaceably and amicably to the authority of the United States, and we assured them that whilst they acknowledged the authority of the United States, and were obedient to the Constitution and laws of the country, they would be protected by the government in all their constitutional rights. That the army which would in a few days be in the valley of Great Salt Lake, would not molest or injure any peaceable citizen, in person or property. We announced to the people that they could return to their homes without danger of interruption from the army. All present appeared gratified at the result of the conference. On the evening of the 12th instant, we despatched a messenger to Brevet Brigadier General Johnston, informing him that the people of this Territory had agreed to submit peaceably to the authority of the government, and suggesting that he issue a proclamation to the people of Utah, and march to the valley at his earliest convenience. General Johnston replied to our note on the 14th instant, and enclosed us his proclamation to the people of Utah. We send enclosed with this a copy of our note to General Johnston, and copies of his reply and proclamation. It was the intention of the people, if a peaceable adjustment had not been made, to have burned their houses, destroyed the growing crops, and retreated to the mountains on the approach of the army. With this view they had removed their women and children, and their household and personal property from this city and the settlements north of it, to the southern part of the territory, and had stored large quantities of grain and provision in the mountains.

On the evening of the 16th instant we addressed a large crowd of the people at Provo, and on the evening of the 17th we addressed the people at Lehi. They seemed pleased that peace had been restored in the Territory.

It is to be hoped that peace, order and quiet may hereafter prevail in this Territory, and that the people of Utah may ever be loyal, true and faithful to the Constitution and flag of the Union.

His excellency Governor Cumming was present at most of our conferences and heartily co-operated with us in carrying out the object of our mission.

Brevet Brigadier General Johnston, commanding the army at Utah, cordially co-operated with us in our efforts to carry out the wishes of the President.

The governor, secretary of state, chief justice, marshal, superintendent of Indian affairs and postmaster are in the Territory, and have entered upon the duties of their respective offices. The special justices have not yet reached the Territory. Brevet Brigadier General Johnston with the army under his command reached the valley of Great Salt Lake this morning, and will to-day, march through this city and encamp just beyond its limits. The general will in a few days select

the locations for his permanent posts; peace and quiet prevail in the Territory. We will set out for Washington in a few days.

We have the honor to be very respectfully, your obedient servants,

GEORGE W. POWELL,

BEN McCULLOCH,

Commissioners to Utah.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,

Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

No. 84.—*Messrs. Powell and McCulloch to the Secretary of War.*

GREAT SALT LAKE CITY, U. T.,

July 3, 1858.

DEAR SIR: On the 26th of last month General Johnston marched the army under his command through this city, and encamped on the banks of the River Jordan, just without the limits of the city.

The army remained encamped on the Jordan for two days. Wood and grass being scarce, the general moved twelve or fifteen miles west, near the foot of the mountains, where wood and grass were more abundant; at which place the troops will probably remain until the general selects the place for a permanent post.

The general has examined Zovile, Rush, and Cedar valleys, but has not fully determined the location of his permanent post. The great difficulty in selecting a location for a permanent post will be in finding a place that affords wood, water, and grass. All the wood used in Great Salt Lake City is hauled from the cañon, a distance of sixteen or eighteen miles, and grass is scarce in the immediate vicinity of the city.

In going from Fort Bridger to Great Salt Lake City, in Echo cañon and other places, we observed the defences constructed by the Mormons, to resist the approach of the army to the valley of Great Salt Lake. A short time before we passed, the forces had been withdrawn from Echo cañon. We were informed by the Mormons that at one time during the winter they had an army of two thousand two hundred men stationed at and near Echo cañon. For the first four or five days after we arrived at Great Salt Lake City, about night fall, the drums were regularly beat and guard mounted.

Two or three Mormons, who had refused to obey the order to go south, informed us that, during the first week we were there, they had been notified that unless they went as they had been previously ordered, the military would turn them out of their houses. We understood that a small guard was left at each of the settlements from which the families had been removed. If any military organization exists among them at this time we are not advised. In the conference held on the 11th and 12th last month, ex-Governor Young and others declared that it was their intention to remain in Utah, and that it was their desire to live peaceably under the Constitution and government of the United States.

We were informed by various (discontented) Mormons who had lived in the settlements north of Provo, that they had been forced to leave their homes and go to the southern part of the Territory; that they desired to remain at their residences, and would have done so had they not been threatened with forcible ejection. We were also informed that at least one-third of the persons who had removed from their homes were compelled to do so. We were told that many were dissatisfied with the Mormon Church, and would leave it whenever they could with safety to themselves.

We are of opinion that the leaders of the Mormon Church congregated the people in order to exercise more immediate control over them, and thus prevent their secession from the church.

We deemed it advisable that such of the people as desired to dissolve their connexion with the church should have every opportunity to do so; we therefore advised them to return to their homes, and informed them that the government would protect them in the enjoyment of their farms and houses, and that the church had no right to control or interfere with them.

We feel assured that if the people once return to their homes, and a government is maintained in Utah with force sufficient to protect them, the leaders of the Mormons will never be able to cause them to leave their homes and congregate them as they have heretofore done.

If the masses return to their residences they will be removed from the immediate presence of their chief leaders, and the influence of the priesthood over them will be greatly diminished, and those who desire to leave the church or Territory will have an opportunity of doing so.

It is strikingly evident that the priesthood exercise very great control over the masses, and their polity manifestly tends to the centralization of wealth, and both ecclesiastical and temporal power in the church. Ex-Governor Brigham Young, Heber C. Kimball, and other chief men of the Mormons, have returned with their families to this city. The residents of this city and of the settlements north of it are returning to their homes.

Great contrariety of opinion exists in Utah as to the number of people in the Territory, and the force the Mormons were able to bring to the field. From the best information we were able to obtain, we do not believe the population exceeds forty or fifty thousand, about one-half of whom are of foreign birth, and that they could not bring into the field an army of over seven thousand men, about one thousand of whom are fine horsemen, accustomed to the use of fire-arms, and are excellent materials for soldiers. The remainder are industrious, hard-working citizens—mechanics, gardeners, and farmers; a very large number of them Europeans, not much accustomed to the use of fire-arms, and would not be efficient as soldiers unless subjected to training in a regular army. We made inquiry of many of the most intelligent citizens of Utah as to the quality of wheat, potatoes, corn, cattle, &c., annually grown, with a view of ascertaining the amount of supplies that could be purchased within the Territory for the use of

the army. They were unable to say whether the army could rely upon the people of Utah for any supplies, owing to the uncertainty of their crops. We therefore consider it fortunate that ample supplies are being forwarded to the valley of Great Salt Lake to sustain the troops that will be required in the Territory.

We are firmly impressed with the belief that the presence of the army here, and the large additional force that had been ordered to this Territory, were the chief inducements that caused the Mormons to abandon the idea of resisting the authority of the United States. A less decisive policy would probably have resulted in a long, bloody, and expensive war.

Since the arrival of the army in the valley the apprehensions of many of the people here that the army would not respect their persons and property have greatly diminished. The Mormons express their gratification at the admirable order observed by the army since it reached the valley of Great Salt Lake.

If the people of Utah sincerely wish to live in peace and quiet under the Constitution and laws of our country, it is apparent that they would desire a portion of the army to be located in the Territory. It would protect them from Indian depredations, and afford them a market for their surplus products.

As soon as the minds of the masses are disabused as to the intention and object of the government in sending a portion of the army to Utah, and they learn that the army will be used to protect, and not injure, all true, loyal, and patriotic citizens will rejoice that a portion of the army is in their midst, and its presence will only be offensive to such as are wanting in patriotism and allegiance to the country.

It affords us pleasure to state that the admirable conduct of the "army of Utah" (officers and men) has been such as to merit the commendation of all who have observed the courage, patience, and gallantry displayed in surmounting the many difficulties by which they were surrounded during the past winter.

Brevet Brigadier General Johnston has continued cordially to co-operate with us in carrying out the wishes of the President. He has discharged the important and delicate duties intrusted to him with eminent prudence and distinguished ability.

In our report of the 26th ultimo we gave a concise statement of the proceedings of the conference held in this city on the 11th and 12th of the month, to which we respectfully refer.

So far as we are advised peace and order prevail throughout the Territory.

We have the honor to be, your obedient servants,

L. W. POWELL,

BEN McCULLOCH,

Commissioners to Utah.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,

Secretary of War, Washington.

No. 85.—*Messrs. Powell and McCulloch to the Secretary of War.*

WASHINGTON, D. C.,
August 24, 1858.

DEAR SIR: We have enclosed herewith a copy of a paper containing a concise statement of what was said in the conference held in Great Salt Lake City on the 11th and 12th of June last, which is certified by ex-Governor Brigham Young, as correct.

We have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servants

L. W. POWELL,
BEN McCULLOCH,
Commissioners to Utah.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

In the conference held in Great Salt Lake City, on the 11th and 12th of June, 1858, L. W. Powell and Ben McCulloch, commissioners to Utah, and ex-Governor Brigham Young and others, touching difficulties between the United States government and the people of the Territory of Utah, Governor Powell in behalf of the commissioners, said in substance, as follows:

He stated the object of the mission, and distinctly made known the views and intentions of the President concerning the people of Utah. He stated that the commissioners had no power to make any treaty or compact with them. The object of the mission was to make known to the people of Utah the policy the President intended to pursue towards them, and to induce them to submit quietly and peaceably to the authority of the United States.

He stated that it was the determination of the President to see that the authority of the United States be maintained in Utah, and that the Constitution and laws of the nation should be enforced and executed in this Territory; that the President would send the army of the United States to the valley of Great Salt Lake, in such numbers, at such times, and to such places in the valley or other parts of the Territory, as he might think the public interest demanded, and retain it there as long as he should think the interest of the United States required him to do so.

That such military posts would be established in the Territory of Utah, and in the valley of Great Salt Lake as the Secretary of War should think necessary to protect the emigration to and from the Pacific, prevent Indian depredations and to act as a *posse comitatus* to enforce the execution of civil process should it be necessary. He said that the object of the President in sending a portion of the army to Utah, was to enforce the execution of the laws, and protect the civil officers of the government in the exercise of the duties of their offices, that in the event the inhabitants of the Territory quietly and peaceably submitted to the execution of the laws of the United States, and would peaceably receive the officers of the government appointed for Utah, and permit them without resistance to exercise the various

functions pertaining to their respective offices, there would be no necessity for the army to be used to enforce obedience to the civil authority. If they should refuse to receive in a peaceable manner the officers of the government, or should in any way resist the execution of the laws of the United States within the Territory, the President would employ if necessary the entire military power of the nation to enforce unconditional submission and obedience to the Constitution and laws of the United States.

If the civil officers of the Territory were peaceably received and no resistance made to them in the discharge of their official duties, the army then in the Territory, or such portion of it as might hereafter be sent there, would only be used to protect emigrants and inhabitants from Indian depredations.

We stated that it was not the intention of the President, in sending a portion of the army to the Territory to deprive the people of Utah of any of their constitutional rights, but to see that the authority of the United States was respected, the civil officers protected and obedience yielded to the Constitution and laws, as enjoined by the President in his proclamation; should they quietly and peaceably submit to the authority and laws of this country, the army would be used as promptly to protect them in all their constitutional rights as it would be to compel obedience to the authority of the United States.

We called their attention to the proclamation of the President which had been distributed among them.

We stated that the President, in order to avoid the effusion of blood, and to cause them to return to their allegiance to our common country, had deputed the commissioners to make known to them the designs and intentions of the government, and the policy that would be pursued towards the people of Utah, which we had now done. We stated that the President asked nothing of them but what it was their duty as good citizens to perform, and that we trusted our mission would result in the restoration of peace, quiet, and order in the Territory.

We further stated that the commissioners had no power to give an order to the army, but that we had conferred with General Johnston, and that his army would not march to the valley of Great Salt Lake until he received information from us; that we did not know where General Johnston would make his permanent posts when he arrived in the valley of Salt Lake. General Johnston, however, told us that it was not his intention to station his army in or very near one of their large cities; that such a location would be calculated to demoralize the army; that he wished to make his permanent posts where wood, water, and grass were abundant. Governor Young expressed a desire that the commissioners would investigate certain charges that had been made against the people of Utah, to wit: as to whether the Mormons had killed Lieutenant Gunnison's party and Colonel Babbit, and burned the records and library of the federal court, and the truth of the charges made by Judge Drummond and others. The commissioners declined to go into the investigation desired for the reason that such an investigation was not within

their instructions, and that it was impossible for them to do so if they desired it, for want of evidence and time.

Ex-Governor Young and others state that they were, and had ever been attached to the Constitution and government of the United States, and desired to live in peace and quiet under the government; they denied all the charges that had been made against them, except the burning of the army trains and driving off the cattle from the army last fall; that they admitted, and for that they accepted the President's pardon; they claimed that they were more ardently attached to the Constitution of the United States than others who made charges against them. Upon the President's views and intentions being made known, as set forth herein, it was agreed that the officers, civil and military, of the United States should peaceably and without resistance enter the Territory of Utah, and discharge, unmolested, *all their official duties*.

GREAT SALT LAKE CITY, *July 3, 1858.*

I have examined the foregoing statement of the substance of what was said in the conference held at Great Salt Lake City, Utah Territory, on the 11th and 12th of June, 1858, by Governor Powell and Ben McCulloch, commissioners to Utah, and ex-Governor Young and others, touching the difficulties that existed between the United States government and the people of Utah; the statement in writing examined by me is contained in six pages, hereto attached, and is, in substance a correct synoptical statement of what was said in said conference; the above is correct as far as I can recollect at present.

BRIGHAM YOUNG.

No. 86.—*Colonel Hoffman to Utah Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DETACHMENT ESCORT TO SUPPLY TRAIN,
Camp Scott, U. T., June 10, 1858.

SIR: Pursuant to the instructions of the general commanding, I have the honor to make the following report of the service with which I was intrusted by Special Orders No. 32, dated February 28, from the headquarters of the army, and the instructions of the Secretary of War in a letter from the adjutant general, dated Washington March 8, 1858.

Immediately on the receipt of Special Orders No. 33, from the headquarters of the army, with countermanded Special Orders No. 32, I left Fort Leavenworth with a small escort on the 10th of March, under the instructions which I had previously received, and was a hundred and fifty miles out on the route to Fort Laramie when I received the adjutant general's letter. Deeming it important that I should be present with the command, I retraced my steps and joined it at its first camp a few miles out from Fort Leavenworth.

The escort consisting of two companies of the 6th infantry and two of the 1st cavalry, marched on the morning of the 18th of March, and

arrived at the Blue river on the 24th, where all the wagons of the train, 156 in number, with a drove of 300 loose mules (there were some 1,400 animals in all belonging to the command) were assembled. After some little detention from rain storms we arrived at Fort Kearney on the first of April; and having renewed our supplies, the march was continued on the 3d, and we arrived at Fort Laramie on the morning of the 21st. Between these two points inclement weather and other unavoidable causes detained us three days and a half, so that the march of 336 miles was made in less than fifteen days; the horses and mules of the command were with few exceptions, in good condition, and the loss on the road, mules only, was very small, occasioned in almost all cases by colic. I was able to obtain but a small supply of corn at Fort Kearney, and at O'Fallon's Bluffs where I expected to get a full supply from the contractor's train which had wintered there, I could only obtain about one-half what I required. At Fort Laramie I was joined by two companies of the 6th infantry and one of the 7th, and at this post I took charge of four ox trains consisting of twenty-five wagons each, belonging to the contractors. To expedite the movement I authorized these trains to leave the day after my arrival, sending with them a company as guard; but they did not get up their cattle in time to move until the second day after. Having taken into the public train all the supplies of every kind which could be spared at the post, and which I thought might be useful to the army at Camp Scott, the march was resumed on the 24th. There was no corn at the post, and from here I was able to issue only a very reduced ration and for a very few days. The next morning I passed the ox train which had moved only about ten miles, and that evening learning that they had made little or no progress during the day, I sent for the contractor's agent with a view of remonstrating with him at this inexcusable dilatoriness. He reached my camp on the Platte the following evening, the 26th, and on my representing to him the urgent necessity for the exercise of the utmost diligence on the part of his wagon masters, he assured me there should be no further cause for complaint. Here Captain Hawes with his squadron 2d dragoons joined me. From this camp to La Bonte's creek, a distance of forty miles, the trains were urged on with all the expedition the circumstances would permit. On the evening of our arrival at La Bonte's, the 29th, it began to snow, which continued without intermission until after dark on the 30th, when the ground was covered to the depth of two feet and upwards; during the night of the 30th a number of mules died. On the 1st of May there was a little snow falling, and it was necessary to turn all the mules loose to herd them; during the night it froze hard, but on the 2d it moderated, and the snow melted a little. It froze again at night, but on the 3d the snow melted fast, and the grass began to be seen in places. On the 4th the sun was bright and warm, and the grazing on the hill sides was comparatively good. The roads were left in a very soft state by the melting of the snow, and the oxen were entirely too weak from their long fast, to be able to move without having some days to graze and fill up. On the 5th the weather was threatening, but the animals were all doing well

on the new grass; the snow was still lying on the low places. On the night of the 5th a storm of half snow and half rain commenced, which continued through the day and night of the 6th; during the night it became decidedly a snow storm, and notwithstanding it melted rapidly, on the morning of the 7th the ground was covered with some three inches of snow; more or less snow fell during the day, melting as it fell until sunset; at night it froze hard, but the sun shone bright and warm on the 8th and much of the ground was uncovered. The quantity of water which saturated the ground made the whole country a bed of mire. To move the command was out of the question, and the most I could do, was to send the cavalry horses and mules, with a guard to the Wagonhound creek, $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles in advance, where there was good grazing; the animals were in a famished condition, and until their strength was recruited, and the roads dried up somewhat, it was impossible to move even one company. During the 9th a smart breeze and warm sun dried the ground rapidly, and on the 10th, after transferring upwards of thirty thousand pounds from the ox trains to the public train, their loads being too heavy for the strength of their cattle and the state of the roads, two of them got in motion, but at the close of the day they had not made two miles. The long continued deprivation of adequate sustenance which our animals suffered at La Bonte, reduced them to such a degree that many of the mules were unable to drag themselves out of the mud without assistance; and when at length we moved forward, it was only accomplished with great labor. But fortunately the grass was well advanced for the season, and the animals rapidly recruited. On the 11th the two remaining ox trains moved, and at 1 p. m. the command followed and reached the Wagonhound creek that evening, having passed three of the trains on the way; two of them came up before dark. The creek was too high to cross, but on the following morning, having discovered a practicable ford a mile and a half above, a road was constructed to it, and the command and one ox train crossed before night. We marched on the 13th at quarter before 5, a. m., and reached La Prisle creek at half past nine a. m., 13 miles; two ox trains camped with us, and the two remaining trains came up the following morning, escorted by a company of cavalry. This stream was also too high to ford, and, as it was not practicable to bridge it, there was no alternative but to wait for it to fall. On the morning of the 15th, the water having fallen some inches, a practicable ford was discovered, and after a little cutting of the bank, the command and trains crossed without difficulty, and we reached the next stream, Box Alder, early in the day. This stream had been swimming, but it had fallen, and by a ford which, after much searching was discovered, a part of the command crossed. Here Captain Hawes and his squadron left us to escort a drove of cattle belonging to the contractors to this camp. During the night the water rose several inches, and the part of the command on the east bank was unable to cross. That afternoon another ford was found practicable, though very circuitous, and to reach it a bridge over a deep gully had to be constructed. Soon after daylight the next morning, a party was at work

building a bridge, and before 10 o'clock the escort and that part of the mule train not already over had crossed. During the night the waters had receded sufficiently for crossing at the first ford, and it being the least difficult, the remaining ox trains crossed there. The advance reached Deer creek, just fordable, 11 miles, at half past four p. m., and the crossing was commenced immediately, and was continued until 9 o'clock at night, at which time all had crossed but two ox trains, with a few wagons of another train, and the rear guard.

On the following morning at daylight I found the ground covered with snow, and is still snowing. Fearing that the melting of the snow would cause a sudden rise in the stream, I visited the ox-trains to hurry their preparations for the march. We moved at 10 a. m., the advance making only eight miles. The roads were very heavy and the animals very much jaded. Three ox-trains made about six miles and the fourth, which was delayed by breaking wagons, halted two and a half miles in rear. On the 19th, desiring to be able to cross on the following day a piece of sandy road west of the Platte bridge, the advance was pushed on to within two and a half miles of the bridge; the ox-trains halted some four miles in rear. The next morning the leading trains were up with us early, and we encamped five and a half miles above the bridge; one ox-train camped two miles in rear of us, the other only reached the bridge.

At this point, finding that the two rear trains were either unable or unwilling to make reasonable marches, and on the representations of the wagon masters of the other trains, that they could make fifteen to twenty miles a day, I determined to leave the two slow trains with one company of infantry and one of cavalry under Captain Hendrickson as escort, to make the best time they could, and to move on with the remaining trains with all possible despatch. I was induced to this course from having received official information that the supplies at Camp Scott would be nearly or quite exhausted before I could reach there. This arrangement took place on the 21st of May, and on the same day I received the general's instructions of the 15th of May, directing that I should send forward certain subsistence stores in wagons lightly loaded, with the least practicable delay. Accordingly the following morning I despatched Captain Lowell's company with twenty-seven wagons loaded with stores, with orders to reach this place by the 2d June at the latest, earlier if possible. From our camp on the Platte, five and a half miles above the bridge where I divided the trains, to this camp, the march was continued without interruption, and by dint of unceasing pressure upon the wagon masters of the ox trains, I was able to make pretty fair average marches being $14\frac{3}{4}$ miles per day. Their performances fell far short of their promises, mostly, I am inclined to think, from an unwillingness on their part.

Captain Hendrickson's trains were delayed one day on the Sweet Water in consequence of sickness among the cattle, occasioned by their feeding on the alkaline bottoms of the stream; but notwithstanding, he reached this vicinity on the evening after my arrival, the 9th instant. He was only able to accomplish this, however, by continual

remonstrances with his wagon masters at their tardiness and negligence.

The agent of the contractors at Fort Laramie over loaded his wagons, considering the reduced condition of the cattle, and one of the trains belonging to a sub-contractor, was old and unfit for the service, which caused much delay by the frequent breaking of tongues, &c. But for these causes, and the want of proper and energetic management on the part of the wagon masters, the march would have been accomplished in much less time.

Considering it a matter of the first importance that the cavalry horses should reach this camp in a condition to do good service, I, on the day following the commencement of the march, directed that during each day's march, after the first hour, one-half the men should walk alternate hours, those riding leading the horses of those on foot; and to facilitate this arrangement and lighten the weight the horses were obliged to carry I ordered the sabres to be placed on the wagons. To this expedient, which was cheerfully carried out by every man of the squadron, doubtless encouraged thereto by the handsome example set them by their officers, and to the untiring devotion of officers and men to the welfare of their horses, must be attributed the very fine order in which they reached the camp. Not a single horse with an unsound back or other injury, and more than a full amount of serviceable horses for both companies.

To the energetic supervision of Lieutenant W. G. Gill, 4th artillery, acting assistant quartermaster, aided by the excellent head wagon master, Mr. N. Berry, I am indebted for singular success in bringing out so large a train with so many mules in a condition which could not have been expected after a march of a thousand miles, begun in March, and with so many obstacles to contend against.

It is but due to the whole command, both officers and men, that I should say, and I do it with great pleasure, that all the fatigue and privations of a long and arduous march were borne with a cheerfulness and good will deserving the highest commendation.

I had the honor to report my arrival at this camp on the 8th, and the whole command, save an escort with the mail under Lieutenant M. Cleary, is now present.

A field return of the command is hereby enclosed.

Very respectfully your obedient servant,

W. HOFFMAN,

Major and Brevet Lieutenant Colonel

6th Infantry, Commanding.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Headquarters, Department of Utah,

en route to Salt Lake City.

No. 87.—*Colonel Loring to Army Headquarters.*

CAMP SCOTT, UTAH TERRITORY,

June 11, 1858.

SIR: In accordance with instructions from the headquarters of the department of New Mexico, I have the honor to state that the following command left Fort Union under my direction on the 7th and 8th of April, 1858: Company "K" and detachments from "H" and "G" rifle regiment, under command of Lieutenant McRae, rifle regiment; companies "F" and "E," 3d infantry, respectively under the command of Captain John Trevitt and Lieutenant A. N. Shipley, 3d infantry, (the two companies having a few days before reached Fort Union from Albuquerque, 160 miles,) for the purpose of joining the expedition under Captain Marcy, which had left for Utah—word having been previously sent him to await our coming at some good camping place.

Camps.	Odometer measurement miles.
April 7, 1858.— <i>Okate creek</i> .—Road good; grass indifferent; water good. Distance marched.....	18
April 8, 1858.— <i>A mountain creek</i> .—Road and camp good; at this time a scarcity of grass.....	14
April 9, 1858.— <i>Rayado creek</i> .—Good camp; commenced snowing at 12 a. m. and continued until the evening of the 12th, with a heavy fall of snow and consequent bad roads; on a level near two feet deep; remained at this camp until the 14th; grass so covered with snow that it was of little service to animals.....	8
April 14, 1858.— <i>Vermijo creek</i> .—Good road; grass poor; some seasons good; water good; no wood.....	18 $\frac{3}{4}$
April 15, 1858.— <i>Red river</i> .—Good road and camp; grass burned and very scarce, (usually good); remained here resting the animals and awaiting the rear train until the 17th.....	22 $\frac{1}{2}$
April 17, 1858.— <i>Head of a small creek in the Raton Mountains</i> , about three and one-half miles from the dividing ridge.—Road mountainous and rocky; good camp; grass this season scarce.....	11
April 18, 1858.— <i>Raton creek</i> .—Crossed the dividing ridge; good camp; roads in consequence of the recent snow storms miry and very bad; snow during the day and night; remained here until the 22d; heavy wind and snow during the 21st, with consequent bad roads; grass not abundant,	11
April 22, 1858.— <i>Santa Clara creek</i> .—Road and camp good; water slightly tintured with mineral; crossed the Purgatoire creek about twelve and one-half miles; snow to-day and very cold.....	19
April 23, 1858.— <i>Veta creek</i> , a branch of the Cuchara creek. Crossed the Pishepa creek nine miles; good road and good camping on both streams.....	17 $\frac{1}{8}$

Camps.	Odometer measurement.
<i>April 24, 1858.—Huerfano creek.</i> —Crossed the Cuchara creek eleven and one-half miles; good road and good camping on both streams	21 $\frac{1}{8}$
<i>April 25, 1858.—Muddy creek.</i> —Crossed Apache creek about four and one-half miles, the two Granero creeks ten miles, and Green Horn creek twelve miles; good road, the last portion rolling, and good camping on these streams	19
<i>April 26, 1858.—Arkansas river.</i> —Road and camp good; crossed the San Carlos nine miles; rocky and difficult descents on both sides	21
<i>April 27, 1858.—Fontain que Bouillé creek.</i> —The grass dry, not as much advanced as heretofore, otherwise a good camp; being in the vicinity of Captain Marcy, who is at the head of this stream, some twelve miles out of our way, sent an order to him assuming command and requesting him to join us as early as practicable; soon after leaving the Arkansas, about four or five miles, crossed the stream and followed it up all day	25
<i>April 28, 1858.—Jimmy's Spring.</i> —Good camp; rolling but good road; left the Fontain que Bouillé about eight miles; the emigrant trail comes into our road before leaving the creek	20
<i>April 29, 1858.—Point of Rocks.</i> —Crossed Squirrel creek thirteen miles, and six or seven miles of camp of to-day; this camp is on the dividing ridge between the Arkansas and the South Fork of the Platte river; a snow storm commenced to-day at 5 p. m. and continued unremittingly until the 2d of May, when its violence somewhat abated; the cold and violence of the wind was so great that human life was in constant peril; a citizen teamster in the quartermaster's employ was frozen to death, and several hundred sheep perished in the storm; a large number of horses and cattle belonging to citizens travelling with the command also perished; a number of mules broke through control and fled before the storm, many as far as sixty miles; the entire number with but few exceptions were recovered. Captain Marcy, whose herds were seven miles back, used every exertion to save them; in the fury of the storm some three hundred of his mules fled in the same manner as in our camp; they also with few exceptions were finally recovered, and I believe only those in both instances which perished in the storm were lost; one of his herders in his endeavors to recover them was frozen to death; in both camps a large number were badly frost-bitten and otherwise injured; the snow on a level was two and a half to three feet deep, and when drifted fifteen to twenty feet; the antelope of the prairie were frozen to death, numbers of them in our immediate vicinity, mixing	

Camps.

Odometer measurement.

among our sheep for protection and perishing with them; 30th of April, 1st, 2d, and 3d of May remained in camp to recover our animals and in consequence of bad roads occasioned by the recent storm	20
<i>May 4, 1858.—Black Foot.</i> —Still on the dividing ridge; grass good; water three-fourths of a mile to the left; in consequence of the snow the roads are very bad, almost impassable	12
<i>May 5, 1858.—Head of Cherry creek.</i> —Fine camp; roads still bad; Captain Bowman commanding company "A," 3d infantry, and Captain Marcy's detachment, 5th and 10th infantry, overtook the command here to-day; Captain Bowman had marched from Fort Massachusetts, by the way of Taos, about 160 miles to the Rayado, and the same distance from there as the others; the herds also came up with us; another snow storm which lasted until the morn- ing of the 8th; on the 7th Captain Marcy came into camp and also Lieutenant J. V. DuBois, with his detachment of rifles; the detachment had marched from Fort Union with Captain Marcy; immediately on his joining, duty and incli- nation required me to confer with Captain Marcy, as to the best road, the most expeditious, and the one that could afford the best grass for his animals and those of the com- mand; the road he had selected leading in the direction of Bridger's Pass was continued, but in consequence of the guide, who knew the route, having left the command, a large portion being without a road, it was thought safest to take the route known as "Evans' trail;" this with several cut-offs, proved the best and nearest for the season we were marching	6
<i>May 8, 1858.—Cherry creek.</i> —Miry roads; fine camp; snow in the morning	7
<i>May 9, 1858.—Cherry creek.</i> —Miry roads; fine camp	12
<i>May 10, 1858.—South Fork of Platte river.</i> —Good road and fine camp; deep, rapid, and difficult stream to cross; built a flat and completed the crossing by the morning of the 14th. Our course since leaving Fort Union has varied but little from N	17½
<i>May 14, 1858.—Vasquez Fork.</i> —Fine camp. Course NW	5
<i>May 15, 1858.—Thompson's Fork.</i> —Good road; fine camp; wood scarce; crossed to-day three streams from three to six miles apart	19½
<i>May 16, 1858.—Bent's Fork.</i> —Good road; fine camp; crossed two streams at five miles interval; no wood at the first	16½
<i>May 17, 1858.—Cache la Poudre river.</i> —Fine camp; rapid, deep, and difficult to cross; passed two streams at ten and twenty-three miles; good camp at both. Course NW	26
<i>May 18, 1858.—Beaver creek.</i> —Fine camp; rained the entire day and very cold; roads heavy. Course N	16

Camps.	Odometer measurement.
<i>May 19, 1858.—Small creek on the dividing ridge.—</i> Crossed Beaver creek three times to-day; last crossings thirteen and fourteen miles; road hilly; rain and hail in the afternoon; grass scarce, (usually good). Course NW	19
<i>May 20, 1858.—Beyond the dividing ridge.—</i> Good road and fine camp; wood scarce. Course NW	17½
<i>May 21, 1858.—Small creek.—</i> Fine camp, except wood; crossed Laramie Fork three miles from last camp. Course NW	18½
<i>May 22, 1858.—Small creek.—</i> Good road; fine camp; crossed creek fourteen miles. Course N	21
<i>May 23, 1858.—Medicine-bow creek.—</i> Fine camp; about ten miles the road forked, one, Bryant's, going to the north of Medicine Bow Butte, and the other to the south of it; took the northern; crossed Sulphur Spring creek about twelve miles. Course N	17
<i>May 24, 1858.—Remained in camp.</i>	
<i>May 25, 1858.—Prairie creek.—</i> Deep and muddy; the latter part of the road rough; fine camp. Course E. and N. . .	17½
<i>May 26, 1858.—North Fork of Platte river.—</i> Fine camp; left Bryant's road four or five miles before reaching the Platte, making a road to "Baker's Ferry," at this time the only one in the vicinity fordable; the water being high, found this one difficult and dangerous; effected a crossing the day of our arrival. Course NW	12½
<i>May 27, 1858.—Remained in camp.—</i> Snow during the day, and very cold.	
<i>May 28, 1858.—Clear creek.—</i> Grass scarce; cold, with much rain and snow; express started for Camp Scott to-day . . .	12½
<i>May 29, 1858.—Dry creek.—</i> Good grass near the spring, about two miles from our camp, on the old trail; crossed Sage creek four or five miles; very muddy	23
<i>May 30, 1858.—Cut off, leaving the emigrant train on a narrow road. Muddy creek; no timber to bridge; made one for the trains to pass out of wagon tongues</i>	10½
<i>May 31, 1858.—Lake, still on the cut off.—</i> Water tolerable; grass passable. Passed a saline spring three or four miles; water can be used in case the lake we are encamped on is dry in the summer. The country in the vicinity of the spring for several miles is in places <i>miry</i> . The road we travelled can be shortened three or four miles by bearing to the left six or eight miles from our present camp, skirting the hills. Made in the last two days, by the cut off, between thirty and forty miles. Course NW	19½
<i>June 1, 1858.—Within one and a half miles of the Red lake.—</i> Fine camp; good road. Though we have an abundance of water, this lake is said to go dry in summer. Course NW	24½

Camps.	Odometer measurement.
<i>June 2, 1858.—Within four and a half miles of Seminoes Spring, which is at the head of a branch of Bitter creek; camped without water; excellent grass</i>	17½
<i>June 3, 1858.—Seminoes Spring.—Good road; fine camp. Course SW</i>	4½
<i>June 4, 1858.—Bitter creek.—Good camp; water saline, scarcely perceptible, (in dry seasons said to be more salt.) Made a new road, cutting off near twelve miles. Course W.</i>	12½
<i>June 5, 1858.—Bitter creek, near Sulphur Spring.—Good road; grass and water not very good. A few miles in advance of this camp good water and grass. There is also good grass in advance of camp of yesterday. Course W.</i>	25
<i>June 6, 1858.—Green river.—Fine camp; good road; crossed the day of our arrival. Course W</i>	17
<i>June 7, 1858.—Black's Fork.—Fine camp. Course W</i>	20
<i>June 8, 1858.—Black's Fork.—Crossed it twice and Ham's once; fine camp; road good. Course W</i>	16
<i>June 9, 1858.—Muddy creek.—Fine camp; good road. Slight snow storm to-day. Course W</i>	15
<i>June 10, 1858.—Black's Fork.—Fine camp; good road. Course W</i>	16
<i>June 11, 1858.—Fort Bridger and Camp Scott.—Fine camp; good road. Course W</i>	3

Distance from Fort Union, New Mexico, to Camp Scott, Utah Territory, 762½ miles.

I respectfully give you a short sketch of the march of my command from Fort Union, New Mexico, to Camp Scott, Utah Territory, the headquarters of the army of Utah, and I here take pleasure in stating that from the time I first communicated with Captain Marcy, I received his cordial and able assistance upon all occasions; the direction of his large herds was given with his well known energy, and, in the end, secured a successful termination of his expedition to New Mexico.

To Captain Bowman, Captain Trevitt, and Lieutenant Shipley, commanding companies 3d infantry; Lieutenant Hendren, 3d infantry; Lieutenant McRae, commanding company rifle regiment; Lieutenant Tilford, rifles; Lieutenant Du Bois, commanding detachments companies G and H, rifles, and acting assistant adjutant general; Lieutenant McNally, rifles, acting assistant quartermaster, and acting assistant commissary of subsistence, and Dr. A. A. Kellogg, acting assistant surgeon, is the command indebted for unremitting attention in the discharge of their respective duties; like the men, exposed to a succession of snow storms, attended with extreme cold, at a season more inclement than any known for many years, if ever witnessed by the oldest mountaineers; crossing with their men numerous mountain torrents swollen by the recent snows, made their duties one of hardship and difficulty. Without exception, both officers and men exerted

themselves to effect the object of the expedition, and succeeded in carrying it to a successful termination.

Our thanks are due to the guides, Lereux, Baker, and Maury—competent and experienced mountaineers.

Very respectfully, I have the honor to be your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,

Colonel Rifle Regiment, commanding.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Headquarters of the Army.

No. 88.—*Captain Marcy to Major Porter.*

CAMP SCOTT, U. T., *June 12, 1858.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to Special Orders No. 50, dated headquarters army of Utah, Camp Scott, Utah Territory, November 24, 1857, directing me to proceed to New Mexico for the purpose of procuring animals for service in Utah, I left Camp Scott on the 27th day of November last, having an escort of forty soldiers from the 5th and 10th regiments of infantry, with twenty-four citizens as guides, packers, and herders.

Our route from the camp follows a small trail in a southeast direction to Henry's Fork, and down the valley of that stream to its confluence with Green river, which we forded about a mile above the junction at a point where it was one hundred yards wide and three feet deep with a rapid current flowing over a gravelly bed.

Thence nearly east along the northern slope of the mountains bordering Green river for six miles, turning gradually to the south and passing over abrupt and elevated mountains covered with pine and cedar for fifteen miles, when the trail turns down a very precipitous and rocky bluff crossing Green river again at a good ford with only eighteen inches depth of water upon a rocky bed.

From thence in a southeast direction to the summit of a very elevated plateau enclosed on both sides by lofty mountains. Our trail traverses the entire length of this plateau, and at the southern extremity makes an abrupt descent of probably a thousand feet into the valley of Box-elder creek; thence down that stream for eight miles below its junction with Birch creek, when we turned south over a very rough country and in nine miles struck Ashley's Fork, which is a clear rapid stream about twenty yards wide and twelve inches deep, issuing from the southern slope of Uhintha mountains. In the highlands bordering this stream there is a great abundance of excellent grass, and we found the temperature here still mild and pleasant.

From thence we struck south to Green river, which we followed in its tortuous meanderings for twenty-three miles. In many places it is enclosed by high bluffs of white and red sandstone rising almost perpendicularly from the water and rendering it necessary for us to follow the Indian trail passing directly over them.

The river bottom is generally very narrow, but in places spreads out from one-fourth to half a mile in width, and is here covered with a luxuriant growth of grass. Cottonwood, willow, and birch skirt the banks, which during seasons of high water are overflowed.

The general course of the river from the point where we struck it to our last crossing above the mouth of White river is south 2° west.

Our trail on leaving Green river crosses White river three miles above its mouth at the first point where the highlands on the north approach the stream. White river runs west 20° south, is thirty feet wide with a deep and rapid current flowing over a soft alluvial bed between high clay banks, and is a difficult stream to ford with safety.

From thence we travelled eight miles in a course south 5° west, which took us to another tributary of Green river called Box-elder creek. This we found about ten feet wide with abrupt clay banks, and its valley narrow and bounded by high bluffs of light grey sandstone. Our track follows a small Indian trail along the north bank of the creek for nineteen miles. We found grass in detached spots along the sides of the bluffs, but generally there is very little grass in this locality.

On leaving the creek we struck into a narrow and tortuous cañon, which by a very regular grade led us to the summit of an elevated plateau dividing the waters of Green and Grand rivers. After travelling fifteen miles across this we found it terminated in a towering escarpment of rock overlooking the valley of Grand river and its two principal tributaries the Bunkaree and Compadre. Upon the summit of this table land the snow was two feet deep, making it very difficult travelling, and covering up the trail in such a manner that we were obliged to search for several hours before we succeeded in finding the place where it passed down the face of the bluffs.

There seemed to be no other point within a distance of several miles where the descent could be made into the valley before us, and our guides say this is the only practicable passage for twenty miles on either side.

The trail led us down the precipitous side of the escarpment for probably eighteen hundred feet before we reached the valley beneath. The pack mules had great difficulty in making the descent, and several which lost their footing rolled thirty and forty feet down the bluffs before they were stopped by a projecting tree or rock.

On arriving at the base of the mountain we found ourselves in a deep cañon where there was no snow and the grass still green.

The trail led us down the windings of this cañon with a general bearing of southeast for sixteen miles, running along the banks of a small stream called Paint Rock creek, which rises in the cañon and empties into Grand river. The trail then leaves the creek and turns to the east, skirting the mountains bordering Grand river valley for thirteen miles, when it bears to the south and in seventeen miles intersects Gunnison's wagon trace from New Mexico through the Kutch-e-tope Pass. This road could be distinguished in places, but for the most part the grass had grown over and obliterated all traces of it.

As we passed over the same route from this point to the valley of

the Rio del Norte, as that travelled by Captain Gunnison, I have deemed it unnecessary to enter into a detailed description of a country which has already been elaborately reported upon. I propose merely to give some of the incidents of our journey over the mountains, as they may serve to add information upon the subject of the feasibility of railway travelling over this route during the winter season.

Our trace is along the valley of Grand river to the junction of the Bunkaree and Compadre, both of which we forded and ascended the latter about fifteen miles. We found no snow in these valleys, and the atmosphere was mild with much of the grass green.

Several lodges of Utah Indians were met with upon the Compadre, who informed us that the major part of their band had gone to Snake river upon a buffalo hunt, and had taken with them nearly all of their best horses. I held out every inducement to persuade them to sell some of the remaining ones, but did not succeed in purchasing one.

They seemed to be amply supplied with rifles and blankets, which they said had been presented to them by their agent in New Mexico. I also made an effort to hire one of them to accompany us, as guide, as far as the "Kutch-e-tope" Pass, supposing he would know the best route to avoid the deep snows, and as an inducement I offered him the value of two horses, but he most peremptorily declined, saying "the snow was very deep in the mountains; that we would all perish; and that, for his part, he was not disposed to die in that way." He also said it would be much more wise for us to turn about and go back, or stop and winter with them.

Our interpreter replied to him that we were men, and not old women; that we intended to go on, and had no fears as to the result.

We purchased some deer skins from these Indians, which were distributed among the soldiers to repair their shoes and make moccasins, as many of them were nearly barefooted.

On the 22d day of December we left the valley of the Compadre, and taking a southeast course entered the mountains, where we at once encountered snow, which increased in depth as we ascended, and upon the top of this was a hard crust that cut the mules' legs severely and greatly augmented the difficulty of travelling.

It now became impossible for our animals to get any sustenance except by digging with their hoofs through the deep snow, and they very soon gave indications of failing. Several were abandoned on the 23d; and I deemed it necessary, in order to relieve the remaining ones as much as possible, to "cache" and abandon the Indian goods, as well as all other articles of baggage that could be dispensed with.

On the 24th the snow had become so deep that, finding it impossible for our jaded animals any longer to break the track, I placed forty men in the advance, who waded slowly through it, alternating from front to rear as they became exhausted, and in this manner a path was beaten, over which the pack mules with difficulty passed. The snow continued to increase in depth as we advanced, but the men struggled most manfully on. They were cheerful, and there was not a word of complaint from any one of the soldiers.

This intensely severe labor, continued as it was from day to day, necessarily wearied the men and animals, and five mules were abandoned on the 26th.

Our march on the 27th was more severe than any we had previously made, and eight mules were left upon the road this day,

Finding that our means of subsistence were so rapidly diminishing, and the snow still increasing, I determined, on the night of the 27th, to send an express to Fort Massachusetts for supplies. Accordingly, on the morning of the 28th, I despatched two Mexicans with three of the best of our remaining animals, with a letter to the commanding officer of that post, informing him of our situation and requesting him to send supplies for our relief.

We then followed slowly on until the 31st, making about five miles a day. This brought us to a small creek, which our guide informed me had its rise in the Kutch-e-tope Pass. Here we had the misfortune to encounter a snow storm, which added about fourteen inches to the heavy body of snow already upon the ground, and increased very greatly the difficulty of breaking a track through it.

The following morning dawned upon us with gloomy auspices—far from promising a happy New Year; yet we struggled on, and by the severest toil made about two miles during the entire day. The snow was now from four to five feet deep, and the leading men were obliged in many places to crawl upon their hands and knees to prevent sinking to their necks. They could only go a few yards at a time before they were compelled, in a state of complete exhaustion, to throw themselves down and let others take their places; yet these noble hearts of oak never for a moment faltered or uttered a murmur of discouragement or insubordination. On the contrary, seeing, I presume from the expression of my countenance, that I was troubled, (as I most certainly was,) they sent me a message to the effect that they were ready to work as long as they could stand up; they were willing to eat mules, or to encounter any privations or hardships I might think it necessary to place upon them in accomplishing the objects of the expedition.

Gallant fellows! Many of them who were almost barefooted had frozen their feet badly and had suffered intensely from fatigue and cold, yet every soldier, without a single exception, always performed everything that was required of him cheerfully and with alacrity.

I felt for them from the bottom of my heart; and I should be recreant to my duty, as their commander, if I neglected to give this official expression of my profound gratitude for the almost superhuman efforts put forth by them to extricate the party from an exceedingly perilous position.

On the 2d day of January we crossed the summit of the mountains through the "Kutch-e-tope Pass," and descended a very precipitous mountain into the valley of the Sah-Watch creek; and here we found a small patch of grass, which our famished mules eagerly devoured. The last remnant of our rations was consumed on the 1st, and our only means of subsistence until the return of our messengers from Fort Massachusetts was our jaded animals.

We continued on at the rate of about five miles per day, the men

breaking the track for the mules, and subsisting upon those that could perform no further service, until the 10th, when we passed over the last mountain, and our eyes were gladdened by the long and anxiously looked for sight of the valley of the "Rio Del Norte," which we entered about one hundred miles above Fort Massachusetts. Up to this time we had marched every day since our departure from Camp Scott, and the men and animals had become much worn down and exhausted. We had been expecting the return of our messengers from Fort Massachusetts for several days, and I began to be fearful they had not reached there. I therefore determined to make a halt, and send forward another express.

The snow was about two feet deep in the valley, and a long prairie of sixty miles in extent lay before us in the direction of Fort Massachusetts. The halt was deemed necessary to recruit the animals before attempting to make the passage of this bleak prairie.

We had now been subsisting for ten days upon the flesh of starved mules and horses; and notwithstanding we consumed an entire animal at a single meal, probably averaging four or five pounds to the man, yet it did not satisfy the cravings of the appetite, and we were continually wishing for fat meat.

We halted for two days at the point where the Sah-Watch creek debouches into the valley of the Rio del Norte, and we were constantly looking out for the return of our express men, but it was not until nearly night on the second day that two objects were seen in the distance approaching camp. I could hardly credit my eyes when these proved to be two horsemen, who came rapidly forward, and to our delight they were our long absent messengers, who had returned from Fort Massachusetts. When they came galloping into camp, firing their revolvers, the men gave them three hearty cheers, and seemed perfectly overcome with joy. They were most truly welcome, especially as they brought us the news that three wagons were near with a generous supply of provisions.

They brought me a handful of coffee, and what was of much more value to the men, a large plug of tobacco, which I cut up into forty pieces, and distributed among the soldiers. I have never before been conscious of the very great sacrifice it is to men who are habituated to the use of tobacco, and are deprived of it. They devoured the small pieces that I gave them most voraciously; and one man who supposed he was to be left out in the distribution, offered five dollars, or half a month's pay, for a single quid. It indeed seems to be most indispensable to them.

Our camp to-night presented a marked contrast with what it had been for the three weeks previous, and every one was rejoiced at the prospect of speedily meeting the wagons sent to our relief.

We set out early on the following morning, and after marching ten miles met the wagons, and immediately encamped, when the men were at once supplied with fat beef, bread, sugar, and coffee; and as Captain Bowman had kindly sent me, among other things, a demijohn of brandy, I issued a good dram to the men, and gave them a supply of tobacco.

The fires were soon made, the cooks set to work, and in an incredibly short time our camp presented a scene of feasting and happiness such as I have never witnessed before. The poor fellows seemed to have forgotten all their sufferings, and it made my heart glad to see them enjoy themselves. For my own part I can vouch for the fact, that a bountiful dinner upon fat and juicy beef, smothered in onions, with fresh bread and butter, and a strong cup of coffee, is decidedly more to my taste than mule meat without either bread or salt. I have never enjoyed a meal as much as I did this. I now felt that our sufferings were over, and that we were safe, and I feel confident that all of us were truly grateful to Divine Providence that we were extricated from the deep snows of the Rocky mountains.

Sergeant William Morton, of the 10th infantry, a most excellent soldier, who, from over-exertion and exposure in the zealous discharge of his duty, had been ailing for several days, was taken quite sick at this camp, and died the following night. He had acted a prominent part in conquering the formidable obstacles that we had encountered, and his loss was deeply lamented. He was buried upon the east bank of the Rio del Norte, and the spot marked upon a tree near the grave.

Several others of the command made themselves sick from over-eating, but I administered medicines, which soon relieved them.

On the 18th day of January we marched into Fort Massachusetts, where we were most cordially received by the commanding officer, Captain A. W. Bowman, of the 3d infantry, to whose hospitality we are greatly indebted, as he placed all the resources of his garrison at the disposal of the party.

After remaining here over night, I proceeded to Taos, from whence I had the honor of reporting my arrival to you.

The route we passed over from Camp Scott to the valley of the Rio del Norte traverses for almost the entire distance a very broken and mountainous region, over which I regard it as wholly impracticable to carry a wagon road without the expenditure of a vast amount of labor. It would, however, be a good route for summer travel with pack mules, as grass, water, and wood are abundant upon the whole route. The estimated distance from Camp Scott to Fort Massachusetts is five hundred and ninety-three miles.

The only object of interest that presented itself to our observation in crossing the mountains was the "*Sagopus leucurus*," a white-tailed Ptannigan, a species of which but two or three specimens are said to exist in any ornithological collections, and those are in Europe. This beautiful bird, which in its winter plumage is as white as the snow upon which we invariably found them, was supposed to be confined to that part of the Rocky mountain range north of latitude 54° north. These specimens, which have been sent to the Smithsonian Institution, are said by Professor S. F. Baird to be the first indications of their occurrence within our territory, and it extends their supposed ranges about a thousand miles to the south.

On my arrival in New Mexico, after seeing my escort comfortably quartered at Cantonment Burgwin, I immediately set about purchas-

ing the animals required, and on the 13th of March had collected (960) mules and (160) horses at Rayado, the extreme border settlement upon my return route, and on the 17th we commenced our march.

The general commanding the department of New Mexico had reinforced my escort with one company of the 3d infantry and twenty-five mounted riflemen.

From the Rayado we followed the Fort Leavenworth road over the Raton mountains, as far as Purgatoire creek, where we arrived on the 23d. From thence we left the road and struck in a northwest course, crossing the Opishipa, Santa Clara, Cuchara, Huerforno, Green Horn and St. Charles creeks to the Old Pueblo on the Arkansas river, where I received an order from the commanding officer of the department of New Mexico, directing me to halt at the first convenient camping place and await further reinforcements.

In accordance therewith I ascended the "Fontaine qui Bouille" creek about thirty miles to a place where I found good grazing, and there remained until the 28th of April, when the reinforcements, consisting of one company of the mounted rifles, and two companies of the 3d infantry, under the command of Colonel Loring of the regiment of mounted rifles arrived, when Colonel Loring assumed command of the entire escort.

On the 29th of April we again set forward and proceeded as far as the ridge dividing the waters of the Arkansas from those of the Platte. It was a mild and pleasant spring day, with no appearance of bad weather, but as night approached it became cloudy, and about dark a snow storm set in accompanied by a violent gale of wind from the north, which increased until it became a perfect tempest, and continued without cessation for sixty hours. We immediately set to work making "corrals" for the animals, but before all were secured one herd of three hundred mules and horses stampeded and broke away in spite of the utmost efforts of the herdsman, and ran directly with the wind for fifty miles.

Of two Mexicans who followed this herd one was afterwards found dead, and the other crawling about upon his hands and knees in a state of temporary insanity. Another man perished within two hundred yards of the camp.

I had fortunately preserved a quantity of corn, which was fed out to the animals during the continuance of the storm, and this probably prevented any of them from perishing with cold or hunger. Nearly all the animals were recovered after the storm had ceased.

We were detained at this camp until the 5th of May, when we again resumed the march down Cherry creek to its confluence with the South Platte, which we found so deep and rapid as to make it necessary for us to halt and build a ferry-boat. This, with the time consumed in crossing, delayed us four days.

From thence we continued on upon the "Cherokee California trail," skirting the eastern base of the Rocky mountains, and crossing small tributaries of the South Platte, until we reached the "Cache la Poudre" creek. Here the road leaves the plains and bears to the left,

making a very gradual ascent into the mountains along a valley with a smooth and gentle grade, and passes over a high rolling country, crossing three forks of the Laramie river, and thence to the "Medicine Bow creek," near which we struck Lieutenant Bryan's road to Bridger's pass. This we followed until we arrived near the north fork of the Platte, crossing this stream about two miles above Bryan's crossing.

We transported our boat to this point but found the river fordable, and left the boat upon the west bank.

From thence we continued on the Cherokee trail for thirty eight miles to a small creek which runs into the Platte. Here we left the road to the right and struck for the head of "Bitter creek," passing over an undulating and elevated district of country for sixty-five miles throughout which we found occasional ponds of water, but saw no running streams.

This elevated plateau divides the waters of the Atlantic from those that flow into the Pacific.

It is a sterile region, with little other vegetation than artemisia, and although we found sufficient water, there would probably be a scarcity in a dry season. Grass is found in places but is not abundant.

This section of arid and barren country terminates at the head of a small tributary of Bitter creek, which we descended to its mouth, following the north bank of Bitter creek to its confluence with Green River, and from thence intersecting the Fort Laramie and South Pass road near the junction of Hams' and Black's Forks, and arriving at Camp Scott on the 10th day of June.

The halt of thirty days which we made for Colonel Loring involved a further detention of six days during the snow storm, and four days at the crossing of the South Platte.

Had it not been for this delay I think I may safely say that the march would have been made within fifty days, and that we would have arrived at the headquarters of this army on or before the 10th day of May.

The route we have travelled over from Fort Union to the crossing of the North Platte river, with the exception of about five miles near the summit of the Raton mountains, traverses a country which presents a smooth and firm surface, over which wagons pass with great facility.

Grass of the most nutritious quality covers the entire face of this section, and numerous streams of excellent spring water issue from the eastern slope of the mountains, and cross the road throughout the entire distance at convenient intervals for marches with troops and trains of loaded wagons.

From the North Platte to the waters of Bitter creek, as I have before remarked, the water may become scarce in a dry season, but with this exception the road we passed over in returning from New Mexico, a distance of (741 miles,) I regard as one of the very best natural roads I have ever seen.

The Rocky mountains are passed upon this route through an opening in the chain where the summit level spreads out into a broad ex-

panse of table land, without mountains or abrupt hills, and the traveller passes imperceptibly from the waters of the Atlantic to those of the Pacific.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

R. B. MARCY,
Captain 5th Infantry.

Major F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General, Army of Utah, Camp Scott, U. T.

Itinerary of a march from Camp Scott, Utah Territory, to Captain Gunnison's wagon road upon Grand river, Utah Territory, by Captain R. B. Marcy, during the winter of 1857-'58.

Date.	Hour.	Estimated distances.		Bearings.	Remarks.
		Camp to camp.	Total.		
1857.		<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>		
Nov. 27	3 p. m.			SE	
27	4½ p. m.	3.50	3.50		Smith's Fork.
28	8½ a. m.			S	
28				S	
28				S	
28				S	
28	1 p. m.	15	18.50	S	Small branch, Smith's Fork. Cottonwood Fork.
29	8½ p. m.			S	
29				S	
29				S	
29		10	28.50	E. 5° S	There is good grass throughout the valley of Henry's Fork ; timber, spruce-pine, cotton- wood, and willow ; good camps at any point on the creek.
29	1½ p. m.	5	33.50	E. 5° S	
29	8½ a. m.			E. 10° S	
29				E. 10° S	
29				E. 10° S	
29				E. 10° S	Small branch.
29				E. 10° S	
29				E. 20° S	
30	2½ p. m.	21	54.50	E. 20° S	
30	8 a. m.			E. 20° S	
30				E. 20° S	
30				E. 20° S	
30				E. 20° S	Road ascends the mountains upon the north slope ; good grass and water ; small branch.
30				E. 20° S	
30	3½ p. m.	16	70.50		
Dec. 1	9 a. m.			E. 20° S	
1				E. 25° S	
1				E. 30° S	
1	3 p. m.	16.50	86	E. 30° S	Good ford.
2	8½ a. m.			SE	
2				S. 20° N	
2				S. 20° W	
2				S. 20° W	
2				S. 20° W	
2				S. 20° W	
2				S. 20° W	

REPORT OF THE ITINERARY—Continued.

Date.	Hour.	Estimated distances.		Bearings.	Remarks.
		Camp to camp.	Total.		
1857.		<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>		
Dec. 3	2½ p. m.---	18	104	S. 20° W. --	Good camp.
3	8 a. m.---	-----	-----	S.-----	
3	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	
3	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	Good bunch grass along the highlands bordering these creeks.
3	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	
3	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	
3	1¾ p. m.---	16.50	120.50	S.-----	Good camp.
4	8 a. m.---	-----	-----	S. 20° W.---	
4	-----	-----	-----	S. 20° W.---	
4	-----	-----	-----	S. 20° W.---	Good camp.
4	-----	-----	-----	S. 20° W.---	
4	-----	-----	-----	S. 10° E.---	
5	1½ p. m.---	14	134.50	S. 10° E.---	Good camp.
5	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	
5	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	
5	-----	-----	143.50	S.-----	
5	-----	-----	-----	S. 40° W.---	
5	-----	-----	-----	S. 10° W.---	
5	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	Excellent grass and wood along the valley of Green river.
6	3½ p. m.---	22	155.50	S. 10° W.---	
6	8 a. m.---	-----	-----	S.-----	
6	-----	-----	-----	S. 10° E.---	Good ford.
6	-----	-----	-----	S. 10° E.---	
6	11 a. m.---	18	163	S. 10° E.---	
6	-----	-----	-----	S. 20° W.---	White river, soft bed and difficult to ford.
7	3 p. m.---	18	173	S. 20° W.---	
7	8 a. m.---	4	177	S. 10° W.---	
7	-----	-----	-----	S. 5° W.---	Road runs along the bottom of Box Elder creek, between the bluffs; grass in detached spots along the adjacent hills; water brackish; no wood except sage and grease wood.
7	-----	-----	-----	S. 10° W.---	
8	2½ p. m.---	16	189	S. 10° W.---	
8	8¾ a. m.---	-----	-----	S.-----	
8	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	
8	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	
8	-----	-----	-----	S. 10° E.---	
9	2¾ p. m.---	18	207	S. 10° E.---	
9	9 a. m.---	-----	-----	N. 55° E.---	
9	-----	-----	-----	N. 55° E.---	Small branch, good grass and wood.
10	12 m.---	10	217	S. 55° E.---	
10	7½ a. m.---	-----	-----	S.-----	
10	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	
10	-----	-----	-----	S. 65° W.---	
10	-----	-----	-----	S. 65° W.---	
10	-----	-----	-----	S. 10° W.---	This elevated prairie is covered with grass, and in the borders of the bluffs are numerous springs.
10	-----	-----	-----	S. 10° W.---	
10	-----	-----	-----	S. 10° W.---	
11	3 p. m.---	24	241	S. 20° W.---	
11	7¾ a. m.---	-----	-----	S. 20° W.---	
11	-----	-----	-----	S. 20° W.---	
11	-----	-----	-----	S. 20° W.---	
11	-----	-----	-----	S.-----	
11	-----	-----	-----	S. 55° E.---	
12	12½ p. m.---	15	256	S. 55° E.---	
12	8¾ a. m.---	-----	-----	NW.-----	

ITINERARY—Continued.

Date.	Hour.	Estimated distances.		Bearings.	Remarks.
		Camp to camp.	Total.		
1857.		<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>		
Dec. 12	-----	-----	-----	S. 20° W.---	
12	-----	-----	-----	S. 20° W.---	
13	12 m.---	10	266	E. 50° S.---	
13	-----	-----	-----	E. 40° S.---	
13	-----	-----	-----	N. 50° E.---	
13	-----	-----	-----	E.-----	
13	-----	-----	-----	E.-----	
14	2 p. m.---	18	284	N. 50° E.---	Small branch, good water and grass.
14	9 a. m.---	-----	-----	E.-----	
14	-----	-----	-----	E.-----	
14	-----	-----	-----	E. 50° S.---	
14	-----	-----	-----	E. 60° S.---	
14	-----	-----	-----	E. 20° S.---	
15	3 p. m.---	18	302	E. 20° S.---	Small branch, good grass and water.
15	-----	-----	-----	S. 35° E.---	
15	8½ a. m.---	-----	-----	S. 35° E.---	Road then follows Gunnison's road to the valley of the Rio del Norte.
15	10½ a. m.---	6	308	S. 35° E.---	

Itinerary of a march from New Mexico to Camp Scott, Utah Territory, made by Captain R. B. Marcy, 5th infantry, in 1858, commencing at the point where the road from Fort Leavenworth enters the Raton mountains and terminating at the confluence of Black's and Ham's Forks of Green river, upon the South Pass road to Salt Lake City.

Date.	Hour.	Measured distances.		Bearings.	Remarks.
		Camp to camp.	Total.		
1858. Mar. 23	6 a. m.--	<i>Miles.</i> 5.25	<i>Miles.</i> 5.25	N. 25° W. N. 25° W. N. 25° W. N. 25° W. N. 25° W. N. 30° W.	Good grass, wood, and water are found upon all these streams, which are tributaries of the Arkansas. They take their rise in the eastern slopes of the mountains, and are fed from springs.
24	12½ p. m.-- 6½ a. m.--	10.13	15.38	N. 30° W. N. 30° W. N. 30° W.	
25	12½ p. m.-- 6½ a. m.--	10.10	33.73	N. 35° W. N. 35° W. N. 35° W. N. 30° W. N. 30° W. N. 30° W.	
26	10½ a. m.-- 6½ a. m.--	11.25	44.98	N. 20° W. N. 25° W. N. 30° W.	
27	9½ a. m.-- 6½ a. m.--	10	54.98	N. 25° W. N. 30° W. N. 30° W. N. 20° W. N. 20° W.	
28	12½ p. m.--	16	70.98	N. 20° W. N. 35° W. N. 35° W.	
29 to 31	12 m.---- 6 a. m.--	12.50	83.48	N. 35° W. N. 25° W. N. 25° W. N. 25° W. N. 25° W.	
Ap'l 1	11½ p. m.-- 6 a. m.--	13.50	96.98	N. 25° W. N. 25° W. N. 25° W.	
2 to 5	1¾ p. m.--	17	113.98	N. 25° W. N. 25° W.	
6 to 28	6 a. m.--	7	120.98	N. 25° W. N. 25° W. N. 20° E. N. 20° E. N. 20° E.	

ITINERARY—Continued.

Date.	Hour.	Measured distances		Bearings.	Remarks.
		Camp to camp.	Total.		
1858.		<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>		
April 28	2 p. m.	17.50	138.48	N. 20° E.	Black Squirrel creek always affords good water and grass.
to					
May 5	6 a. m.	-----	-----	N. 10° W.	The dividing ridge is very elevated and bleak, with very frequent storms. It is covered with pine timber.
				N. 10° W.	Running spring water, with good grass and wood.
6	12½ p. m.	14	152.48	N. 10° W.	Small branch; water in holes in dry season; grass and wood plenty to the left of the road.
	6 a. m.	-----	-----	N. 10° W.	
7	9½ a. m.	10	162.48	N. 10° W.	Good grass, water, and wood throughout the valley of Cherry creek.
	6 a. m.	-----	162.48	N. 10° W.	
8	9 a. m.	7	169.48	N. 10° W.	
	6 a. m.	-----	-----	N. 10° W.	
				N. 10° W.	
9	10½ a. m.	11	180.98	N. 10° W.	The mountains are from five to ten miles distant from Cherry creek.
	6 a. m.	-----	-----	N. 10° W.	
				N. 10° W.	Wood, water, and grass abundant throughout the valley of Cherry creek.
10	12 m.	17	197.98	N. 10° W.	
to 14	6 a. m.	-----	-----	N. 10° W.	Good grass, wood, and water abundant.
				N. 5° W.	
14	8½ a. m.	5	202.98	N. 5° W.	Good grass, wood, and water.
	6 a. m.	-----	-----	N. 15° W.	
		7	209.98	N. 20° W.	No wood; good grass; permanent water. Tributary of South Platte.
				N. 20° W.	
		5	214.98	N. 20° W.	No wood; good grass; constant water. Tributary of S. Platte.
				N. 15° W.	
15	2½ p. m.	19.50	222.48	N. 15° W.	Tributary of South Platte. But little wood; good grass and water.
	6 a. m.	-----	-----	N. 20° W.	
				N. 20° W.	Good grass. Tributary of the South Platte.
				N. 20° W.	
16	11½ a. m.	16	238.48	N. 10° W.	Good grass, water, and wood on this tributary of the South Platte.
				N. 15° W.	
				N. 15° W.	
				N. 10° W.	Wood, water, and grass.
				N. 10° W.	
				N. 15° W.	
				N. 15° W.	Wood, water, and grass.
				N. 15° W.	
17	3 p. m.	-----	-----	N. 5° W.	Wood, water, and grass. Seventy-five yards wide; very rapid; rock bottom.
	6½ a. m.	-----	-----	N. 30° W.	
				N. 10° W.	
				N. 10° W.	
				N. 20° W.	

REPORT OF THE ITINERARY—Continued.

Date.	Hour.	Measured distances.		Bearings.	Remarks.
		Camp to camp.	Total.		
1858.		<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>		
May 18	12 $\frac{3}{4}$ p. m.--	15.50	279.98	N. 20° W.	Wood, water, and grass.
	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ a. m.--	-----	-----	N. 15° W.	
				N. 10° W.	
				N. 10° W.	
				N. 10° W.	
19	1 $\frac{3}{4}$ p. m.--	19.50	299.48	N. 10° W.	Springs ; wood and grass.
	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ a. m.--	-----	-----	N. 25° W.	
				N. 25° W.	
				N. 25° W.	
				N. 30° W.	
20	12 m.----	17.50	316.98	N. 30° W.	Good grass ; no wood. No wood ; good grass and water. Tributary of Laramie. Laramie wide and deep ; but little wood ; good grass.
				N. 25° W.	
				N. 25° W.	
				N. 10° W.	
				N. 10° W.	
21	12 m.----	18	334.98	N. 10° W.	Tributary of Laramie. Wood and grass plenty.
	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ a. m.--	-----	-----	N. 15° W.	
				N. 25° W.	
				N. 30° W.	
				N. 35° W.	
22	2 $\frac{1}{4}$ p. m.--	21	355.98	N. 35° W.	Good wood, water, and grass upon these creeks.
	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ a. m.--	-----	-----	N. 35° W.	
				N. 65° W.	
				N. 65° W.	
				N. 70° W.	
23,24	12 $\frac{3}{4}$ p. m.--	17	373.98	N. 70° W.	Good ford ; wood and grass abundant. South side the Medicine Bow butte is the best road over the Cherokee trail. Good wood and grass.
	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ a. m.--	17	373.98	S. 65° W.	
				S. 70° W.	
				S. 70° W.	
				S. 70° W.	
25	12 $\frac{1}{2}$ p. m.--	17	390.98	S. 65° W.	Good ford ; wood and grass abundant. Good ford, except in highest stages of water.
				S. 60° W.	
				S. 65° W.	
				S. 65° W.	
				S. 65° W.	
26,27	-----	12.50	403.48	S. 65° W.	Good camp on both sides of the river, with wood and grass in abundance.
				North.	
				North.	
				North.	
				North.	
28	11 a. m.--	12	415.48	N. 5° W.	But little grass and no wood, except sage, on Sage creek.
	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ a. m.--	-----	-----	N. 5° W.	
				N. 5° W.	
				N. 10° W.	
				N. 5° W.	
29	4 p. m.--	24	439.48	N. 5° W.	Sulphurous water ; good grass, no wood but sage. Excellent water and grass ; little wood.
	6 $\frac{1}{2}$ a. m.--	-----	-----	North.	
				N. 60° W.	
				N. 60° W.	
				N. 50° W.	
				N. 45° W.	

ITINERARY—Continued.

Date.	Hour.	Measured distances.		Bearings.	Remarks.
		Camp to camp.	Total.		
1858		<i>Miles.</i>	<i>Miles.</i>		
May 30	11 a. m.--	10.50	449.98	N. 45° W.	Good grass along the banks of the creek; no wood except sage.
	6½ a. m.--	-----	-----	N. 65° W.	
				N. 60° W.	
				N. 60° W.	
				N. 60° W.	
31	2¼ p. m.--	19	468.98	N. 60° W.	Grass good in the bordering hills. Water in all these ponds is brackish. Sage the only fuel.
	6½ a. m.--	-----	-----	S. 70° W.	
				S. 70° W.	
				S. 75° W.	
				S. 75° W.	
June 1	3 p. m.--	24	492.98	S. 70° W.	Standing water in ponds in many places in these flats. Good grass on the hills adjoining. Sage the only fuel. The water here would probably dry up in midsummer.
	6½ a. m.--	-----	-----	S. 70° W.	
		30	522.98	N. 80° W.	
				N. 80° W.	
				N. 70° W.	
2	10¼ a. m.--	11	533.98	N. 70° W.	No water; good grass; sage the only fuel.
	6½ a. m.--	-----	-----	N. 80° W.	
3	8 a. m.--	4.50	538.48	W. 10° S.	
	6½ a. m.--	-----	-----	W. 10° S.	
4		8	546.43	W. 10° S.	Good grass on south side of the creek, in hills.
				West.	
	11½ a. m.--	12.50	550.98	West	
	6½ a. m.--	-----	-----	W. 10° S.	
				W. 10° S.	
5				W. 10° S.	Good grass in hills on south side of the creek; in the hills sage the only fuel.
				W. 10° S.	
				W. 10° S.	
				W. 10° S.	
				W. 10° S.	
6	4¼ p. m.--	25	575.98	S. 65° W.	Excellent grass; sage the only fuel.
	6½ a. m.--	-----	-----	S. 75° W.	
				S. 75° W.	
				S. 65° W.	
				S. 65° W.	
7	12¼ a. m.--	16.75	592.73	S. 65° W.	Good ford. Wood and grass abundant at the crossing of Green river.
	6½ a. m.--	-----	-----	West.	
				West.	
				West.	
				West.	
7	2 p. m.--	20	612.73	West.	
				West.	
				West.	
				West.	
				West.	

No. 89.—*Captain Newton to Major Porter.*

CAMP FLOYD, CEDAR VALLEY, U. T.,
July 17, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to present herewith a journal and sketch of the route followed by me to test the practicability of making a wagon road along the elevated ground lying between Yellow creek and Ogden's Hole, and, under certain circumstances, also to make an examination for a road between Bear Lake and Cache valley.

It was considered an object of great importance to examine the country, with the view of locating a road, which should not pass through cañons or deep ravines liable to be easily blocked by snow.

Under such instructions, a point on the valley of Yellow creek, about four miles from Bear river, was taken as the starting point. The valley of Sandy or Beaver creek, flowing into Bear river of the east, was first encountered. A continuous ridge turns the head of this creek, or it may be passed with ease, and the ridge ascended on the other side. The same may be effected by following up the valley of Sandy creek to the same point, starting from Bear river.

Once upon the ridge the line cannot be deviated from without falling into the cañons of Pumber's creek, on the south, or into those of certain tributaries of Bear river on the north. The general appearance of the country on both sides of the ridge was well defined. Cañons or steep ravines of reddish earth were the prominent features of the landscape.

The ridge was not a *plateau*, but, on the contrary, was composed of a succession of hillocks or mounds. The soil was wet from recently melted snow, and in many places slippery. It was likewise heavy when wet, but appeared to pack under the tread. No water or grass encountered on the ridge; these must be sought, and may perhaps be found in sufficient quantities, by descending into the ravines. The ridge forks; the north branch terminates with steep inclinations in a cañon six miles from Ogden's Hole. The south branch forms the south boundary of Ogden's Hole, and can be ascended or descended at its termination; but for the last six (6) miles the ridge is covered with loose round and angular stones, many of large size, and there is not a sufficient soil present to form the bed of a road. Several hills along this part of the ridge have likewise to be worked.

Abundance of aspen occurs on this elevated ridge, but the clearing away of these would not prove a serious work.

Ogden's Hole was covered in a nearly north and south direction; the line of our trail carrying us over the most barren part of this locality; we saw more weeds than grass therefore.

The divide between Ogden's Hole and Cache valley is, in the western portion of it, composed of steep hills, apparently impracticable for a road. It is my opinion that a road, if any should be made here, would lie along the eastern portion of this divide.

In Cache valley, the western boundary, as far north as Logan's Fork, was explored with the view of finding a pass *over it* in prefer-

ence to *through* it. None was found. The cañon of Blacksmith's Fork was then examined and found to present serious but by no means insurmountable difficulties to the establishment of a road through it. Three cañons south of this were likewise examined, but not with a good result.

The cañon of Muddy creek was not examined for want of opportunity therefor, though I have been since informed that it offers the best features of any of these cañons for a practicable road.

A ridge road over to Ogden's Hole is inconvenient, if not impracticable. A ridge road from Bear Lake to Cache valley is impossible. Ravines or cañons, it is apparent, must be explored in order to connect Bear river of the east with Ogden's Hole or Cache valley.

By observing the sketch, one place is found where the sources of Muddy are separated by a narrow divide from the sources of some stream, probably the Sandy, flowing into Bear river. An exploration along this line might prove the existence of a practicable valley route between Cache valley and Bear river.

I respectfully recommend that the above exploration be made, as likewise that of the cañon of Muddy and the continuation of this line as far as Bear Lake.

It was impossible, with the limited time at my disposal, to investigate completely all the points of interest connected with the objects of the exploration.

I have the honor, &c., &c.

JOHN NEWTON,
Captain of Engineers.

Journal and sketch of exploration made by Captain John Newton, Corps of Engineers, between Bear river and Ogden's Hole and Cache valley, between June 15 and 25, 1858.

June 15, 1858.—Started from camp on right bank of Bear river, under instructions to explore a ridge route from Yellow creek to Ogden's Hole; followed the Mormon route as far as the "Needles;" crossed over a steep divide into the valley of Yellow creek, and encamped on northwest side of its valley. The escort of 30 dragoons was commanded by Lieutenant Holladay. Crossed Bear river at ten minutes of two p. m.

June 16.—Sandy creek. Proceeded down the valley of Yellow creek as far as a side valley, with a gentle ascent, opening across a low divide into a rolling prairie country. This prairie communicates with Bear river, distant by estimate about four miles, and is practicable for a wagon road; grass good; one stream of water was passed; no fuel, except a scanty supply of sage brush, was seen until Sandy was closely approached. The route continued up this prairie, having on the right hand a steep ridge, which gradually declined towards the west into a level plateau, which is said by the guide to communicate without interruption with the valley of Bear river; followed

the plateau to Sandy, and descended to the stream by a steep bank, scarcely practicable on foot; to the right, following the dotted line, an easy descent for wagons through ravines can be found, or the ridge might be followed around the sources of Sandy, but it would then be necessary to descend to the level of the stream to find a camp; grass, fuel, and water in the bottom, and hills close at hand to be found here. The route was continued back along the ridge for the purpose of examination; descended into cañons at head of Pumbar's creek to encamp; heavy squalls of wind and rain.

June 17.—Followed up ravine of Pumbar's creek, until it emerged at A on the ridge, where an open valley with a gentle descent falls into that of Sandy, forming thus a low divide; this point of the ridge could be easily reached by following up the valley of Sandy from its mouth; continued route along ridge, which is closely confined by cañons from Pumbar's creek and from Sandy creek. From A the west side of the valley of Sandy appeared to be bounded by spurs or red clay, sharply defined to the eye; the ravines or cañons between these were frequently encountered along the ridge; grass failed on hills shortly after leaving the Sandy, and there was not a blade of it seen during the whole further journey on either fork of the ridge; snow was encountered in one or two places on the ridge; the ridge is not a plateau but is composed of narrow divides between cañons connected by hillocks or mounds; a road is practicable for wagons and required during this day no working, except in forming a *side* road around one hill, and a little cutting through two groves of aspen; a camp was found in one of the cañons of Pumbar.

June 18.—Route continued along ridge; passed the point where the ridge forks in a southerly direction, and bounds Ogden's Hole on the south; took the north fork; encountered frequent groves of aspen on the summit; much cutting required through these; no water anywhere on ridge this day, or at any other time; must descend into cañons for grass and water; slopes into these impracticable for wagons; passed during the day two reputed tributaries of Sandy creek, and at the last point a narrow divide separated the source of Sandy from that of Muddy emptying into Bear river in Cache valley; left the ridge here on account of thickets reported to exist further on, on its summit, and encountered the head waters of Ogden rising in a rolling prairie; good grass and water; followed down this stream running through a narrow ravine; the Indian trail followed, crossing the stream frequently, and encamped where the valley opened more than at its summit; good grass here on the hills.

June 19.—Saw before us the termination of the ridge followed during the days previous—a steep succession of hills ending in the valley or cañon of this tributary of Ogden's creek; continued the route down the creek, the valley contracting again into cañons, and emerged into Ogden's Hole; when at this point we found good grass; continued our course down Ogden's creek and *nooned*; grass good to the south, nearer the base of the hills; little or no grass on the bottom; fuel and timber along Ogden's creek. After nooning, proceeded north through Ogden's Hole, choosing the east side on the bench

lands to avoid miry places; little grass met with; soil pebbly and sterile and covered with weeds; frequent water courses and springs encountered, skirted with brush and small timber; turned off to the west to seek a camp on a tributary of Ogden's creek; grass for a small camp; plenty of fuel; rained during the whole afternoon, with frequent squalls and hail storms, and continued during the whole night.

June 20.—Made the passage of the divide into Cache valley; the spur ascending to the summit of the divide impracticable for wagons and covered with large boulders, we were compelled to turn sharp to the east to avoid the steep hills in this section. Descending into a level plateau, with fine grass growing upon it, encountered one of the heads of Muddy creek and followed down its course along an Indian trail to its mouth in Cache valley; the valley of this stream, in the upper part of its course, is a mere ravine, with high hills on either side; grass good on sides of hills, which are generally very steep; encamped on Muddy in Cache valley; pack mules very much chafed and sore from the difficult journey up to this point; through thickets and close grass, up and down steep hills, following no beaten path and occasionally only having the benefit of an Indian trail.

June 21.—Leaving the command and pack mules in camp, proceeded to make a reconnaissance of the mountains forming the eastern boundary of Cache valley, to ascertain the prospects of finding a practicable road over these to Bear Lake. Hills steep and forbidding, and no prospect of a road except through cañons; examined cañon of Blacksmith's Fork for four miles of its course; a great deal of work necessary here to make a wagon road. The stream must be crossed frequently and bridged on account of nearly perpendicular and rocky banks. The bottom of the cañon is extremely narrow and sidling somewhat; much rock seen along what would probably be the line of road. This cañon is reported by my guide to be very bad for two miles further up its course; after that, for nine miles, the sides of the cañon flare into comparatively gentle hills, and a road during this part of its course is reported to be easily practicable. Three other cañons lying between this and the cañon of Muddy were examined by the guide detached from the engineer officer, with an unfavorable report as to their practicability. Some Indians passing through camp in the afternoon, the guide reported that the cañon of Muddy, through which they had travelled, was the most eligible of the whole.

June 22.—Started from camp on the return route; followed up the valley of the same tributary of Muddy; then turned to the left into another valley. A route is practicable without much labor into Ogden's Hole, until the summit of the divide is attained. The main party descended into Ogden's Hole over a spur and ridge; found on trial to be too rocky and steep for a road. The guide descended by a ravine and reports the same practicable for a road. Continued route south through Ogden's Hole and encamped on Ogden's creek.

June 23.—Struck over to the termination of the south fork of the

ridge leading from Bear river to Ogden's Hole. Ascended to the top of it over a long, tedious, and rocky route. Four hillocks were noticed as requiring work in carrying a road around them, the direct ascent and descent of these being judged to be too steep. There was not enough soil on this ascent to form a road; stones, round and angular, constituted nearly the whole surface. The ridge or spur ascending might be avoided, and a ravine taken instead. Much rock would thus be avoided and a practicable road might be carried through to the summit. Not a blade of grass seen during the day on the ridge. After a continuous and fatiguing ascent of over six miles, struck upon the plateau on top of the ridge, which was pursued until we left the ridge beyond, seeing from that point the continuity of the ridge to its junction with the main ridge, at a distance in a northerly direction of six or seven miles. Encamped on head of Pumbar creek; grass on the hills; fuel abundant.

June 24.—Followed down the creek until at the bend the valley enlarged with fine bottom grass and hill grass; continued with a succession of good camps down the valley and crossed Weber river just above the cañon. Saw the wagon trail from Weber over to Bear river, which avoids the cañons on the usual route of emigration; this route is reported an easy and practicable one; continued the journey and overtook the army encamped on Bauchenin's Fork, (East Cañon creek,) after a journey of 222 miles, performed in nine and a half days.

Respectfully submitted.

JOHN NEWTON,
Captain of Engineers.

No. 90.—*Colonel Andrews to the Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS 1ST COLUMN UTAH FORCES,
Camp No. 49, July 11, 1858.

SIR: In accordance with instructions from the headquarters Utah forces, I have the honor to forward you a report of Lieutenant Bryan, Topographical Engineers, of the country passed over up to this point.

I am now about the middle of Bridger's Pass, but am at a stand still on account of the difficulties experienced by the advance party, company "A" engineers, and a detachment of the 6th infantry, in making a roadway for the passage of wagons.

As far as the head of Lodge Pole creek the road is good, with a sufficiency of grass and water. From the head of Lodge Pole creek to the North Platte the road is more broken, though still passable for wagons. The water and wood are good, but there is grass only at a few points on streams, and even at these points not sufficient for any large trains following each other. From the North Platte to this point, except in one place, at the head of Sage creek, there is little or no grass.

Although the road from the entrance of Bridger's Pass to this point has required a good deal of work, it is now a good wagon road, and so far no considerable difficulty has been experienced. This is decidedly the best season of the year for trains on this route, as the streams would be higher at an earlier season, and later, the little grass there is would be parched and not fit to be eaten by animals.

Our having found some of the streams too deep to ford has been owing more to the late spring than to any usual cause.

I would decidedly not recommend that any trains or commands be sent after us over this route. The Laramie route is preferable in every particular; the only advantage that can be claimed for this is that it is about sixty miles shorter, but the scarcity of grass does away with this advantage.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. ANDREWS,

*Lieutenant Colonel 6th Infantry,
Commanding 1st Column Utah Army.*

Col. S. COOPER,

Adjutant General, U. S. Army, Washington, D. C

CAMP AT BRIDGER'S PASS,

Utah Territory, July, 1858.

SIR: In compliance with instructions, dated Headquarters Utah Forces, St. Louis, Mo., April 27, 1858, I have the honor to make the following report on the route passed over by the column under my command, from Fort Leavenworth to this point. From Fort Leavenworth to the Laramie crossing of the South Platte the route has been so long travelled and is so generally known that I deem any particular notice of it in this place unnecessary. The command arrived at a point on the South Platte twelve miles above the Laramie crossing on the 9th of June. The river being very high and the usual fords impracticable, it was necessary to reconnoitre for another. One was found about two miles above the camp, at which the command crossed the line, camping the same day about one mile above the ford. With regard to the fords of the Platte, it may be observed that none of them are at all times reliable, all of them being more or less subject to change and deterioration by high water, and the consequent shifting of the bottom and accumulation of quicksand.

From the Platte the route lay over an alternation of level country and rolling sand hills for nine miles, to the crossing of the Lodge Pole creek. This crossing is about four miles above the crossing used by my party in 1856. Crossing the creek and marching nine miles up the right bank brought us to camp at a bend of the creek, furnishing tolerable grass, but no fuel other than buffalo chips and small dry willow twigs.

June 13.—March to-day still on the right bank of the creek; road excellent, and fine bottoms of grass, passed at intervals of three and

four miles; no fuel other than that noted yesterday. After a march of nineteen miles camp was made; grass and water excellent and abundant.

June 14.—To-day crossed to the left bank of the creek; at the end of seven and a half miles, continuing our march on this side, we camped, having made eighteen miles; country presents the same appearance as yesterday, except that the bluffs appear higher and more rugged; grass in abundance throughout the day's march. The road touches the creek at intervals of four and [five?] miles; fuel still wanting.

June 16.—About four miles from camp the bluffs on the north come close to the creek, making it necessary to cross and re-cross. Both of these crossings were effected without difficulty. About a mile further on, the creek sinks, and is not seen again for twelve miles. At eight and three-fourths miles from camp crossed the dry bed of the creek, and at nineteen and a half miles camped on the right bank, when the water was again running, and excellent grass to be had for the animals. The route of to-day has been over a fine, hard prairie. The bluffs passed this morning furnish abundance of pine wood for fuel.

June 17.—After an easy march of sixteen miles over a rolling country, made our camp. In the course of the day's march it was necessary to cross the creek several times, none of these crossings, however, caused any delay; grass abundant at intervals along the creek.

June 18.—Marched to-day $19\frac{1}{2}$ miles, passing, at the end of twelve miles, the Pine Bluffs. At the foot of these bluffs the road crosses Pole creek (for the sixth time during the day's march) near the head of Spring Branch. Owing to the wet season, some difficulty was experienced in crossing at this place. The Pine Bluffs furnish a supply of fuel, and it is necessary to obtain a supply of this article at this point to last to the foot of the Black Hills, a distance of sixty miles.

At the foot of these bluffs the bottom furnishes an abundant supply of excellent grass. Camped on the left bank, near a lone cottonwood tree. Grass good and abundant.

June 19.—Marched to-day $18\frac{1}{2}$ miles, passing, at the end of six miles, the road running from Laramie to New Mexico, and at this point making the nineteenth crossing of the creek. Here is also a good camping, the water being excellent and the grass abundant. The wetness of the season caused the road through the valley to be too soft for easy travelling; further to the south and over the hills is a good route. In dry seasons, however, the valley affords the better road and also more numerous opportunities for camping. Road to-day good, and water and grass abundant.

June 21.—At five miles from camp this morning found that the water in the creek again disappears, and does not re-appear for four or five miles. At the end of twenty miles camped, having good grass and water, but no fuel. The route to-day has been over smooth, hard ground, though the surface has been more uneven and rolling, though not so much so as to present any difficulty. The road, in the course

of the day's march, touches the creek several times, so as to afford watering places to animals, as well as opportunities for camping.

June 22.—Followed to-day a high ridge on the right bank of the creek, which gave a smooth track for wagons. At about nine miles from camp the road descends from the high ground into what is called the Cheyenne Pass, a depression along the eastern base of the Black Hills. About two and a half miles further it crosses the creek near the junction of the north and south forks. At this point there are wide grassy bottoms, and some drift wood, which serves well for fuel. At a point five miles further we camped on the creek, having excellent and abundant grass, and willows and drift wood for fuel. Pole creek has, up to this point, furnished an excellent route for wagons. There is however except at two points, a great deficiency of fuel. The two lines of bluffs above mentioned furnish a sufficiency at those points where they cross the road. For other camping places, fuel must be transported. Water and grass are at this season in greater abundance than was to be found in August, 1856, when the examination of this route was made. As the summer advances, the supply of both of these necessities diminishes, though it is believed that, even in the dryest seasons, water can always be obtained by digging in the bed of the creek. At this time (June, 1858,) an abundance of either grass or water may be had at almost any point.

June 23.—To-day the route led up the valley of the south fork for two miles, and then ascending a ridge kept the divide between the north and south forks, which furnished an excellent wagon way. At the end of thirteen miles crossed a small creek, and then ascending a ridge, we found ourselves at the summit of the Black Hills, the dividing line between the waters of Pole creek and the East Laramie river. Having made fifteen miles, camped at the head spring of Pole creek. Grass in the valleys on either side of the summit luxuriant, and pine for fuel abundant; the sides of the hills in this vicinity being covered with this kind of timber.

June 24.—Descending from the summit of the Black Hills, four miles of marching brought us into the Laramie plains. The descent is easy and gradual. Five miles further across the rolling prairie brought us to the bank of the East Laramie river. The soil of the plains is poor and sandy, and thinly covered with grass. Our fuel was brought from the Black Hills, not a tree or shrub of any kind growing on the river in this part of its course. Good grass is to be had on either side of the stream. On our arrival the river was very high, rendering fording impracticable, though in ordinary seasons the water is only about two feet in depth at this point. Two days were spent in effecting a passage over the stream.

June 27.—Our route to-day was across the plains to the west fork of the Laramie, a distance of fifteen miles. The crossing of the wide bottom and numerous branches of this stream was effected with some difficulty, owing to the high stage of the water. At this camp we had excellent grass in abundance, but no fuel, there being none nearer than that furnished by the hills in which the stream heads.

June 28.—To-day marched along the Cherokee road. This road is

over the return route of Captain Stansbury, and is very good, with occasional ascents and descents, and over a fine hard gravel. This soil is very destructive to the shoes of our animals, many having been lost during the day and the animals becoming tender-footed in consequence. With a large train a forge for shoeing animals is indispensable. Camped at the end of fourteen miles on Cooper's creek, a beautiful little stream running into a lake lying some ten miles off in the Laramie plains. Several large lakes are visible to our right. Grass and fuel in abundance at this camp.

June 29.—Continued to-day over the emigrant road for about thirteen miles to Aspen creek, an affluent of the east fork of Medicine Bow. Passed at seven and a half miles from camp Frappe's creek, also a branch of Medicine Bow, and at one and a half miles further the east fork of Medicine Bow, at this time a mountain torrent very difficult to cross with wagons. The passage of this stream occupied several hours, and was difficult and dangerous as the stream was over its banks, being swollen by melting snows of the mountains on the south. Camped on the west bank of Aspen creek, having good grass, wood, and water in abundance for the train. Good grass may be had on the Medicine Bow, about one and a half miles below the crossing. Fuel is abundant.

June 30.—Leaving camp a march of three miles brought us to the point where the road to the north of the Medicine Bow butte leaves the Cherokee road. Three miles further, over a barren country covered with sage plant, brought us to Birch creek, a small stream flowing through a deep cañon. After preparing the banks, which had been much washed by the recent high water, a passage was effected without difficulty. Travelling five miles further over the same desolate country we came to the west fork of Medicine-bow creek. This stream was also over its banks and flowing with a strong rapid current, presenting the same difficulty and danger as the east fork. The bottom is wide and covered with brush and cottonwood timber. There were three separate channels, two of which were very dangerous for teams and marching men from the depth and rapidity of the current. When not swollen by melting of the snow in the spring one of these channels is dry and the other two present no difficulties. Two miles further, making *thirteen miles* for the day's march, camped on a small affluent of west Medicine bow creek, finding wood, grass, and water at Flint creek.

July 1.—Marched three miles to Elk creek. Here the command halted to prepare an advance party for exploring the country west of Bridger's Pass and working the road. This camp is well adapted for a prolonged stay as there are large bottoms of fine grass on the numerous small creeks which issue from the Medicine Bow butte, which is only a mile or two to the south. This mountain is covered with fine timber, mostly aspens and pines. The banks of the creeks furnish an abundance of fuel.

July 3.—To-day a party consisting of company "A" engineers, a detachment of twenty-four men under Lieutenant Carlin, 6th infantry, and the topographical party, left the column to explore the country

and prepare the road in advance for the main body of the command. This party after a march of twelve miles camped on Pass creek, a fine stream affording good grass and water but no fuel. This last article must be transported with the trains. This creek is also high from the melting of snows. The grazing is not so good as usual, the grass appearing to be burnt and parched and the soil at some distance from the creek very dry. Immediately after leaving camp several small streams were crossed, whose banks were running and gave some trouble. At five miles from camp, crossing a ridge, we came to the head of a small stream called Rattlesnake creek, which flows into Pass creek. The road follows the valley of this creek, crossing it three times in the course of the day's march. The crossings of this creek as also that of Pass creek have been damaged by the recent floods.

July 4.—Marched to-day fourteen and a half miles to the North Platte river over a barren rolling country, mostly covered with sage plants. At the end of nine miles the two roads, by the north and south sides of the Medicine Bow butte, approach to within half a mile of each other. The descent into the valley of the Platte is easy but circuitous. On arriving at the river it was discovered to be so high as to preclude the possibility of fording. The boat left some five miles above by Captain Marcy was accordingly brought down by the engineers' company. and preparations made for ferrying. At this camp we found abundant grass and fuel.

July 5.—Spent in crossing the North Platte.

July 6.—Spent in crossing the North Platte.

July 7.—Left the river and marched nineteen miles, camping on the banks of a small stream issuing from the hills on the south. At three miles from the river crossed Sage creek, and at ten miles further crossed a second time. Four miles further crossed a branch of the creek. The country is miserably poor and desolate, being covered almost entirely by sage plant and much washed by water. The soil is clayey and covered by fragments of broken stone and gravel. The almost total absence of grass caused us to make for the mountains, where a small supply may be had in the valleys of the small streams running into Sage creek.

July 8.—A march of thirteen miles this morning brought us to our camp on Monday week, having passed the divide between Sage creek and Muddy (Bridger's Pass) at eight miles from camp. The road crosses several spurs, and in parts is circuitous, but presents no difficulty to the passage of wagons. The soil and vegetation are of the same character as that noted yesterday. The ascent to and descent from the summit are easy and accomplished without difficulty. Grass is very scarce being found only at the spots where the small streams issue from the hills. The sage plant furnishes fuel which answers well for camp purposes. Large trains passing through this country would be very much straitened for forage, unless grain were transported for their use at these points.

The road has thus far been easily passable at all points except at the crossings of streams. Detention and difficulty were experienced

at the crossings of the South Platte, the east and west forks of Laramie, the east and west forks of the Medicine Bow and the North Platte. These streams at this season of the year are always more or less difficult, as they are swollen by the melting of the snow in the mountains. A month earlier or a month later in the season, no difficulty would have been experienced in crossing any one of them, and generally at this season, the road has not been in as good order for travelling as it would be either before or after the melting of the snows. It may however, also be remarked that the same cause which deteriorated the road way gave grass and water in abundance, as it is probable that the supply of these two necessities later in the season, would not be so good or so large. The great want on the route is fuel, very little of any kind being obtainable from Fort Kearney to Cooper's creek. Buffalo chips are generally used as a substitute, and in seasons of low water some drift wood may be had from the bed of the South Platte. A supply for several days may be taken from Cottonwood Springs on the Platte, from the two lines of bluffs crossing Pole creek and from the Black Hills to last through the intermediate distances and across the two forks of the Laramie to Cooper's creek. From Cooper's creek westward there is no lack of fuel; wood may also be obtained on the river at O'Fallon's bluffs, one hundred and twenty-two miles above Kearney. Accompanying this report a list of distances from camp to camp is furnished.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS T. BRYAN,

Lieutenant Topographical Engineers.

Lieutenant Colonel GEORGE ANDREWS,

Sixth Infantry U. S. A., Commanding first column Utah Forces.

Distances from Fort Kearney to Bridger's Pass.

Date.	Miles per day.	Miles from Fort Kearney.	Camps and remarkable points.
1858.			
May 28	9.18	9.18	Camp No. 19, Nine Mile point.
29	12.50	21.68	Camp No. 20, near Platte river.
31	14.96	36.64	Camp No. 21, Plum creek.
June 1	17.33	53.97	Camp No. 22, Platte river.
2	17.50	71.47	Camp No. 23, Platte river.
3	12.28	83.75	Dry bed within bushes, and water in holes.
3	1.75	85.50	Cotton-wood springs.
3	3.27	88.77	Camp 24, Platte river.
4	3.00	91.77	Dry bed with bushes.
4	15.00	106.77	Camp 25, Platte river.
5	15.50	122.27	O'Fallon's bluffs.
5	4.00	126.27	Camp 26, south fork of Platte river.
7	16.50	142.77	Camp 27, south fork of Platte river.
8	16.30	159.07	Lone tree on north side of river.
8	3.07	162.14	Camp 28, on South Platte river.
9	3.18	165.32	Lone tree on north side of river.
9	3.00	168.32	Laramie crossing of South Platte.
9	11.02	179.34	Camp 29, on South Platte river.
11	2.00	181.34	To ford of South Platte.
11	1.00	182.34	To camp 30, on north side of river.
12	9.00	191.34	To 1st crossing Lodge Pole creek.
12	9.18	200.52	Camp 31, on Lodge Pole creek.
13	19.37	219.89	Camp 32, on Lodge Pole creek.
14	10.14	230.03	2d crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
14	8.33	238.39	Camp 33, on Lodge Pole creek.
16	6.68	245.07	3d crossing of creek under Rocky Pine bluffs.
16	1.00	246.07	4th crossing of creek under Rocky Pine bluffs.
16	2.00	248.07	Stream sinks in channel of Lodge Pole creek.
16	3.00	251.07	5th crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
16	5.62	256.69	Heavy sand bed on right bank, and last bluffs on left.
16	1.20	257.89	Camp 34, on Lodge Pole creek.
17	10.77	268.65	Dry branch.
17	1.66	270.31	6th crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
17	4.38	274.69	Camp 35, on Lodge Pole creek.
18	2.00	276.69	7th crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
18	0.33	277.02	8th crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
18	1.15	278.17	9th crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
18	0.33	278.50	10th crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
18	0.85	279.35	11th crossing at Rocky bluff on right bank.
18	2.75	282.10	12th crossing at Rocky bluff on right bank.
18	3.50	285.60	13th crossing at Rocky bluff on right bank.
18	3.75	289.35	14th crossing at a spring branch at foot of Pine bluffs.
18	6.84	296.19	Camp 36 near Lone tree, on left bank.
19	2.25	298.44	15th crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
19	1.25	299.69	16th crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
19	0.50	300.19	17th crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
19	1.43	301.62	18th crossing of Lodge Pole creek.
19	0.89	302.51	19th, New Mexico and Laramie road.
19	10.18	312.69	Camp 37, on Lodge Pole creek.
21	1.72	314.41	Dry branch.
21	6.00	320.41	Do.
21	1.00	321.41	Do.
21	11.28	332.69	Camp 38, on Lodge Pole creek.
22	11.68	344.37	Junction of north and south forks of creek, 20th crossing.

Distances from Fort Kearney to Bridger's Pass—Continued.

Date.	Miles per day.	Miles from Fort Kearney.	Camps and remarkable points.
1858.			
June 22	5.32	349.69	Camp 39, on Lodge Pole creek, 21st crossing.
23	2.00	351.69	Road enters the Black hills.
23	13.10	364.59	Camp 40, summit of the Black hills.
24	4.00	368.59	Western base of black hills.
24	6.25	374.84	Camp 41, on East Laramie river.
27	15.00	389.84	Camp 42, on West fork of Laramie.
28	14.00	403.84	Camp 43, on Cooper's creek.
29	-----	-----	Several small streams running only in spring.
29	7.50	411.34	Frappe's creek.
29	1.50	412.84	East fork of Medicine Bow creek.
29	2.50	415.34	Small creek.
29	0.85	416.19	Camp No. 44, on Aspen creek.
30	2.75	418.94	Fork of roads north and south of Medicine Bow butte.
30	3.00	421.94	Birch creek.
30	5.33	427.27	West fork of Medicine Bow creek.
30	2.50	429.77	Camp 45, on Flint creek.
July 1	4.00	433.77	Camp 46, on branches of Elk creek.
3	6.02	439.79	Rattlesnake creek, along the valley.
3	6.90	446.69	Camp 47, on Pass creek.
4	9.00	455.69	Road nearly joins South road on a hill.
4	5.50	461.19	Camp 48, on North Platte river.
7	3.20	463.39	1st crossing of Sage creek.
7	10.32	473.71	2d crossing of Sage creek.
7	3.95	477.66	Branch of Sage creek.
7	2.50	480.16	Camp 49, on small stream.
8	2.16	482.32	Branch of Sage creek.
8	2.14	484.46	Do.
8	0.85	485.31	Do.
8	3.19	488.50	Summit of Pass, dividing ridge of Rocky mountains.
8	5.10	493.60	Camp 50, on Muddy creek.

No. 91.—*Colonel Andrews to the Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST COLUMN UTAH ARMY,
Camp near Fort Bridger, U. T., August 5, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report my arrival here with my command. I enclose the reports of the engineer officer of my command. After a careful consideration of all the circumstances connected with the route through "Bridger's Pass," I am clearly of opinion it is not advisable that it should be used for large government trains, or number of emigrants en route to Oregon, Utah, or California. Although I passed over the route at what I believe the most favorable season, I found the grass and water exceedingly scarce. From the North fork of the Platte to Green river, both grass and water was with great difficulty found sufficient to subsist the command and the animals of the train, and from where I struck Muddy creek to the mouth of Bitter, the water cannot be depended on later in the season, as the streams become dry in places. I found Bitter creek dry for about forty miles; and water was found only in holes and in small quantities and is not only unpalatable, but was refused in some cases by the animals of the train.

The water in the streams depends more upon the amount of snow that falls than upon rain, and of course the amount varies in different seasons.

As relates to Indians on the route, I met a few lodges of Cheyennes at the South Platte, who appeared to be very much humbled and in great distress for food and clothing. This distress was said to be owing to the severe chastisement they received from Colonel Sumner last summer, and the scarcity of buffalo for food.

At the North Platte the principal chief of the Anapapoes and about forty lodges of his people came several times to my camp, begging as usual for food.

The route from Medicine Bow butte, through Bridger's Pass, is said by my guide, to be frequently visited by the Utahs, hunting, trading, &c.

As the route through Bridger's Pass is but some sixty miles shorter than the old route by Fort Laramie, I see nothing to be gained by this route.

I may here mention a fact to show that the old route must be better: that an ox train that my command separated from at the South Platte, arrived at Camp Scott two weeks before my command reached Green river, one hundred and fifty miles in advance of me.

From the character of the expedition, the most laborious duties naturally fell on the regimental quartermaster (Lieutenant Sawtelle, 6th infantry.) This officer, although young and somewhat inexperienced, by his energy, industry, and perseverance, overcame every obstacle opposed to the progress of the column.

The want of experienced teamsters and well broken mules was among the least of the difficulties the quartermaster had to contend with and obviate.

The company of sappers and miners under Lieutenants Duane and Alexander of the engineers, who preceded the column from "Elk creek," had a most onerous and difficult task in opening and rendering the road practicable for the advance of the command. This was most satisfactorily executed by them.

The health of my command was generally good. Many cases of mountain fever occurred among the officers and men, but under the careful and skilful treatment of the assistant surgeon, D. Milhau, they have all, or nearly all, recovered. One private of company A, engineers, died of apoplexy.

Lieutenant Bryan, topographical engineers, located the road in advance of the engineers, and I believe to the best advantage the nature of the country admitted of its being done.

Among the many employés on this expedition, I would most respectfully recommend to the kind and favorable consideration of the general commanding, Mr. Jones, of Ohio, who had charge of the beef cattle, and who by his admirable management retained them in excellent order and without the loss of an animal.

It gives me great pleasure to express my approbation of the excellent conduct of the non-commissioned officers and men of my command. The good conduct of the recruits who joined my regiment a few days before I left (on the 7th of May) Fort Leavenworth, was, in general, admirable. I attribute the cheerful and good conduct of the men of the command to the excellent example of their officers as displayed on the march.

In conclusion, I mention that my guides say that the route through Bridger's Pass may be used to advantage in the winter by mails or small parties, as the snow is not deep except where it drifts.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. ANDREWS,

Lieutenant Colonel 6th Infantry, Commanding Regiment.

Colonel S. COOPER,

Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

CAMP 58, ON BITTER CREEK,
27 Miles below the Haystack, July 19, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that the advance party detached from your command arrived at this point to-day, and that the road from Bridger's Pass to this point is now open and can be travelled without any serious obstruction.

This camp is about twenty-five miles above the crossing of Bitter creek, where the road enters what is called Evans' trail. From the crossing of Bitter creek, I am informed that there is a well beaten road all the way into Fort Bridger, so that your command need not experience any detention on the way, as it is expected that the gap of twenty-five miles now existing, will be completed within the next three days.

The following is an itinerary of the march from the first camp on Muddy creek, (near Bridger's Pass,) to this point:

July 11.—Left camp 51, and marched to camp on Muddy creek, five and a quarter miles. Country rough from gullies and sage brushes. Found some grass under the sand peaks near which the camp was pitched. Sage for fuel, besides willows from the bank of the creek.

July 12.—Remained in camp, the working parties being busy on the road in front.

July 13.—Left camp, and after travelling about one mile, crossed the first bridge. Here and a little beyond, some grass was found in the valley of the creek and on the slopes, probably enough for one night's camp. About one mile further, crossed the creek on a good ford. Here also grass is to be found and willows on the creek, and sage for fuel; one mile and a quarter further, near a point of rocks, is also another ford (the fourth) over a pebbly bottom. Near this point there is bunch grass mingled with the sage. A short distance beyond the fourth ford is the second bridge where we made the 52d camp. Distance to-day about four and a half miles. Near this camp grass is very scarce, there being a little to be found in the bottom of the creek under the bluff.

July 14.—Marched this morning about five miles, a nearly westerly direction, down the valley of the creek. Soil is light and clayey, and is covered in places with fragments of stone. Our progress was slow, as there were a number of small ravines to be filled up and some sage to be removed. At the end of five and a half miles, came to a rocky point where the road turns to the right, and in a short time crossed two deep ravines. At two miles from the rocky point the road turns short to the left, and reaches camp 53 in about three-quarters of a mile.

Here we found quite a large bottom of fine grass, enough to last the whole command several days. There is also a little grass at the rocky point first passed to-day, some mingled with the sage before reaching that point, and some at the mouths of the ravines running into the creek, and on the sloughs near the camp.

Beyond this camp there is no grass of any consequence on the creek, so far as we follow it. It will, therefore, be necessary to camp at this point. Sage is the only fuel to be had. Distance to-day $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

July 15, 1858.—Following down the creek this morning for two miles, we came to where the valley opens, and the road leaves it, passing near the throat of the valley; a remarkable clay mound on the left and two others on the right. Continuing on our course about one and a half miles further brought us abreast of two sandstone buttes covered with cedars, on our right. The course to-day was generally west south west, and lay mostly over an undulating country composed of clay and sand, alternately, and remarkably destitute of vegetation suitable for forage.

At the end of 17 miles the road ran between two bluffs of red and green clay, called by Captain Stansbury the Red Gate. About two and a half miles further brought us to camp on a spring running into the right bank of Bridger's Fork. This spring is of very good water,

being but slightly impregnated with soda. The water of the creek is not drinkable. The creek is dry near the spring, but is running a few hundred yards above.

Rushes were to be had near the spring for our animals, and some bunch grass, and grass in the bottom about a quarter of a mile above camp. Made to-day $19\frac{1}{2}$ miles, to camp 54. On approaching Bridger's Fork the soil is very light, like ashes, the horses and mules sinking above their fetlocks in it.

July 16.—Marched this day six and a half miles to the head of a branch of Bridger's Fork, near the Haystack, passing over a soil of sand and clay, alternately. About four miles from camp of this morning passed a small spring of good water coming from the hills on our right; this we cleared out and left running. About two and a half miles from this spring, after bending to the left to avoid the sand hills, we reached camp. White clay bluffs sparsely covered with cedars lie to the south of us, while to the north and front are the gullies and ravines leading down to the spring at the head of Bridger's Fork. The water of this spring oozes through the sand, and is slightly impregnated with soda. Bunch grass is scattered over the country near camp sufficient for our animals, and sage is to be had for fuel.

July 17.—Leaving camp this morning, we came in a few miles across the divide, and into the valley of Bitter creek. The country is smooth and easy to travel over, there being only some few ravines, which are not of much importance.

About seven miles from camp, in a rocky gorge, and on the right of the road, there is a fine spring of cold water coming from the bluffs; this was cleaned out and covered over with rock. The bunch grass near this point is very good. About half a mile beyond the spring is also a wide bottom covered thinly with grass. About five miles further, over a rolling country, brought us to the crossing of Bitter creek, where it is running. The water is very slightly brackish, the crossing soft and miry. About a mile and a half further brought us to camp on the high ground to the south of the creek, and over two excellent springs of clear cold water; bunch grass on the hills and rushes in the valley furnished our forage; fuel of the usual kind. Distance $13\frac{1}{2}$ miles, to camp 56.

July 18.—It being impracticable to proceed by way of the high ground, it became necessary to work the road under the bluff and over the springs. This being done, we retraced our steps to the valley of the creek, and followed the road under the bluffs for two and a half miles to the south fork, a deep narrow stream with vertical clay banks. Here we encamped, finding excellent and abundant grass, and good water, and sage for fuel. Distance travelled to-day and yesterday from the Haystack 10 miles, to the south fork of Bitter creek; made camp 57. Just before reaching this camp the road passes between two lines of bluffs, composed of red, white, green, and yellow clay, backed by sandstone ridges.

July 19.—Travelled this morning about seven miles down the left bank of the creek, crossing several ravines and spurs from the hills on the south, to a point opposite where the east fork comes in on the

right bank, and an open valley on the left. Here we leave the creek, and travelling four miles over a ridge composed of sand and clay, we came to camp 58, on the creek again, opposite a conspicuous landmark of clay covered with cedars, called the "Cedar Bluffs of Bitter Creek." Here we found good water, excellent and abundant grass, mingled with the sage and greasewood, and these latter for fuel. Soil near the camp and the camp of this morning of hard baked clay.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS T. BRYAN,

Lieutenant Topographical Engineers.

Colonel GEORGE ANDREWS,

Commanding 1st Column Utah Forces.

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST COLUMN UTAH FORCES,
Camp near Fort Bridger, U. T., August 5, 1858.

A true copy:

JAS. L. CORLEY,

First Lieutenant 6th Infantry, Adjutant.

CAMP ON BITTER CREEK,
Fifteen miles from Green River, July 22, 1858.

COLONEL: Enclosed I have the honor to furnish an itinerary of the march of the advance party for the 20th, 21st, and 22d of July.

July 20.—Marched to-day 15 miles, following the left bank of the creek over a desolate, barren country; vegetation composed mostly of sage and greasewood; road generally good. Camped at half past one about one mile above the mouth of the northeast branch; grass near the camp very thin and scarce. About three-quarters of a mile below the camp two sulphur springs issue from the bluffs on the right bank, and in their immediate vicinity there is some good grass and rushes; also, in the valley of the northeast fork, and near its mouth, there are other sulphur springs, and quite a body of grass. The camp should be about a mile below our camp, in order to profit by the grass near the springs and at the mouth of northeast fork. About four miles from camp of this morning, a coal bank was found in the bluff immediately on the creek, and on the left bank.

July 21.—Marched to-day only nine miles, the country being very rough and required a great deal of work. At about one mile from camp passed the mouth of the northeast branch and the sulphur springs. The northeast branch has water standing in holes; the bluffs on its right bank are reddish, those on the left bank whitish; by this difference of color the mouth may be distinguished at a distance. The mouth of this branch offers the last good camp until Green river is reached. At two miles from camp passed a chalybeate spring issuing from the bluffs below the road, and on the left bank; near this point there is some grass in the creek bottom sufficient for a small party. Camped at half past two about a quarter of a mile above the crossing; grass very poor and scanty.

July 22.—Crossed at one-quarter of a mile from camp Bitter creek, after preparing the banks and paving the ford with stone from the hills. At the crossing struck into the Evans road, which proved to be very good, and mostly over very level country. A short distance below the crossing the creek runs dry, water being found only in holes. At $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles below camp found some good grass growing among sage and greasewood in the creek bottom. The water in these holes proving brackish and muddy, the train was watered and then proceeded seven miles further, to camp at some sulphur springs on the right of the road and in a cañon. The water of the springs is strongly impregnated with sulphur; the grass about them is very thin and scanty; but half a mile below we found sufficient to picket the animals upon; sage served for our fuel.

Probably it would be best for the command to camp at the north-east branch, and then, filling up the water kegs, to come on to the $12\frac{1}{2}$ mile point, below the crossing, and camp at this point. Fuel may be found, (of sage,) and grass and water for the animals. The point where we are now encamped, being seven miles further, would be too great a distance for one day's march. The country for the last three days has been remarkably desolate and destitute of grass.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

FRANCIS T. BRYAN,

Lieutenant Topographical Engineers.

Lieutenant Colonel GEORGE ANDREWS,

Commanding 1st Column Utah Forces, en route for Utah.

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST COLUMN UTAH FORCES,
Camp near Fort Bridger, U. T., August 5, 1858.

A true copy:

JAS. L. CORLEY,

First Lieutenant 6th Infantry, Adjutant.

No. 92.—*Captain Marcy to the Secretary of War.*

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 25, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to state for your information that on the 24th November, 1857, I received an order from Colonel A. S. Johnston commanding the army of Utah, to proceed by the most direct route to New Mexico for the purpose of procuring animals to replace those that have perished upon the march from the Missouri river to Camp Scott.

An official statement from the senior quartermaster with the army, showed that one-half the horses of the batteries and two-thirds of those of the dragoons and a very large percentage of the mules had died; and there was good reason to believe, from the famished con-

dition of the remaining animals that the greater part of these might not survive a severe winter in this inclement locality.

I left Camp Scott on the 27th November with an escort of forty enlisted men of the 5th and 10th regiments of infantry, and twenty-two citizens to act as guides, herders, and packers. Thirty days rations for the party, with other articles necessary for such a trip, were packed upon sixty-five mules.

Our route which crosses the Uhinty and Rocky mountains chains in a very direct course for New Mexico, had been travelled by trappers and hunters in the summer season, but I cannot learn that it had ever before been traversed in the winter. The Indians, and indeed the veteran mountaineer Bridger, pronounced the transit impracticable at that season.

We however, proceeded on without difficulty over the Uhinty mountains and across Green to Grand river, where we struck Gunnison's wagon trail from New Mexico, which we followed until we reached the base of the Rocky mountains on the "Un-com-padre" river; here the snow covered it so deep that we could no longer follow it, and we struck into the mountains, ascending along the south side of "Eagle Tail" river, which is the main branch of the "Un-com-padre."

Immediately after entering the mountains the snow became so deep that it was impossible for our animals, in their jaded condition, to make any progress through it. I therefore placed forty men in advance of the mules to break a track for them. This course which was pursued from day to day, enabled us slowly to force our way up the western slope of the mountains, but the snow rapidly increased in depth as we advanced, when as we approached the summit of the mountains it lay about five feet deep upon the level, and here the leading men were obliged to crawl upon their hands and knees to prevent sinking to their necks.

Our progress was necessarily very slow, and although we labored most faithfully every day from daylight till dark, yet we advanced only nineteen miles in five days. Our animals finding no forage except the pine leaves, became weaker continually. Many of them had died and those remaining were reduced to a state bordering on starvation. The majority of the men had worn out their shoes before one-half the journey was performed, and owing to their exposed condition several had their feet badly frozen, rendering it exceedingly painful for them to march or to sleep.

On the 3d January the rations were all consumed and we were reduced to the necessity of subsisting upon such of our animals as became exhausted and could perform no further service.

This meagre and unwholesome diet with men who were undergoing the most intensely severe labor that the human system is capable of sustaining, soon told upon them, and after a few days they became weak and emaciated, while the amount of labor they could perform sensibly diminished. Yet this little band of excellent soldiers, all of whom had volunteered for this severe service, performed the hard task allotted them cheerfully and with alacrity, and no one of them during the entire march, ever uttered a murmur or manifested the

slightest spirit of insubordination; and I am firmly convinced that nothing but the untiring energy and devotedness to duty evinced by these men, enabled me to overcome the formidable array of obstacles presented by the deep snows covering those lofty sierras.

We were twelve days living exclusively upon horses and mules without salt or any other article of subsistence, yet the men appeared to suffer more for the want of tobacco than food.

One man sergeant, Wm. Morton of the 10th infantry, a most excellent soldier, died, and several others became very sick from privations, exposure, and overwork.

On the 17th of January we reached Fort Massachusetts, where we were kindly received by the commanding officer, Captain Bowman of the 3d infantry, who provided the men with clothing and everything else necessary to make them comfortable.

The estimated distance from Camp Scott to Fort Massachusetts over the route we passed is 623 miles.

It generally traverses a rugged and mountainous region wholly impassable for wagons, but can be travelled with pack animals in summer and there would be an abundance of grass, water, and wood.

I was fifty-one days in making the march, and of sixty-five mules with which I started forty-seven died upon the mountains.

I succeeded in purchasing all the animals I desired in New Mexico, with the exception of American horses, which could not be obtained.

My *return route* was from Fort Union over the Raton mountains; thence skirting the eastern base of the Rocky mountains, across the headwaters of the Arkansas and South Platte rivers, and intersecting Bryan's trail to Bridger's Pass, at the Laramie river; thence along this trail about thirty miles to Sage creek, a branch of the North Platte, where we left Bryan's trail and passed entirely to the north of the spurs of mountains in the vicinity of Bridger's Pass, and struck Bitter creek fifty-four miles above its mouth. This we followed to its confluence with Green river, and arrived at Camp Scott on the 10th of June.

In consequence of a detention of thirty-five days, awaiting reinforcements, on the Arkansas river, we were delayed that length of time in our arrival at Camp Scott. Had we not been ordered to halt, we should probably have made the march in fifty-two days, and reached General Johnston's camp about the 5th of May.

The odometer measurement of the road from Fort Union to Camp Scott is seven hundred and forty-one miles.

The road, with the exception of about seventy miles between Sage and Bitter creeks, traverses a country abounding in grass, water, and wood of the very best quality. Upon the section of seventy miles alluded to, there are no streams of running water, but several ponds are found there which will always, except in a very dry season, furnish sufficient water for the traveller's purposes.

Numerous small streams flow into the Arkansas and South Platte which issue from the eastern slopes of the Rocky mountains. The country bordering these streams is rich and fertile, and is better

adapted to farming than any section I have seen west of the Missouri frontier.

The road I travelled passes from the waters of the Atlantic to those of the Pacific without going over a mountain. The ascent to the summit level of the Rocky mountain chain is here so very gentle as to be almost imperceptible, and for sixty miles upon the plateau forming the dividing ridge, the eye cannot distinguish which course the water takes.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. B. MARCY,
Captain 5th Infantry.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.

III.

DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA.

- No. 1.—Colonel Loomis to Army Headquarters, December 2, 1857, enclosing statement of volunteers in service, and comparative cost of mounted volunteers, guides, boatmen, &c.
- No. 2.—Same to same, December 6, 1857.
- No. 3.—Same to same, December 13, 1857, enclosing reports of Colonel Rogers and Captain Stephens, December 2 and 14, 1857.
- No. 4.—Same to same, January 30, 1858, enclosing letter to Captain Brannan, January 29.
- No. 5.—Same to same, March 6, 1858, enclosing letters to Governor Perry of 3d and 20th January and 13th February, and list of volunteers.
- No. 6.—Same to same, March 22, 1858.
- No. 7.—Same to the Adjutant General, May 8, 1858, enclosing letter from Colonel Rector to Colonel Loomis, May 6, and Colonel Loomis to Colonel Rector, May 7. General Orders No. 4 of May 8, 1858, and proclamation declaring the Florida war closed.
- No. 8.—Same to Army Headquarters, May 12, 1858.
- No. 9.—Same to same, July 8, 1858, enclosing letter from Captain McNeill, July 3, 1858.

No. 1.—*Colonel Loomis to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, December 2, 1857.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a statement of the number of volunteer companies in the service on duty in this depart-

ment, showing the duty required of them, and the date of the expiration of their terms of service respectively.

In addition to this volunteer force one of the independent companies of volunteers called for has not yet been raised, although I have been informed that an effort is being made to raise the company.

It will be seen that between the 25th of December and the 27th of March, the entire volunteer force in Florida will be mustered out of service. As I do not feel authorized to call for troops to replace them the matter is respectfully referred, and I would suggest that if this volunteer force is to be replaced an early call be made on the governor of this State for that purpose.

This volunteer force goes out of service at the best season of the year for operations in this country, and if practicable ought to be replaced immediately.

Having been regularly advised by my orders transmitted at their dates, of the disposition of troops in the department, I do not consider it necessary to repeat here, suffice it to say that with the present disposition of the force in the department, and a prompt execution of my orders, I have a right to expect some important results in a few weeks.

If it is intended to continue operations in this department with a volunteer force, I would respectfully suggest that instead of a mounted regiment of volunteers I may be authorized to raise five companies of guides, trailers, boatmen, &c., this description of force besides being much more efficient can be maintained even at \$45 a man per month at a much less cost to the government than a mounted volunteer force on the half ration of forage; I am satisfied that with seven independent companies of mounted volunteers and five companies of sixty men each, guides, trailers, boatmen, &c., the latter employed at from \$30 to \$40 per month, operations in this department might be carried on more successfully, and relieve the treasury of nearly one-half the cost of the present force. The comparative cost of a company of sixty men—fifty-nine—at \$45 per month per man, and one captain at \$3 per day, \$90 per month, and a company of mounted volunteers, is set forth in the accompanying estimate.

These companies of sixty men each could be obtained with great facility, and some of the best men in the country would probably engage in the work. The efficiency of such a partisan force unencumbered is unquestionable, and the service to be required of it so arduous that men must receive increased pay to engage in it voluntarily.

From reports made to me I have strong reason to believe that an illicit trade is kept up between the inhabitants of the Bahama Islands and the Seminoles in Florida. It is said that small craft, in some instances commanded by negroes from the Bahama Islands, communicate and trade with them, and that they have a regular system of signs. I shall endeavor to ascertain the facts, and would respectfully suggest the use of a small revenue cutter to watch the eastern coast of Florida.

It is a fixed fact that the Seminoles in Florida trade and procure supplies, and all measures to detect citizens of the State having failed tends to confirm my belief in the above report. The attention of the proper department is respectfully invited to this subject, as it is hardly in the power of the department commander to detect, much less prevent it.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel 5th Infantry, Commanding Department.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army, N. Y.

Statement of the different stations, date of mustering in, and when to be mustered out of service, of the different volunteer companies in the service of the United States in the department of Florida.

1. INDEPENDENT COMPANIES.—NUMBER OF COMPANIES, 10.

No.	Names of captains.	Stations.	Depot of supply.	Date of mustering in.	When to be mustered out.
1	John McNeil.....	Scouting east of Kissimmee river, and north and south bank of Lake Okeechobee.....	Fort Lloyd.....	June 26, 1857	Dec. 25, 1857.
2	W. H. Kendrick	Scouting south and west end of Lake Istokpoga.....	Fort Josephine.....	June 27, 1857	Dec. 26, 1857.
3	J. F. P. Johnston.....	Scouting between Istokpoga and northwest of Okeechobee.....	South end of Lake Istokpoga.....	June 29, 1857	Dec. 28, 1857.
4	E. T. Kendrick.....	Scouting south, to the head waters of St. John's.....	Lake Harney.....	July 13, 1857	Jan. 12, 1858.
5	R. Mickler.....	North and south Halpatiokee swamps.....	Forks of St Lucie river.....	Aug. 3, 1857	Feb. 2, 1858.
6	S. L. Sparkman.....	Scouting the banks of Kissimmee river, north and south.....	Fort Kissimmee.....	Aug. 17, 1857	Feb. 16, 1858.
7	J. J. Carter.....	Scouting between Pease creek and the head waters of Kissimmee river.....	Fort Clinch.....	Aug. 19, 1857	Feb. 18, 1858.
8	L. G. Lesly.....	Scouting Pease creek to its mouth, and furnishing a guard at Manatee and Chokonikla, and escorting trains.....	Fort Meade.....	Aug. 24, 1857	Feb. 23, 1858.
9	O. Hart.....	Scouting south, to the head waters of New river.....	Fort Jupiter.....	Aug. 25, 1857	Feb. 24, 1858.
10	R. Bullock.....	Scouting west bank of Lake Okeechobee.....	Fort Center.....	Sept. 28, 1857	March 27, 1858.

STATEMENT—Continued.

2. REGIMENT OF FLORIDA MOUNTED VOLUNTEERS.—NUMBER OF COMPANIES, 10.

No.	Names of captains.	Stations.	Depot of supply.	Date of muster- ing in.	When to be mus- tered out.
1	Field and staff.....			Aug. 10, 1857	Feb. 9, 1858.
2	N. A. McLeod.....			July 20, 1857	Jan. 19, 1858.
3	N. P. Willard.....	Fort Deynaud.....		July 20, 1857	Jan. 19, 1858.
4	L. A. Hardee.....			July 20, 1857	Jan. 19, 1858.
5	H. Harrington.....			July 23, 1857	Jan. 22, 1858.
6	W. H. Cone.....			July 23, 1857	Jan. 22, 1858.
7	S. Whitehead.....			July 27, 1857	Jan. 26, 1858.
8	W. Stephens.....			July 27, 1857	Jan. 26, 1858.
9	A. A. Stewart.....			July 27, 1857	Jan. 26, 1858.
10	J. Parkhill.....	Fort Myers.....		July 29, 1857	Jan. 28, 1858.
	J. W. Brady.....			Aug. 9, 1857	Feb. 8, 1858.

One hundred men on the southwest coast, penetrating to the Big Cypress; the remainder of the regiment, with the exception of the companies at Forts Myers and Deynaud, operating in the Big Cypress swamp.

The remainder of the regiment supplied from the depot at temporary depot No. 1, and the depot at Pavilion Key.

G. LOOMIS,
Colonel 5th Infantry, commanding depot.

FRANCIS A. PAGE, Assistant Adjutant General.

Comparative statement of the cost of main'aining a company of mounted volunteers and a company of guides, boatmen, &c., in the department of Florida.

ORGANIZATION OF BOAT COMPANY.

Rank.	Pay and allowances.	Total cost per month.	Remarks.
1 commander.....	\$3 50 per day and 1 ration.....	\$97 03	
59 privates.....	45 00 per month, and 1 ration per day	2, 892 77	
	Total cost per month.....	2, 989 80	

ORGANIZATION OF A VOLUNTEER COMPANY.

1 captain.....	\$170 80.....	\$170 80	In the department of Florida there are now (including 20 wagons on the way from New Orleans) 134 wagons in service, costing per month as follows: Monthly consumption of oats, 4,517 bushels, at 80 cts., \$3, 613 60 Subsistence of 134 teamsters, at 13 cents..... 540 02 151 tons of hay for train, at \$46..... 6, 946 00 <u>11, 099 62</u>
1 1st lieutenant.....	150 80.....	150 80	
1 2d lieutenant.....	145 80.....	145 80	
1 1st sergeant.....	36 12.....	36 12	
3 duty sergeants.....	33 12 each.....	99 36	
4 corporals.....	29 11 each.....	116 44	
2 musicians.....	28 16 each.....	56 32	
75 privates.....	27 06 each.....	2, 029 50	
		<u>2, 805 14</u>	
		172 04	
	Half forage at 6½ cents.....	409 20	Operating with 7 companies of mounted volunteers but one-fourth of the number of wagons (33) would be required, diminishing the expenses now chargeable to volunteers (mounted) \$8, 299 72 per month, or \$108, 611 28 per annum.
	Cost of half forage issued.....	354 64	
	Cost at Tampa of subsistence issued..	<u>3, 741 02</u>	
		2, 989 80	
	Balance in favor of boat company..	751 22	

J. McKINSTRY, Brevet Major, Assistant Quartermaster.

CHIEF QUARTERMASTER'S OFFICE, Department of Florida, Dec. 1, 1857.

No. 2.—*Colonel Loomis to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, December 6, 1857.

SIR: I have the honor to report that Captain Cone's company of the regiment of mounted volunteers, with detachments amounting to 115 men, on the 21st of November, scouting on the west of the Oko-loa-coochee, and south of Fort Doane, struck an Indian trail, which he followed with great tact and perseverance. He was rewarded by surprising one of the secret hiding places of the Indians in the Big Cypress, and captured an aged warrior, five squaws, and thirteen children, the eldest child about seven years old, and killed one warrior and a boy twelve years old.

He found several towns, in all numbering forty houses; found stored a considerable amount of corn, rice, and pumpkins, all of which were destroyed. A great many trinkets were found, among them two daguerreotypes, one of Billy's group, which was taken in Washington. There is convincing proof that the hiding place of Billy Bowlegs has been found at last, and that he has received a severe blow in the capture of his women and children. The town where the Indians were captured was newly built, and the depots of supplies were found in three different towns. Captain Cone says he saw at least twenty acres of cultivated ground in corn, rice, peas and pumpkins. The Indians followed on his trail to the camp at depot No. 1, and attempted to ambuscade him without effect. On the 26th of November, at depot No. 1, some horses were turned out to graze, and when about a mile and a half from the camp the Indians attacked them, killing thirty-six horses belonging to Captain Stevens' company regiment of mounted volunteers.

On the 28th of November a detachment from Colonel Rogers' command on the southwest coast, commanded by Captain Parkhill, of the regiment of mounted volunteers, having left their boats, and in pursuit of an Indian trail on foot, came upon a town which the Indians had just left; he unfortunately set fire to the town before he pursued the trail. In a short distance from the town, and on the trail, he fell in with a body of Indians, in all probability in ambuscade, and at the first fire I regret to state that Captain Parkhill was killed and five of his men wounded.

This party then returned to their camp, the Indians having retreated at the first fire. It is not known whether any warriors were killed by Parkhill's command; no official report of this last action has yet been received, or a list of the wounded.

You will perceive by my special order of this date that the most active pursuit will be kept up in the Big Cypress, with co-operation from the southwest coast, and I design increasing the force where the Indians are most likely to be found with the least delay practicable. Active and constant pursuit, until the arrival of the delegation, will be the best means of insuring speedy communication on their arrival.

I learn from the captured squaws that Bowlegs has held councils, and at the risk of his life has entreated the Indians to come in, and that he only saves his life by striking a blow whenever an opportunity offers. The Micasokies are said to be as hostile as ever, and will not permit any of the Indians to talk about peace.

Captain W. H. Cone and his command deserve high commendation for the skill and energy displayed in the pursuit of the trail and surprise and capture of the women and children of Bowlegs' family.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel 5th Infantry, Commanding Department.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,

Ass't Adj't Gen., Headquarters of the Army, N. Y.

No. 3.—*Colonel Loomis to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,

Fort Brook, December 13, 1857.

MAJOR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of Colonel S. St. George Rogers, Florida mounted volunteers, detailing the operations of his command of one hundred and ten men on the southwest coast of Florida, giving also a detailed statement of Parkhill's skirmish with the Indians on the 28th ultimo, referred to in my report of the 6th instant.

I also transmit a report received this evening of another engagement in the Big Cypress, which occurred on the 3d instant. Captain Stevens was with Captain Cone in his fight on the 21st ultimo, and deserves high commendation for his success on both occasions.

It is now evident that the strongholds of the Indians have been ascertained, and that by an active prosecution of the campaign they may be found and eventually compelled to give up.

I have taken measures to increase the force in the immediate vicinity of the Indians, and if they remain where they are to fight, I anticipate some important results in a few weeks.

I am, sir, with much respect, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel of 5th Infantry, Commanding Department.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,

Asst. Adj't. Gen., Headquarters of the Army, New York.

CAPE ROMANO, FLORIDA, *December 2, 1857.*

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that on Wednesday, the 18th of November, I left Fort Myers with the command organized for scouting on the coast. The command numbered, all told, including myself, one hundred and ten men, as follows: Captain Parkhill, with

twenty-five men of his company; First Lieutenant A. W. Da Costa, with thirty-six men of Captain Hardee's company; First Lieutenant John Canova and Second Lieutenant Ramon Canova, with forty-one men of Captain Brady's company, Dr. W. H. Pope, surgeon, Captain Turner, guide, &c. The expedition reached Chokoliska key on the following Sunday, 22d ultimo, without serious accident. I was taken with severe fever on Saturday, the 21st, and remained confined to my blankets until the following Friday, the 27th. On Tuesday, the 24th, Captain Parkhill, with seventy-five men, left Chokoliska for the main land, under instructions to scout to the north and west from the point of debarcation. He was accompanied by First Lieutenant and Adjutant W. S. Harris, First Lieutenant Da Costa, and First Lieutenant Canova. He proceeded up the river that runs down from the Cypress immediately opposite Chokoliska. The maps in my possession are reported so inaccurate as to render it doubtful as to the name of the stream. Captain Turner calls it the Fabkahothee, which river is laid down as entering considerably to the southward. Mr. Harris thinks Chokoliska laid down too far to the north on the map, and I agree with him. Captain Parkhill effected a landing in the mangroves nine miles from the mouth of the river. After wading through the marsh three miles, the mud and water being from half leg to half thigh deep, he reached a higher country, whence he proceeded in a northwesterly direction. The sad and untimely death of Captain Parkhill and the severe illness of Mr. Harris put it out of my power to give you an accurate report of the scout at present. I can only give you a general outline. Captain Turner, though a most excellent and fearless guide, and though he can go anywhere into the country and come out again, has not a correct idea of the geography of the country. The course of the scout for three days was generally northwest. The large cypress swamps, heretofore reported impracticable, were penetrated. The route lay through a section never before examined. On the evening of the third day, the 26th, a large trail was discovered running east and west; the trail was larger and more distinct than that made by the scouting party. The west end of the trail was followed until it was crossed by another large trail running in a southwesterly direction. This new trail was followed through dense cypress, with occasional prairie. After following the first large trail mentioned, a large Indian settlement was discovered in a palm hammock. There were about thirty lodges, and about forty acres of land cleared and in cultivation. Large quantities of pumpkins, potatoes, pease, corn, and rice were found—the corn, pease, and rice hid away carefully in houses built off in the swamp, the trail leading to which was carefully concealed. The pumpkins were housed in the fields, and the ground was literally covered with them, of all ages and sizes; even the trees were full, the vines having run over them. The ground was full of potatoes. Everything was destroyed that could be. This was on Friday, the fourth day of the scout. On Saturday, the 28th, twenty men were left at the camp with the sick and exhausted, and Captain Parkhill pursued the trail that ran in a southwesterly direction. About 9 o'clock a. m. another field was

discovered, with some fifteen houses; about 11 o'clock still another field was discovered, and about 1 o'clock a succession of fields, with ten or fifteen houses. Here the command stopped for dinner. After dinner Captain Parkhill took twenty-five or thirty men and started to destroy some fields and houses some two or three hundred yards from where the command had bivouacked. On his way he fell into a large trail, upon which he discovered fresh Indian tracks. Instead of sending back for the portion of this force behind, he pressed on upon it for about three miles, until it came to a deep stream of water about twenty yards in width, with cypress and thick undergrowth on both sides. Captain Parkhill, with five or six of his men, had just entered the edge of the water, but had not emerged from the bushes, when they were fired upon by a party of thirty or forty Indians from the opposite bank, or rather side of the stream, as it had no banks. At the first fire Captain Parkhill was mortally wounded, and lived but a few minutes. Five of his men were severely wounded at the same time. The fire of the Indians was immediately and briskly returned by Lieutenant John Canova, and, it is supposed, with some effect; but the Indians fled almost immediately after the first discharge, doubtless thinking the force stronger than it was. The wounded men are private John A. Stephens, Captain Parkhill's company, in the body under left arm; private M. M. Mann, same company, in the neck; private Thomas Posey, same company, in the face; private A. McAlphin through the hip—cap pouch saved his life; private — O'Neil, Captain Hardee's company, through the shoulder, collar bone broken. The wounds are all severe, but not dangerous. The whole number of men of the party that day was forty-eight, and it was near night before they got Captain Parkhill's body and the wounded men out of the swamp. They had then ten miles to go before reaching the camp where the sick had been left. No attempt, therefore, was made to follow the Indians, as indeed it would have been utterly useless. The following morning the command started back for Chokoliska, a distance of nearly forty miles. They went out with seven days' subsistence. They reached Chokoliska the night of the 30th. The men are completely exhausted, and this morning there are but forty-eight well men in the command. This is owing in part to the fact that our supply of fresh water gave out at Chokoliska, owing to the low state of the water in the river and the high tides. I found it absolutely necessary to move to this point, as the only one where water can be had. I omitted to mention that Captain Parkhill's body was brought out some fifteen miles and buried upon the shore of a lake.

One object of this expedition is in part accomplished; that is to discover where the Indians are secreted. We have unquestionably discovered the hiding place of the whole of them. The field discovered amounted to eighty or one hundred acres of land, and the houses destroyed to sixty or seventy, and nothing like a thorough examination has yet been made, and, indeed, cannot be with the force I have here. I am of the impression that their families are concealed upon the keys between this and Chokoliska, and that they only occupied the settlements destroyed during the cropping season. The

corn, rice, pease, &c., destroyed seemed to be what they had hidden away for seed another planting season. The bulk of these articles raised in these fields has doubtless been carried off to where they live, which cannot be far from that place. The boat companies, I think, could be well employed now in these keys, penetrating the interior by every inlet. That the whole nation is here I have not the least manner of doubt.

I can do nothing with my command in its present condition. It is completely used up. I hope, however, to get out with them after a few days' rest.

I cannot close this report without paying a just tribute to the merits of the lamented Captain Parkhill. In him the service has lost one of its best officers, and the State one of its best citizens. Though a strict disciplinarian for a volunteer officer, he was beloved by his men. He was a man of elevated and chivalric feelings, and by nature a soldier. His untimely death throws a gloom over the command, and is most deeply lamented by both officers and men.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. ST. GEORGE ROGERS,
*Colonel Florida Mounted Volunteers,
commanding 2d District.*

Major FRANCIS N. PAGE,
Assistant Adjutant General, Fort Brooke, Florida.

CAMP RODGERS,
December 4, 1857.

SIR: I have the honor to report that on the 26th of November thirty-two of my horses and four of Captain Stewart's were killed while grazing in the garden, but it was not known certain that the horses were killed until the morning of the 27th, when I examined the garden and found the horses dead, and saw a great deal of Indian signs. I then returned and reported to Major Dozier, and he ordered me to take thirty of Captain Stewart's men, Captain Harrington with forty of his and forty of my company, and follow them; but in consequence of a suggestion of the trailers, the scout was postponed until the 30th.

On the morning of the 30th, I left camp with only ninety-one men, including a small detachment from Captain Cone's company, as the companies could not furnish any more well men, and four of this above number left me on the first day on account of disability, leaving me eighty-seven men rank and file. Captain Harrington was sick, consequently I had only two lieutenants with me, Lieutenant Crews of Captain Stewart's company and Lieutenant Stephens. I took the Indian trail, and followed it in nearly an easterly direction, without the sign increasing, until the evening of the first, when the trail intersected another large trail that I supposed was used in going to the settlement that we had captured the Indians at on the 21st of Novem-

ber. There was fresh sign going either way. On the morning of the 2d, I took the east end of the trail, and late that evening I came to where the trail I was on intersected another large trail coming from towards Fort Shackleford. I struck camp, and sent a party on both ends of the trail to wait on the side until dark to see if they could hear or see anything to indicate the presence of Indians. One of the parties that went on the east end of the trail returned about dark, and reported that he had heard something that he thought was children playing. In consequence of the report of children being so near us, I started before day on the 3d, and in going about three or four miles, I found a small patch with pumpkins and other stuff. I continued the trail east until about 8 a. m., when we got in view of a large town. I ran into it, but from appearances I suppose the families had been gone some three or four days. There were fifty neatly built palmetto houses in the town. I found a field of about ten acres near the town, and saw where they were making a clearing as though they expected to continue to live near there. I also found a crib with corn, rice, and pease in it. I had it thrown out, but allowed no fires, as I was sure they were near there. I then returned to the town, and ate dinner; after which some of the men went with the trailers to find out the trail the Indians had moved on, and not long after, one of the men came running in reporting they had seen some Indians. I ordered the men to shoulder their packs, and we went to the place the Indians (some eight in number) were seen, and took their trail and followed them a few hundred yards, and saw it would be a fruitless chase. I then went and took the trail they were on when seen, supposing they had come from the families, and I intended to push on to the settlement before they could be notified, if possible; but I did not go far before two of the men that were sick reported themselves unable to go any further, and having so few men, I was forced to strike camp. In a few minutes after I stopped, one of the trailers took eight or ten men, with the view of going a short distance on the trail to see if he was sure the families had gone that way. He had not gone more than four hundred yards, before the Indians, who were lying in ambuscade, fired upon them, killing one of the men. I ordered the company to run to their relief, but before we got to the spot, the Indians had secured the gun and cartridge box of the man killed. They also continued to fire and yell. I ordered a charge, but the Indians ran off, keeping out of gunshot. I pursued them about half a mile, and saw, from the movement of the Indians, they intended another ambuscade. I then returned and took the dead man to where we were camping, and as we returned, the Indians would follow us, keeping about three hundred yards from us, and they continued to increase in numbers very fast; and as my location was not a very good one, I thought best to retreat to a more favorable one; consequently I ordered the dead body covered up the best they could, (as we could not dig a hole with anything, as the rock was on the surface,) and retreated some two or three miles, when I came to a dense cypress head, and I passed as though I was going to continue; and when I got to the opposite end of the cypress head, I turned into

it, and went back to the first end and concealed ourselves, and waited for them to follow us. We had waited about half an hour, when we heard three coming, and when they got close, we shot two of them down dead, and the third one was shot down, but got up to run off, and I shot him in the back running from me, and he came very near falling on his face, but recovered, and got into the cypress. I then returned to my hiding place, and after waiting some two hours, I heard some more coming, and prepared; and when they got around the bodies of the two that were lying where they had been shot, we fired and killed three others, and wounded another one mortally, as he fell twice before he got out of sight in the cypress, making five killed on the spot, and two badly wounded. I am sure they could not recover.

I judged, from the number of Indians that first fired upon my men, and from the way they continued to increase, that more than two hundred fighting men could be collected in twelve hours, and I think they have five hundred altogether, from the sign I saw; and, under all the circumstances, I thought it prudent to come out of the swamp before my company were hemmed in.

I therefore marched from my ambuscade as soon as it was dark, and arrived at camp on the morning of the fourth. I secured five rifles and shot bags. It is about thirty miles to the Indian town. A fight can be had any time a party wants it, but I would advise that not less than one hundred and fifty men be sent in, and them good, hearty men, and would rather have more to use them to advantage. I do assure you the Indians are in good position to fight, and in much stronger numbers than was supposed.

They have every advantage of an approaching army, as the country is open, with thick cypress swamps interspersed, giving them an opportunity of seeing the approach of the whites, and preparing their ambuscade accordingly.

The country, after a little more dry weather, will allow the transportation of supplies on pack mules, and think it best for the service that not more than six days' supplies be carried by the men; then they will go much further, and if necessary, can move much quicker than with ten days' supplies. The men are all worn out that were with me.

I remain yours, respectfully,

W. STEPHENS,

Captain Florida Mounted Volunteers.

Lieutenant W. J. HARRIS,

Mounted Florida Volunteers, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy.

W. K. VAN BOKKELEN,

Captain, Assistant Quartermaster.

No. 4.—*Colonel Loomis to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, January 30, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that the delegation of friendly Indians (Seminoles and Creeks) arrived here on the 19th instant.

In anticipation of instructions, I have afforded every facility to this delegation, and accompanied it to Fort Myers on the 27th instant. On my return at this moment, I am in receipt of your instructions relative to my co-operation with the civil officers of the government in charge of the delegation, dated Washington, January 20, 1858.

I am satisfied that there never has been a more favorable time for peaceful communication than the present, and I confidently hope that this delegation may be successful. On the late scout in the cypress a warrior was wounded and taken alive; the official report of the scout is this moment received.

On arriving at Fort Myers, I went with the chiefs, (Seminoles,) John Jumper and Halleck Tuste-nuggee, and the Creek chief to see the captive warrior, and told him the President had sent these men from Arkansas to talk with their brethren, and invite them to emigrate peacefully, and I would leave them to converse together. I am informed by Colonel Rutherford, Seminole agent, that the information from this warrior resulted as follows: "That nearly all their provisions were destroyed, and they found it impracticable to communicate, and were afraid to attempt it with a white flag." I transmit herewith a copy of my instructions to Captain Brannan, commanding Indian district, issued in anticipation of instructions from you. I need not say that I shall render the civil officers with the delegation every facility in my power to accomplish the object for which they were sent here.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
G. LOOMIS,

Colonel 5th Infantry, Commanding Department.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army, N. Y.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Myers, January 29, 1858.

CAPTAIN: Your report of the 24th instant is received. The Arkansas delegation of friendly Indians are here; I have not yet received any instructions from general headquarters relative to the conduct of the future operations with the hostile Seminoles, &c. But it seems proper and right that hostilities on our part should cease while this friendly delegation are trying to effect the desired object—the peaceable emigration of these Florida Indians. You will therefore cease

scouting with your command; if practicable, call in all your out parties.

Send Captains Lesly's, Sparkman's, and Carter's companies to Fort Deynaud, from thence to Tampa, to arrive at the proper time to be mustered out of service.

I think you had better remain at Camp Rodgers until further instructions. I send you Sampson, an interpreter. The hostile Indians are desirous of peace; their provisions are destroyed, and it is confidently expected that they will listen to the overtures now about being made, and emigrate. Show a white flag at your camp as soon as your scouting parties are in.

In case you can effect a communication, inform the hostiles that their friends from Arkansas are here, and desirous of a talk with them.

You are in command of the 2d military district, and of course of this post. You had better visit this after you send the volunteers off for Fort Deynaud.

Since writing the above, I have concluded to send out Billy's niece Polly, and her brother, also Fah-can to Tuste-nuggee of the delegation, to endeavor to effect a communication with the hostiles. I rely upon you to use every effort to effect the desired object. I have promised, if they come in and are not satisfied to listen to the offers made them, that they may return again to their party; if they come to you, and are derirous of again returning, let them do so. When any of these go out let them take a white flag.

I am, captain, respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel 5th Infantry Commanding, Department.

Captain J. M. BRANNAN,

First Artillery, Commanding 2d Military District,

Camp Rogers, Florida.

Official:

FRANCIS N. PAGE,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 5.—*Colonel Loomis to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,

Fort Brooke, March 6, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I have returned from Fort Myers, on the 4th instant, which place I visited with a view of offering facilities to the delegation operating under the direction of Colonel Rector. I am happy to state that so far Colonel Rector has been entirely successful. He has communicated with the principal chiefs of the Seminoles and Micasukies—Billy Bowlegs and Assunwah—has arranged a general council with the Indians on the fifteenth of this month, and he seems confident of success in removing the Indians from Florida.

I have deemed it expedient to call for companies of volunteers in

sufficient numbers to recommence the campaign without delay, in the event of failure in the operations of the delegation.

I sincerely hope, however, that in a short time the whole volunteer force may be discharged.

I transmit copies of my requisitions on the Governor of the State of Florida for volunteers; also, an abstract of the companies now in service.

Colonel Rector arrived here this morning, and is so confident of success that he is making arrangements to comply with his agreements as early as practicable.

In consequence of the difficulty of supplying Fort Capron, the immense expense of keeping up this post, and its entire unimportance, I am prepared to have it broken up and the troops now there stationed at Fort Dallas.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel 5th Infantry, Commanding Department.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL, U. S. A.,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, New York.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,

Fort Brooke, January 3, 1858.

SIR : By virtue of authority from the War Department, dated December 22, 1857, I have the honor to call upon your excellency for companies of mounted volunteers, as follows:

Three independent companies of mounted volunteers, to replace the companies lately commanded by Captains John McNeill, James F. P. Johnston and William H. Kendrick, respectively, which have been mustered out of service. These companies to be mustered into service at this place as early as practicable.

One independent company of mounted volunteers, to replace the company now commanded by Captain E. T. Kendrick, whose term of service expires on the 13th instant. This company to be mustered into service at this place, and as early as practicable after the 13th instant.

One independent company of mounted volunteers, to replace the company now commanded by Captain Robert Mickler, whose term of service expires on the 3d of February, 1858. This company to be mustered into service at this place, and as early as practicable after the 3d of February. All the companies to serve for six months, unless sooner discharged.

The organization of the companies will be the same as heretofore, 88 rank and file, and it is desired that no company be presented with less than 64 rank and file—the minimum organization of a cavalry company.

I deem it expedient to remark to your excellency, that owing to the extremely arduous character of the service required by these

volunteers, it is essential that strong and able-bodied men only be enrolled in the companies. Much unnecessary suffering has been entailed upon them, by receiving into the companies elderly men and boys of 18.

The mustering officers will be instructed to be more particular in the selection of the men and horses than they have been heretofore, and to resist the pressure upon them to receive men and boys incapable of standing the hardships of a campaign in the Big Cypress.

The late operations in the Big Cypress have convinced me that the best material can alone withstand the hardships necessarily required to accomplish success.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel 5th Infantry, Commanding Department.

His Excellency M. S. PERRY,

Governor of State of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,

Fort Brooke, March 6, 1858.

Official:

FRANCIS N. PAGE,

Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,

Fort Brooke, January 20, 1858.

SIR: By virtue of authority vested in me by the War Department I have the honor to call upon your excellency for a battalion of mounted volunteers, composed of one lieutenant colonel and five organized companies; the battalion adjutant and quartermaster to be selected from the lieutenants of the companies. The organization of the companies will be the same as heretofore explained, and the minimum, sixty-four rank and file, will be required to receive the company; the maximum, eighty-eight rank and file, is desired.

In reference to the physical qualifications of the men great care will be taken on the part of the mustering officer in the selection of the men.

This battalion to serve for six months, unless sooner discharged.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel 5th Infantry, Commanding Department.

His Excellency M. S. PERRY,

Governor of the State of Florida, Tallahassee, Florida.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,

Fort Brooke, March 6, 1858.

Official:

FRANCIS N. PAGE,

Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, February 13, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to call upon your excellency for three independent companies of mounted volunteers to replace the three whose terms of service expire as follows:

Sparkman's independent company Florida mounted volunteers, February 17, 1858.

Carter's independent company Florida mounted volunteers, February 19, 1858.

Lesly's independent company Florida mounted volunteers, February 24, 1858.

These companies to be mustered into service at Fort Brooke, Florida, for six months, unless sooner discharged.

It is much to be desired that the relative rank of the captains of the independent companies should be fixed by you, thus to prevent in future any difficulties which may arise when the companies are required to serve together.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Col. 5th Infantry, Com'g Department.

His Excellency M. S. PERRY,

Governor of the State of Florida, Tallahassee, Fla.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, March 6, 1858.

Official:

FRANCIS A. PAGE,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Independent mounted volunteer companies.

Captains.	Date of mustering in.	Date of mustering out.
Robert Bullock.....	September 28, 1857.....	March 27, 1858.....
Hamlin V. Snell.....	December 15, 1857.....	June 14, 1858.....
William H. Kendrick.....	January 11, 1858.....	July 10, 1858.....
John McNeill.....	January 27, 1858.....	July 26, 1858.....
James F. P. Johnston.....	February 2, 1858.....	August 1, 1858.....
Edward T. Kendrick.....	February 16, 1858.....	August 15, 1858.....
Leroy G. Lesly.....	February 23, 1858.....	August 22, 1858.....

Battalion of mounted volunteers.

Captain.	Date of mustering in.	Date of mustering out.
James A. Pickett.....	February 9, 1858.....	August 8, 1858.....

FRANCIS A. PAGE, Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA, Fort Brooke, March 6, 1858.

No. 6.—*Colonel Loomis to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, March 22, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report that I have lately returned from Fort Myers, from which post I accompanied Colonel Rector, superintendent of Indian affairs, to attend the council appointed by him with the hostile Seminoles, on the 15th instant.

I have returned under the impression that a large portion, if not all, of the Indians will be persuaded to emigrate to the west, and that I need not retain in service more than eight independent companies of mounted volunteers.

I shall therefore instruct the mustering officer to receive the four companies required to complete the battalion of five companies, called for in my requisition upon the governor of this State, dated January 20, 1858, and to muster them out of service on the same day. I am informed by the governor of the State that these companies will be presented at Ocala on the 29th instant.

I conceive this the better course, as it will increase the expenses of the government vastly to retain these companies in service doing nothing, when they may be again called into service for a full term, if required.

Colonel Rector, by an arrangement with the hostile Indians, will learn at a council to be held on the 27th instant at what time they will emigrate, and obtain some definite information which will enable me to decide upon what force will be absolutely required.

I then hope to be able to reduce the volunteer force still more.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel Fifth Infantry, Commanding Department.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL, *U. S. A.,*

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army, New York.

No. 7.—*Colonel Loomis to the Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, May 8, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that I have this day issued a proclamation declaring the Florida war closed.

Last evening Colonel Elias Rector, superintendent of Indian affairs, with the delegation of friendly Indians, and the chief, Billy Bowlegs, and one hundred and sixty-five hostiles—men, women, and children—left Tempa Bay on the United States steamboat "Grey Cloud," for New Orleans, on their way to their homes in the west.

I have the honor to enclose herewith a report from Colonel Rector, also my note to him; also copies of my proclamation; also a copy of my order No. 4, of this date.

The entire force of Florida mounted volunteers will be mustered out of the service of the United States at this post so soon as they can be assembled for the purpose, leaving four companies of the 1st artillery, which are now stationed at Forts Dallas, Capron, Myers, and Deynaud, with detachments at Forts Brooke, Dulaney, Kissimmee, and Key West, I shall immediately break up Fort Deynaud; the company now there to take post at Fort Myers, and Colonel Winder will return to Key West, leaving a small detachment of his company at Fort Dallas.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel Fifth Infantry, Commanding Department.

Colonel S. COOPER,

Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

ON BOARD STEAMER GREY CLOUD,

Egmont Key, Florida, May 6, 1858.

SIR: I left Fort Myers on the 4th instant with the steamer Grey Cloud, which was turned over to me for the purpose of transporting the Seminole and Creek delegations and the hostile Florida Seminoles (who have consented to emigrate) to New Orleans, on their way to their country west of Arkansas. I have on board the steamer with me one hundred and twenty-three hostile or Florida Seminoles, of which number thirty-eight are warriors (men and youths capable of bearing arms) and eighty-five women and children, who have consented to emigrate voluntarily; and forty-one hostiles who have been captured; making in all, with the woman "Polly," one hundred and sixty-five Indians who leave Florida for their new homes west. Of those left in Florida are the parties of Sam Jones, containing seventeen men, (twelve active warriors and five very old men,) the Boat party, containing twelve men and one boy capable of bearing arms, and the Tallahasseees, of whom little is known, but from the best information had is supposed to number eight warriors. "Bowlegs" says that if the Boat party can be found they will undoubtedly desire to emigrate. The Tallahasseees he says will also go west as soon as communication can be had with them, as many of the relatives of both the Tallahasseees and Boatmen are with me, and are confident that the two bands last mentioned will voluntarily leave Florida upon having an opportunity. The "Sam Jones" party may not wish to go west so long as Jones (who is very old) lives. I have been particularly requested by "Bowlegs" and several of the Seminole men with me that hostilities may not be resumed until the Tallahasseees and Boatmen can have an opportunity to emigrate. I informed them that I would represent their wishes to you, and suggest that hostilities may for a reasonable time remain suspended for their benefit. Their views in relation to the removal of the remaining Florida Indians (above expressed) I believe to be correct, and would respectfully suggest that hostilities may not be resumed until I can communicate with the

Department of the Interior, and determine whether peaceful measures for their removal will be continued or not. The steamer Grey Cloud, as requested by Assistant Quartermaster McKinstry, will be returned from New Orleans immediately after the delivery of the Indians at that place.

Thanking you for the co-operation and kindness extended to me by yourself and staff, I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ELIAS RECTOR,
Superintendent Indian Affairs.

Colonel G. LOOMIS,
Commanding Department of Florida.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, May 8, 1858.

Official:

THEO. TALBOT,
1st Lieutenant 1st Artillery, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Steamer "Ranger," Egmont Key, May 7, 1858.

SIR: I acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 6th instant; I am gratified at your success in so far accomplishing the object of the government in the peaceable removal of the hostile Seminoles. I fully coincide with you in the propriety of suspending for a time, at least, hostile operations against them by the force under my command. But in consequence of the report of Colonel Rutherford, the Seminole agent who went out to find the Tallahassee band, I suggest to you the propriety of leaving a small delegation to continue further efforts to immediately communicate with the hostile bands not yet seen, and especially with the Tallahassee band. By doing this your efforts to remove these Indians peaceably will not cease, and the minds of the inhabitants will be quieted with the assurance that the government does not leave them to the depredations of the Indians without continued efforts for their removal west.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,
Colonel 5th Infantry, Commanding Department.

ELIAS RECTOR, *Superintendent Indian Affairs.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, May 8, 1858.

Official:

THEO. TALBOT,
1st Lieutenant 1st Artillery, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

GENERAL ORDERS No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,

Fort Brooke, May 8, 1858.

Having proclaimed the Florida war closed, and having ordered the entire volunteer force under his command to be mustered out of the service of the United States, the colonel commanding takes this occasion to say to the forces—regulars, volunteers, and boatmen: you have with untiring zeal and energy penetrated in every direction the swamps and everglades of the country, driving the enemy from their strongholds and hiding places; you have engaged them in several skirmishes and actions, killing more than forty of their warriors, as acknowledged by the chief, Billy Bowlegs; you have destroyed their magazines of stores and provisions; you have captured more than forty of their men, women, and children; you have rendered them hopeless of remaining any longer with safety in the country, thereby preparing them for and greatly facilitating their peaceful emigration by the delegation under Colonel Elias Rector, Superintendent of Indian Affairs. For all these services the colonel commanding gives you his sincere thanks, and would further state for your gratification that the joy of the captive women and children, upon being restored to their friends on board the steamer "Gray Cloud," was deeply affecting, and overpoweringly so to many among them, even Billy Bowlegs himself.

By order of Colonel Loomis.

THEO. TALBOT,

First Lieut. 1st Artillery, A. A. Adj't General.

PROCLAMATION.

The delegation of friendly Indians under the charge of Colonel Elias Rector, superintendent of Indian affairs, having succeeded in removing the hostile chief Billy Bowlegs and most of his band, with some of the band of Sam Jones, leaving only about thirty warriors, all told, in the State of Florida, and these being very widely scattered upon the islands in the swamps of the country, and no trace of them having been discovered for some months back, no depredations having been committed, and no hostile gun fired by them for some months, except in defence of their fastnesses and hiding places, I now consider it unnecessary and unwise, in view of the rapid settlement of the country, to prosecute scouting the swamps and everglades to hunt up the few remaining Indian families. I therefore hereby declare the Florida war closed, and the people can now return to their homes and usual avocations without fear of further molestation.

GUSTAVUS LOOMIS,

Col. 5th Infantry, Comd'g Department of Florida.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,

Fort Brooke, May 8, 1858.

Official:

THEO. TALBOT,

First Lieut. 1st Artillery, A. A. Adj't General.

No. 8.—*Colonel Loomis to the Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, May 12, 1858.

MAJOR: Having closed the Florida war I deem it my duty, and it is a very pleasing one, to bring to the notice of the General-in-Chief the services of my staff during the time I have been in command of this department.

Brevet Major F. N. Page, assistant adjutant general, has with much zeal and fidelity discharged his appropriate duties of the adjutant general's department; and in addition has faithfully discharged the duty of ordnance officer for the department and for this post. These duties have been very multiplied, so much so that Major Page was obliged to apply for a sick leave, which has been granted him. His services with the volunteers, which occupied much of his time, were particularly valuable.

Brevet Major J. McKinstry, chief quartermaster of the department, has discharged his duties with untiring zeal, fidelity, prudence and economy to the government; and, in addition, I have been obliged to call upon him for other duties not pertaining to his particular portion of the staff, such as assisting to muster into and out of the service the volunteers. His zeal in the service deserves my highest commendation.

Captain C. L. Kilburn, chief commissary of the department, has discharged his duties with strict integrity and economy, and the troops have been supplied with the best of provisions. He has also faithfully discharged the duty of Indian agent since the decease of Captain Casey. I have also been obliged to send him on distant duties to inspect troops and muster in volunteers, &c.

Surgeon A. N. McLaren, medical director, has discharged his duties with his usual zeal and fidelity; his long and faithful services are well known to the army and need no special commendation from me.

Majors Leonard and Brown, paymasters of the army, have with zeal discharged the duties of their department, and receive my highest commendation.

For all these valuable services rendered during the recent hostilities I specially recommend these officers to the favorable consideration of higher authority.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel 5th Infantry, Commd'g Department.

Major IRVIN McDOWELL,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, New York.

No. 9.—*Colonel Loomis to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, July 8, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of a report furnished by Captain McNeill, of his operations in endeavoring to communicate with the small band of Tallahassee Indians.

This band was not communicated with by the friendly delegation under Colonel E. Rector, superintendent Indian affairs.

I have great hopes that Captain McNeill will succeed in his object.

If we had had the services of a small delegation of friendly Indians, I have very little doubt this band would have been on their way west.

I am, major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. LOOMIS,

Colonel 5th Infantry, Commanding Department.

Major J. McDOWELL,

United States Army, Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

FORT MEADE, *Florida, July 3, 1858.*

LIEUTENANT: I have the honor to report to you the progress of the last fifteen days scout. I left this place on the 19th ultimo, for the vicinity of Lake Marian, and arrived there on the 21st, thence scouting next day in my boat; was out three days examining lake and creek in the swamp north and east of said lake; satisfied myself that the Indians were not in that direction; found one hut or stone house on the west side of said lake; in this hut there were two packages of dressed deer skins, a double-barrelled shot gun, pease, pumpkins, &c. I also found a boat on the west side of said lake, and their trails leading west for a short distance and then disappearing; I then returned to my camp and started west on a scout on horseback, having Moses with me on all occasions with his white flag; on the 26th ultimo I found a corn field on an island in a lake near the head waters of Pease creek. This was accessible from the main landing by wading and bogging through water, mud, and saw-grass, for near half a mile.

There had been some Indians working in that field that day; I left a white flag in the field and returned to my camp on the 27th. On the 28th a party of my men were riding around a lake and discovered two Indians a short distance from them running, they halloed to them, they stopped and looked back, one of the men beckoned to them but the Indians ran into the swamp and disappeared.

I then got my boat out of Lake Marian and proceeded to the lake on Pease creek, where I had found the field; I got my boat into the lake and upon examining found where they had cut a ditch through the saw-grass to pass from one lake to another with their boats; from that lake they had cut a ditch through a swamp to a third lake; on

an island in said lake I found a field of corn and a village of eleven huts, all new, but the Indians had left several days. In all of these huts they had left some of their property. I think they are trying my honesty by tempting me with their dressed deer skins, bear skins, &c.; my next object was to find where they had landed when they left the lake; I found their boat, a canoe, on the west side of the lake, also found fresh tracks at their boat; left a white flag at their boat and one on their field, with tobacco and pipes for them to find; their water melons are now ripe. I have been very careful not to allow the men to take any of them, or the smallest article from their camps.

I shall leave this post on the 5th instant with a supply for my party for twenty days. I shall go back to the same vicinity that I have been operating in during the last scout, and remain there for several days, as I know the Indians are there, and I think it unnecessary to scout further to the east and leave these behind me uncommunicated with.

If you have any ideas to suggest I would be glad to hear from you. I would also be glad to hear if Captain Kilburn is likely to be successful in getting his delegates.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN McNEILL,
Captain, Commanding guides, &c.

Lieutenant T. TALBOT,
1st Artillery, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF FLORIDA,
Fort Brooke, July 8, 1858.

Official:

THEO. TALBOT,
1st Lieut. 1st Artillery, A. A. Adj't. General.

IV.

DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS.

- No. 1. General Twiggs to Army Headquarters, January 13, 1858, enclosing letter from Governor Runnels, January 9, and reply, January 13.
- No. 2. Same to same, January 20, enclosing report from Superintendent Neighbors, January 17.
- No. 3. Same to same, January 30.
- No. 4. Agent Leeper to Colonel Wilson, May 6, enclosing his report to Superintendent Neighbors, April 23.
- No. 5. Captain Evans to Lieutenant Garrard, May 7.
- No. 6. Lieutenant Garrard to Agent Leeper, May 19.
- No. 7. General Twiggs to Army Headquarters, July 6.
- No. 8. General-in-Chief to General Twiggs, July 22.

- No. 9. General Twiggs to Army Headquarters, July 27.
- No. 10. Same to Adjutant General, August 9, enclosing letter to Army Headquarters, August 4.
- No. 11. Same to Army Headquarters, August 24, enclosing letter from Captain Prince, August 9.
- No. 12. Same to same, September 17, enclosing letter from Agent Leeper, August 31, and Lieutenant Van Camp, September 2.
- No. 13. Same to same, October 7.
- No. 14. Same to same, October 18, enclosing letters from Major Van Dorn, September 20, Captain Whiting, October 2, Captain Prince, October 3, enclosing letter to him from Captain Whiting, October 1, and his reply, October 2, and Major Van Dorn, October 5.
- No. 15. Same to same, November 1, enclosing letter from Major Van Dorn, October 11.
- No. 16. General-in-Chief to General Twiggs, November 2.
- No. 17. Orders No. 25 from Texas Headquarters, October 19.

No. 1.—*General Twiggs to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, January 13, 1858.

SIR : Enclosed I herewith transmit a communication from his excellency the governor of the State of Texas, with my action in the matter and reply to the governor. Expresses will be immediately sent to the posts nearest the point where the murders and robberies are said to have been committed, to despatch such force as can be spared. It is extremely mortifying to be placed in this situation with an inadequate force.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,

Brevet Major General, U. S. A., Commanding Department.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Asst. Adj. Gen., Headquarters of the Army, New York City, N. Y.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, *Austin, January 9, 1858.*

SIR : I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication bearing date Headquarters, January 6, 1858, enclosing copies of the communications of G. R. Paul, captain 7th infantry, and brevet major, United States army, dated December 18, 1857, and of Major R. S. Neighbors, dated December 9.

This office is now in possession of information as late as the 2d and 3d of January, 1858, from the counties of Grath and Bosque, giving intelligence of new and additional depredations on that frontier. Since the date of the communications you have been pleased to en-

close, several citizens and one negro have been murdered, a boy has been taken into captivity, and a large amount of property stolen. The frontier citizens are under arms, and the highest degree of excitement prevails. Of the one hundred men who have been called out by the State, there is one company of twenty stationed in that immediate vicinity, but owing to the vast extent of country exposed, and the smallness of their numbers, they have been found inadequate for its protection.

I therefore beg leave respectfully to request that you will cause such mounted force as you may be able to spare from other service to be removed to that frontier, and if you have not such disposable force, that you will authorize the raising of two or three companies of mounted men by the authorities of the State, for three or six months, as circumstances may require, with as little delay as possible, in order to meet the existing emergency.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. R. RUNNELS.

D. E. TWIGGS,

Brevet Major General, U. S. A., Commanding Department.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

San Antonio, January 13, 1858.

SIR: Yours of the 9th of January is received. An express will be sent immediately to the posts of Fort Mason and Camps Cooper and Colorado to send a portion of their command in pursuit.

I regret to say I am not authorized to call for volunteers, and can only employ the force now at my disposal.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,

Brevet Major General, U. S. A., Commanding Department.

His Excellency the GOVERNOR OF TEXAS, *Austin, Texas.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

San Antonio, January 13, 1858.

Official:

JNO. WITHERS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 2.—*General Twiggs to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

San Antonio, January 20, 1858.

SIR: Enclosed herewith I transmit a copy of the Indian agent's report to the superintendent of Indian affairs. By it you will perceive he has attributed the robberies, murders, and thefts in

Texas to parties of Indians, who in summer receive, on the Arkansas river, presents of arms and ammunition. The agent, Major Neighbors, represents those Indians to be Comanches, Kioways, and Kickapoos, and to be the depredators on the Texas frontier, and are the same Indians that receive arms and ammunition on the Arkansas river; one of the guns I have in my possession, as I do not understand the policy of the government in arming those Indians, when they are notoriously known to be those that are harassing the Texas frontier. I do not complain of it, but think it strange that such things are. The losses for the last six months on the frontier are estimated at six hundred horses, some six or eight of the inhabitants killed, and other property destroyed, amounting to \$60,000 or \$100,000.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,

Brevet Major General, U. S. A., Commanding Department.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. A.,

Headquarters of the Army, New York City.

SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS,

January 17, 1858.

SIR: Owing to the want of mail facilities I have been compelled to delay my usual quarterly reports until my arrival at this point.

In my last report soon after my arrival at Brazos agency, I called your attention to the very serious Indian depredations committed on our citizens residing on the waters of the Brazos and Colorado rivers, about one hundred and fifty miles below the Indian agencies, in which I notified you that a large portion of the depredations and murders, viz: the murder of the Kenfros had been traced to the Kickapoos, and that they had stolen a large number of horses. It appears by after investigations that the horses stolen from Mr. Mullens, near the mouth of Pecan bayou, and the murder of Mr. Davis, is attributable to a band of northern Comanches, viz: No-conees and Kioways; they stole from Comanche reserve and the citizens in the neighborhood about the same time about fifty head of horses; Ka-tem-e-see, principal chief, sent a small party to follow the trail, who went into their camp on the Middle Fork of Red river, but they refused to return the horses, although the party saw several of the horses that were stolen near the reserve. They arrived in their camp at that time with one hundred and ten head of stolen horses. Major Van Dorn, with a large force, followed the trail of those horses as far as the Canadian river, but failed to overtake them, they having travelled from seventy-five to one hundred miles between camps from the time they left the settlements until they crossed the line of the State of Texas. He states in his official report that there was evidence found at several points to prove that they were Kioways, and I have full proof, through the Indians at Comanche agency, that the Comanches were with them. A party of our citizens with the 2d An-ah-dah-ko chief, followed the trail of the

horses stolen on the waters of the Leon, a branch of the Brazos, and in addition to the description of the dress by those who saw them, several articles were found on the trail which convinced the An-ah-dah-kos fully that the Kickapoos were the parties who murdered the Kenfros, and stole the horses from that neighborhood.

On the second day of January another party of eight or ten Comanches and Kioways were seen passing within eight miles of Comanche agency, with about fifty head of stolen horses, who stated to the reserve Indians, who saw them, that they had got the horses from the Leon, near the head of Bosque. The weather was so unfavorable, there having been a very heavy fall of snow during the night after they passed, that they could not be followed. On the fifth of January, on my road down, I learned that they, the Indians, had attacked the house of a Mr. Johnson, killed him, one other man, a negro man, and carried his son into captivity; and I learn from various sources that there have been, during the past three months, a number of other minor depredations, and I am fully convinced that they can all be traced to the same parties, viz., Kickapoos, Kioways, and middle or more northern Comanches; and in no case, although the subject has been as fully investigated as it was possible to do, can I trace any connexion between these depredatory parties and the Indians settled on the reserves; but in all cases I have found them willing to give what information they could obtain, and assist, as far as possible, in protecting the frontier against those outside bands who have been engaged in the latter depredations. And there can be adduced from the Comanche reserve positive proof to convict the middle Comanche bands, viz., No-co-nees and Ten-a-wish, who inhabit the region near the Wichita mountains, and the Kioways, with the depredations traced to them; and from the An-ah-dah-kos, and other Indians, together with the evidence of a number of our most respectable citizens, to convict the Kickapoos, who reside somewhere on the borders of the Creek nation, near the Canadian Fork of the Arkansas, of the murder of Mr. Skidmore, in 1855, and of the depredations lately traced to them, viz., the killing of the two Kenfros and the stealing of a large number of the horses taken from the Leon Fork of the Brazos river.

To sum up the whole, our investigations show that there have been stolen and driven off from our frontier, since the 1st November, about six hundred head of horses, and that seven persons have been killed or captured by Indians in the same time, viz., 1, Mr. Davis; 2, Messrs. Kenfro; 2, Mr. Johnson and man; 1, Mr. Johnson's negro; and 1, Mr. Johnson's son taken captive. The amount of property destroyed and driven off is estimated by our citizens at at least \$60,000, without taking into consideration the lives that have been sacrificed.

This subject requires your serious consideration, and absolutely demands that you should inquire into the causes that have produced a state of things so contrary to the usual peace and quiet that has prevailed on our frontier for the last three years, or since the establishment of the reservations and the settlement of the Indians proper of Texas. In order to save repetition, and the necessity of extending

this report, I beg leave most respectfully to refer you to the views and suggestions contained in my several reports, in regard to the Indians bordering on our frontier, "their starving condition," &c., &c., and the absolute impossibility of preventing an annual recurrence of the serious inroads made upon our exposed frontier settlers and their property, until the general government should procure them a permanent home, supply their actual necessities and place them under proper control. You will find this subject discussed in every annual report that I have made since I have had the honor of being an agent of the general government, and I must be permitted here to say that the late depredations are attributable more particularly to the fact that the government has entirely failed in making suitable provisions for those bands of Indians, and placing them under proper control (when the Indians themselves have repeatedly agreed to the measure) than to any failure on the part of the Indian agents of Texas, or the military authorities, to perform faithfully the duties entrusted to them.

By the treaty made with the Choctaw and Chickasaw Indians, a large reserve was obtained, and Congress, at its last session, appropriated \$50,000 to settle those bands of Indians on that reserve. In March last that subject was brought fully before your department, and ample reasons urged by the representatives of Texas at Washington why that measure should be at once consummated, but up to the present time I can hear of no measures that have been adopted for the control of those Indian bands by the superintendent and agent to whom that duty was assigned, or of relieving the Texas frontier from a recurrence of the serious depredations that have been committed this fall.

The consequence is that the agents of Texas are liable to continual censure by the citizens of the State, the friendly Indians in the reserves brought into jeopardy, and unless measures are adopted at an early date to relieve our frontier from the forays of the depredating bands, it will be impossible to prevent the people of Texas from making an indiscriminate war upon the Indians that will endanger the peace of our whole frontier.

There are now settled down at Brazos agency 1,012 Indians and at Comanche agency 381 Comanches. Is it better to maintain those Indians under good control, in their present condition, when they are in a fair way to subsist themselves and are rapidly advancing in the arts of civilized life, or shall they again be driven to their former roving and predatory habits, because other Indian bands on our borders are unrestrained and permitted to depredate at pleasure? This will be the inevitable result if measures are not at once adopted to arrest the depredators, and protect the whites from their frequent forays; and, as Congress has apparently placed the necessary means at the disposition of your department, I can see no good reasons why measures have not ere this been adopted for that purpose, although your department has been notified frequently that the northern bands of Comanches, Kioways, &c., were hostile, and in addition to their attacks on our frontier settlers, rendering our roads across the State to El Paso unsafe for travellers, as well as the transportation of the

mails. They have received their annual presents at Fort Atkinson, amongst which was a portion of arms and ammunition, thus arming them the better for their attacks. It is certainly time that this policy should be abandoned and active military measures adopted to coerce those hostile bands into subjection, and to force them to abandon their predatory habits; and I would again urge this subject upon your immediate attention, as it appears clear that all the Indian depredations this fall have been committed by Indians who do not properly belong to the State, but intruders from the United States Indian Territories. Our citizens are preparing their papers, and claims will be urged against the general government for indemnity for the losses they have sustained.

Hoping that you will give this subject your early attention, and that measures will be immediately adopted to relieve our frontier from those hostile attacks,

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant.

ROBERT S. NEIGHBORS,
Supervising Agent Texas Indians.

CHARLES E. MIX, Esq.,
Acting Commissioner Indian Affairs, Washington, D. C.

No. 3.—*General Twiggs to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, January 30, 1858.

SIR: Herewith is transmitted an account of Indian depredations near and south of Belknap. All the disposable force of cavalry from Camp Verde, Fort Mason, Camps Colorado and Cooper, have been ordered to that part of Texas, leaving other portions of the frontier in some measure unprotected. That is all I can do with the present force. This is the first time in a number of years that the Indians have committed depredations in that vicinity.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,
*Brevet Major General, U. S. Army,
Commanding Department.*

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army, New York City.*

[From the Austin Intelligencer.]

THE INDIANS.—Captain John H. Conner, who had been appointed by Governor Pease to look after the recent Indian depredations, came to town yesterday and made a report of some skirmishes in which he

had one man wounded, and killed "one Indian that he got" and perhaps one more. Five citizens of Brown county have been killed, and 326 horses driven off. The frontier men are retreating to the settlements and the greatest consternation prevails.

A meeting was held on Monday night at Smith's hotel at which Captain Conner detailed the facts, and Colonel I. M. Adams confirmed them. Colonel Forbes Britton, General Hugh McLeod, A. I. Hamilton, and H. C. Knight, also made some stirring speeches. Enthusiastic resolutions were passed, calling upon the legislature for aid.

A bill passed both branches of the legislature, yesterday, authorizing the governor to call out one hundred rangers for the protection of the frontier, and appropriating \$70,000 for the purpose.

This is a step in the right direction. What with the Utah war and Kansas, the United States fails to afford Texas the protection necessary to save the scalps of our citizens. Let us, therefore, protect ourselves, and charge the bill to Uncle Sam.

The legislature has nobly performed its duty; let the governor see to getting the right sort of men.

If the thing must occur, we think it fortunate that it occurred while the legislature is in session.

No. 4.—*Agent Leeper to Colonel Wilson.*

COMANCHE AGENCY, TEXAS,
May 6, 1858.

SIR: Having learned that the supervising agent, through whose agency it is proper for me to transmit all my reports, is absent on public business, it becomes my duty, as one of the civil magistrates of the United States government, to appeal to you for such assistance and protection from the troops as is absolutely necessary to maintain the majesty of the laws, protect the agent and his family, and to defend the Indians on the reserve from outrage and violence with which they are threatened, not only by the wild tribes, but by the citizens, who are greatly exasperated on account of the recent murders and depredations of which you are probably apprised. They do not charge those things on the Reserve Indians, but they, too, are Indians, and they wish to exterminate them; and with a view to make known to you the exact state of affairs here, I have the honor herewith to transmit a copy of my report to the supervising agent, of April 23, from which you will perceive that the officer in command of the troops in this vicinity is disinclined to give any protection to the Indians, either on or off the reserve, or to the agent, to enable him to discharge his official duties. I am in receipt, per Major Neighbors, the copy of a letter, as follows:

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS
San Antonio, April 20, 1858.

SIR: Your communication of yesterday has been received by Colonel Wilson, commanding this department, and I am instructed by him to

acknowledge its reception and say that, on your representation and application, he has this day directed the commanding officer of Camp Cooper to furnish from his post a special guard (mounted) of one officer and twenty men, to be posted near the Indian camp or agency as Agent Leeper may think best.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

KEENER GARRARD,

First Lieut. 2d Cavalry, A. A. A. Gen.

Major R. S. NEIGHBORS,

Supervising Agent Texas Indians, San Antonio.

On the 1st instant I received a letter from Captain Evans, of which the following is a copy :

HEADQUARTERS CAMP COOPER, TEXAS,

May 1, 1858.

COLONEL: I have received instructions to detail a temporary guard of one commissioned and one non-commissioned officer and nineteen privates to be stationed at old Camp Cooper, to give assurance of the security afforded by the vicinity of this post to the agency. Will you please inform me if the guard is sufficiently near you to give the protection desired.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. G. EVANS,

Captain 2d Cavalry, Commanding Post.

Colonel M. LEEPER, *Special Indian Agent, Texas.*

To which I replied as follows, to wit:

COMANCHE AGENCY, TEXAS,

May 1, 1858.

SIR: In reply to your letter of to-day, permit me to say that even a small force stationed here, where they would be made available if necessary, would be desirable; but nineteen men stationed three miles from the agency and upon the opposite side of the Indian camp would not be considered any protection or of any use to the agent in controlling the Indians on the reserve or enforcing the intercourse laws.

On the 3d instant Captain Evans placed Lieutenant Hood near the agency, with a command, agreeably to your instructions of the 21st April, but on the next day ordered them to Camp Cooper for the purpose of protecting the public stores at that place in addition to the agency, as I am informed by the officer in charge; permit me, therefore, to solicit you to have at least one company stationed at or near the agency for the protection thereof, and the Indians on the reserve, until such time as the necessary provision and orders can be obtained from the general government.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. LEEPER,

Special Indian Agent, Texas.

Colonel WILSON,

Commander of the Department of San Antonio, Texas.

COMANCHE AGENCY, TEXAS,
April 23, 1858.

SIR: The most reliable information I can obtain with regard to the distance from this place to the present location of the troops recently stationed at Camp Cooper is eight miles by the trace-way and twelve by the wagon-road, but it matters but little in reference to the Indians and agency, as no suitable aid or assistance may be expected from that quarter, from the spirit manifested by the officer in charge. On the 19th instant, I addressed Captain Evans a note as follows:

SIR: I hope you will pardon me for again trespassing upon your time and patience with Indian news, which I shall feel bound to continue under my instructions until otherwise directed, it being one of my first duties to report promptly everything connected with the Indians and their movements on this reserve to the nearest military officer in command of troops. I have just learned from Retumisee, the chief, that two of his friends (perhaps relatives) arrived last night from the Noeo-nees, their object being, as he says, to apprise him of the determination of the wild tribes to make an immediate descent upon the frontier settlements of Texas, particularly upon this and the Brazos reserve. With regard to the importance and probable veracity of the above statement your better judgment will determine. Retumisee has taken his boys from school, lest they should be captured by the Noeo-nees.

Which communication was disregarded and unanswered. On yesterday the Indians came to me en masse, under the influence of great excitement and alarm, and informed me that some of their people were out herding horses, and had discovered a large body of hostile Indians some three miles north, approaching the Indian camp and agency. I immediately reported the fact to Captain Evans, who did not deem it worth a written reply, but instructed my messenger to inform me that "he would not send out the troops upon such information." In an hour after I had despatched my messenger, I ascertained that the report of hostile Indians being in the neighborhood was unfounded, which fact I immediately made known to Captain Evans, by Mr. Jones, whom he requested to say to me, "that he would not regard any report or requisition made by me, any more than he would reports from Mr. Jones or Tom Caghill," (two employés on the reserve,) "but if the wild Indians were actually fighting on the reserve and he could get reliable information of the fact, he would then send the troops."

The above facts I have transmitted without comment, from which, however, you will readily conclude that it is quite unnecessary for me to trouble Captain Evans with any further information relative to Indian matters.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. LEEPER,
Special Indian Agent, Texas.

R. S. NEIGHBORS, Esq.,
Supervising Indian Agent, Texas.

In addition to the above report, I learned on the next day that instead of a large body of wild Indians having been discovered, ten were seen advancing, as before mentioned, who passed on to the Clear fork, which information I considered useless to report to Captain Evans, but I informed the citizens of the fact in order to put them on their guard; but notwithstanding their vigilance, five horses were stolen within six miles of the agency, twenty head within twenty miles, and sixty or eighty head in the vicinity of Fort Belknap and the Brazos agency, of which I presume Captain Evans is aware; but I am not apprised of his having made any effort to pursue them.

On the first of May, an old Indian left the reserve it is true, without a pass, with his wife and two children, with a view to visit the lower agency, he pursued the road to one King's, by whom he was recognized, at which place he camped very near four men who also stopped for the night at King's. They told King that "that old Indian had some d—d good horses, and they had a notion of killing him and taking the horses." King admonished them not to think of such a thing, he was a civil, good Indian, and designed no harm, and that if he was killed it would endanger the lives of all the citizens on the frontier, and they promised they would not interrupt him. The next morning the Indian having ascertained that those men were going to travel in the same direction that he was, told them that they were friends, and that he wished to travel with them. They all started together, but it seems that the four men passed the Indian on the road, and travelled to the house of Mr. Anderson, where they stopped and dined.

In the meantime the Indian came up, and they deliberately went out cruelly murdered him, and robbed him of five horses. His wife and his two children made their escape. They came to me in the greatest distress, and asked permission to bury the body of the murdered father and husband. I applied to Captain Evans for an escort, to enable them to perform that last sacred duty, and he replied that he would not protect the Indians off the reserve, or that he had no authority to do so.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

M. LEEPER,

Special Indian Agent, Texas.

No. 5.—*Captain Evans to Lieutenant Garrard.*

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP COOPER,

May 7, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I have established the special guard for the Indian agency at old camp Cooper. Agreeable to instructions from your office of the 27th ultimo, I detached Lieutenant Hood, 2d cavalry, the only officer detailable, to command the guard. There is considerable amount of public stores at the old camp which

are now daily being moved. When all the public stores are moved I will ask for further instructions relative to the guard.

I would report for the information of the department, that one of the Indians of the reserve was killed by a party of white men, about thirty miles from this camp. He was absent from the reserve without permission from the agent, and was cautioned not to leave the reserve by the chief. With this exception, which was duly reported by the agent to this post, the Indians on the reserve seem all quiet. The murder was committed on the 1st instant, at a place known as Fish creek, east of this post.

The spring emigration has commenced; two large trains passed three days ago en route to California.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. G. EVANS,

Captain 2d Cavalry.

Lieut. K. GARRARD, *Acting Assistant Adjutant General,*
Department of Texas, San Antonio, Texas.

No. 6.—*Lieutenant Garrard to Agent Leeper.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

San Antonio, Texas, May 19, 1858.

SIR: By direction of Colonel Wilson, commanding the department of Texas, I have the honor to acknowledge the reception of your communications of the 6th instant; and in reference to your application for a company of troops to be stationed near the agency, on the Comanche reserve, to say that the present diminished strength of command in this department prevents a compliance with your request, and that your communications have been forwarded for the consideration of the War Department.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

KENNER GARRARD,

First Lieutenant 2d Cavalry,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

M. LEEPER,

Special Agent Texas Indians, Comanche Reserve, Texas.

No. 7.—*General Twiggs to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

San Antonio, July 6, 1858.

SIR: The 2d cavalry remains at or near Belknap. If they are intended to be placed under the orders of the department commander for the defence of this frontier, I would respectfully recommend a change of policy with the Indians. For the last ten years we have been on the defensive. I would suggest that it would be better not to detach the regiment to the post as formerly, but send two detach-

ments (I say four companies each) into the Indian country, and follow them up winter and summer, thus giving the Indians something to do at home in taking care of their families, and they might possibly let Texas alone. I think the experiment worth making. Guides and trailers, I am informed by the agent, can be had from the Indian reservation in Texas.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,

Brevet Major General U. S. A., Commanding Department.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. A.,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, N. Y.

No. 8.—*General-in-Chief to General Twiggs.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,
West Point, New York, July 22, 1858.

GENERAL: I am instructed by the General-in-Chief to say in answer to your letter of July 6, suggesting a plan of sending the 2d regiment of cavalry into the Indian country to follow up the Indians winter and summer, that in General Orders No. 18 you were authorized to make such change in the disposition of the 2d cavalry as the state of the service or our Indian relations might require. Under this discretion, if you are of opinion that the inhabitants of Texas can be better protected by the troops under your command in the way you suggest than in any other, you have the necessary authority for the purpose. In doing so, the General desires you will carefully consider the question of supplies.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

IRVIN McDOWELL,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Major General D. E. TWIGGS,

Commanding Department of Texas, San Antonio, Texas.

No. 9.—*General Twiggs to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, July 27, 1858.

SIR: By Department Orders No. 18, you will find I have made a disposition of the 2d cavalry companies on this frontier. I respectfully ask permission of the General-in-Chief to detach three or four companies in the fall, to leave on the 15th of September, to go into the Indian country and follow up the Comanches to the residence of their families, this command to remain some three or four months or until spring. It is necessary to have the orders of the General-in-Chief,

as the command might find it necessary to follow the Indians into another department.

I intend if the permission is given to put the command under Major Van Dorn, as I have every confidence in his capacity and energy to conduct such an expedition.

The 2d cavalry being concentrated at Fort Belknap has, in my opinion, restrained the Indians from retaliating on the settlements for the attack on them by the Texans lately.

I would again respectfully represent, that in my opinion one or two topographical officers might be very usefully employed in this department.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,

Brevet Major General U. S. A., Commanding Department.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A.,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

P. S.—The above movement on the plains will involve no additional expense, as the public mules and wagons can be used for transportation.

D. E. TWIGGS,

Brevet Major General U. S. A.

No. 10.—*General Twiggs to the Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

San Antonio, August 9, 1858.

SIR: Your letter of the 24th July, enclosing one from the headquarters of the army, is received. In reply I beg leave to transmit a copy of my letter to army headquarters of the 4th of August, which will give my views more in detail. For the last ten years the troops in this department have been acting mostly on the defensive; the Indians will not remain quiet, and they must be made to feel the power of the United States. An expedition like the one I proposed can be made without any additional expense; and I think if it remained in the Indian country for some time it would give quiet to this frontier. The post about to be established on the Rio Grande, where the El Paso road strikes the river, is of great importance; it will give security to emigrants and to the mails. Two companies of infantry will occupy that position as soon as arrangements can be made.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,

Bv't Maj. Gen. U. S. A., Commanding Department.

Colonel S. COOPER,

Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, August 4, 1858.

SIR: If I am permitted to send a command into the Indian country my plan is this: To send three companies of cavalry into the Indian country with guides (Indians from the reservation) to where their families reside; one company of cavalry and fifty infantry to follow on with a train of wagons with provisions; the animals to rely on grazing. This command to open a road as far as they go; the mounted force to get their supplies from this train, and to remain in that country some three or four months, and indeed until spring, if practicable. This I think will give security to the Texas frontier, and enable us to give up the defensive, as we have now necessarily to resort to. Not a dollar additional need be expended, as the public transportation will be sufficient.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,

Br't Maj. Gen. U. S. A., Commanding Department.

Lieutenant L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, N. Y.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, August 9, 1858.

Official copy:

JOHN WITHERS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 11.—*General Twiggs to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, August 24, 1858.

SIR: The enclosed paragraph from the papers of this place, is the only information I have of a recent attack on some drovers on their way from this place to El Paso.

Fort Davis is one hundred and eighty miles from Fort Lancaster. This extreme distance is without any military post. It is between those points most of the depredations on this road are committed.

The road from this to El Paso is travelled almost daily, and large amounts of property transported on packs and trains. The San Diego mail makes two trips a month to San Diego from this place. It is important that this road be well guarded, *but I have not the force to do it.*

The enclosed letter from Captain Prince, commanding at Fort Arbuckle, shows a state of Indian affairs that requires attending to. Major Van Dorn's command will march in September with four com-

panies of cavalry, say three hundred men, and fifty infantry. If I had more troops I would, on the information of Captain Prince, add at least two companies to Major Van Dorn's command.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,

Brevet Major General U. S. A., Commanding Department.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

“*Indian Depredations—Four Men Killed.*—We learn from Mr. Rome, captain of the ‘San Diego’ mail party that came in on Saturday last, that on the 9th instant a party of fifteen Comanches attacked a party of California cattle-drivers at the Leon water-hole, on the El Paso road, seventy-five miles this side of Fort Davis. Two white men and two Mexicans were killed by them, and some twenty horses taken. The Indians also killed several of the cattle, rifled the wagons of all valuables, as well as the trunks of the slain. We have only been able to learn the name of one of the killed, which is M. W. Hufford, probably from Cincinnati, Ohio, as some of his letters bear that post-mark. Mr. Rome tells us that there was a much larger party of Indians a day or two ahead of this party. He thinks they had all been to Mexico, as the ‘sign’ indicated that they were from that direction and had a large herd of horses.”

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ARBUCKLE, C. N.,

August 9, 1858.

SIR : I have the honor to state that the Wichita chiefs report that large bands of Comanches, Apaches, Cheyennes, and other wild tribes of Indians are collected on the Canadian, near Antelope hills, professedly for hostile purposes; and that the depredations which have recently been made upon the settlements of this nation are for the purpose of procuring horses to make an incursion upon the frontier of Texas.

As these declarations are supported by the concurrent opinion of all the friendly Indians of this region, and generally entertained by others, I deem it important information for the Commanding General of the department of Texas.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. E. PRINCE,

Captain 1st Infantry, commanding.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Department of Texas, San Antonio, Texas.

No. 12.—*General Twiggs to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, September 17, 1858.

SIR: Indications along the frontier, as well in Texas as outside, augur a general war with the Comanches, Kickapoos, and such other hostile tribes of Indians as they can induce to join them, and that they will operate united against the frontier of Texas. It is said a council of the different tribes has been held this summer, and such was the determination. From the Rio Grande reports are numerous of depredations and murders in Mexico. The river is of course no barrier to their crossing on this side, as the Rio Grande can be forded at this season of the year anywhere. Major Van Dorn's command is smaller than I could wish, but it is all that can be safely spared from the department at this time.

The enclosed report from Lieutenant Van Camp, of the 2d cavalry, shows the feelings of the Comanches on the reserve. I have consulted with the supervising agent of Texas Indians, and it is deemed proper, and indeed necessary, that some two or three of those Indians be arrested and punished. I am deeply mortified at the occurrence at the Comanche reserve, and I am at a loss what to do in this case. To parade for a fight, and on the eve of commencing to find the command without ammunition, is distressing to think of. This Comanche reserve is the first and only place where any of that tribe of Indians have been induced to cultivate the soil, send their children to school, &c. If I did not think it was the wish of the government to try and civilize these Indians, I would order a force there and take them all prisoners, or shoot them if they resisted. I have ordered an investigation relative to the want of ammunition of this detachment. There is a most criminal neglect somewhere.

Major Neighbors, the supervising agent, will be up at Fort Belknap about the first of October, when an investigation will be made of the part the chiefs took in the matter of opposing the troops, and on his report I will act. I have every confidence in his making a full and fair investigation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,

Brevet Major General U. S. A., Commanding Department.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A.,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

“COMANCHE AGENCY, TEXAS.

“August 31, 1858.

“SIR: Our school has opened with prospects more fair than I anticipated. We have now in constant attendance thirty-nine students,

and several more who wish to come, but I advised the teacher not to instruct more than forty, believing as I do that that number is quite as many as any one teacher could do justice by.

"To-day we had quite an excitement in the Indian camp. A notoriously bad Indian, by the name of Santa Anna, in company with a No-co-nee, came there on yesterday, not having any visible business, they were told by Katemesee to leave immediately; they, however, continued at the camp until this morning; Katemesee again told them that they *must* leave, but they declined doing so; and said they would remain a few days and rest. He reported the facts, and I made a requisition on Lieutenant Van Camp for assistance to arrest them. We proceeded to the camp with nineteen men, and found them quartered in a house originally occupied by a company of soldiers. Lieutenant Van Camp had the house surrounded and demanded them, but the Indians refused to surrender them; the Indians who had by this time collected armed themselves even to the women and children; the house also contained considerable numbers, all furious, and determined to fight to the death. Katemesee and his party only amounted to seven who were willing to assist in the arrest. It being the relief day of Lieutenant Van Camp, and he not having anticipated the prospects of a regular battle; his store of ammunition was entirely exhausted, with the exception of a single round, which utterly forbid the propriety of making a fight against such fearful odds; to have done so would have been madness, and the loss, perhaps, of all his men; he therefore ordered the Indians immediately to leave, and to take with them four or five men from the reserve as far as the Brazos to see that they left the country; this they agreed to, but the escort returned in a short time, leaving the two Indians to go at large, who returned in the evening to Katemesee's gardens, and attempted to kill two Mexicans, who escaped by flight; they would also have killed old 'Hawk,' a friend of Katemesee's, when they first left the camp, if they had not been prevented by the other Indians.

"The belligerent party, numbering some sixty or seventy, came to the agency in the evening to explain their extraordinary proceedings, (but with previous threats, as I am informed, that if I did not talk to please them they would kill myself and family, and join the No-co-nees;) they said their object and determination was to do right; that they had no notice of the approach of the troops or their object; they had been repeatedly threatened with extermination, and were apprehensive the troops had surrounded the house for the purpose; that they, in an event of the kind, were determined to defend to the last extremity, and they had not, nor did not intend to countenance or succor the wild tribes, but had assembled at the house for the purpose of telling those men that they *must* leave.

"You will perceive from the above facts that thirty men is an inadequate force to control the reserve. It would require at least one company for that purpose, and two companies if they were expected to scout or to pursue strolling parties of Indians.

"SEPTEMBER 1, 1858.

"I have just learned that two hundred horses were stolen last night from To-sha-way, Ka-kar-a-way, and Whu-ra-que-top.

"Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

"M. LEEPER,

"*Special Indian Agent, Texas.*

"R. S. NEIGHBORS, Esq.,

"*Supervising Indian Agent, San Antonio.*"

"COMANCHE AGENCY, TEXAS,

"August 31, 1858.

"The facts as above stated by Colonel Leeper are correct in all particulars. My whole disposable force amounted to but nineteen men, I having previously despatched a body to take post in the hills to cut off the fugitives in case they attempted to save themselves by flight; so that including every man that was disposed to fight on the side of the agent we were twenty-seven or eight against eighty or a hundred Indians, all incensed and ready to fight to the last. With but one round of ammunition the combat would have been too unequal; and hence the compromise which was made was the only thing which could have been done to retain our *morale* over the Indians. The small force which I had with me would have proved utterly powerless to secure the arrest of these two obnoxious Indians; and if it is the intention of the government to assist the agent in maintaining the integrity of the reserve, I am convinced that a much larger force than is stationed here at present is required for the task. With an entire company yesterday the parties would have been only equal and then not in numbers.

"C. VAN CAMP,

"*Lieutenant 2d Cavalry, Commanding Detachment.*"

"P. S. I have just learned that the horses stolen last night were taken by Kioways; a large party of them camped within three miles of Captain Giren's ranche on Paint creek and drove off a number of his cattle. They got from two hundred and fifty to three hundred of the Indians' horses. They could easily be overtaken but there are no troops here to follow; the Indians will do so but I fear they are too weak.

"M. LEEPER,

"*Special Indian Agent, Texas.*"

FORT BELKNAP, TEXAS,

September 2, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I arrived at the Comanche agency, Clear Fork of Brazos, on the 15th ultimo, with a detachment of three non-commissioned officers and thirty privates of the 2d

cavalry, and relieved Lieutenant C. W. Phifer, who was in camp near the agency with a similar detachment. Nothing of interest transpired during my tour of duty, except occasional false alarms of wild Indians being in the neighborhood, until last Tuesday, the 31st ultimo. About ten o'clock on the morning of that day, Colonel Leeper, the agent, came into my camp and told me that he had been informed by Ke-lum-seh, the head chief of the Comanches on the reserve, that two Indians, one a No-ko-nie, and hostile to us, and the other a notorious thief and vagabond, by name Santa Anna, had arrived at his camp, and when ordered to leave, had expressed their determination to stay there a day or two and rest their horses. Colonel Leeper requested my assistance in arresting these two men. I acquiesced cheerfully, and mustering all my disposable force, twenty-five men, (leaving three men in camp, three men sick, and two being absent fishing,) and set out for the Comanche camp, hoping to come upon it suddenly and surprise the two Indians. Just before reaching the camp, I sent a non-commissioned officer and five men to take post in the hills in rear of the camp (old Camp Cooper,) and intercept the fugitives if they fled. We were almost at Ke-lum-seh's tent before a soul knew of our approach; upon his hurriedly rushing out to meet us, we inquired where those Indians were, when he told us at Tosh-e-weh's house. We hastened to the indicated place, when I ordered the detachment to divide; a part to place themselves in front and a part in rear of the house, formerly occupied as quarters by one of the companies at Camp Cooper, so as to cut off all egress. By this time the whole camp was alarmed, dogs barking, women screaming, and warriors yelling and stringing their bows, and gathering around the door of the house. We explained our mission to Tosh-e-weh, who appeared to be the principal man, when he replied that he, and every man, woman, and child who could fight, would die rather than see these men killed. Ke-lum-seh exclaimed that "too much talk no good," and sprang forward as if to enter the house, when he was violently seized and restrained by about thirty squaws, who were extremely excited, and who begged him in tears not to proceed to extremities. Ke-lum-seh then told us that a large number of these warriors were his own people, his own party, and would fight to the last for him, (Ke-lum-seh). Upon hearing this, I proposed to Colonel Leeper to tell the chief to call out those warriors who were willing to fight for us, so that we might see who were our friends. Ke-lum-seh called out in a loud voice for those who were friendly to him to come over to where Colonel Leeper and myself were standing, when Ke-lum-seh, his brother and nephew, an Indian called Hawk, and two others whose names I did not know, ranged themselves on our side, while the remainder, numbering some seventy warriors and thirty women and boys who could use their arms, placed themselves opposite us with bows strung and rifles leveled (they had about twenty-five or thirty guns.) All told, we were twenty-six or twenty-seven against such odds. The fight, however, would have commenced the next instant by my firing on the opposite party, when my sergeant informed me that the men had but

one round of ammunition in their boxes, that this was the last day of our tour of duty, and that they had expended their ammunition, not anticipating any such emergency. I confess this staggered me, especially as I knew we could not backout after such a display, when fortunately at this juncture, Tosh-e-weh stepped forward from the opposite side, and begged us to let these men go, promising faithfully that they never should come back, and that they would escort them to the other side of the Brazos immediately. Seeing the utter folly of a combat against such odds arrayed against us, Colonel Leeper and myself willingly acceded to this proposal, when they demanded that the troops should be withdrawn, and that then, the Indians would go. This I refused to do, and accordingly waited in my position until their horses were saddled and they and their escort (about thirty warriors) left. I then returned to my camp. Next day Tosh-e-weh and two or three others came and informed us that all their horses had been stolen the night before by Kiowas, they thought, and requested me to follow their trail and recover their horses. I peremptorily refused to do so in the first place, because I did not believe a word of the story inasmuch as these men were particularly venomous and hostile towards me the day before, and none of those who were friendly to us had lost any of their horses; and secondly, by their conduct towards us on the previous day they had forfeited all claim to the protection of the United States troops, and were not entitled to assistance from them. Besides, they had men enough of their own to follow the trail if they desired to do so. Under these circumstances I would have nothing to do with them.

Lieutenant Phifer relieved me on the evening of the same day. I reached this post this morning; and have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. VAN CAMP,

Second Lieutenant 2d Cavalry.

Lieutenant J. F. MINTER, *2d Cavalry, Acting Post Adjutant.*

No. 13.—*General Twiggs to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

San Antonio, October 7, 1858.

SIR: A letter from an officer of the army at Fort Arbuckle, written in August, says he sent out Lieutenant Powell from that post, and a treaty was made with the Comanches, Wishitas, &c. At that time I was fitting out an expedition against those Indians. There ought to be some concert of action. One of us has made a serious blunder—he in making a treaty, or I in sending out a party after them. This letter was published in the Washington Star in September last.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,

Brevet Major General U. S. A., Com'g Department.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A.,

Headquarters of the Army, New York City.

No. 14.—*General Twiggs to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, October 18, 1858.

SIR: Enclosed are the reports of Major Van Dorn and Captain Whiting of the battle with the Comanches on the 1st instant. It will be seen from the reports that every officer and man did their duty in the most gallant manner. It rarely happens that a command so efficient is assembled together. I fear the wounds of Major Van Dorn will keep him from the head of his command for some time. I intend to keep this command in the field until spring. I understand from a reliable source the Comanches are locating themselves in Mexico, by way of the "great Comanche trail," crossing the El Paso road between Forts Lancaster and Davis. If I had four more mounted companies to put on this track and penetrate the Indian country by the route crossing the Pecos at "Horse-head Crossing," they would render good and efficient service. The victory of Major Van Dorn should be followed up, and the Indians be made to feel the power of the United States. I wish, if possible, to abandon the defensive system. I have to-day ordered companies "B" and "C," 2d cavalry, under command of Captain Oaks, to reinforce Major Van Dorn.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,
Brevet Major General U. S. A., Com'g Department.
Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,
Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army, New York.

HEADQUARTERS, EXPEDITION TO THE WICHITA MOUNTAINS,
Camp on Otter Creek, C. N., September 26, 1858.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report my arrival at this point with my command. I have established the depot on the south side of Otter creek, and about 200 yards east of Marcy's line marking the 100° of longitude west. I am at work putting up a picket or stockade enclosure for the protection of the supplies and animals during the absence of the cavalry part of the command, and expect to get off in three or four days on my first scout. It is my intention to go to the Antelope hills on the Canadian, and scout in that vicinity with my whole command.

I found on the march from Fort Belknap to this creek all the grass burned off the prairies, with the exception of about twelve miles south of Red river. I had some difficulty to find enough to sustain the animals. Mr. Duff's train of corn wagons will reach here to-day, however, and I shall have the benefit of a few days' forage before leaving for the Canadian river. The grass does not seem to have

been set on fire north of this creek. There is a sufficient growth of timber here to build, should it be deemed advisable to do so, the principal species of trees being walnut of a large, healthy growth. The creek is the assemblage of many springs, and the water is clear, limpid, and good; the camp is by a good spring.

I respectfully suggest that this camp be named after the late Lieutenant Radzinski, of the 2d regiment of cavalry, a high-minded, chivalric soldier and an accomplished gentleman, of whose death we have but recently heard, and which we now regret as a severe loss to our regiment.

I enclose a sketch of our march from Belknap, made by Lieutenant Van Camp.

Very respectfully, sir, I am your obedient servant.

EARL VAN DORN,

Brevet Major, Captain 2d Cavalry, Com'g.

Captain JOHN WITHERS,

Assistant Adjutant General, San Antonio, Texas.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, October 18, 1858.

Official copy for the information of the War Department respectfully furnished.

JOHN WITHERS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

CAMP NEAR WICHITA VILLAGE,
October 2, 1858.

SIR: I send you a brief statement of the action of the troops under Major Van Dorn since we left camp on Otter creek. The major being wounded severely, but not dangerously, this duty devolves upon me. We left Otter creek the afternoon of the 29th of September, upon the report of some of our friendly Indians that a band of Comanches were encamped near this place, and that the distance was forty miles. The major concluded to start at once with his four companies, and expected to reach the Indians by daylight the next morning. The Indians, however, were mistaken in the distance, and we did not arrive here until daylight of the 1st of October. We charged the Comanche camp just at sunrise; took the camp and everything they had. Our loss was: killed, Lieutenant Van Camp and 3 men of "H" company; wounded, Major Van Dorn and Captain Ross, jr., (in charge of the friendly Indians;) 1 private of "A" company; 1 of "K;" 4 of "H," and 4 of "F."

The loss of the Indians was 44 killed, and some women and children taken prisoners by the friendly Indians; I don't know exactly how many. This is not intended as a report. I have no writing materials, and have only been able to find a small piece of paper upon which I have written this, and send it to Lieutenant Lowe at Fort Belknap, with a request to him to copy and forward to you. As we only started

with two days' provisions I sent an express last night to Arbuckle for four days' provisions, and an ambulance and wagon to transport our wounded to Arbuckle, which is said to be some twenty-five or thirty miles from this place. Two companies will go with Major Van Dorn and the wounded to Arbuckle, and I shall return with mine and Captain Johnston's to our camp on Otter creek. Major Van Dorn will probably not be "for duty" for some months. I expect the ambulance and wagon to-morrow, and shall leave as soon as possible.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES J. WHITING,
Captain 2d Cavalry.

Captain JOHN WITHERS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

A true copy:

W. W. LOWE,
First Lieutenant and Adjutant 2d Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, October 18, 1858.

Official copy for information of the War Department respectfully furnished.

JOHN WITHERS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ARBUCKLE, C. N.,
October 3, 1858.

SIR: Fearing Major Van Dorn's despatches to your headquarters may be intercepted, I have the honor to enclose a copy of a note received from Captain Whiting, 2d cavalry, in relation to the major's fight with the Comanche Indians at the Wichita village, and my reply.

Copies have also been sent to the headquarters, department of the west.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. E. PRINCE,
Captain 1st Infantry, commanding.

Captain JOHN WITHERS,
*Assistant Adjutant General, Department of Texas,
San Antonio, Texas.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, October 18, 1858.

Official copy for the information of the Secretary of War respectfully furnished.

JOHN WITHERS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

CAMP NEAR WICHITA VILLAGE, *October 1, 1858.*

DEAR CAPTAIN: A command of the 2d cavalry, under Major Van Dorn, has had an engagement with the Comanche Indians this morning, in which I am sorry to say that Van Camp was killed, the major severely wounded, and also eight soldiers wounded, so much so as to render them unable to ride on horseback. We left our camp with three days' rations, which will be out to-morrow evening. Will you be kind enough to send me four days' rations for 225 men, with one wagon and an ambulance or carriage for the transportation of the wounded to your post? If the wagon cannot be sent, please send the provisions on mules, as we are eighty-five miles from our depot. Forty Indians are known to be killed. If Doctor Gaenslen can come out, and bring with him such medicines as are necessary for gun and arrow shot wounds, please let him come. We will move to your post as soon as possible on the arrival of provisions and transportation.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

CHARLES J. WHITING,
Captain 2d Cavalry,

Captain W. E. PRINCE,
1st Infantry, commanding Fort Arbuckle.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ARBUCKLE, C. N., *October 3, 1858.*

A true copy:

W. E. PRINCE,
Captain 1st Infantry, commanding.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, Texas, October 18, 1858.

Official:

JOHN WITHERS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ARBUCKLE, C. N., *October 2, 1858.*

DEAR CAPTAIN: Your express arrived this afternoon, at 3½ o'clock p. m., and I shall despatch immediately Assistant Surgeon John J. Gaenslen and such supplies from his department as you require; also the subsistence stores necessary for your command. I have also hired an ambulance which I send for the wounded, whom you had better send at once to this post. I send one non-commissioned officer and twenty men as escort for that purpose.

Permit me to suggest, from my knowledge of the numbers of Comanches in your vicinity, and their determined hostility against the United States troops stationed in Texas, as well as the citizens of that State, the necessity of immediately reinforcing your camp on Otter creek. I consider the command there as in a very critical condition,

and think that at least two companies of your present command should be sent to their aid at once.

My company is the only force I have at this post. Major Emory, with two companies of the 1st cavalry, is expected daily.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. E. PRINCE,

Captain 1st Infantry, commanding.

Captain CHARLES J. WHITING,

2d Cavalry, Camp near Wichita Village, C. N.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

San Antonio, Texas, October 18, 1858.

Official:

JOHN WITHERS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, WICHITA EXPEDITION,

Camp near Wichita Village, October 5, 1858.

CAPTAIN : I have the honor to make the following report of the operations of my command since the 25th ultimo, the date of my last report. The stockade work, in progress of construction at that date, was completed on the 29th, and preparations were being made to move towards the Canadian river the following morning when two of my Indian spies came in and reported a large Comanche camp near the Wichita village, about ninety miles due east of the depot. Upon receipt of this information, I had all the stores, draught mules, and extra horses moved at once into the defensive enclosure, and marched for this point with the four companies of cavalry and Indian allies. After making a forced march of ninety odd miles in thirty-eight hours during the last part of which we were continuously in the saddle, for sixteen and a half hours, including the charge and pursuit; we arrived at this camp on the morning of the 1st instant.

I had been in hopes of reaching a point in close proximity to the enemy before daylight, and had made dispositions for an attack, based on information received from the spies, but as daybreak came upon us some three or four miles off, and I found them very inaccurate in their information, I moved the companies up in column, with intervals of a hundred yards, and moved in the direction in which the camp was said to be, sending instructions to the captains to deploy and charge whenever it was seen over the crest of the hills in advance of us. After marching with this formation, about two miles at an increased gait, the sound of the charge came from towards the left, and in a moment the whole command poured down into the enemies' camp, in the most gallant style, and we soon found ourselves engaged on a warmly defended battle-field. There being many ravines in and about the camp that obstructed the easy operation of cavalry, and gave good shelter to Indians, it was more than an hour and a half before they were entirely beaten out or destroyed, during which time

there were many hand to hand engagements, both on the part of the officers and men. The friendly Indians I ordered, in approaching the camp, to stampede the animals and get them out of the way. This order they effectually carried out. The Delawares and Caddos also entered into the fight with the troops, and did effective service, especially in the skirmishing in the neighboring hills and ravines. We have gained a complete and decisive victory over the enemy. Fifty-six warriors are left dead on the field, and it is presumed that many more are lying in the vicinity, as many were doubtless mortally wounded, but enabled to escape on their horses from the battle-field. How many were wounded is not known. Over three hundred animals were captured; about one hundred and twenty lodges were burned. Their supply of ammunition, cooking utensils, clothing, dressed skins, corn, and subsistence stores were all destroyed or appropriated to the use of the command. Those who escaped did so with the scanty clothing they had on and their arms, and nothing was left to mark the site of their camp but the ashes and the dead. I regret that I have to report that two Indian women were accidentally killed in the battle; their dresses only concealed, not indicated their sex. Two Wichita Indians were also accidentally killed, being in the Comanche camp. The number of Indians has been variously estimated from three to five hundred. I think there were over four hundred.

This victory has not been achieved without loss on our side. Lieutenant *Cornelius Van Camp*, one of the most promising and gallant young officers of our regiment, or of the service at large, fell pierced through the heart by an arrow whilst charging the enemy's camp, and died as the brave alone should die. In his loss we feel our victory to be a dear bought one.

The following is a list of the killed and wounded, as furnished me by the captains, viz:

Company "A."—Brevet Major Earl Van Dorn, severely wounded; Corporal Joseph P. Taylor, dangerously wounded.

Company "K."—Private Smith Hinckley, slightly wounded.

Company "H."—Private Peter Major and private Jacob Echard, killed; private Henry Howard, missing, supposed to be killed.

Company "H."—Sergeant C. B. McLellan, slightly wounded; Corporal Bishop Gordon, slightly wounded; Bigler M. Abergast, slightly wounded; Private C. C. Alexander, severely wounded.

Company "F."—Sergeant P. E. Garrison, mortally wounded, since died; Private C. C. Emery, severely wounded; Private A. J. McNamara, severely wounded; Private W. Frank, slightly wounded.

Mr. J. J. Ward, sutler to the command, and Mr. S. Ross, in charge of the friendly Indians, were also wounded, the former slightly, the latter severely. I am so greatly indebted to all the officers of the command collectively, for the energy, the zeal, the ability and gallantry with which they aided me in achieving this success, that I feel it impossible to name one as being distinguished above the others. I am equally indebted, in the same manner, to all the non-commissioned officers and soldiers of my command, who under all the circumstances of the forced march and the battle, proved themselves to be soldiers

worthy of the name. Their gallantry, personal bravery, and fearless intrepidity are the admiration of their officers, but they find themselves unable to discriminate where all are brave.

The officers present in the engagement were Captains Whiting, Evans, and Johnson, Lieutenants Phifer, Harrison, Porter, and Major, and Assistant Surgeon Carswell. Captain Evans killed two, Lieutenant Harrison two, Lieutenant Phifer two, and Lieutenant Major three Indians, in hand to hand encounters, during the battle. Mr. S. Ross and Mr. Ward charged with Captain Evans and did good and efficient service, and are spoken of highly by all the officers for their bearing during the engagement; in fact I am indebted to all the command.

I regret that my wounds have prevented my writing this report at an earlier date. I have requested Lieutenant Lowe, at Fort Belknap, to copy this and send it to you in proper form.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

EARL VAN DORN,

Brevet Major, Captain 2d Cavalry, commanding.

FORT BELKNAP, TEXAS,

October 10, 1858.

A true copy:

GEO. W. THOMAS,

Major 2d Cavalry.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

San Antonio, October 16, 1858.

Official copy for the information of the War Department respectfully furnished.

JNO. WITHERS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 15.—*General Twiggs to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,

San Antonio, November 1, 1858.

SIR: Herewith I transmit a communication from Major Van Dorn. He is still confined with his wounds. He was shot through the body with an arrow, and another through the wrist, passing between the bones of the arm.

I have sent to reinforce him, if necessary, with three companies of cavalry. If his situation will justify it, Captain Oakes is to operate with the three last companies and Major Van Dorn's command (until he is able) under Captain Whiting.

Being convinced that action and energetic operations at this time are necessary, I have, very unwillingly, stripped the frontier of nearly all the mounted force. This, in my opinion, is a very hazard-

ous move, but it is the choice of evils. I intend to keep the command out until spring at least.

As I know, whatever the received opinion to the contrary may be, that dead Indians are not taken from the field, I directed Major Van Dorn not to report any killed that he did not count on the battle ground. His official report only mentioned fifty-six; subsequently a number more were found dead near where they fought, and it is now well ascertained that seventy or eighty are found dead.

It is understood here that many of the Comanches have gone over to New Mexico and located themselves, and will in all probability cross over to Mexico. Shall we pursue them into New Mexico? I ask for instructions in relation to this. In the absence of instructions I will order them pursued across the Rio Grande.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. E. TWIGGS,
Brevet Major General United States Army,
Commanding department.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,
Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army, New York.

HEADQUARTERS, WICHITA EXPEDITION,
Camp on Otter creek, C. N., October 11, 1858.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to report my return with my command to this camp. Before leaving the Wichita village Captain Whiting, then in command, sent Lieutenants Phifer and Harrison and forty men with the wounded to Fort Arbuckle, with instructions to return immediately to this point as soon as they got them safely in hospital. I think they will be here in a very few days.

Upon my return I found everything going on smoothly and nothing had occurred of interest during our absence. The whole command are in good health and in fine spirits.

My horses, very much reduced by the forced marches to the Comanche camp and the hard riding during the engagement, were still more weakened by the want of grass on several occasions, when we were compelled to camp in the burnt districts between here and the east end of the mountains. I am in hopes, however, that in fifteen or eighteen days they will be enabled to start out on another expedition to the Canadian river, where it is presumed there is another band of Comanches encamped, to which will be added probably the remnant of the one recently broken up. I regret that my wounds will prevent me going in person, but I feel every confidence that my command will succeed if it is possible, and that Captain Whiting and the other officers will do everything that can be done to promote the objects of the expedition. I shall probably (the surgeon informs me) be enabled to mount my horse again in three or four weeks, but the season for active operations in the field cannot be lost, and I am compelled to send my command out and remain at the depot.

About eighteen miles east of this and near the foot of the southern slope of the Wichita mountains there is a finely wooded country, to which I shall probably remove the depot upon return of the next expedition, if you do not object to it. Here the country is rather bare and bleak and, of course, but little protection is offered to our camp and the animals, that is, off from the margin of the creek, where there is fine timber. There are indications that the creek overflows its banks and I am afraid to risk my stores near them. The creek upon which I propose to move is the west branch of Cache creek and is in as good a central position for the depot as this, and it has the advantage of having on it the finest growth of timber I have seen in this country, and would no doubt be selected as the best point for a military post should it be deemed advisable to establish one in this vicinity.

There is nothing further of any interest to report. I regret that I have no sketch of the country passed over ready to send by this express. The death of Lieutenant Van Camp and my wounds have interrupted the execution of that portion of your instructions, but the omission shall be attended to as soon as possible.

Very respectfully, captain, I am, your obedient servant,

EARL VAN DORN,

Brevet Major, Captain 2d Cavalry, commanding.

Captain JNO. WITHERS,

Assistant Adjutant General,

San Antonio, Texas.

No. 16.—*General-in-Chief to General Twiggs.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

New York, November 2, 1858.

SIR: The General-in-Chief desires to congratulate you on the very brilliant and substantial success of Major Van Dorn's column, as demonstrating the judiciousness and utility of the expedition you planned. He approves highly of your intention to follow up the campaign and of your sending out reinforcements. He hopes the addition of Major Emory's squadron to the garrison of Fort Arbuckle may support and aid your operations, and any orders you may think advisable for that end he hereby authorizes you to give to the commander of Fort Arbuckle, although not within your department. The post and department commanders will be so informed.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEORGE W. LAY,

Lieutenant Colonel, Aid-de-camp.

Major General D. E. TWIGGS,

Commanding Department of Texas.

No. 17.

ORDERS NO. 25.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF TEXAS,
San Antonio, October 19, 1858.

The general commanding takes great pride in publishing to the department the signal success of the command under Brevet Major Earl Van Dorn, captain 2d cavalry, over the Comanche Indians, at their camp near Wichita village on the 1st instant.

Major Van Dorn, with his command, left Fort Belknap on the 15th ultimo, and marched in a northwest direction to the point designated in Special Orders No. 71, current series, where he established his depot and threw up a field work for its protection; he had scarcely completed this work when, on the 29th ultimo, learning from his Indian spies that the Comanches were in force at a point about 90 miles due east from his position, he at once proceeded to secure his property and stores, and left with four companies of cavalry and a hundred and twenty-five friendly Indians, in search of the enemy. After a forced march of over 90 miles, which was accomplished in thirty-six and a half hours, he came upon the enemy's camp, consisting of 120 lodges and between 400 and 500 Indians, a little after daylight on the 1st instant, charged it, and, after a most desperate struggle of an hour and a half, during which there were many bloody hand to hand engagements, achieved a victory more decisive and complete than any recorded in the history of our Indian warfare. *Fifty-six Indian warriors were left dead on the field*, one hundred and twenty lodges were burned, over three hundred animals taken, and a large quantity of supplies either appropriated to the use of the command or destroyed; the surviving Indians were dispersed among the mountains in a destitute condition.

The general commanding the department hoped much from this command, and he is most happy to say that the brilliancy of its success has been such as to exceed his most sanguine expectations.

He deeply sympathizes with the officers under his command, in the death of Second Lieutenant Cornelius Van Camp, 2d cavalry, a young officer of exceeding promise, who fell, pierced to the heart by an arrow, while gallantly charging the enemy in this engagement.

He is pained to state too, that Sergeant J. E. Garrison, of company "F," 2d cavalry, who was mortally wounded, has since died, and that privates Peter Magan and Jacob Echard, of company "H," 2d cavalry, were killed, and private Henry Howard, of same company, is missing and supposed to have been killed.

Brevet Major Earl Van Dorn, 2d cavalry, was severely wounded, and one of his company, "A," Corporal Joseph P. Taylor, was dangerously so. Privates C. C. Alexander, of company "H," and C. C. Emery and A. J. McNamara, of company "F," 2d cavalry, were severely wounded; whilst Sergeant C. B. McClellan, Corporal Bishop Gordon, and Bugler M. Abergast, of company "H," privates

W. Frank, of company "F," and Smith Hinckley, of company "K," 2d cavalry, were slightly wounded.

The sutler, Mr. J. F. Ward, who was slightly wounded, and the special agent in charge of the friendly Indians, Mr. S. Ross, who was severely wounded, and both of whom were voluntarily with the expedition, are deserving the highest praise for their gallantry during the action.

During the fight Captain N. G. Evans, Lieutenants Harrison and Phifer each killed two, and Lieutenant Major killed three Indians in hand to hand encounters.

The other officers of the command were Captains Whiting and Johnson, Lieutenant Porter, and Acting Assistant Surgeon Carswell, United States army. These officers, as well as the non-commissioned officers and privates of companies "A," "F," "H," and "K," 2d cavalry, were engaged in the conflict, and are alike deserving the highest meed of commendation that can be bestowed upon them.

The friendly Indians who were under Mr. Ross rendered essential service in first stampeding and afterwards securing the enemy's animals, and are deserving of like praise with the regular troops.

By order of Brevet Major General Twiggs.

JNO. WITHERS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

V.

DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO.

- No. 1.—Governor Rencher to Secretary of War, January 18, 1858, enclosing resolutions of the legislature of New Mexico.
- No. 2.—Secretary of War to Governor Rencher, March 16.
- No. 3.—General Garland to Army Headquarters, January 31, enclosing letter to General Johnston, January 24.
- No. 4.—Same to same, January 31.
- No. 5.—Same to same, March 1.
- No. 6.—Same to same, March 1, enclosing reports from Lieutenant Alley, February 8, Colonel Miles, February 18, and Colonel Loring and Lieutenant Du Bois, February 23, 1858.
- No. 7.—Same to General Johnston, March 13.
- No. 8.—Same to Army Headquarters, March 31.
- No. 9.—Same to same, May 1, enclosing report from Lieutenant Wood, April 17.
- No. 10.—Same to same, May 31.
- No. 11.—Mr. McCarty to Secretary of War, May 31, enclosing memorial to General Garland, and his reply.
- No. 12.—General Garland to Army Headquarters, August 1, enclosing reports from Major Brooks, July 15 and 22.
- No. 13.—Same to same, August 8.
- No. 14.—Colonel Miles to Adjutant General, September 3.

- No. 15.—General Garland to Army Headquarters, September 5, enclosing report from Colonel Loring, August 20.
- No. 16.—Colonel Loring to Adjutant General, August 20.
- No. 17.—Colonel Bonneville to Army Headquarters, September 22.
- No. 18.—Same to same, October 1, enclosing letters from Colonel Miles, September 8 and 10, Mr. Collins, September 23, with letter to Mr. Yost, August 13, and reports from him August 31, and September 3, and instructions to Colonel Miles, September 23 and 26.
- No. 19.—Same to same, October 10, enclosing reports from Colonel Miles and Captain Hatch, September 25, Special Orders No. 91, and instructions to Major Backus, October 3, and Colonel Miles, October 4.
- No. 20.—Same to same, October 17, enclosing report from Colonel Miles, October 3, with reports of Captains Elliott and Lindsay, October 3 and 4, and Lieutenant Averill, September 29, and letter to Colonel Miles, October 14.

No. 1.—*Governor Rencher to the Secretary of War.*

EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT,
Santa Fé, January 18, 1858.

SIR : By request I have the honor herewith to transmit to you the enclosed copy of a resolution adopted by the legislative assembly of the Territory of New Mexico, tendering the thanks of that body to Colonel B. L. E. Bonneville of the United States army, and to the officers and men under his command, for the signal service rendered by them in the late expedition against certain Indian tribes, under the command of Colonel Bonneville.

In doing so I beg to add my own hearty concurrence in this deserved testimonial to the gallantry and success of an officer who has rendered such valuable service not only to the territory of New Mexico, but also to the whole country.

I have the honor to be, with great respect, your obedient servant,
 A. RENCHER,
Governor New Mexico.

Honorable, THE SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington city, D. C.

PREAMBLE AND JOINT RESOLUTIONS

Whereas, for several years past the Mimbres, Gila, and Coyoter Apache bands of Indians have been depredating upon our frontiers west of the Rio del Norte, extending their forays as far north as Cuvero and the valley of the Pueres, stealing our cattle and endangering the lives of our citizens and families. These Indians surprised the United States Indian agent, H. L. Dodge, a few miles from Zuñi, and put him to a cruel death. Colonel B. L. E. Bonneville, 3d United

States infantry being then temporarily in command of the Department of New Mexico, organized an expedition against these bands which proved one of the most arduous as well as successful ever projected since New Mexico has been a Territory of the United States. In the several encounters with these Indians thirty-two were killed on the field, among them the murderers of the agent, H. L. Dodge; forty-five women and children were taken prisoners, a large amount of stock recaptured, and immense fields of corn destroyed. A salutary lesson has been taught these people, inducing their principal headmen to come in and sue for peace. To have thus fully accomplished the end contemplated is an evidence of the care with which the expedition was organized, and of the vigor of the operations in the field. It has resulted also in bringing to notice a valuable and fertile portion of our Territory on the headwaters of the Gila river and its tributaries, which otherwise would have remained unknown for years and our Territory still subjected to the incursions of these roving bands regardless of lives and property. Therefore be it

Resolved, 1st : That the thanks of the legislature of New Mexico be hereby tendered to Colonel B. L. E. Bonneville, 3d United States infantry, the commander of the late Gila expedition against the several tribes of Mimbres, Gila, and Coyotera Apache Indians; and through him to the brave officers and soldiers he has the honor to command, for their zeal, intelligence, and fortitude in accomplishing the successful results of the expedition in the midst of so many privations and dangers.

2d : That the governor of the Territory be requested to transmit a copy of the foregoing to the honorable Secretary of War, the general commanding-in-chief the army, and to the commanding officer of the Department of New Mexico, and to Colonel B. L. E. Bonneville, 3d United States infantry,

MERRILL ASHURST,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

DONACIANO VIGIL,
Presidente del Consejo Legislativo.

No. 2.—*Secretary of War to Governor Rencher.*

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, March 16 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th January last, transmitting a copy of a resolution of the legislative assembly of New Mexico, tendering the thanks of that body to Colonel B. L. E. Bonneville and his command for services rendered by them in an expedition against certain Indian tribes, and in reply, beg to say that I am very much gratified that the gallant con-

duct of the officer should merit and receive such high commendation from so high a source.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.

His excellency A. RENCHER,
Governor of New Mexico, Santa Fé, N. M.

No. 3.—*General Garland to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, January 31, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to enclose for the information of the General-in-Chief, a copy of a communication addressed to Colonel Johnston, 2d cavalry, commanding the Utah expedition, which will explain itself. At the moment of despatching it, I learned that Captain Marcy, 5th infantry, with a detachment of some sixty men, had arrived at Taos, and deeming it quite certain that he would either report himself in person, or his arrival at these headquarters, I delayed sending it, thinking I would receive such information as might induce me to write or act more advisedly with respect to that expedition.

Up to this time I have heard or seen nothing of Captain Marcy, and I am therefore compelled to communicate only such steps as I had deemed advisable and proper to take.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. GARLAND,
Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,
Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army, N. Y.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, January 24, 1858.

COLONEL: Our mail from the States is just in, and brings information of your determination not to enter Salt Lake valley this winter, but to take up a position on Green river, there to await reinforcements and supplies. With a hope that it may be in my power to render you aid to some extent, I have deemed it expedient to send two trusty men, by different routes, with the expectation of opening a communication with you.

If consistent with your views, please inform me of your designs, in order that I may, if practicable, create a diversion in your favor by throwing a column of men, not less than 800, (eight hundred,) into the country of the Utah Indians, who are becoming impudent. A rumor has reached me that these Indians are being tampered with by

the Mormons, and I am inclined to believe it. A copy of this despatch will be forwarded to the Secretary of War.

Wishing you all success in your present expedition, I am, colonel, most truly yours,

JOHN GARLAND,
*Brevet Brigadier General, commanding
Department of New Mexico.*

Colonel ALBERT J. JOHNSTON,
*2d Cavalry, commanding the Utah Expedition,
Fort Bridger, on Green river, &c., Clarke's Fork.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, January 31, 1858.

Official copy:

W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 4.—*General Garland to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, January 31, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the General-in-Chief, that the Indians within the limits of this department are generally quiet.

In the early part of this month an Indian arrived at Fort Defiance from the Utah country, on a mission from the Utah Indians, charged with bringing about a peace between the Navajoes and Utahs. He said he was sent by Indians who were only ten days from the Great Salt Lake City, and that the Mormons were instigating these different tribes to bury their animosities, with a view doubtless, in case of necessity, of arraying themselves against our government. The messenger brought with him a certificate of baptism and membership in the church of Latter Day Saints.

There is reason to believe that the Utahs have been tampered with by direction of Brigham Young, whose object also is to extend his relations into the country of the Navajoes.

I respectfully enclose the report of Second Lieutenant W. W. Averell, regiment of mounted riflemen, of a scout made by a detachment of troops from Fort Craig under his command on the 10th of last month, with the endorsement of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Chandler, 3d infantry, thereon. The result of this affair was in every way successful. The prisoner referred to is understood to be a chief of some note, and is now in the hospital at Fort Union, and will probably recover from his wounds.

It is proper, in conclusion, to remark that I returned to these head-

quarters on the 14th instant from a visit to the several posts south as far as Fort Bliss.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN GARLAND,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, New York.

No. 5.—*General Garland to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, March 1, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report for the information of the General-in-Chief, that Captain Marcy, from the Salt Lake army, has accomplished the object of his visit to New Mexico, and will leave the vicinity of Fort Union on the 10th instant for the headquarters of Colonel Johnston.

An express will leave here in the morning, *via* Abiquise, for the same destination, giving information to Colonel Johnston of the movements of Captain Marcy. Captain Bowman, 3d infantry, with one hundred men is added to the return escort, this number being considered by Captain Marcy and myself sufficient for the protection of his animals and other supplies.

Lieutenants Whipple and Craig, with a detachment of recruits, have arrived at Fort Thorn, where an officer was ordered to be in readiness to march them to Fort Buchanan.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN GARLAND,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieut. Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army.

No. 6.—*General Garland to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, March 1, 1858.

COLONEL: Since my report of the 31st January I have the honor to state, for the information of the General-in-Chief, that our peaceful relations with the Indians have been disturbed, and, I regret to say, by the bad conduct of some of our own citizens. On the 5th of last month two Mexicans, whose names are known, followed a small party of Navajoes from Albuquerque and in its immediate vicinity killed a woman and wounded one man. The woman was robbed of money and

goods; this was a wanton and unprovoked affair, which has greatly exasperated this formidable tribe of Indians.

Early in this month another horrible outrage was perpetrated upon a party of Mezcalero Apaches in and about the town of Doña Ana by citizens of Mesilla; for particulars I enclose reports of Lieutenant Colonel Miles and Lieutenant Alley, 3d infantry, marked "A;" this will doubtless give us much trouble. See report of Lieutenant Colonel Miles, marked "B." Another band of this tribe belonging to Texas made an effort to settle in the vicinity of Fort Stanton, but I have caused them to be driven off; they have taken shelter in the Guadalupe mountains.

The Kiowas are also assuming a hostile attitude; see letters of Colonel Loring with enclosure, marked "C." It is my intention to open a communication with these people by means of one of their chiefs, now a prisoner at Fort Union.

Several chiefs of the Navajoes and Utah tribes are expected here in a few days to arrange terms of peace among themselves. I will take advantage of the occasion to ascertain to what extent the Mormons have tampered with them.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
JNO. GARLAND,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, New York.

FORT FILLMORE, N. M., *February 8, 1858.*

SIR: I respectfully report that in obedience to the instructions of the commanding officer, I this day proceeded to Doña Ana and Mesilla, making diligent inquiries from all reliable sources with the view of informing myself as to the correctness of certain reports which called forth the orders under which I acted, having reference to alleged outrages committed by Mexicans upon the Mezcalero Apaches living on terms of amity with the inhabitants of the former place. At the little settlement of *Tortugas* about four miles from this post, and nearly opposite Mesilla, I was informed that the Indians had passed on Saturday night with animals stolen from that vicinity. In Las Cruces I could gather no other information respecting the subject other than that inducing me to believe that the perpetrators of the alleged outrage were actuated by wantonness. The people of Doña Ana with whom I had occasion to make inquiries concerning the matter, asserted that certain people from Mesilla came into the town in a riotous and wanton manner, and without warning commenced an indiscriminate attack upon the Indians, killing and wounding them even after they had taken refuge in the houses of certain citizens. It was related to me that the Mexicans had pursued the trail of the Indians to a camp about three miles from Doña Ana, where some of

the tribe were living, and after killing three Indians came into the town in a condition of semi-intoxication, following women and children who were fleeing there for protection. It seems to be a subject of complaint from the people of Doña Ana that the peace of the town should be thus violated. Some of the Indians had endeavored to conceal themselves in the house of a Mexican, who with his sons and wife with arms, successfully forbade the entrance of the party, the chief of which, upon being so repulsed, summoned the protector of the Indians to appear with them at a certain hour in Mesilla, which summons he did not obey. I saw two women, one a very old one, both badly wounded, and was told that the bodies of three women most horribly mutilated by the Mexicans were buried to-day.

From the best sources of information I could obtain, I gather that this Mexican band is held in high esteem by the people of Mesilla; a party that seems to be constantly held in readiness to pursue Indians, retake stolen property from them, and when not employed on active service of this nature enjoying certain civil privileges in that town; they are known as the "Mesilla Guard."

I believe, as the result of my inquiries, that eight or nine Indians principally women were killed, two women wounded, and one child taken captive and carried into Mesilla.

I would also add that it seems the Mezcaleros, or a portion of the tribe at least, are permitted by the Indian agent to come into and linger about Doña Ana.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. W. ALLEY,
First Lieutenant 3d Infantry.

Lieutenant J. McL. HILDK,
3d Infantry, Post Adjutant, Fort Fillmore, N. M.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT FILLMORE,
New Mexico, February 18, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the gratification to repeat that so far the Mezcaleric Apaches have not made an attack on the people of Mesilla, as apprehended. They, on the 15th instant, came into Doña Ana about one hundred strong, fully intent on attacking Mesilla; fortunately Doctor Steck was present, who told them if they did I would attack them and carry the war into their country; that they must wait and abide the decision of the United States court, &c. After this they retired and said they would return to Fort Stanton and remain quietly there.

Doctor Steck informed me that the chief, Gomez, told him the Mesilla volunteers killed the celebrated marauder Shaw-o-na, when they attacked the Mezcaleric camp.

I am, major, respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. MILES,
Lieutenant Colonel 5th Infantry, commanding post.

Major W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General, Santa Fé, New Mexico.

FORT UNION, NEW MEXICO,
February 23, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to enclose a report made by Lieutenant Du Bois, rifles, on his return from the plains. The Kioways seem to be hostile from various quarters. I hear that they threaten retaliation for the recent killing of the party near Fort Craig.

They have learned that we have the wounded Kioway at this post. Very respectfully, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
W. W. LORING,

Colonel Rifle Regiment, commanding post.

Major W. A. NICHOLS,
Assistant Adjutant General, Department New Mexico.

FORT UNION, NEW MEXICO,
February 23, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that while in camp on the Cimarron on the 17th instant in charge of the mail escort, I received information from a party of Comanches, that two Mexican citizens of New Mexico, had been murdered by the Kiowas, and that a third severely wounded was a captive among them. They were traders for a small party of Comanches and murdered for their property.

The same day the mail party halted a few miles behind the escort, disobeying my order in so doing, and were driven into my camp by the hostile conduct of the Kiowas. The mail party reported that when the escort was absent the Kiowa spies signaled their movements, and by the time they were again on the road about one hundred mounted Kiowas charged upon them, and followed them until they approached the escort again.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN V. DU BOIS,
2d Lieutenant Rifles.

J. G. TILFORD,
2d Lieutenant Rifles, Adjutant.

No. 7.—*General Garland to General Johnston.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, N. M., March 13, 1858.

COLONEL: My despatch to you of the 24th January intended to be sent by a confidential agent, was delayed in consequence of a rumor which reached me of the arrival of Captain Marcy at Fort Massachusetts. On the arrival of the captain at these headquarters, he handed me your letter which I have answered and forwarded by him. I write now to inform you that the captain has fully accomplished the object of his visit to this department, and has no doubt left Fort

Union on his return to Utah before this date. He required but 100 men as additional escort, which number was put at his disposal under the command of Captain Bowman, 3d infantry. Captain Marcy returns by a different route from the one by which he came. Please hasten back the express-man with such information as you may think safe to communicate. Some Utah chiefs were here by invitation yesterday. Kit Carson, their agent, is satisfied that you have nothing to apprehend from their association with the Mormons. They have determined to wage fierce war upon the Navajoes. The Kiowa Indians, will I fear give me some trouble this spring.

Very respectfully, &c.,

JNO. GARLAND,
Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Colonel A. S. JOHNSTON,
*2d Cavalry, Commanding Utah Army,
Camp Scott near Fort Bridger, U. T.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF UTAH,
Camp Scott, U. T., April 25, 1858.

Official:

F. J. PORTER,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 8.—*General Garland to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, March 31, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt on the 22d instant of the telegraphic despatch from the headquarters of the army, under date of 1st instant, informing me that Colonel Johnston, commanding in Utah, had reported that the Mormons intended intercepting Captain Marcy on his return from New Mexico to Utah, and directing me to see that he is strongly escorted on his return march, &c., &c.

I have the honor to report that I have received a communication from Captain Marcy, dated 22d instant, camp near the Purgatoire. He was getting along very well, and had been advised through Colonel Loring of the above information.

I have ordered in addition to Captain Bowman's company of infantry, one of horse and two of infantry, the horse company to be drawn from Fort Union, the infantry companies from the post of Albuquerque, to escort him to the army in Utah; well provided with all necessary requirements.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. GARLAND,
Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army, New York.*

No. 9—*General Garland to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, May 1, 1858.

COLONEL: For the information of the lieutenant general commanding the army, I have the honor to report that the additional escort of three companies under Colonel Loring, for the greater security of Captain Marcy's party, arrived at Red river on the 15th of April, having been delayed a few days by heavy snow storms. Colonel Loring's command, taken from this department, after joining Captain Marcy will consist of eighty-five mounted rifles and two hundred and five infantry; added to this Captain Marcy has forty regular troops and about eighty armed employés, making in all over four hundred fighting men. The express which I sent to Colonel Johnston's camp some time since has not returned, although sufficient time has elapsed for it to have done so.

A settlement was commenced by a Mr. Watrous, some time last fall, on the Red river near the eastern boundary of New Mexico, which has been broken up by the Comanches, one man killed, the houses burned, and stock driven off. This was expected by many, and Mr. Watrous was advised not to undertake a settlement so distant from protection.

A company of mounted rifles from Fort Stanton is now examining into this outrage and giving protection to our eastern frontier. If there were any spare troops they would immediately occupy the place which has been broken up, in order to keep both the Comanches and Kiowas quiet.

A portion of the Navajoes continue to be restless, and Major Brooks desires to be reinforced with one company. There are now three companies at his post, Fort Defiance, and there is no disposable company at this time to send him. The withdrawal of two companies from Fort Buchanan, for services in California, is embarrassing to me at this time. I had intended to change the location of that post to a point near the San Pedro river, which would be in striking distance of Tucson and the great western mail route, besides the advantage of being in nearer proximity to the marauding Indians of the Gila.

An unpleasant occurrence has recently taken place in the immediate vicinity of Fort Thorn. See copy of Lieutenant Wood's report herewith. Judge Benedict has ordered the sheriff of Socorro county to bring up the prisoners to the town of Socorro for examination, to which end he has himself gone down.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. GARLAND,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Ass't Adj't General, Headquarters of the Army, New York.

HEADQUARTERS FORT THORNE,
New Mexico, April 17, 1858.

MAJOR: I have the honor to report, for the information of the general commanding the department, that this morning about daybreak a party of armed Mexicans from Messilla charged into the Indian camp at this Indian agency, near this place, and butchered, indiscriminately, men, women, and children.

Immediately on ascertaining what was going on I ordered the garrison under arms, and while the rifles were saddling up went out with the infantry and succeeded in capturing the whole party, about half a mile from the post, as they were retreating with a number of little children whom they had made captives. In a few minutes Lieutenant Howland, with as many of his men as he had been able in the great hurry to mount, came up, and the prisoners, thirty-six in number, including their leader, one Juan Ortega, were marched into the garrison, disarmed, and placed under a strong guard, where they still remain.

After disposing of the prisoners, a party was sent out to collect the dead bodies. They soon returned, bringing in seven, three men, three women, and one boy, all of whom we interred in the rear of our burying ground. Three of the wounded, two women and one boy, have been placed in the hospital.

Upon the first alarm the Indians fled in every direction, seeking shelter and protection. Mr. Tully, at the Indian agency, Mr. Beck, living at the island, and another American, living at the ranch, each were fortunate enough to save a number of lives. As some of the Indians were pursued into the river bottom, where they had fled to hide among the trees, it is feared that a number were killed whose bodies have not yet been found. Parties are still out in search.

This affair is but a repetition of the horrible massacre recently perpetrated at Doña Ana. To show the temerity with which they acted, I have only to state that one of the women was pursued and killed within five hundred yards of the fort, to which place she was evidently running for protection.

These Indians for the last four or five months have been at peace and on friendly terms with all in this vicinity; have been daily in and about the garrison, quiet and well behaved, and I sincerely believe have given no cause for this cowardly outrage. It is, moreover, extremely unfortunate that this affair has occurred at the present time, as their agent, Dr. Steck, to whom they yield ready obedience, is temporarily absent on business connected with his agency.

While waiting for further information from the general commanding the department, and hoping the action I have already taken in this matter will meet with his approval, I have the honor to remain, Major, your obedient servant,

W. H. WOOD,

First Lieutenant 3d Infantry, Commanding Post.

Major W. A. NICHOLS,

Assistant Adjutant General, U. S. A., Santa Fé, N. M.

No. 10.—*General Garland to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, May 31, 1858.

COLONEL: In making up my monthly report, for the information of the commanding general of the army, I regret that there is nothing very definite or satisfactory to communicate.

Having heard nothing from Colonel Johnston, or the confidential information imparted to him, I am forced to believe that the express man has either perished in the snows of the Rocky mountains, or fallen into the hands of the Mormons.

Nothing official has been heard of Colonel Loring since he crossed the Arkansas. By private but reliable information I learn that a disastrous snow storm, on the 29th of April, overtook and paralyzed his command for a few days at a point between the Arkansas and La Platte rivers, but that the lost animals were mostly recovered, and the command again put in motion.

The Indians in the Gadsden Purchase are becoming troublesome, and I can, at present, give no more troops in that quarter without breaking up Fort Fillmore, the least important post now occupied by the troops in this department.

The United States deputy surveyors are pressing their labors so far into the Indian country as to cause serious apprehensions of hostilities. Whether or not this is judicious, without previous understanding with the several tribes, through their proper agents, is not a matter for my judgment, but I am desirous to know how far it will be proper for me to go in protecting surveys thus conducted.

I have the honor to be, Colonel, your obedient servant,

JNO. GARLAND,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army, N. Y.

No. 11.—*Mr. McCarty to the Secretary of War.*

WASHINGTON, *May 31, 1858.*

SIR: I enclose a copy of a petition sent to the commanding officer of the ninth military department, together with a copy of his reply, and I respectfully ask the attention of the department thereto.

The general, in his reply, speaks of "acts of outrage committed upon the Indians by citizens." I have never heard of any hostilities on the part of the Indians having been provoked by acts of outrage on the part of citizens of Arizona, nor do I believe any such cases have ever occurred there.

I would also call the attention of the department to a most gross outrage committed by the officer commanding Fort Thorne. Thirty-

five citizens of the Mesilla valley have been seized by him and confined in the guard-house of the fort. The friends of the imprisoned men sued out a writ of habeas corpus, and had it served upon the officer. He, as is customary with the army in New Mexico, set the civil authority at defiance, and refused to obey the writ or release the prisoners.

I hope such orders will be issued to the military authorities as will prevent a recurrence of such outrages.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JUSTUS J. McCARTY.

HON. SECRETARY OF WAR,
Washington.

DOÑA ANA COUNTY, *March 24, 1858.*

SIR: The undersigned, citizens of the county of Doña Ana, have heard with great surprise and regret that it is your intention to evacuate the post of Fillmore, and that your intentions in this are based upon information you have received that the people of Doña Ana county, and particularly those residing in the Mesilla valley, consider themselves amply able to protect themselves against the hostile Indians, who are continually, almost daily, committing depredations upon our property. This is a grievous error. So far from feeling ourselves able to sustain and protect ourselves without the aid of the government troops under your command, we most earnestly desire that the troops may not be removed from Fort Fillmore, but that an additional force of mounted men be sent to our assistance—more requisite now than ever before.

The continued depredations upon our property, particularly upon the western side of the Rio Grande, by the Gila Apaches and those residing in the Florida mountains and near the Mexican line, keep us in a state of excitement and alarm.

Our losses are numerous and serious, for most of those who lose their animals lose that upon which they principally rely for support.

The people of this county are poor; it can hardly be said that there is a wealthy man residing within its limits; and being thus poor, almost daily deprived of their means of support, and there being no mounted force at Fort Fillmore to pursue and chastise the marauding Indians, the citizens of the towns of Mesilla and La Mesa have felt it imperatively necessary to form a company of mounted men, who, in consideration of their constant readiness to pursue at a moment's warning, are relieved from acequia and "road fatigue," or labor. This company has several times followed the Indians; have killed some Indians, and have recovered, at various times, a portion of the property stolen from us; but the statement of barbarous atrocities having been committed by the people living in Doña Ana, as published in the Santa Fé Gazette, are grossly exaggerated and false. However efficient this company may be, we cannot depend upon it for our

safety. General, we need the presence of your troops; there is no county in the Territory more exposed, or more in want of military protection, than Doña Ana, and we respectfully assure you that if you adhere to your intention of evacuating Fort Fillmore the result will be most disastrous, not only to the residents of the county but to travellers over its roads.

We beg you to consider the peculiarly exposed condition of this county, with the Mescaleros, and occasional bands of Kioways and Comanches, in the east; and the Gila and Mexican Indians, on the west, are, whatever may be their protestations of friendship, deadly enemies of the whites, and particularly of those residing on the western bank of the Rio Grande, for the plain reason that since the settlement of the Mesilla valley they have not been allowed to enter its town to buy *whiskey, powder, lead, &c.*

We ask you, General, to reconsider your intentions as expressed, and not deprive us of that protection under which, since you first raised the flag of our country in the Mesilla, have grown up large and flourishing towns, and where farms and hamlets, and a sturdy, industrious population, have sprung into existence.

We ask you not to deprive us of that protection we need, and, with all proper respect, we claim to be our due.

You will notice, in a copy of a letter addressed by Colonel Miles to the probate judge of the county, which is herewith sent, that Colonel Miles advises the prefect to "*warn the inhabitants of Mesilla of the impending storm that apparently will soon break over them, and guard close, with watchful care, their flocks and themselves.*"

He further says: "*At any alarm of danger I will come to your assistance with whatever troops I can spare from this fort; you know I have but two foot companies, and shall not be able to make pursuit with any probability of success in overtaking.*"

In reply to this the prefect remarks: "*As to exciting the revenge of the whole Apache nation, we have but little to fear, and we are ready to meet 'the impending storm' that may at any time break over us, and now, more than ever, that we have the promise of the colonel commanding Fort Fillmore that he will assist in our defence.*"

These extracts will, we trust, assure you, that although we may have in our country a mounted force of minute men to pursue our enemies, it is the presence and certainty of aid from the United States forces which gives us confidence in our ability to sustain ourselves.

We also submit an incomplete list of names of persons residing on the western side of the Rio Grande, in this county, who have lost property by Indians within the last six or eight months; some of the property has been recovered, but most of it is irrecoverably lost; this list, numbering nearly two hundred head of cattle, horses, &c., could be largely increased, verified by ample testimony of its truth, had we now time; but even this will suffice to convince you that we are seriously depredated upon by the Apache tribe.

In conclusion, we are convinced that if you will station a company of mounted troops here there will be but very little occasion for the services of the volunteers, who will be very happy to be relieved

from an onerous and expensive duty, which takes them from their farms and workshops, and cripples their ability to labor for the support of themselves and their families.

With great respect, we remain your fellow-citizens,

[Signed by six hundred and thirty-four citizens.]

Brevet Brigadier General JOHN GARLAND, U. S. A.,
Commanding Military Department of New Mexico.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, April 7, 1858.

GENTLEMEN: I am in receipt of your numerously signed petition, comprising six hundred names, for the retention not only of the present garrison of Fort Fillmore, two companies, but requesting an additional company mounted. The request cannot, in the present condition of affairs, be complied with. Two of the mounted companies at Fort Buchanan have been ordered out of this department; one hundred mounted men have been detached from Fort Union for the Salt Lake, Utah; and a company of mounted men ordered from Fort Stanton to the Red river where a settlement has been recently broken up by the Comanches. With respect to the retention of the two companies at Fort Fillmore, I cannot now speak positively, but will maturely consider the matter. It must be borne in mind that the Mesilla is the strongest settlement in New Mexico, and that there are two posts with mounted men, each within forty miles of the town. With every disposition to protect the lives and property of the inhabitants residing in this department, I regret to be compelled to say that instead of receiving aid from the citizens hostilities have in some cases been provoked by their acts of outrage upon the Indians.

Whilst I shall be ever prompt to protect the innocent and helpless, it is proper for me to say that those of our citizens who perpetrate acts of violence and outrage, such as have been represented to me, have no claim to the protection of the military, and will receive none.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. GARLAND,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Messrs. CHARLES A. HOPPIN, JAMES A. LUCAS, and others.

Mesilla, New Mexico.

No. 12.—*General Garland to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, August 1, 1858.

COLONEL: The enclosed reports from Brevet Major Brooks, 3d infantry, commanding Fort Defiance, marked A and B, will apprise Lieutenant General Scott, commanding the army, of the critical con-

dition of affairs in the country of the Navajo Indians. These Indians have assumed a boldness in their forays of late which forces upon me the necessity of opening a campaign against them with not less than one thousand men; they are understood to number two thousand five hundred warriors. I have already ordered a mounted company from Fort Stanton and a foot company from Fort Craig, to repair to Albuquerque in order to escort supplies for Fort Defiance, and if necessary to join its garrison. As soon as Colonel Loring returns I design to send two fresh companies from Fort Union, and a company of infantry from Cantonment Burgwin, to take part at Abiquie, to be joined whenever necessary by a company of guides and spies.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. GARLAND,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army, N. Y.

HEADQUARTERS FORT DEFIANCE,

July 15, 1858.

SIR: For the full understanding of our relations with the Navajoes I propose to relate in their order the events of the past week. Up to the 7th instant our relations continued as reported on the 1st of the month. On the 7th instant I established a hay camp at the pond on the other end of this cañon. The next morning two of the men came in and reported the camp had been fired into by Indians with arrows during the night. I immediately proceeded to the camp; that eight arrows had been fired, one of them killing a dog, and three others entering the tent, one of them going into the bed of the man *said* to have been on post. Nothing could be discovered as to the number of Indians engaged; as no particular damage beyond the insult was done, and as an Indian had been fired upon by a sentinel in the garrison to *scare* him away from a target, where he was picking up old bullets and balls, I made no complaint of the matter to Sarcillo Largo and some other chiefs who were in the garrison a few days afterwards, merely cautioning them that it might be a dangerous experiment to try again. On Monday an Indian came into garrison and hung around for three or four hours, trying to sell a couple of blankets, or more likely waiting the opportunity that finally presented itself. Having sold a blanket to a camp woman, and within thirty yards of the door of my quarters, he saw my servant boy, Jim, (a slave,) coming towards him and pass in rear of the camp woman's quarters; as Jim was about to pass him the Indian jumped upon his horse, and as soon as Jim's back was turned he fired an arrow, which passed under the boy's shoulder-blade into the lungs. The Indian immediately put whip to his horse and left over the hill. The boy, strange to say, never uttered a word or exclamation, but attempted to pull the arrow out, in doing which he broke it off near the head;

the head of the arrow remained in the body, the doctor being unable to extract it; the boy is still alive, but there is no doubt he is mortally wounded. I think this act may be well characterized as one of greater atrocity than that committed in 1854, and reported by Major Kendrick in his letter of October 8 of that year. The boy maintains, and all believe his statement, that he never did anything to the Indian, did not speak to him, and thinks he never saw him before.

The next day I sent for Sarcillo Largo, and demanded that the assassin should be given up to us. He at first wavered—said perhaps the boy would not die. I told him it made no difference; the Indian shot to kill, and he must be given up. After various pretexts, he said that he was then on his way Zuñi; that on his return he would attend to it; that he would send after him. On my expressing dissatisfaction with so much delay, he provokingly replied that I ought not to be in such a hurry; that it was six weeks since I had killed Mannelito's cattle, and I had done nothing yet towards paying for them. I gave him well to understand that I would not pay for his cattle, nor would I allow it to be the slightest offset for shooting the boy. In the conversation I had tried to picture to him the consequences of a war to his people, and that it would be certainly made on them if they did not give up the murderer. On leaving, he asked if we would send to Laguna Negra to receive the Indian, when they had caught him. I told him I would; but none of us felt any hope or confidence that he would do anything in the business. It is thought the Indian is not what is called a *pelado*, but a man of independence, and hence this hesitancy of the rich or influential men of the tribe to take any steps that might commit them with their own people.

Two hours after Sarcillo Largo left the garrison, Lieutenant Averell with his company arrived, giving us a surprise not the less agreeable because it was unlooked for. From the conduct of the Indians I think they could hardly have been aware of his approach.

I sent Lieutenant Averell with his company, yesterday, as a guard to the hay party at La Joya, for which duty I had previously detailed Captain McLane and his company. I have commenced haying full early, but the season admits of it earlier than usual. The crops of hay may not be as heavy as in some other years; but if we do not get two crops in some places we hope to make up the loss of hay by the grazing the grounds will yield. The hay secured, we have a force at once ready to take the field.

I received by the hands of Lieutenant Averell special orders No. 60, and your communications of the 24th ultimo. Until the effect produced by the arrival of Lieutenant Averell on the Navajoes is known I shall not ask for any more reinforcements. In the mean time I will continue with all expedition our haying, and make such preparation as lies within us for taking the field. We have at the post only four months' provisions after this month for the garrison proper. An additional supply will be necessary with the arrival of more troops. If a campaign becomes necessary, and I can see no alternative, I would respectfully call attention to Major Kendrick's suggestions, as communicated in his letters of October and November,

1854. In addition, I would respectfully suggest that, if possible, the Utahs be encouraged to repeat their expeditions into the country, for they appear to have inspired the Navajoes with a dread not to be gotten over. I have been asked by Sarcillo Largo what I would do in case the Utahs would come this far into their country, as they have threatened. I replied I would aid whichever tribe that showed itself to be our best friends. I don't think it would be at all practicable to attempt to wage war against a particular band of this nation, and not with all, as Major Kendrick seemed to think might be necessary.

July 16.—The boy Jim died this morning. I have delayed the mail thus late with the double purpose of receiving the mail for Albuquerque and of knowing the fate of the boy. The mail is not in. Our requisitions for cartridges for the rifles have not been filled; the train now due may have ammunition for us. With the exception of rifle cartridges, (new pattern,) there is a good supply of ammunition at the post for the command now here.

Although I have said I would not at present ask for more reinforcements, yet it would add to our confidence in ourselves to know that a supporting force was as near to us as the Rio Grande, to rely upon in case of actual hostilities.

Very respectfully,

W. T. H. BROOKS,

Captain 3d Infantry and Brevet Major, Commanding Post.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Department New Mexico.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, August 1, 1858.

Official copy :

W. CRAIG,

2d Lieutenant 8th Infantry, Aid-de-Camp.

HEADQUARTERS FORT DEFIANCE,

July 22, 1858.

SIR: I take advantage of the return to the river of Dr. Connelley's train to say, day before yesterday I sent word to Sarcillo Largo, and the other chiefs of the Navajoes, that I wanted to see them so as to have a talk with them on our present difficulties, for them to set upon the day, some day of this week. Sarcillo Largo and Hemero came in yesterday. It was by Juan, our late interpreter, that I sent for the chief, and he came in with Sarcillo Largo. I doubt if any other of the chiefs had been notified, though Sarcillo Largo said that he was authorized to speak for the others.

The conversation held with Sarcillo Largo gives no good reason to hope that they will surrender the murderer of the boy Jim, though he said he would make an effort. I required the surrender of the Indian within twenty days, ten days having elapsed since the outrage

was perpetrated, making in all, the same time they were engaged in delivering the Indian demanded by Major Kendrick in 1854.

To-day I learned from Juan Lucoro, a very reliable man, I think, for an Indian, that the murderer belongs to Castaur's band; that his people say they will die before they surrender him; that it is not their custom. This band are now in the Yunecha mountains. It seems the murderer belongs to a family of influence; the man given up to Major Kendrick they say was a peon, which makes a great difference to them.

I am forced to the conclusion that war with them is inevitable. It seems they have been threatened with punishment, that the idea has lost its terror. I would therefore respectfully suggest that arrangements be made for a large force to take the field against the Navajoes not later than in September, earlier if practicable.

My own knowledge of their country is too limited to make any suggestions in regard to the routes to be followed by the troops. At this season of the year I presume it practicable, so far as water is concerned, to take any route, either from Abiquie or Jemez. In the mean time I hope every encouragement will be given to the Utahs of Abiquie to repeat their raids. I have no doubt that a very sufficient force of Mexicans could be had under the name of guides and spies, under suitable commanders, that for a promise of booty could be employed at a very low price, without some of the objections attending the calling into service regularly organized companies of volunteers.

By our next mail I am in hopes of being able to communicate something more definite. I have brought all the hay there is at La Joya, and have cut all that can be cut for the next two or three weeks.

Lieutenant Averell's company remains at La Joya on account of the grazing.

Very respectfully,

W. T. H. BROOKS,

Brevet Major, and Commanding Post.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Department of New Mexico.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, July 31, 1858.

Official copy:

W. CRAIG,

2d Lieutenant 8th Infantry, A. D. C.

13.—*General Garland to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, August 8, 1858.

COLONEL: The country east of the Pecos river as far as the Canadian, has been recently surveyed down to the western boundary of Texas, and is represented to be a fine country for agricultural pur-

poses. It embraces a favorite haunt of the Comanche and Kiowa Indians, who occasionally depredate upon the eastern settlements of New Mexico. There is a mail route established from Neosho, Missouri, to Albuquerque, which must, of necessity, pass near the entrance of Utah creek into the Canadian. Near to this point it is desirable, for the reasons above stated, to establish a military post with a garrison of not less than four companies, which number cannot, at this time, be withdrawn from other parts of this department without leaving too much exposed the settlements, now protected by the presence of our troops. If this suggestion should meet the approbation of the commanding general of the army, I hope to obtain the authority of the War Department as well as the means of carrying it into effect.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. GARLAND,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieut. Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, N. Y.

No. 14.—*Colonel Miles to the Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS NAVAJO EXPEDITION,

Fort Defiance, September 3, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report, in obedience to department order (special) No. 73, present series, I arrived at this post on yesterday afternoon in command of company "A," mounted rifles, Captain Elliott and Lieutenant Lane, and 59 rank and file; and company "C," 5th infantry, Second Lieutenant Hildt, and 65 rank and file.

On the 29th ultimo Captain McLane, mounted rifles, while passing Bear Spring, was attacked by a party of Navajoes; he reports he killed six or eight, and was wounded in the right side himself, which will disable him for the next twenty days. This fight has precipitated matters, and makes war inevitable. I shall commence operations in the field on the 8th instant with 310 rank and file, leaving at this post, under Brevet Major Brooks, 5th infantry, a force of 120 rank and file. These Indians, it is stated, can bring from 1,500 to 2,000 warriors into the field; report says they have assembled at Cañon de Chēy. I shall march to meet them wherever they may be found.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. MILES,

Lieut. Col. 3d Infantry, Comd'g Navajo Expedition.

Colonel S. COOPER,

Adjutant General, Washington City, D. C.

No. 15.—*General Garland to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa F, September 5, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to enclose, for the information of the General-in-Chief, a copy of the report of Colonel Loring, now on his return from the Salt Lake valley.

With the exception of the Navajoes, the Indians of this department have been unusually quiet. There are at this time seven companies at Fort Defiance, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Miles, 3d infantry, and three additional ones ready to move for the same destination in the event of hostilities. It was my intention to have gone in person to the Navajo country, but my health has not been sufficiently good during the past summer to engage in any such enterprise.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN GARLAND,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, N. Y.

HEADQUARTERS ON CAM-POR-GRE CREEK,
August 20, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report the arrival of my command at this creek on its return from Utah. After marching with the army of Utah through Great Salt Lake City, it encamped with it at Camp Floyd, in Cedar valley, about forty miles from the city, until the 19th of July, when it was relieved and ordered to return to your department. The route was to the west and south of Lake Utah, up Salt river, through the Wasatch mountains, across the St. Raphael, Green, Blue, and Grand rivers. We have to-day crossed Grand river at a ford near the mountains, having been so fortunate as to cross the other large streams in the same way, and have thus far overcome our greatest difficulties, the only one of any consequence remaining in the Sawatch mountains; this we shall pass over in a few days. The guide informs me that he can strike the Rio del Norte in San Luis valley, and follow the river down to near the mouth of the Trinchera, leaving Fort Massachusetts some distance to our left, getting a better and much nearer road than going the other way. The saving of distance, however short, to a command after a long and arduous march, being of great importance, I hope to arrive at Costilla in about eighteen or twenty days, possibly less time. I propose, unless ordered to the contrary, to send Captain Bowman with his company to Fort Massachusetts; when passing that station, Captain Trevitt and Lieutenant Shipley from the vicinity of Toros to Albuquerque, and the rifles with my headquarters to Fort Union, the stations from which we were

ordered upon leaving New Mexico. The employés have engaged to be discharged at Fort Union and Albuquerque.

We have from to-day commissary supplies for twenty-eight days, for the entire command, I think sufficient to take us to our stations.

We have marched up to this camp four hundred and twenty-one miles from Camp Floyd.

If it is possible to order grain for us, along the way from Fort Massachusetts, it will be of great service to our animals, and enable us to bring them into the department in better condition for future use.

Respectfully, I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,

Colonel Rifle Regiment, commanding.

Major W. A. NICHOLS,

Asst. Adj. Gen., Department of New Mexico, Santa Fé.

P. S. We have in all about five hundred animals.

W. W. L.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, September 5, 1858.

Official copy :

W. A. NICHOLS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 16.—*Colonel Loring to the Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS, &c., ON CAMP-PO-GEE CREEK,
August 20, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to inform you that I arrived at this camp to-day, twelve miles from Grand river, with the command for New Mexico, having crossed that river this morning, the last of the three large streams on our route. The only difficulty now is in the Sawatch mountain, and that we shall cross in a few days.

We have marched, since leaving Camp Floyd on the 19th of July, four hundred and twenty-one miles, and shall arrive at the settlements in less than 20 days.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. LORING,

Colonel Rifle Regiment, commanding.

Colonel SAMUEL COOPER,

Adjutant General United States Army, Washington.

No. 17.—*Colonel Bonneville to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, N. M., September 22, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report that on the 15th instant General Garland, Major Nichols, and Captain Easton left this department, and on the 16th I assumed the command.

To-day we received information from Colonel Miles, 3d infantry, in command of the troops in the vicinity of the Navajo Indians, bearing date of the 8th instant. He states the Indians attempted to deceive him by bringing in the dead body of a Mexican boy, recognized as that of a captain amongst them, as the murderer of Major Brooks' servant; that a council was held shortly after, and negotiations closed. Colonel Miles immediately took the field with a column of about three hundred men, and nothing had been heard from him on the 14th instant, the day the express left. I had already taken preliminary steps for bringing together the available strength of the department; his excellency Governor Rencher and the superintendent of Indian affairs, Colonel Collins, agreeing with me in the imperative necessity of chastising these Indians, not only for the failure to deliver the murderer, but also for their repeated depredations on the settlements.

Colonel Miles requests that a volunteer force may be raised, but I do not think it will be necessary.

Major Backus and the recruits have not arrived.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. L. E. BONNEVILLE,
Colonel 3d Infantry, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assist. Adj. Gen., Headquarters of the Army, West Point, N. Y.

No. 18.—*Colonel Bonneville to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, October 1, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor herewith to transmit, for the information of the lieutenant general commanding the army, the following documents relating to affairs with the Navajo Indians:

Paper marked A—Copy of instructions from the superintendent of Indian affairs to Mr. Yost, agent for the Navajoes.

B and C—Copies of the agent's reports to the superintendent, wherein the agent, after having held a council with the Navajoes, closes all negotiations and turns them over to the military for chastisement.

D—Copy of Lieutenant Colonel Miles' report of the 8th instant, informing the department commander of his taking the field.

E—Copy of my instructions thereupon, approving his course, in consequence of the murder of a Mexican captive and the bringing of the dead body into Fort Defiance, and offering it as the body of the murderer demanded; and the fact that the agent had closed all negotiations and placed the subject in the hands of the military.

F—Copy of Lieutenant Colonel Miles' report of his scout in and about the Cañon de Chilly.

G—Copy of my instructions thereupon, approving his operations and directing him to continue, but at the same time not to allow any opportunity of terminating hostilities to escape; and in case the mur-

derer should be delivered up, directing him to be sent here, with witnesses, to be turned over to the civil authorities for trial.

I have thus been minute, at the risk of being prolix, in order that the general may be perfectly advised of the state in which affairs stand with the Navajo nation.

The lieutenant general is aware that at the time I came in command of the department, September 16, hostilities had already commenced. Negotiations, however, were still pending, and, as a precautionary measure, I issued orders for the troops most distant to approach, to support the negotiations, defend the settlements, and, if necessary, to take the field. The war had actually commenced before the companies arrived at the points assigned them.

Major Backus and the recruits joined on the 17th ultimo. The quartermaster and ordnance supplies, now much needed, are still on the road from Leavenworth to Union. On the arrival of the companies and supplies I will put a second column in the field, under Major Backus. This column to operate among the Navajo planting grounds, on and about the river San Juan, and the mouth of the Cañon de Chilly, with the view of forcing the Navajoes further south, towards the Rio Chiquito Colorado. Should this succeed my intention then is to operate in various columns from Fort Defiance, as a depot.

In continuation, I desire to inform the General-in-Chief that a band of Comanches have planted themselves upon the Canadian river, opposite Anton Chico, and created much alarm in that vicinity by their bad conduct. I have directed Colonel Loring, of the regiment of mounted rifles, to ascertain the facts, and if they are still there depredating, to punish them at once. The superintendent of Indian affairs informs me that a band of Utahs, near Abiquiu, have refused to leave that neighborhood, and are troublesome from constant intoxication. He fears he will have to call on me to remove them. As there are no reserves for Indians in this territory, the Indian has no home, no place of refuge, where he may remain unmolested by traders and settlements, with their numerous herds of cattle and sheep. It has been decided by the legislature that there is no Indian country within the territorial limits, which places all traders beyond control. Many of the difficulties with the Indians may be ascribed to the fact that they come to the settlements to trade, become intoxicated, and in their drunken frolics act badly. This must continue until Congress grant them reservations, within the limits of which they may be restrained, and protected from promiscuous traders and from the encroaching settlements and herds.

Captain Pope, of the Topographical Engineers, with his artesian well expedition, has arrived at Galisteo, eighteen miles from this place, where he intends to pass the winter in discharge of his duties. His estimate for six months, commencing on the 1st of October and ending March 31, 1859, including arrearages, amounts to thirty-five thousand dollars on the quartermaster's department. This, together with the supplies of subsistence stores and medical stores I am directed to furnish him, will add much to the expenses of the department.

I omitted to mention, in the former part of my letter, that Lieutenant Colonel Miles calls for the assistance of all the surrounding tribes of Indians—Utahs, Pueblos, Coyetons; and also for volunteers. The superintendent of Indian affairs does not approve of one tribe of Indians being brought into conflict with another. I do not consider volunteers necessary at this time; certainly not until all the available strength of the military shall have been tried in vain.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. L. E. BONNEVILLE,
Colonel 3d Infantry, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Asst. Adj. Genl., Headquarters of the Army, West Point, N. Y.

INDIAN SUPERINTENDENCY,
Santa Fé, New Mexico, August 13, 1858.

SIR: In assigning to your charge the important duties involved in the supervision and management of the several tribes of the Navajoes and the Indians of the Pueblo of Zúñi and the Moquis, I deem it proper to call your attention to the difficulty that now exists between the troops at Fort Defiance and the Navajoes. Should the demand recently made upon the nation for the delivery of the murderer of Major Brooks' servant be complied with, it will, of course, restore the parties to amicable relations.

To this end it will be proper for you to co-operate with Major Brooks in urging the surrender of the Indian. Since the demand has been made it should be adhered to unless there is some positive assurance that the culprit has left the nation and his delivery rendered impossible.

On your arrival at the fort you should, without delay, notify the principal chiefs to meet you in council, so that the nation may be advised of your presence, and that, as their agent, you are ready to defend and counsel them whenever they are disposed to be governed by reason and the principles of right.

If they wish to secure the confidence and favor of the government they must live in good faith with our people and cease their depredations.

You should be careful not to encourage the belief that the presents intended for them the present year will be delivered to them unless the difficulty with the troops is settled and we have some guaranty that the property stolen by them, after they received their annual presents last year, will be returned.

You are aware that the government has made no provision for feeding the Navajoes; your expenses, therefore, will be chiefly confined to the cost of travelling for yourself and interpreter. It may, on some special occasion, be necessary to give the chiefs a few articles of goods, but the amount should never exceed a few dollars.

It would perhaps be most proper, in view of this necessity, to

retain a few articles from their annual presents, such as tobacco, manta, and other useful articles, to be distributed from time to time during the year to the principal men. It will be proper, whenever you can do so without personal risk, to visit the Indians at their planting grounds and suggest such improvement as would, in your opinion, result to their benefit. Make yourself familiar with the principal men of the nation and try to secure their confidence and respect, to the end that they may, through your influence, be made to understand the object of the government in her kind and liberal policy towards them. Impress upon them the assurance that the presents which they annually receive are intended to better their condition, and not, as they may suppose, to buy their good behavior. But I need not enlarge upon these matters; your own good judgment will supply what should be said on this subject.

As regards the Indians of Zuñi and the Moquis, I presume that little of your time will be required with them. If Mr. Harley returns, unless I should be otherwise instructed, I may send him to Zuñi to co-operate with you in the important duties pertaining to the Navajo agency.

It is my intention, should it be deemed advisable to distribute the goods that are now on the road for the Navajoes, to be present when they are distributed. The goods will at any rate be sent out as soon after their arrival as freighters can be obtained.

I am advised by General Garland that a train of wagons with an escort will leave Albuquerque in about ten days. It is advisable that you avail yourself of that opportunity to go through to Fort Defiance, as it will be some time after that before another opportunity offers for your safe transit. Relying upon your sound judgment and discretion in everything relating to the delicate and important duties assigned you,

I remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. L. COLLINS,

Superintendent of Indian Affairs, New Mexico.

SAMUEL M. YOST, Esq.,

Indian Agent, New Mexico.

NAVAJO AGENCY,

Fort Defiance, August 31, 1858.

SIR: I deem it proper to make to you a statement of the origin of the present difficulties with the Indians of this agency, as near as I can to approximate authenticity. It seems that on the 12th of July last an Indian came into the garrison ostensibly to sell a pair of small blankets. He remained here during the greater part of the day, his conduct being rather unusual, and his manner nervous, uneasy, and somewhat suspicious. In the afternoon, he succeeded in selling the blankets to a woman whose place of employment was some fifteen yards from the residence of Major Brooks. The negro boy was pass-

ing near about the time the blankets were paid for, and in rear of the building. The Indian mounted his horse and started off, the negro boy's back being turned towards him. As he started, he let fly an arrow, which penetrated the person of the boy, and proved fatal. The boy had never spoken to the Indian, and asseverated on his dying bed that he had never, to his knowledge, seen him before, and had nothing in any way to do with him. The Indians say the murderer had had a difficulty some days before with one of his women. He wished her to go to some place with him, she refused, and at a dance he tore from her all the clothing that covered her person. She still refused; whereupon, to appease his feelings, he started out (as is the custom of the Navajo Indians) to kill some one outside of his nation. This he succeeded in doing in the person of the negro boy. The Indian returned to the place where his woman was, and she proceeded with him to the place originally desired by the Indian. I presume, had an opportunity presented itself, the victim of the outraged feeling of the Indian would as soon been the commander of the post as any one else.

This I deem a correct statement of the occurrence, all rumors to the contrary notwithstanding. The various versions of the affair which come to us in Santa Fé are entirely unfounded, and should receive no credence.

I am, respectfully, yours, &c.,

S. M. YOST,
Indian Agent.

Colonel JAMES L. COLLINS,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Santa Fé, New Mexico.

FORT DEFIANCE, NEW MEXICO,
Navajo Agency, September 3, 1858.

SIR: In obedience to your instructions, I left Santa Fé for this agency on the morning of the 24th ultimo, understanding that Captain McLane, of the rifles, would start from Albuquerque on the evening of the 25th. I hurried on to that point, in order to be ready to avail myself of the earliest opportunity to make a speedy journey to this post. My horse, on arriving at Albuquerque, not being in a condition to undertake the trip, I was compelled to hire another, which will be returned by the first suitable occasion, and the one I left at Albuquerque sent to Santa Fé as not adapted to the heavy service in this agency. After a four days' march of great rapidity and much uneasiness to me from Albuquerque we arrived here.

Captain McLane's force consisted of twelve men, which was joined at Cuvero by Captain Blas Lucero and his company of Mexican spies, composed of fifty men. We proceeded on our journey, at the rate of fifty miles each day, until the morning of the 29th, when we reached Bear spring about 9½ o'clock a. m. We there discovered a large number of Navajo Indians. Captain McLane, from information in his

possession, and the fact that no express had been despatched from Fort Defiance after the ten days for the demand for delivery of the murderer of Major Brooks' negro boy had expired, deemed it his duty to attack the Indians, which he determined to do immediately on seeing them. Four of his men and twenty Mexican spies were detailed for the attack, in company with whom I went to be a witness to the proceedings. The spring is approached from the road by a valley some two hundred yards wide, on either side of which and in front rise high hills covered with pine timber. As the attacking party galloped forward to the place where the Indians were encamped, they deployed off to the hills on the right and left and in front with a view, as I thought, to surround us and make a desperate fight. Those on the left and right kept out of sight, while those in front fired a volley of arrows, gave the warwhoop, and by gesture invited us on to an engagement. As the chief of the party was galloping up and down before his men, apparently giving commands and rallying them, Captain McLane fired a pistol shot at him from horseback, which seemed to amuse more than frighten them. The fire was instantly returned from our left without doing any damage, which was followed by a number of arrows from all sides, which did not reach us. Captain McLane gave the command to three of his men to dismount, and, with himself in the lead, pushed on the attack, felling the Indians at a distance of four hundred yards with much accuracy. Fatal shots at such a great distance took the Indians by surprise, and they quickly made for trees; occasionally they would run out, seemingly endeavoring to decoy the attacking party into a close or rather an ambush fight. While Captain McLane was aiming a shot at an Indian in front, one of those who had secreted himself on the left, one hundred and fifty yards distant, took deliberate aim at the captain's heart. The captain fired, struck, and, I presume, killed his man, and wheeled quickly to get another cartridge. Just as he turned the Indian fired, the ball striking the front part of the fifth rib of the right side, and passing round some two and a half inches, came out, leaving a severe but not fatal wound. The shock was so great that he staggered some ten paces, became very pale, and sick at the stomach, and in fact gave every outward indication of a speedy death. He was mounted on his horse, taken to the wagon, about half a mile off, and there nursed as well as the advantages and circumstances would allow until we arrived at Fort Defiance. During the fight, which lasted some ten or fifteen minutes, I remained on my horse immediately on the spot, and saw for myself the whole proceedings. But one or two of the spies dismounted. They all seemed anxious for the fight, and equally anxious for booty. They captured some twenty-five ponies, a number of blankets, and one Navajo Indian. I cannot say with any certainty how many were killed. I think, however, the number must be between six and ten, and three or four wounded Indians; also one or two horses.

On the night of the 29th Lucero and a part of his men encamped on the Puerco, while we pushed on to Fort Defiance, on account of Captain McLane's wounds. The Indians were around Lucero's camp

all night, and succeeded in stealing two horses, one of them with a saddle and pistol, while Lucero captured three more Indians and their ponies. I am under many obligations to Captain McLane for his exceeding kindness and attention to me in affording me messing and facilities for travelling, &c., while on the road to this agency. He manifested every courtesy of the gentleman, as well as such official regard as to make my trip agreeable and pleasant beyond my expectation, although tedious and painful to me physically.

Sandoval and three or four of his men came into the fort on the 31st. He reveals nothing specific as to the object of his visit. He said he would not go out among the Navajoes; he seemed afraid. On the 1st, Juan Lucero came in to see if Major Brooks was not satisfied, he alleging that two Indians had been killed in the engagement at Bear spring, (this is the only time they have admitted any were killed.) Major Brooks informed him that he was not satisfied, and would not be until the murderer was delivered up either dead or alive.

Colonel Miles arrived here to-day. He instructed Sandoval, in a conversation with him, to call as many of the chiefs together as he possibly could within five days, before which time active demonstration could not be commenced. I have no idea that any steps towards a pacification will be taken. The Indians will not give up the murderer, although I am satisfied he is close at hand. The friends of the murderer are far more numerous than the friends of peace. It is Colonel Miles' determination to commence operations on the 8th instant.

With this statement of facts I close this communication, apologizing for its inaccuracies and disconnectedness, for it is written in great haste and without time for copying.

I am, sir, very respectfully, yours, &c.,

S. M. YOST, *Indian Agent.*

Colonel JAS. L. COLLINS,

Superintendent Indian Affairs, Santa Fé, New Mexico.

HEADQUARTERS NAVAJO EXPEDITION,
Fort Defiance, New Mexico, September 8, 1858.

MAJOR : To-day was completed the block-house on the hill east of this fort, as its defence, and the necessary preparations for taking the field. In the several conferences I have had with the Navajoes, they were informed that this was the last day I would talk with them. Two days since, Sarcillo Largo came in and said he was now convinced we were in earnest, and that he would then say, what he never had before, that the murderer should be brought in; that the chiefs and headmen were after him in every direction. Sandoval is here, and expresses much concern at the near prospect of war; occasionally he would come in and say the murderer has been seen near Bear spring; another time he was in a cave near Laguna Negrita; at another time in some other place. This morning, with much parade, he rushed

through the garrison, stating, in his great haste, that the murderer was caught near Chusca yesterday afternoon. After a while, Sarcillo Largo and a few came in to say that the murderer, when captured, was desperately wounded, and had died last night, requesting a wagon to bring the dead body in. I told Major Brooks, as commander of the post, he should not give the wagon, but might send a mule to pack this dead body. He did so; and after some delay, with great display on the part of the Indians, the dead body was delivered to the major, who called in the attending surgeon, and all who knew the murderer, to identify him. Every individual witness, the moment he saw the body, pronounced it, unhesitatingly, an imposture; that it was not the murderer. Sarcillo Largo, with many chiefs, and some hundred of followers, are waiting my presence to go into council with them. I shall decline to do so, as their attempted deception makes them unworthy of further conference; but I send word to them, by Major Brooks, that their falsehood is exposed, and I will have nothing more to say to them. The result I will state when the council adjourns.

My orders No. 4 will inform you, on to-morrow morning I declare war, and march against these Indians, to find them where I can, for not a guide or spy with me knows the country; some were here twenty-five years ago, one about seven years since. I have a Zuñi Indian as a guide, who may be serviceable. In connexion with this, I regret to state, Major Kendrick has not left at the post a single map, or sketch of his explorations, nor is there any person here that has been over the country further than Laguna Negra. My march will be like an exploration of an unknown region.

I must state my convictions that Captain McLane's fight at Bear spring, which I deemed premature, has not, in any degree, hastened or advanced the attack I intend making to-morrow on these Indians. Their duplicity is sufficient evidence that they never intended to deliver up the murderer, and I or no other commanding officer, after he was ready, (such were the threats and state in which this affair stood,) could hesitate to attack at once. The regret is, now, that he had not done them more injury, and suffered less himself.

I earnestly request that Major Backus and command be placed in position as soon as possible; that he be ordered to march on Tunichay, and from there to Chusca, where he will halt and communicate with me, as I wish to establish there, or at Cañon de Chey, a depot for him to operate around, until all the Navajoes are driven south, and out of that almost impregnable fastness. If my requisitions are promptly complied with, I shall be able to supply him from here with pack mules from my column, without delaying its offensive operations in this neighborhood, as there are many planting grounds and villages within one or two days' march of this vicinity, where pack mules could be spared while acting against them.

I take for granted by this time Captain Lindsay, with Howland's company, and the company of the 8th, are en route, guarding the train; if he is not, I hope and pray you will have him despatched at once.

Every scout will require repair; men get disabled, mules and horses break down; the arrival of the train, if the requisitions of Captain

Hatch, acting assistant quartermaster, have been filled, has the means to keep us in order, and filling up the ranks to replace disabled men, enabling me to keep constantly in the field; for I feel confident no one, two, or three scouts, with as many battles, will end this war. The wear and tear will be great; immediate measures should be adopted to keep me supplied with reinforcements and quartermaster's stores, mules, horses and mule shoes, clothing, (particularly shoes,) and to let loose on these Indians all the surrounding tribes and inhabitants, particularly the Utahs and Mexicans, the two they seem to dread the most.

I should think it advisable to send me a battalion of five or six companies of Mexican volunteers, under Colonel St. Vrain, (if possible,) at the earliest date. I want also, immediately, a Mexican interpreter and guide that knows the country. A guide I had on the Gila, by the name of Antonio; I was told he has been a captive among the Navajoes, must know the country and speak their language; he resides at Limitar.

Major Brooks has returned from the councils; he delivered my message; the chiefs stoutly asserted that the dead body delivered was the murderer, but very many here know to the contrary, and believe they recognize the body of a Mexican captive boy who has frequently visited the garrison. The attending physician says he was shot, perhaps, *early in the morning*, and no doubt rests in my mind but they have committed the double crime to shield the real murderer. Enclosed you will receive copies of orders No. 3 and 4.

I am, Major, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. MILES,

Lieut. Col. 3d Infantry, Com'g Navajo Expedition.

Major W. A. NICHOLS,

Assistant Adjutant General, Santa Fé, New Mexico.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 1, 1858.

Official copy.

JOHN D. WILKINS,
First Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. A. A. G.

HEADQUARTERS NAVAJO EXPEDITION,
Fort Defiance, N. M., September 10, 1858.

MAJOR: I returned yesterday afternoon from my first scout in pursuit of the Navajo Indians, and have the honor herewith to present a circumstantial report of the daily occurrences thereof.

On the 9th instant I marched from this post with "A," "I," and "F" companies of mounted rifles, "B" and "C" companies of third infantry, and Captain Blas Lucero's Mexican guides and spies, numbering in all 309 rank and file, with the following officers: Lieutenant Walker, 3d infantry, as adjutant; Assistant Surgeon McKee, medical

officer; Captain Elliott, Captain Hatch, First Lieutenant Lane, and Second Lieutenant Averill, mounted rifles; First Lieutenant Whipple and Second Lieutenant Hildt, third infantry.

The Indians had frequently, with bravado, said they had collected at Cañon de Chelly, and where they intended to fight. This determined me to march direct on that point, and indulge them to their full contentment.

My first day's march was northwest to Ewell's camp, about twelve miles distant, where I encamped. On the 10th I started at half-past 6 a. m., course west; soon after moving from camp, or after two hours' march, the guides and spies in front brought in a well dressed, fully armed, and well mounted Indian, who was evidently spying out our lines of march. On questioning him, he said he was from Cañon de Chelly, where there was a great number of Indians who intended to fight us; he also informed me that the boy brought in as the murderer, on the 8th instant, was the slave of a chief who had him killed that morning. This Indian seemed, from his appearance, of too much importance to release, and it was embarrassing us too much to retain him; after reflection, I reluctantly gave the order to have him shot as a spy. Encamped this day on a ravine, having water sufficient supplied by rain; marched to-day ten miles. In the afternoon the Indians made their first appearance, on fleet horses, to the north of us; fired on them, but at so long a range as to do no damage.

The third day (the 11th instant) marched at 6 o'clock a. m.; course for twelve miles due west; then turned north for two miles, when we came to an obscure narrow pass that led us down a precipitous rocky path to the bottom of Cañon de Chelly. This path was at least a mile long, overhanging with large rocks and very narrow; when I reached the bottom the men on the top of the mountain looked like —, and the mules like rats. I suppose we were from 1,200 to 1,500 feet below the level of the top. So soon as I reached water I halted for the rear to close up; Lieutenant Averill, in command of F company R. M. R., commanding the rear guard, reported the Indians had fired on him; that he had killed one, and had a mule belonging to Lieutenant Whipple, company "B" 3d infantry, wounded by a ball in the knee. The Indians evidently did not expect us to enter the cañon at this pass, or else we would have been greatly annoyed and injured by them; nor would any of my guides have known it, but the Zuñi Indian I had along; to him I am indebted for safely getting into this hole in the earth. At this resting place I detached Captain Elliott, in command of his own and Captain Hatch's companies of mounted rifles, to sweep through the cañon to its mouth if possible, and rejoin me, if he thought I could not reach there before dark; soon after he left he sent back a squaw and child captured. I marched with the infantry. The heights around were covered with Indians, occasionally firing on us; in a mile or so an Indian was discovered to our left; chase was given by two or three Mexicans, my three mounted orderlies, and Assistant Surgeon McKee. The Indian escaped, but they captured a squaw and two children; directly after this I saw an Indian creeping through a corn field to my right; Lieutenant Hildt

and myself gave chase; he was soon overtaken and captured; he proved to be an old man; I did not kill him, and I found him useful afterwards. In a march of a few miles more I met Captain Elliott and command returning; he had not reached the mouth, it being 5 o'clock p. m. I chose as wide a place as I could and encamped, the Indians gathering around us as crows to a feast. Captain Elliott reported he had had a fight with ten (10) Indians, killed one certain, and perhaps more, and no doubt had wounded several. The moment we stopped the Indians commenced firing on us. I then thought what use I could make of the captive. I asked him if he knew who commanded the Indians on the north side; he replied his son was there. I then told him he could call to the Indians, if they shot an arrow or fired a gun into the camp that night I would surely hang him in the morning; he called lustily and prayed to them to cease firing; they immediately did so, and we slept unmolested during the night. Marched this day about twenty-five miles.

At early dawn on the 12th we commenced preparing for our march. Captain Elliott had informed me we had to pass a narrow place where the Indians had shot at him and rolled down immense rocks, but which had crumbled to pieces before reaching the bottom. I sought and found a place on the south side to throw up the infantry companies, who soon cleared the edges of the cañon on both sides, and relieved the column of all fears. In five or six miles' march I reached the mouth of the cañon, and encamped in an extensive corn field, where the men feasted on green corn and peaches, glad enough to get rid of this remarkable hole in the earth. The average width of the Cañon de Chelly I suppose to be two hundred and fifty yards; its average depth, for the seventeen miles we marched in it, about nine hundred feet—frequently rising to one thousand five hundred feet, and near its mouth depressions to four hundred feet. There is but little grass and no wood in the cañon, but good water. No command should ever again enter it. While encamped at the mouth the Indians hovered around in great numbers, giving our men, in the afternoon, the opportunity of practicing at long ranges with their rifles. No doubt several Indians were wounded; I saw one fall from his horse. A chief of great importance among the Navajoes, named Nak-risk-thlaw-nee, showed a white flag; I directed my adjutant to meet him, and to know what he wanted. He commenced by saying that the murderer was not there; that he wanted peace, and what were we there for eating up his corn? Lieutenant Walker delivered my message, that he could have peace if he delivered up the murderer; that we had no talk for any one until that was done. The captive informed me that about twelve miles south, over the high red hills we could see, were several large lakes, where there were large herds and many Indians. I determined to detach Captain Elliott, with the mounted companies, at 12 o'clock at night, to attack this place, and I would, with the infantry and packs, march at the usual hour next morning. Captain Elliott got out of camp at the hour appointed, and as secretly as he could, but he was soon discovered, and signal fires were raised on his flanks and front. At 12 m. on the 13th, after a hard march, dusty and hot, I reached the lakes, and discovered a

large dust approaching from the south; it proved to be (Lieutenant Lane in command of it) company "R," mounted riflemen, having in charge about 6,000 captured sheep. He reported he had a long chase after Indians, and that one of Captain Lucero's guides had killed one. Soon after, Captain Elliott and the balance of the mounted companies arrived. The water at the lakes was good, and in great abundance, but there was not a spear of grass for the animals. I will here remark, there is no grass in this country near water, nor is there wood; and a campaign in this region can only be made where a dependence must be had on corn fields for food for the horses, and when it is sufficiently warm to do without wood, except for cooking. The captive was again called up, and he said over the hills to the north-east were cornfields, but he believed there was no water without he dug for it. I immediately gave the order forward! and after marching two or three hours rose the crest of the hill we passed over in the morning, and descended into the same valley in which the mouth of the cañon is situated, where we found large corn fields, but no water, or but little, in the holes dug by the Indians. Set men to enlarge them, and obtained sufficient for the men. We encamped. The cavalry had marched thirty miles; the infantry about twenty-one miles. This morning, before marching from the encampment at the mouth of the cañon, I released the two women and three children; I could not kill them, and they were too great an incumbrance to retain. About 3 o'clock on the morning of the 14th the Indians commenced firing on the *piquette* of the sheep herd, wounding mortally private Manus Sweeny, of "A" company, mounted rifles; Sergeant James Watson, of the same company; private George Dunn, of "E" company, mounted rifles; and private William Mank, of company "C," 3d infantry, slightly. They were shot by arrows. Sergeant Watson, although wounded, maintained his ground with great determination and bravery until reinforced, and beat off the Indians.

So soon as I marched with the advance the Indians collected and commenced firing on the rear guard, commanded by Captain Elliott. Private Sweeny had to be carried on a litter, which made our march necessarily tedious and slow; for twelve miles our course led south before we reached the pass we had to ascend. A dust was discovered to our front and right; it was supposed to be a flock of sheep. I detached Lieutenant Averill, with his company, to capture them; we had not marched over two miles when, being on the hill, I could plainly see what was supposed sheep were white rocks. I then sent Lieutenant Lane, with my orderly, bugler Fisher, belonging to "I" company, mounted rifles, to recall Lieutenant Averill. After Lieutenant Lane had done so, he directed Fisher to cross over to the trail and await my coming. He, being an absent-minded man, neglected to do so, but kept on ahead; we soon came to water, and some time was consumed in watering our thirsty animals; a half-mile's march brought us to the dead body of bugler Ezekiel Fisher, stripped naked, except his gloves and shoes, pierced in the back by two arrows. I directed he should be buried where he fell. We now were entering a narrow wooded pass. I directed the infantry to the front, Lieutenant Whipple to ascend to the left, and Lieutenant Hildt to the right, and

to protect the flanks of the column. Lieutenant Whipple soon scattered a large number of Indians concealed on the crest, doubtless intending to attack us. After crossing this mountain pass we turned to the southeast and east, and arrived about 3 o'clock p. m. at the upper corn fields of Puebla Colorado, a beautiful valley, with fine water and wood, and good grass, where I encamped. I took the precaution to double my pickets this night, cautioning them not to light matches to smoke, to lay close, and, if discovered, to change their location. After dark the Indians commenced again firing on the camp, but at too long a range to do any damage. Soon the pickets opened, and I inferred with success, for, after a discharge, I distinctly heard a grunt, that makes me believe one or more were struck, for, a short time after, they ceased firing for the night. At about 8 o'clock p. m. private Sweeny died. Marched to-day twenty-two miles. On the 15th I marched early, our course east and north of east; the Indians commenced firing on the rear guard, commanded by Lieutenant Averill, as soon as the front left the encampment; he reports having killed two (2) to-day, and continued to do so during the day, giving a parting volley as he descended the hill to the west of this fort; arrived here about 4 o'clock p. m. Marched about twenty-eight miles.

The result of this scout has been the killing of six Indians, not a doubt but many were wounded, capturing four or five horses, six women and children, and the old man, and between five and six thousand sheep. Our loss has been one, bugler Ezekiel Fisher, of "I" company, mounted rifles; private Manus Sweeny, of "A" company, mounted rifles, died of wounds; and the wounding of Sergeant James Watson, of "A" company, mounted rifles; private George Dunn, of "T" company, mounted rifles; and private William Mank, of "C" company, third infantry, slightly.

I cannot close this without adding my testimony of the untiring devotion, determination, endurance, and cool bravery of my officers and men. I have no exception to make; all exerted themselves to their utmost, each with chivalrous valor, to distinguish themselves. I thank them for their patient endurance during this short but arduous scout, and I sincerely hope their very meritorious conduct will meet the fullest approbation of the commander of the department.

I return my thanks to Captain Lucero and the few guides and spies he had with him. His activity and industry, and bravery, deserves of me my highest commendation. Mr. Edward Martinez, my interpreter, was ever ready to translate and fight; he accompanied Captain Elliott in his night march, and did good service. Assistant Surgeon McKee showed skill and great industry in his constant attendance on the wounded and the sick.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. MILES,

Lieut. Col. 3d Inf'y, Com'g Navajo Exped'n.

To Major W. A. NICHOLS, or

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Department New Mexico, Santa Fé.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 1, 1858.

Official copy.

JOHN D. WILKINS,
1st Lieut. 3d Infantry, A. A. A. G.

INDIAN SUPERINTENDENCY,
Santa Fé, New Mexico, September, 23, 1858.

At your request I herewith enclose a copy of my instructions to Agent Yost, and also copies of two official letters received from the agent since his arrival at Defiance.

In one of the letters you will find a well written account of the attack and fight at Bear spring between the troops and spies under Captain McLane and the Navajoes.

It is perhaps needless now to criticize the attack made by Captain McLane; yet I deem it proper to say that I regard the movement as entirely premature. It is true that I have had no hope that the murderer of Major Brooks' boy would be given up; but it had been agreed upon by General Garland and myself that after the arrival of Agent Yost at Defiance, a general council should be held with the chiefs of the nation, and a last and final effort made to secure the surrender of the culprit.

The captain, I suppose, must have been advised of this understanding, for it was embraced in the instructions to Agent Yost, who was with the captain when the attack was made. But aside from this it seems to me, in a military view of the case, to be unfortunate; for if in the end the quarrel had to result in a fight, time should have been given for the commanding officer to arrive, and the plans of the campaign should have been well matured, so as to make an effective stroke at once. The captain's movement seems like flushing the covey before you were ready to fire.

But aside from all this, since the fight has commenced, I wish to see the Indians well chastised; for ——— and ——— the immediate cause of the present difficulty, they deserve to be punished. They have never respected our authority, and have at no time ceased depredating upon our settlements. They do not construe the liberal and humane policy of the government as intended to better their conditions, but rather as designed to secure their good conduct. We can never depend upon the good conduct of an Indian until he stands in some fear of being punished if he misbehaves. The Navajoes have no such fear, for they think themselves an overmatch for us or any other people.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. L. COLLINS,
Superintendent Indian Affairs, New Mexico.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, September 25, 1858.

Official copy.

JOHN D. WILKINS,
First Lieut. 3d Infantry, A. A. A. General.

Duplicate for the information of the General in-Chief respectfully forwarded.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, September 23, 1858.

COLONEL: General Garland left the department on the 15th instant for the States, and it becomes my duty to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 8th instant.

I regret you did not attend in person at the council. Whatever talent might be around you, the government had a claim to your personal attendance and your long experience upon this particular occasion.

The murder of the Mexican captive, and the offering him as the murderer demanded, is an outrage of so heinous a character, that when the negotiations were closed, and the agent turned the matter into the hands of the military, you were right in pressing the demand by taking the field against them.

Your movement, however, is in advance of the preparations that have been made. You will perceive from the orders issued, that immediately on my taking command, I gave instructions to bring together the available force of the department to support your negotiations, defend the settlements, and, if necessary, to put another column in the field. Major Backus, whom you request may be put in position, has not arrived in the department, but the moment he does so, will take the field at the earliest day practicable, of which you will be duly informed. Your requisitions have been complied with as far as they are in the department. The guide you asked for has been sent for, together with his companion, Felipi Gonzales.

The interpreter I will send you from Albuquerque; the best maps within reach have been sent you. I do not think it necessary to call for volunteers at this time. As for the complaints of the guides and spies, you are at liberty to discharge or exchange any that you have with you. You are also authorized to hire thirty Zuñi or other Pueblo Indians as guides for the middle and southern portions of the Navajo country; two to receive two dollars per day, the others one dollar, they finding their own arms, riding and pack animals, you the ammunition and subsistence. I will send guides for the northern and middle portions of the Navajo country with the other column. You will have with you nine companies, besides the spies and guides, which is supposed a sufficient force for one column and the defence

of the depot. Captain Van Bokkelen, assistant quartermaster, will be sent as quartermaster at Fort Defiance, your depot. Assistant Surgeon Ghiselin will also be sent.

Although it becomes your duty to press this matter by active operations, I must insist that you allow no opportunity of negotiating to escape the moment they manifest a sincere desire to comply with your demand.

In case the murderer should be given up, you will send him in with the witnesses, to be delivered to the civil authorities for trial.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully,

B. L. E. BONNEVILLE,
Colonel 3d Infantry, Commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel D. S. MILES,
Third Infantry, commanding Navajoe Expedition.
Fort Defiance, New Mexico.

Duplicates for the information of the General-in-Chief respectfully forwarded.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fe, September 26, 1858.

COLONEL: I am in receipt of your report of the 16th instant, together with your communications of the 16th, 17th, and 18th instant.

In regard to the censure of the late commanding officer of the department, it is an act of my predecessor over which I have no control. My instructions to you of the 23d instant informed you, that on account of the brutal murder of the Mexican captive, you were justified in offensive measures, and my regret that you did not seize on fifteen or twenty of the perpetrators.

Prior to the receipt of your letter, directions had been given that the remainder of Captain Lindsay's company, together with the recruits for Fort Defiance, should join you, and that they would form an escort to Captain Van Bokkelen, assistant quarter master, Assistant Surgeon Ghiselin, and any train that would be ready.

The column under Major Backus will not be ready for some time, as I before stated. You are a long way ahead of us; Major Backus is not in the department. When the column is ready it will march on Tuni-chey, &c. I have directed one hundred rounds of ammunition for all arms in your command to be sent to Albuquerque; also, have ordered you all in store there.

I do not desire the destruction of animals you take; all should be sent to Albuquerque; that portion belonging to private individuals should be delivered to them; the remainder kept at that place.

I am gratified at the success of the scout, and the manner in which it has been conducted.

Please communicate this to your command. As an additional evidence of my approval, your report will be sent to the lieutenant general commanding the army.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
B. L. E. BONNEVILLE,
Colonel 3d Infantry, Commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel D. S. MILES,
3d Infantry, Comd'g Navajo Expedition, Fort Defiance, N. M.

No. 19.—*Colonel Bonneville to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 10, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to report, for the information of the lieutenant general commanding, that, since my last communication concerning affairs with the Navajo Indians, I am in receipt of the enclosed communication from Lieutenant Colonel Miles, (marked A;) my orders consequent thereon, (marked B,) also copy of an order organizing another column under Major Backus, (marked C,) and my instructions to him, (marked D,) are also enclosed.

I have also to report that the affairs with the Wahs and Comanches, which I mentioned in my last as assuming a troublesome aspect, have changed, and everything is quiet as far as they are concerned.

I am, Colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
B. L. E. BONNEVILLE,
Colonel 3d Infantry, Commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army, New York City.*

HEADQUARTERS NAVAJO EXPEDITION,
Fort Defiance, New Mexico, September 25, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit herewith a report of Captain J. P. Hatch, mounted rifles, detailing the operations of the command he marched from this post this time last night, (tattoo,) and the well contested battle he had with Sarcillo Largo, the head chief of the Navajoes, with about fifty of his warriors, at 7 o'clock this morning, near 25 miles from here.

Captain Hatch and his command have my warmest thanks and unqualified commendation for the untiring zeal and perseverance during this long and tedious night march, and daring unflinching bravery in this sharp conflict. I take particular pleasure in recommending him

and his command to the favorable notice of the commander of the department.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. MILES,
Lieutenant Colonel 3d Infantry,
Commanding Navajo Expedition.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Department of New Mexico, Santa Fé.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 9, 1858.

Official copy.

JOHN D. WILKINS,
1st Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. A. A. G.

FORT DEFIANCE, N. M.,
September 25, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in obedience to orders No. 9, and special instructions of September 23, 1858, I left this post last evening, at 10 o'clock p. m., in command of company B, third infantry, Lieutenant Whipple, and fifty-eight rank and file, and company I, mounted rifles, fifty-eight rank and file—fifty-four horses. I reached Laguna Negra at 5 o'clock this morning. Finding the country beyond the laguna open and rolling, I had no hope of concealing my march should I confine my gait to that of the foot troops and baggage; I therefore reluctantly separated myself from Lieutenant Whipple, leaving the baggage in his charge, and leaving with him six of my mounted men, and moved with as much rapidity as possible, by a circuitous route, to the wheat field of Sarcillo Largo, situated about nine (9) miles from the laguna.

By taking advantage of the irregularities of the ground I reached without discovery the arroyo which passes through the fields about one and a half miles below them. Entering the arroyo with my company I succeeded in conducting it within two hundred yards of the ranches of Sarcillo Largo's people before I was discovered by them, arriving there at 7 o'clock a. m.

I immediately formed in columns of fours, advanced to the front of the lodges, and dismounted my men within fifty yards of them.

I was met by about forty Navajoes, armed almost exclusively with fire-arms. The fire was for a few minutes quite warm, when the Navajoes retreated, leaving six dead near the houses, and two certainly of those who escaped severely wounded—one of these Sarcillo Largo himself, the head chief of the Navajoes, probably mortally.

My force was so small that I was not willing to allow it to be scattered in the thickets of oak near the ranches to look up the dead and wounded; were it not for this, I think I could have reported a larger loss to the enemy. I captured upon the ground over fifty horses and a large number of buffalo robes, blankets, saddles, &c.;

many of these latter articles I caused to be thrown upon the wheat stack, which was fired by my orders. I then moved with the company to the open ground, one and a half miles west of the wheat field, where I was joined by the remainder of the command, under Lieutenant Whipple. After getting breakfast for the command I returned to this post, where I arrived at six o'clock p. m., having marched a distance of fifty miles in twenty hours, and that upon one meal.

I am happy to be able to report that I bring my command back to this post in as good condition as when I left here ; the only reason I can give for this is, that these Indians are unaccustomed to the use of fire-arms; most of them were probably using for the first time arms purchased for this war. Had they been armed with the bow and arrow, I must have had numerous casualties to report; for certainly no man ever behaved with more gallantry and coolness than did Sarcillo Largo, until he had discharged the last shot from his rifle and revolver. I cannot praise too highly the conduct of my company ; their prompt obedience to orders under a heavy fire proved their discipline, as their unflinching behaviour did their gallantry; where all behaved so well, none would desire special mention. The excellent conduct of First Sergeant McGrath can, however, be mentioned without injustice to the remainder of the company, as all will take pleasure in testifying that the reputation earned a few months since under similar circumstances was well sustained on this occasion.

None can regret more than myself the circumstances that forced upon me the leaving in the rear of Lieutenant Whipple and his gallant command; it was painful to my feelings, but I felt that it was my duty to do so, and Lieutenant Whipple generously coincided with me in opinion.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JNO. P. HATCH,

Brevet Captain U. S. Army, Commanding Detachment.

Lieutenant W. B. LANE, R. M. R.,

Adjutant Navajo Expedition.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, October 9, 1858.

Official copy.

JOHN D. WILKINS,

First Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. A. A. G.

SPECIAL ORDERS NO 91.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, October 1, 1858.

I. Major Electus Backus, 3d infantry, is assigned to the command of the 2d column for the Navajo expedition, which will be composed of the following troops :

1. Companies "E," regiment mounted rifles (Duncan's) and "D,"

3d infantry, (Schroeder's,) under the command of Major C. F. Ruff, regiment of mounted riflemen, marching *via* Il Defonso. Assistant Surgeon W. W. Anderson, medical department, will accompany this command.

2. Company "G," regiment mounted riflemen, (Morris',) marching *via* Santa Fé.

3. Companies "B," (Reeves',) and "I," (Longstreet's,) 8th infantry.

4. One commissioned officer and twenty-five men of company "E," 8th infantry, (Sprague's.)

5. José Maria Valdez, with his guides and spies, *via* Santa Fé. On his arrival there to receive the necessary arms and ammunition.

6. The guides and spies from the Utahs, with their horses, arms, and packs.

II. The above mentioned troops will march so as to arrive at Jemez by the 15th instant, with rations to include the 25th instant.

III. The acting assistant commissary of subsistence of the depot of Albuquerque will cause sixteen thousand rations, with anti-scorbutics in proportion, and a few head of cattle and sheep, to be turned over to Major D. H. Rucker, assistant quartermaster, for transportation to Jemez. On the arrival at Jemez the commanding officer of the expedition will take with him such wagons as are necessary to Tuni-chey, there to unload and return to Albuquerque.

IV. Company "K," 3d infantry, (Sykes',) is detailed as escort to this train.

V. The commanding officer of Fort Marcy will detail a commissioned officer to report to the principal quartermaster for the purpose of proceeding to Jemez, there to purchase, under his direction, such quartermaster's supplies as may be necessary for the want of the troops.

VI. Major Backus will make the necessary requisitions for quartermaster's stores on the assistant quartermaster at Albuquerque, who will be directed to furnish them. He will also see to the execution of this order as far as it concerns the troops at Albuquerque.

By order of Colonel B. L. E. Bonneville.

JOHN D. WILKINS,
First Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. A. Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 3, 1858.

MAJOR: You have been assigned to the command of the second column of the Navajo expedition, (four hundred men,) to rendezvous at Jemez on the 15th instant, from which point it will commence a scout with forty days' rations, terminating its duties at Fort Defiance. In its progress you will make a thorough examination in and about Tuni-chey, from which it is believed the Navajoes make depredations upon the Abiquin and Jemez frontier. You will use the greatest

possible exertion to destroy and drive from that part of the country every vestige of this troublesome tribe. After accomplishing this most important duty, being on the grounds with your guides, you will be best able to determine what is next to be done.

You will communicate with Lieutenant Colonel Miles from Tunichay, and receive his instructions as to the best manner you can co-operate with his column.

You are sufficiently acquainted with the Indian character to know as you approach their families and herds they will make the most determined efforts to mislead you, by false trails and appearances of giving a general battle. Thus about the Cañon de Chilly they will hover and make pretensions of war, drawing you on further and further, whilst their families and herds are securely located hundreds of miles off. Seek then their families and flocks, and when you find them the Navajoes will fight to defend them and not before.

I send a train of wagons to supply you with subsistence stores as far as Tunichay, from which point you will order them to return to the depot.

I should be pleased if you would furnish me with a map of your route in that part of the country, together with any reliable information you may obtain in regard to it.

Wishing you full success, I am, major,

very respectfully, your obedient servant,

B. L. E. BONNEVILLE,
Colonel 3d Infantry, Commanding.

Major ELECTUS BACKUS,
*3d Infantry, Commanding 2d column Navajo Expedition,
Now in Santa Fé, New Mexico.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 9, 1858.

Official copy:

JOHN D. WILKINS,
1st Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. A. A. Gen.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 4, 1858.

COLONEL: The department commander directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your communications of the 25th instant, transmitting reports of Major Brooks and Captain Hatch, and to inform you that the zeal and perseverance of the officers and men are in the highest degree commendable.

Major Brooks, although not fortunate in engaging the enemy, has added valuable information in regard to that portion of the country which will be useful hereafter.

Captain Hatch and his command in their conflict with the enemy,

lead by their head chief, deserve all praise for the cool and daring manner in which they attacked and routed them.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN D. WILKINS,

1st Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. A. Adj't Gen.

Lieutenant Colonel D. S. MILES,

3d Infantry, Commanding Navajo Expedition,

Fort Defiance, New Mexico.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, October 9, 1858.

Official copy:

JOHN D. WILKINS,

1st Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. A. Adj't Gen.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, October 4, 1858.

COLONEL: The commanding officer of the department directs me to call your attention to a point in Captain Hatch's report which does not entirely meet his approval. The command of Captain Hatch was organized by you for a specific service, and the Captain, without showing any new circumstances to have arisen, weakens his command by dividing his detachment, and on his arrival on the ranches had not sufficient force to follow up the advantages gained; and that, although he is gratified with the successful result and daring displayed, he cannot but look upon it as a military error that should be avoided.

He also directs me to inform you that you desire "mules" be sent you and at the same time report fifty horses captured from the enemy. These animals he considers subject to your orders, and should be used for the public service, if necessary, until sent to the settlements to be returned to their owners.

A new supply of ammunition has been sent to Albuquerque.

You will perceive by the enclosed instructions that Major Backus has been ordered in the field with about four hundred men, including guides and spies, rationed for forty days from the 25th instant. He will communicate with you at Tuni-chey, and terminate his scout at your post.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN D. WILKINS,

1st Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. A. Adj't Gen.

Lieutenant Colonel D. S. MILES,

3d Infantry, Commanding Navajo Expedition,

Fort Defiance, New Mexico.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, October 9, 1858.

Official copy:

JOHN D. WILKINS,

1st Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 20.—*Colonel Bonneville to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 17, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor in continuation of my communication of the 10th instant, to enclose a copy of report of Lieutenant Colonel Miles, commanding Navajo expedition of October 3, 1858, enclosing reports of Captains Lindsay and Elliott and Lieutenant Averell, regiment mounted riflemen, (marked A,) and copy of my instructions thereon (marked B.)

Major Backus' column, ordered to rendezvous at Jemez on the 15th instant, will not be able to do so until the 18th, on account of the great distances that some of the troops have to move.

I am now bringing together four companies, ("E," "F," "I," and "K,") 3d infantry, to be temporarily at Los Lunas and Albuquerque to protect the settlements near the Navajo country and meet any contingencies that may arise. These companies are now employed in escorting supplies to Fort Defiance and Tunichay. Should it become necessary to call this reserve into the field there will be added to it a company of "spies and guides," fifty-two strong.

I have also to state, for the information of the lieutenant general commanding the army, that I find the post of Fort Thorn has been so unhealthy for the troops for years past, that with the advice of Surgeon Sloan I have concluded to withdraw the troops from there, except a small guard, with the ultimate design of breaking it up or removing it to some more healthy location.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
B. L. E. BONNEVILLE,
Colonel 3d Infantry, Commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army, New York city.*

CHUSEA VALLEY, N. M.,
September 29, 1858.

COLONEL: In obedience to your orders, I entered this valley this afternoon at a rapid gait with company F, regiment mounted rifles and some Mexicans. Not seeing any Navajoes about the corn fields at this place, but observing a cloud of dust some five miles southeast of it, I concluded that a herd or flock was in that direction, and determined to capture it, which I did with a sergeant and ten men of company F and four Mexicans. The herd of nine horses are in camp, with a flock of about a thousand sheep. One of my horses was killed by a fall, in running over some bad ground.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
W. W. AVERELL,
2d Lieut. Regiment Mounted Rifles, Comd'g Company F.
Lieut. Col. D. S. MILES,
3d Infantry, Commanding Navajo Expedition.

Respectfully referred to the commander of the department, with the request of approval of this gallant young officer's conduct.

D. S. MILES,

Lieut. Col. 3d Infantry, Commanding Navajo Expedition.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,

Santa Fé, October 15, 1858.

Official copy:

JOHN D. WILKINS,

1st Lieut. 3d Infantry, A. Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS, NAVAJO EXPEDITION,

Fort Defiance, N. M., October 3, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report the operation of the troops under my command from the 29th ultimo to the 2d instant, and enclose herewith the reports of Captain A. J. Lindsay, Captain W. L. Elliott, and Second Lieutenant W. W. Averell, mounted rifles, of their active and zealous efforts to injure the enemy while detached from me.

On the 29th ultimo I marched from this post, at 7 o'clock, a. m., with A company mounted rifles, Captain Elliott in command, of fifty-four rank and file; F company mounted rifles, Second Lieutenant Averell in command, of forty-four rank and file; I company mounted rifles, Captain McLane in command, of fifty-four rank and file; H company mounted rifles, Captain Lindsay in command, of thirty-two rank and file; First Lieutenant Whipple, in command of B company, third infantry, fifty-five rank and file; First Lieutenant Willard, in command of K company, eighth infantry, fifty-four rank and file; and Captain Blas Lucero and twenty-two guides and spies.

Our course was eastward and northeastward for about twelve miles, and then descended east down a rugged precipitous mountain for six miles, when we entered on a plain of an extensive basin. About four miles from the lakes and cornfields I detached Captain Elliott and Captain McLane, with their companies and twelve guides, to the left to enter the plain north of the trail I was following. Soon after Captain Elliott left us I discovered an extensive dust in front; as we had been discovered, I detached Lieutenant Averell with his company, to make a diversion in favor of Captain Elliott. On the hill I was marching I could plainly witness the operations of these gallant officers, and see the Indians and herds flying before them, when they were lost to view by descending a ridge bordering the eastern side of this valley and western slope of a high mountain that bounds it on the east.

I encamped at two ponds or lakes nearly dry, with no wood; soon after Lieutenant Averell joined me, having captured nine horses and one thousand sheep. About dark Captain Elliott and command returned, driving in another herd of sheep, and reporting having killed in a conflict with twenty-five Indians two, and wounded four. On

the morning of the 30th of September I moved my camp about one and a half miles to the north to a large lake, which I named after Captain Lucero, and with pack mules had corn transported for the use of the animals from the fields where we first encamped. I found around Lake Lucero good grass and water, but no wood, and was glad of the opportunity of resting the horses after their long and fatiguing race of the day before. My Zuñi guide has informed me that to the east, over the high mountain, was a large lake, and where all the escaped herds would stay that night. I determined immediately to organize a command and attack it that night. Captain Lindsay, with H company, (thirty rank and file,) which my adjutant, Lieutenant Lane, gallantly volunteered to command; Captain McLane, I company, (forty-four rank and file;) Lieutenant Averell in command of F company, (forty rank and file;) Captain Lucero and twelve guides and spies, making in all one hundred and twenty-six, were detailed for this duty. The report of Captain Lindsay will show the great fatigue of this command, and its brilliant achievement in the battle that ensued with Kay-a-tanas band of Navajoes, to which the murderer belongs.

On the morning of the 1st of October at sunrise, I sent Captain Elliot with his company to the mouth of the cañon which Captain Lindsay passed through, to drive off any Indians that attempted to interrupt his return. After waiting until 11 o'clock, Captain Elliott not seeing or hearing anything of Captain Lindsay, returned to camp.

During this day 1st Lieutenant Whipple in exploring around our camp, or rather trying to get a shot at Indians on the distant hills, found about a mile to the north of Lake Lucero, a permanent spring of water in a deep ravine, and a large lake about it.

At 8 o'clock on the morning of the 2d October, five Mexican guides and spies rode into camp from this fort, with a note from Captain Lindsay, and Major Brooks, informing me of his battle, his wounded sergeant, the large herd of sheep and horses, and his inability to join me. At once I determined to join him, and at nine a. m. marched south, up a winding path until I got out of this valley of lakes, (Chusea,) then southwest until I struck the Albuquerque road, where I formed a junction with Captain Lindsay. I directed him to encamp on the Twelve mile pond, I took Captain Elliott's company and came into the post, having travelled from nine a. m. to half past seven p. m., about thirty miles.

The result of this short campaign has been the killing of ten Indians, the wounding of many, the capture of all of Kay-a-tana's camp equipage, eighty horses, and six thousand five hundred sheep; the loss of two men, privates William Nugent and Mauritz Paulman of H company mounted rifles killed, and the wounding of Sergeant John Thompson of the same company.

I cannot close this report without requesting of the commander of the department his approval of the gallant conduct of the officers and soldiers of my command. Captains Lindsay and Elliott, and 2d Lieutenant Averell, had at different times separate commands. Captain McLane was with Captain Elliott in his conflict, and his opportune

arrival in support of Captain Lindsay in the battle with Kay-a-tana, saved that officer and his few men, and secured the victory. My adjutant, 1st Lieutenant Lane, with promptness volunteered to command Captain Lindsay's company, and led the charge on the enemy with twelve men, that brought them to a stand which led to this victory, and the capture of so much of his property. Captain Lindsay speaks justly of Captain Lucero, he is a gallant soldier, and in the division of the spoil sent to Albuquerque, I request he may be liberally rewarded.

I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. S. MILES,

Lieut. Col. 3d Infantry, Commanding Navajo Expedition.

Lieut. JOHN D. WILKINS,

Acting Assistant Adj. General Dept. New Mexico, Santa Fé.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October, 15, 1858.

Official copy:

JOHN D. WILKINS,

1st Lieut. 3d Infantry, A. A. A. Gen.

FORT DEFIANCE, NEW MEXICO,
October 3, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that in obedience to your order, I left your camp in the valley of Chusea at 10 o'clock at night with three companies of mounted riflemen, and Captain Lucero's party of twelve Mexicans to visit a laguna fifteen miles distant, where it was supposed a party of Indians were living. I reached the laguna about three o'clock in the morning, but found it perfectly dry and abandoned.

The trail we followed showed evidence of the recent passage of a large number of animals, and I determined to follow it in hopes of finding out the encampment of the Indians. About daybreak I came to a deep cañon down which led a winding trail three-fourths of a mile in length, but so rocky and abrupt as to render it very difficult to get the horses down. A smoke in the valley below determined me to try it, and the horses were led down as quick as possible.

When near the bottom, I discovered three mounted Indians ascending the trail, and when they became aware of our presence, they immediately turned at a gallop to alarm their friends in the valley.

I arrived shortly after at the bottom of the hill, with Lieutenant Lane and about a dozen men of company H, commanded by him; knowing that we were discovered, and that everything would be lost without a sudden rush, I ordered Lieut. Lane to move off at a gallop and accompanied him myself. At this point, I sent word to Captain McLane and Lieutenant Averell, to inform them of my movement, and to follow on as quickly as possible.

I overtook the Indians with Lieutenant Lane's party after a hard

gallop of five miles, after they had crossed into another cañon, dashed through them, and cut off their stock from the only outlet for escape.

The Indians were very numerous, and my party so small that I determined to take possession of a wooded knoll in the centre of the cañon, and hold it until I could get assistance. I did so, and sent back a small party to show Captain McLane the way. Captain McLane arrived shortly after at a full gallop by fours, dismounted his men, and by my order cleared the cañon of Indians on both sides, collected the sheep and horses and drove them to the centre. I determined to leave the cañon as soon as possible, as the Indians were collecting in numbers on both sides, and the utter impossibility of reaching them rendered a further stay an unnecessary exposure of the men. We got out all the stock, but the Indians fired on our rear, and shot down sergeant John Thompson, of company H, just as we were in the act of going up the hill. I marched over into the next cañon, which was broad and open, and which offered no opportunity for an ambushade. I there found Lieutenant Averell with his company, who had heard the firing, and in his efforts to reach me became involved in a side cañon, which prevented his further advance in my direction. Lieutenant Averell was fired upon, but did not lose any men. He captured a thousand sheep and nine horses, which would otherwise have been lost but for his opportune arrival at that place.

Upon counting my men I found two of H company missing, and, hoping they might possibly be found, I ordered Lieutenant Averell to take forty men and deploy them on the ridge where they were last seen. He did so, but found no traces of them. It is to be feared they were killed. Lieutenant Averell, while upon this service, fired at a party of five Indians four hundred yards distant, killed one, and wounded another.

From the reports of the different officers eight Indians were killed and several wounded. We burnt up all their property in their encampment, consisting of blankets, buffalo robes, and corn, captured four thousand sheep and seventy horses, all of which, except four horses, were brought to this post.

The conduct of the officers and men throughout the whole affair was unexceptionable.

Captain Lucero, by his knowledge of the Indians, contributed greatly to the success of the expedition. It was he who discovered the trail, which led over a ridge of smooth rock and was entirely invisible to any but an experienced eye. He deserves credit for the manner in which he acted during the fight, and for his important services in taking care of the captured stock. He pronounces the Indians to be Kay-a-tana's band, and says that his whole ranche was there. The names of the missing men are privates Mauritz Paulman and William Nugent, of company H.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

A. J. LINDSAY,
Captain Rifles, Commanding scout.

Lieutenant W. B. LANE,
Adjutant Navajo Expedition.

Respectfully referred to the commander of the department, with the particular request that favorable notice may be bestowed on Captain Lindsay for his gallantry, energy, and perseverance in pursuit and attack of these Indians.

D. S. MILES,
Lieut. Colonel 3d Infantry, commanding Navajo Expedition.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 15, 1858.

Official copy:

JOHN D. WILKINS,
First Lieutenant 3d Infantry, Acting Ass't Adj't General.

CAMP NEAR FORT DEFIANCE, *N. M., October 4, 1858.*

SIR: In compliance with the directions of the lieutenant-colonel commanding the Navajo expedition, I have the honor to submit the following report of a "scout," from the column on the 29th ultimo, with companies "A" and "I," rifles, the latter under command of Captain McLane; Captain Blas Lucero, of the spy company, and a few of his men accompanying me.

Soon after leaving the column, a dust was seen on the east side of "Chusea" valley; moving rapidly for it, I succeeded, a short distance from the mouth of a cañon, in overtaking a flock of about 1,000 to 1,500 sheep, and securing the same.

Not finding the Indians in force, I halted and sent a few men in search of the few Indians seen, but without success.

As I was marching out of the cañon my column was fired upon; two horses out of company "A" and the other company, "I," were wounded. I then sent a party from both companies to skirmish the hills in the rear; they returned in about half an hour, reporting two Indians killed and three wounded. I then moved the camp of the main body of the column, the Indians following my rear guard but keeping out of my reach and at a great distance. The companies, notwithstanding the valley was much broken by arroyas, kept well in column, and showed that had the opportunity offered good service could have been done.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. L. ELLIOTT,
Captain of Rifles, commanding company "A."

Lieutenant W. B. McLANE,
*Acting Adjutant Navajo Expedition,
Headquarters, Fort Defiance, New Mexico.*

Respectfully referred to the commander of the department for his approval of this gallant officer's conduct.

D. S. MILES,
Lieutenant Colonel 3d Infantry, com'g Navajo Expedition.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 15, 1858.

Official copy:

JOHN D. WILKINS,
First Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. A. A. Gen.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 14, 1858.

COLONEL: The department commander directs me to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 3d instant, and to express his satisfaction at the successes of the officers and troops of your command.

The detachments under Captain Lindsay, Captain Elliott, and Lieutenant Averell seem to merit particular notice, the scout and engagement of Captain Lindsay especially so, from the difficulties surmounted and the amount of stock captured.

Don Blas Lucero, of the "guides and spies," on this as well as former occasions, appears to have contributed to the success of the troops, and has the commendation of the department commander for zeal and efficiency. The reports of the different commanders, with your complimentary endorsements, in which he unites, together with your own report, will be submitted for the consideration of the lieutenant general commanding the army.

In reply to your request concerning the murderer, he directs me to say that he feels the necessity which compels him to differ with you on the subject, and cannot but reiterate his former instructions that the murderer, with the witnesses, must be sent to Albuquerque and turned over to the civil authority.

He also directs your attention to Sandoval and his people, residing on the Suerco and towards Jemez. They have for years been looked upon as a separate people. The superintendent of Indian affairs has decided they are at peace; they have just received their presents and must not be molested.

I am, colonel, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN D. WILKINS,
First Lieutenant 3d Infantry, A. A. Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel D. S. MILES, *3d Infantry,*
Commanding Navajo Expedition, Fort Defiance, New Mexico.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF NEW MEXICO,
Santa Fé, October 17, 1858.

Official copy:

JOHN D. WILKINS,
First Lieutenant 3d Infantry, Assistant Adjutant General.

VI.

DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.

- No. 1.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters, November 4, 1857, enclosing letter from Colonel Steptoe, October 7.
- No. 2.—Mr. Nesmith to Major Mackall, November 18.
- No. 3.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters, January 1, 1858.
- No. 4.—Major Mackall to Colonel Steptoe, January 12.
- No. 5.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters, February 25, enclosing letters from Colonel Steptoe, January 29; Major Garnett, January 30 and February 3; Major Mackall to Major Garnett, February 22, and Mr. Nesmith to Agent Lansdale, February 24.
- No. 6.—Mr. Swan to Secretary of War, March 29, enclosing resolutions of the Legislature of Washington, January 15.
- No. 7.—Adjutant General to General Clarke, May 3.
- No. 8.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters, June 1.
- No. 9.—Same to Adjutant General, June 1.
- No. 10.—Same to Army Headquarters, June 14, enclosing letters from Colonel Steptoe of April 17, May 2, and May 23.
- No. 11.—Colonel Steptoe to Major Mackall, May 23.
- No. 12.—Colonel Wright to Major Mackall, May 26.
- No. 13.—Colonel Steptoe to Major Mackall, May 28.
- No. 14.—Same to same, May 29.
- No. 15.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters, June 2.
- No. 16.—Colonel Steptoe to Army Headquarters, June 17.
- No. 17.—Father Joset to Father Congiato, June 27.
- No. 18.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters, July 23, enclosing letters to Father Joset, June 25; Colonel Wright, July 4; Major Garnett, July 18, and memorandum for a treaty with the Nez Percés.
- No. 19.—Same to Mr. Graham, August 6.
- No. 20.—Mr. Graham to General Clarke, August 7, enclosing copy of letter to Mr. Blenkinsop, same date.
- No. 21.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters, August 12.
- No. 22.—Same to same, August 13, enclosing treaty with the Nez Percés.
- No. 23.—Major Garnett to Major Mackall, August 15.
- No. 24.—Father Congiato to General Clarke, August 3.
- No. 25.—General Clarke to Father Congiato or Father Joset, August 19.
- No. 26.—Same to Army Headquarters, August 27.
- No. 27.—Major Garnett to Major Mackall, August 30.
- No. 28.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters, September 7, enclosing orders of Colonel Wright, Nos. 3, 5 and 6, and letters of August 13, 14 and 19, from same.
- No. 29.—Colonel Wright to the Adjutant General, September 4, enclosing his reports of August 31 and September 2.

- No. 30.—General Clarke to the Adjutant General, September 23, enclosing reports from Colonel Wright of September 6, 9, 10 and 15.
- No. 31.—General-in-Chief to the Adjutant General, November 13, enclosing reports from Colonel Wright of November 21, 24, 25 and 30, and October 1.
- No. 32.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters, October 2.
- No. 33.—Same to same, October 10, enclosing treaties with the Spokans and Cœur d'Alenes, and orders No. 4, October 7.
- No. 34.—Same to same, October 19,
- No. 35.—General-in-Chief to General Clarke, November 13.
- No. 36.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters, October 29.
- No. 37.—General Harney to Army Headquarters, October 29, enclosing report from Colonel Wright, October 28.

No. 1.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
San Francisco, California, November 4, 1857,

SIR: In transmitting the enclosed copy of a letter received from Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, commanding at Walla-Walla, the following statement is required to explain the letter, and the results which may follow from the acts of Mr. J. Ross Brown.

Soon after taking charge of this department and in June last, I proceeded to Washington Territory, and finding that the Indian tribes east of the Cascades were restless and threatening hostilities, I proceeded to the Dallas, having previously sent an invitation to Mr. Nesmith, Indian superintendent for both territories to meet me there.

He complied—after discussing the difficulties and causes of irritation, we came to the conclusion that two principal causes were: 1st. The uneasiness felt lest those implicated in the murder of Bolan, committed 18 months before, should be sought and seized, or retaliation be made on the tribes, notwithstanding the pacification made under Col. Wright. 2nd. The great objection entertained to the treaties made with Governor Stevens, and fears lest the governor should enforce them; to these treaties they objected the want of authority in the Indians who spoke for the tribes, and the conditions themselves.

The superintendent informed me that the treaties had never been confirmed and it would be impolitic to confirm them, and his influence would be used to prevent it.

Agreeing with him as to the impolicy of enforcing them, at a hazard of a serious war, I determined with his approval to remove distrust, by letting them know that the treaties were non-effective, and issued instructions to commanding officers to that end, (see Special Order No. 87, forwarded at date).

The superintendent thought justice and policy required the surrender of the murderers referred to; agreeing with them in the main, I was obliged to postpone action in the matter until assured that the pacification made by Colonel Wright did not stand in the way.

Reports from the officers commanding on the spot convinced me that whether intentionally or unintentionally the impression had been made upon the Indians that hostilities were to cease, the past to be forgiven, and their future treatment to depend on their future conduct.

Under these circumstances, I determined not to destroy the future influence of the government with these people by bad faith or the appearance of it, and instructed the officers so to inform them.

It is under these circumstances that Mr. J. Ross Brown, makes (with what authority I know not) the declaration to the Indians that the treaties will certainly be ratified and enforced.

How the interests of the government must be injured by having agents so little in accord will be readily seen; my influence with them ceases entirely the moment they distrust either my disposition or ability to fulfil promises made. I hope that the Government will have time to notify me of its determination in the matter in time to prevent mischief.

I believe the present treaties can only be enforced by war, and hope this will be avoided by a new commission.

I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General Commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Ass't Adj't Gen., Headquarters Army, N. Y.

FORT WALLA-WALLA,
October 19, 1857.

SIR: It is my duty to inform the general that Mr. J. Ross Brown, acting I believe as an agent of the Indian bureau, did, in a recent conversation with "Lawyer," the Nez Percés' chief, assert that Governor Stevens' treaty of Walla-Walla would *certainly* be ratified and enforced.

Mr. William Craig, who acted as interpreter on the occasion, gives me this information.

Considering that this statement is in direct opposition to what the Indians have been told by us, and to what as I believe nearly all of them desire, it seems to me in very bad taste, to say the least of it. Mr. Brown could not possibly have *known* that the treaty will be ratified, and even if he had, the proper time to enlighten the Indians on the subject is obviously after it shall have become a law of the land. He had no right to unsettle the Indian minds on a point respecting which his convictions are probably no stronger than the opposite belief of many others in daily intercourse with them.

I will simply add that in my opinion any attempt to enforce that treaty will be followed by immediate hostilities with most of the tribes in this part of the country; for which reason it does appear to me greatly desirable that a new commission be appointed, and a new treaty made, thoroughly digested and accepted by both sides.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. J. STEPTOE,

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel U. S. A., Commanding Post.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.

Official:

W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 2.—*Mr. Nesmith to Major Mackall.*

OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT INDIAN AFFAIRS,

Salem, Oregon, November 18, 1857.

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 3d instant enclosing a copy of Colonel Steptoe's letter of October 19, in which he refers to a conversation had between Mr. J. Ross Brown and "Lawyer," chief of the Nez Percés.

In relation to the opinion entertained by Brigadier General Clarke, that I had not changed my policy relative to those Indians since our interview, I have to say that the general's conclusions on that subject are correct. I have on all occasions directed the agents who have communicated with those people to impress upon their minds the fact that the treaties negotiated with them were like all other treaties in a similar condition, void and inoperative, and must remain so until they receive the constitutional ratification of the *President and Senate*; and I further entertain the opinion that no officer of the government, including the President himself, can give those treaties validity or make them binding while they lack such ratification.

I knew that Mr. Brown had visited the Dalles, and had there some conversation with "Lawyer." The character of that conversation was never reported to me. If he stated that the "treaties would *certainly* be ratified and enforced," I can only say that he possessed knowledge upon that subject which has been withheld from myself. In order to explain to the general my views upon the subject of those treaties I herewith enclose you an extract from my annual report to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, bearing date September 1, 1857.

I am, sir, respectfully, yours, &c., &c.,

J. W. NESMITH,

Superintendent Indian Affairs, O. and W. T.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General, San Francisco, Cal.

Extract from the annual report of Superintendent Nesmith, in relation to the ratification of treaties, dated September 1, 1857.

“The region of country east of the Cascade mountains is daily becoming of more importance to the whites by reason of the discovery of gold in its northern limits, and its being traversed by the great thoroughfares leading to the States. Our people are being continually brought in contact with its Indian occupants, which compose several numerous and warlike tribes. In order to maintain friendly relations with them, and prevent constant difficulties, requires the presence of several reliable agents.

“The treaties negotiated with those interior tribes, never having been ratified, they are averse to the occupation of their country by white settlers, and every endeavor has been made to prevent intrusion upon their lands, until such time as the government shall decide upon the disposition to be made of the treaties. In order to relieve and quiet their apprehensions in relation to the occupation of their country by our people, I directed Agent Lansdale, on his trip to Flat-head country, to explain to them the failure of the government to comply with its promises by reason of the non-ratification of the treaties, and to assure them that their lands should not be taken from them without receiving a fair compensation; they were also informed that until these treaties were ratified they could expect nothing from the government in the shape of annuities or subsistence. I would recommend that steps be taken to throw open the Walla-Walla valley to settlement; it is an advanced point in the interior, which if occupied would protect and increase the facilities for an overland communication with the States. The Walla-Walla is a rich valley, unsurpassed in its qualities as a grazing country, and a desirable locality for a white settlement. It has already been purchased by the treaties made by Governor Stevens and late Superintendent Palmer with the Cayuses and Nez Percés; as the treaties have never been ratified, the country is not considered open to settlement. I understand that the Indians express some dissatisfaction at those treaties, which may render their modification necessary. The only portion of the country east of the Cascade mountains now occupied by our citizens is that in the immediate vicinity of the Dalles, on the south side of the Columbia river. This country belongs to the Indians who were parties to the treaty of *June 25, 1855*. They have been great sufferers by reason of the occupation of their country by the whites, and have never received any compensation; I would therefore earnestly recommend that the treaty entered into between those people and late Superintendent Palmer, on *June 25, 1855*, be immediately ratified and funds appropriated for its execution. The treaty referred to is liberal in its provisions; the Indians who are parties to it have exhibited good faith towards our government; they have been deprived of their lands, and the United States have received all the benefits of the treaty. I think that justice, as well as good policy, should induce the government to comply with their part of the

contract. I would also earnestly recommend that the treaties negotiated by Governor Stevens with the Indians in Washington Territory *west* of the Cascade mountains, be ratified as speedily as possible, as it will be difficult to restrain the Indians, who are parties to those treaties, much longer by mere promises."

No. 3.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
San Francisco, California, January 1, 1858.

SIR: The following items, collated from unofficial but reliable sources, I have thought of sufficient interest to be communicated to the General-in-Chief.

A private letter from Captain Kirkham, of December 1, from Walla-Walla, says: "We have recently received from our Indians news from Salt Lake; they report an engagement between our troops and the Mormons; the information comes through the Snakes, who are in direct communication with the Mormons.

"The Snakes tell our Indians that they are well supplied with ammunition, and that they can get from the Mormons any quantity that they wish; and they further tell our Indians that the Mormons are anxious to supply them, to wit: the Nez Percés, the Cayuses, and Walla-Wallas, with everything that they wish. I would not be surprised if the Mormon influence should extend to all the tribes in our neighborhood, and if they are determined to fight we may have trouble among the Indians on the coast again."

Extract from a letter of George Gibbs, Esq., of Washington Territory, of November 27.

"A very curious statement was recently made me by some of the Indians near Steilacoom. They said that the Klikatats had told them that Choosuklee, (Jesus Christ,) had recently appeared on the other side of the mountains; that he was after awhile coming here, when the whites would be sent out of the country, and all would be well for themselves. It needed only a little reflection to connect this second advent with the visit of Brigham Young to the Flathead and Nez Percés country."

The reports from southern California go to show that a like influence has been exerted over the tribes of that region. It is not to be doubted that the Mormons have cultivated friendship with the Indians, and it is scarcely doubtful that, in the recent exodus of the Mormons from San Bernardino, they have been accompanied by Indians. The Indians in this section of the State are represented as becoming more insolent, and though they have as yet committed no depredations, the fears of the inhabitants are to a great degree excited.

From Carson valley we have like reports of the ill effects on the Indians of Mormon influence.

If these things are true, and I credit them, temporary success on the part of the Mormons may be a signal for an Indian war extending along our whole frontier.

The troops in this department have been stationed with such strict attention to the absolute wants of the service, that but little if any reduction at any post could be made with safety to the inhabitants.

In Oregon and Washington Territories, east of the Cascade range, I consider it unsafe to remove a man for service elsewhere.

My intention as intimated in my letter of December 18, with reference to the relief companies for Yuma, will be carried out, and I will station a company permanently perhaps at San Bernardino, near Cajon Pass.

I recommend instant measures calculated to detach Indians from Mormon influence. As an initial step toward that end, I suggest that headmen or chiefs be invited to visit Washington. As an inducement they should receive presents to a generous extent. Such visits would disabuse them of any erroneous impressions they may have received relative to the power of the United States, by seeing for themselves how numerous and powerful our people are.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, Commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters Army, N. Y.

No. 4.—*Major Mackall to Colonel Steptoe.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
San Francisco, California, January 12, 1858.

SIR: Brigadier General Clarke directs me to say that he desires you to recall your dragoons and horses as early as the state of the road and the grass, or your supply of forage will permit.

He wishes your command to be in a state of full efficiency at the earliest possible day. Lieutenant Gregg, first dragoons, will be directed to join you with his company as soon as the order for the return of your detachment reaches Vancouver, and to guard your horses in the march.

The general wishes you to be deeply impressed with the importance of obtaining early and full information in relation to the Indian tribes in your vicinity, and south and east towards Fort Hall and the Salmon river.

Information from various sources and points on the frontier leads him to the conclusion that through the Mormons the Indians are being inclined to hostility, and that a conflict in Utah may be the signal for trouble on the frontier, and it is not improbable that the Mormons may move north.

He wishes you to be prepared in advance for either contingency. Full and prompt report of all information, and your opinion founded thereon, is desired.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Lieutenant Colonel C. J. STEPTOE,

Major 9th Infantry, commanding Fort Walla-Walla, W. T.

No. 5.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
San Francisco, California, February 25, 1858.

SIR: In my letter of November 4, 1857, I set forth to the lieutenant general the difference existing between the line of policy I thought it necessary to adopt in relation to certain Indian criminals in Washington Territory and that considered just and proper by the superintendent of Indian affairs, J. W. Nesmith.

The enclosed copies of letters will show how the affair has been again urged on my attention, the state of the question now, and sufficiently explain why I urge on the government an early decision. Mr. Nesmith, though holding his first opinion as to the course proper to be pursued, has, with a laudable spirit, determined to suspend action until he or I can be instructed by the government.

I then ask the department to decide, and either direct the demand for these criminals or permit the Indians to know that the offenders may rest secure.

In the present restless state of these people I fear the demand of these criminals may turn the scale and bring on war, and suspense is scarcely less likely to prove injurious.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,
Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieut. Col. L. THOMAS, *Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A.,*
Headquarters of the Army, New York.

FORT WALLA-WALLA, W. T., *January 29, 1858.*

SIR: I received by last mail your letter of the 12th instant. Measures were taken at once to insure the full efficiency of this command, whenever it may be required for active service. It is very difficult to determine, from any information I have now, how far the reports that have reached the general of a meditated outbreak on the

part of the Indians in this direction ought to be relied upon. That the expediency of availing themselves of this Mormon revolt to recover some real or imagined rights has been discussed amongst them I am quite sure, but doubt whether they have resolved to commit themselves to hostilities at present. If they should learn that the Mormons have obtained any marked advantage over the troops, or if the contest in Utah should be a protracted one, I would then seriously apprehend trouble with the surrounding tribes. Between this post and Fort Hall there are numerous families of Snake Indians, who are represented to be great friends of the Mormons, and to be well armed and provided with ammunition. I am inclined to think this is true, and that they have made some efforts to break up the friendly relations existing between the troops and Indians in the Walla-Walla country, but that the latter are not disposed to involve themselves while the chances of success are so much against them. What has been said here applies more particularly to the Cayuse, Walla-Walla, and various petty tribes living on the Columbia river and its tributaries below. Respecting the northern Indians, (Pelouse, Yakima, and Spokane,) there never has been a doubt on my mind that very slight encouragement would at any time suffice to revive their late hostile feelings. It is gratifying, however, to know that they are much under the influence of the Nez Percés, who are, for the most part, and have always been, strong in their friendship towards us. Upon the whole, I do not think, in view of the large force to be here soon, that we will have a difficulty with these Indians this year. If the troops have ordinary success in Utah, the probability will be lessened, and still further if the Mormons shall be signally worsted. I have remonstrated earnestly with the chiefs against the interference of their people in the matter, and I am sure that several of the most influential are impressed with the conviction that such interference could not fail to be disastrous to them. Having no certain information as to the sentiments of the Indians (Snakes) between this and Fort Boise, I have long intended to ascertain the truth of the matter by sending out an expedition early this spring. My purpose now is to start three companies of dragoons over the route so soon as the absence of snow and height of the new grass will justify the movement, and, if possible, to despatch a reliable Indian immediately over the same route (perhaps further) to gain information in advance. It is only about 200 miles from here to Fort Boise, and not over 500 miles to the Salt Lake by the wagon road, (probably fifty miles less by the trails.) An old trapper living here, who spent many years about Fort Hall, and has often travelled the road, says that he can go with ease from this post to the Salt Lake and back in twenty days. A half-breed Indian from Salmon river came here three days since, and states that the Mormon settlement there removed some six weeks ago to the Salt Lake, sacrificing houses and improvements, as at San Bernardino. In my opinion, this is only significant as indicating further the stern resistance contemplated by the Mormons. I question much whether the idea of leaving Utah and emigrating to some other country is seriously entertained by them. But in either event the advantage of arming and

arraying against us all the Indians living on the principal routes to Utah cannot have escaped their attention, and it is more than probable that they have taken steps to effect that end.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. J. STEPTOE,

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel United States Army.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General U. S. Army, San Francisco.

FORT SIMCOE, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,

January 30, 1858.

MAJOR: It seems proper that I should report, for the information of General Clarke, that the Indian chief "Skloom," brother of Kamia Kin, has recently sent word to me, for the second time, that the Mormons, on one or two occasions since last summer, have sent emissaries among the Indians of this region to incite them to a union with the Mormons in hostility to the United States. He states that the chiefs repel those overtures from the Mormons, but that some of the young men seem disposed to countenance them. The Mormons make them large promises of arms, ammunition, cattle, &c.

For myself, I do not attach much importance to these machinations of the Mormons, unless our army in Utah should meet with some serious reverses.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. S. GARNETT,

Major 9th Infantry, Commanding Post.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General, &c.

FORT SIMCOE, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,

February 3, 1858.

MAJOR: I learn from unauthentic sources, though entitled to belief, that Mr. R. H. Lansdale, recently appointed Indian agent for the Yakima tribes of Indians by the superintendent of Indian affairs in this Territory, is soon to arrive here with instructions to demand the surrender of the murderers of Agent Bolan.

As this proceeding will be inconsistent with the views of General Clarke, communicated to me in your letter of August 28, 1857, and department orders No. 87, of 1857, I deem it proper to report the matter to him, and to ask his instructions as to my own conduct, should I be officially called upon by Mr. Lansdale for assistance to enforce his demand.

I think it probable that the Indians will refuse to deliver up the murderers.

While thus seeking to learn General Clarke's wishes in respect to this matter, I deem it proper to say, if left uninformed as to them, I shall consider it my duty to decline acceding to Mr. Lansdale's requisition, on the ground that, in a matter in which the Department of War ought to be so well informed as on this, and in which such important consequences may be involved, it is reasonable to suppose that it would have communicated its wishes on the subject direct to the military authorities of the country, if it had intended or desired that they should be employed in the matter.

I beg leave to assure the general that I am ready and willing to undertake this service, but that I do not consider it the part of an officer of subordinate command in the army, in cases of doubtful policy, to commit acts on his own responsibility which may involve such heavy drains upon the public treasury, unless he should have no time or means for reference to the proper authorities.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. S. GARNETT,

Major 9th Infantry, Commanding Post.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General, United States Army,

San Francisco, California.

Official:

W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
San Francisco, California, February 22, 1858.

MAJOR: Your letter of February 3 has been submitted to Brigadier General Clarke.

The general has since had a consultation with Mr. Nesmith, superintendent for both Territories, and finds that your information is not entirely accurate.

The superintendent had directed the agent to whom you refer to tell the Indians, on all proper occasions, that the murderers of Bolan would finally be obliged to surrender and submit themselves to trial.

He had given no instructions to demand the surrender, and as General Clark has referred the question to the department, Mr. Nesmith is now willing to let it rest until orders in the case are received from Washington.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Major R. S. GARNETT,

9th Infantry U. S. A., Comd'g Fort Simcoe, W. T.

SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA,
February 24, 1858.

SIR: Since my arrival here I have seen a letter from Major Garnett, from which it is to be inferred that he is under the impression that you were authorized to make a positive demand upon the Yakimas for the surrender of the murderers of Bolan; by reference to your instructions from me you will perceive that such was not my intentions.

The whole question is now pending before the department at Washington, and I deem it improper to take any further action, or to communicate further with the Indians on the subject, until such time as positive instructions are received from the department on the subject. You will therefore allow the matter to remain as it is until otherwise directed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. W. NESMITH,

Sup't Indian Affairs for Washington and Oregon Territories.

R. H. LANSDALE, Esq.,

Indian Agent, Dalles, Oregon.

Official:

W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 6.—*Mr. Swan to the Secretary of War.*

WASHINGTON, March 29, 1858.

SIR: I am requested by Hon. Isaac I. Stevens to transmit to you the enclosed copy of joint resolutions of the legislative assembly of the Territory of Washington, relative to citizens and settlers in Walla-Walla county being driven from their homes and claims by the military authorities of Washington Territory, and to respectfully call your attention to the great importance to the interests of Washington Territory that this matter be promptly attended to at your earliest convenience.

I am, sir, with great respect, your most obedient,

JAMES G. SWAN.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,

Secretary of War.

Joint Resolutions, relative to citizens and settlers in Walla-Walla county being driven from their homes and claims by the military authority of Washington Territory.

Whereas certain officers of the United States army, commanding in the county of Walla-Walla, have unlawfully assumed to issue orders prohibiting citizens of this Territory from settling in certain portions thereof, and in accordance with said orders have driven citizens and settlers from their claims and homes acquired under the laws of the United States, to their great injury—

Therefore be it resolved by the legislative assembly of the Territory of Washington that, in our opinion, the said orders are without the authority of law, and that the acts done under said orders are a high-handed outrage upon the rights and liberties of the American people.

Resolved, That the Governor be requested to give the proper authorities at Washington all necessary information on the subject of the outrageous usurpation of the military over the civil authority.

Resolved, That we believe the above usurpation to be the very worst form of martial law, proclaimed by tyrants not having feeling in common with us, nor interests identified with ours.

Resolved, That a copy of the above resolutions be forwarded to our delegate in Congress, and that he be requested to represent the matter to the proper department in Washington city, to the end that the evil be corrected.

Passed January 15, 1858.

J. S. M. VANCLEAVE,
Speaker House Representatives.

C. C. PAGETT,
President of the Council.

SECRETARY'S OFFICE,
Olympia, Jan. 25, 1858.

A true copy.
Attest:

C. H. MASON,
Secretary of the Territory.

No. 7.—*Adjutant General to General Clarke.*

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,
Washington, May 3, 1858.

GENERAL: In compliance with the instructions of the Secretary of War, I have the honor herewith to transmit a copy of the letter which has been addressed to the War Department by Mr. James G. Swan, under date of March 29, enclosing a copy of a joint resolution of the legislative assembly of Washington Territory, representing that citizens and settlers in Walla-Walla county have been driven from their homes and claims by the military authorities.

The subject is referred to you for such consideration as in your judgment it may demand.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

S. COOPER,
Adjutant General.

Brevet Brigadier General N. S. CLARKE,
Commanding Department of the Pacific,
San Francisco, California.

No. 8.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
San Francisco, June 1, 1858.

SIR: I enclose herewith a communication addressed to Colonel Cooper, in answer to one from him. I respectfully request that it be forwarded to him after perusal at general headquarters.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.
ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Headquarters Army, New York.

No. 9.—*General Clarke to the Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
San Francisco, California, June 1, 1858.

SIR: I acknowledge receipt of your letter of May 3. General Wool while in command ordered that persons should not be permitted to settle in the region of country alluded to in the resolutions of the territorial assembly of Washington Territory. I reiterated the order in June last, after consultation with Colonel Nesmith, superintendent of Indian affairs, with the view of saving the Indians from encroachments by whites, and as a measure tending to allay the excitement among the former and so keep them from open acts of hostility. The discontent of the Indians arose from dissatisfaction in reference to the treaty which had been made, but which had not been ratified, and which remains unratified to this day.

In a communication of mine to the headquarters of the army, made in January last, I suggested that instant steps should be taken to pacify the Indians, and their chiefs invited to repair to Washington, in order that they might thereby be made to understand the power of the United States. I now reiterate my suggestions and hope that they may be adopted, especially as, in consequence of recent discoveries of gold fields in Washington Territory and the adjacent British possessions, vast numbers of whites are going there for purposes of mining, who have to go there by way of Puget's Sound and Columbia river. In such state of things collisions will arise jeoparding the lives of whites as well as Indians, and bringing on a general war, the end of which may be prolonged to a distant day, and may be carried on only at very great expense.

Efforts to pacify the Indians should be made (if not now too late) by such judicious and generous appliances as may be consistent with the policy of the government.

Reports from Colonel Steptoe represent the Indians in his advance

as hostile, and that, in fact, they have been insolent in words and in deeds, and have so far insulted his post as to have carried off cattle belonging to the public. The colonel is in the field with the intention of chastising them. He represents that certain chiefs and their followers are friendly, and stand aloof from the solicitations of those who are disposed without further delay to make war. Nevertheless, sinister rumors are afloat that he has met with a repulse. On receiving accurate information as to the state of affairs with him, should he have encountered disaster, I shall repair to Oregon and perhaps Walla-Walla, and take steps to support him as far as my means in troops will enable me, in doing which it may be necessary to withdraw forces from other points at the risk of endangering them.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Colonel SAMUEL COOPER,

Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

No. 10.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,

San Francisco, California, June 14, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to transmit documents relating to the condition of affairs in the country east of the Cascade mountains, and the report of the operations of Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe. They are marked "S," 44, 46, 51, and 53.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieut. Col. L. THOMAS,

Assist. Adj. General, Headquarters Army, New York.

FORT WALLA-WALLA, *April 17, 1858.*

SIR: There appears to be so much excitement amongst the Pelouse and Spokane Indians as to make an expedition to the north advisable, if not necessary; I shall accordingly start with three companies of dragoons in that direction as soon as possible after the arrival of Brevet Captain Taylor.

Some forty persons living at Colville recently petitioned for the presence of troops at that place, as they believed their lives and property to be in danger from hostile Indians. I cannot tell at this

distance whether they are needlessly alarmed, but shall visit Colville before returning.

Two white men are reported to have been killed recently near Pelouse river on their way to Colville. An Indian gave me to-day the names of the Pelouse Indians said to be implicated. I am inclined to think the rumor is correct, but will investigate the matter thoroughly during my trip.

A few nights ago a party of the same tribe made a foray into this valley and carried off horses and cattle belonging to various persons, both whites and Indians, and thirteen head of beef cattle, the property of the commissary department. It is my impression that they did not suppose these animals to be in our charge or they would not probably have taken them. However, it is very necessary to check this thieving, or of course worse trouble will grow out.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient seavant,
E. J. STEPTOE.

Major W. W. MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.

FORT WALLA-WALLA, W. T.,
May 2, 1858.

MAJOR: Brevet Captain Taylor has arrived with the dragoon horses, all in fine condition. I have delayed proceeding to the north until some more definite information could be obtained of the state of things there. Whether the two white men were really killed, as was reported at the date of my last letter, I have not, however, been able to ascertain, but the most reliable Indian chiefs seem to believe so. It is my intention to leave here some day this week, probably on Thursday, with about 130 dragoons and a detachment of infantry for service with the howitzers, and to move directly where it is understood the hostile party is at present.

Lieutenant Harvie, who is at the Dalles to receive and bring up about 250 head of beef cattle, will be on his return in a few days. He has fifteen dragoons for an escort, but in the unsettled state of the country I fear the temptation to get possession of the cattle might be too strong with the Indians, and accordingly have written to Colonel Wright asking him to add a few men to the escort.

It is proper for me to say that there appears to be some probability of considerable disturbance among the neighboring tribes, but I hope to check it.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
E. J. STEPTOE,

*Brevet Lieut. Colonel, U. S. A.,
Commanding Post.*

Major W. W. MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.

FORT WALLA-WALLA, *May* 23, 1858.

MAJOR: On the 2d instant I informed you of my intention to move northward with a part of my command. Accordingly, on the 6th I left here with companies C, E, and H, 1st dragoons, and E, 9th infantry; in all five company officers, and one hundred and fifty-two enlisted men. Hearing that the hostile Pelouses were near Al-pon-on-we, in the Nez Percés land, I moved to that point, and was ferried across Snake river by Timothy, a Nez Percés chief. The enemy fled towards the north, and I followed leisurely on the road to Colville. On Sunday morning the 16th, when near the To-hoto-nim-me, in the Spokane country, we found ourselves suddenly in presence of ten or twelve hundred Indians of various tribes—Spokanes, Pelouses, Cœur d'Alenes, Yakimas, and some others—all armed, painted, and defiant. I moved slowly on until just about to enter a ravine that wound along the bases of several hills, which were all crowned by the excited savages. Perceiving that it was their purpose to attack us in this dangerous place, I turned aside and encamped, the whole wild, frenzied mass moving parallel to us, and, by yells, taunts, and menaces, apparently trying to drive us to some initiatory act of violence. Towards night a number of chiefs rode up to talk with me, and inquired what were our motives to this intrusion upon them? I answered, that we were passing on to Colville, and had no hostile intentions towards the Spokanes, who had always been our friends, nor towards any other tribes who were friendly; that my chief aim in coming so far was to see the Indians and the white people at Colville, and, by friendly discussion with both, endeavor to strengthen their good feelings for each other. They expressed themselves satisfied, but would not consent to let me have canoes, without which it would be impossible to cross the Spokane river. I concluded, for this reason, to retrace my steps at once, and the next morning (17th) turned back towards this post. We had not marched three miles when the Indians, who had gathered on the hills adjoining the line of march, began an attack upon the rear guard, and immediately the fight became general. We labored under the great disadvantage of having to defend the pack-train while in motion and in a rolling country peculiarly favorable to the Indian mode of warfare. We had only a small quantity of ammunition, but, in their excitement, the soldiers could not be restrained from firing it in the wildest manner. They did, however, under the leading of their respective commanders, sustain well the reputation of the army for some hours, charging the enemy repeatedly with gallantry and success. The difficult and dangerous duty of flanking the column was assigned to Brevet Captain Taylor and Lieutenant Gaston, to both of whom it proved fatal. The latter fell about 12 o'clock, and the enemy soon after charging formally upon his company, it fell back in confusion and could not be rallied. About a half hour after this Captain Taylor was brought in mortally wounded; upon which I immediately took possession of a convenient height and halted. The fight continued here with unabated activity; the Indians occupying neighboring heights and

working themselves along to pick off our men. The wounded increased in number continually. Twice the enemy gave unmistakable evidence of a design to carry our position by assault, and their number and desperate courage caused me to fear the most serious consequences to us from such an attempt on their part. It was manifest that the loss of their officers and comrades began to tell upon the spirit of the soldiers; that they were becoming discouraged, and not to be relied upon with confidence. Some of them were recruits but recently joined; two of the companies had musketballs, which were utterly worthless in our present condition; and, what was most alarming, only two or three rounds of cartridges remained to some of the men, and but few to any of them. It was plain that the enemy would give the troops no rest during the night, and they would be still further disqualified for stout resistance on the morrow, while the number of enemies would certainly be increased. I determined, for these reasons, to make a forced march to Snake river, about eighty-five miles distant, and secure the canoes in advance of the Indians, who had already threatened to do the same in regard to us. After consulting with the officers, all of whom urged me to the step as the only means in their opinion of securing the safety of the command, I concluded to abandon every thing that might impede our march. Accordingly, we set out about 10 o'clock in perfectly good order, leaving the disabled animals and such as were not in condition to travel so far and so fast, and, with deep pain I have to add, the two howitzers. The necessity for this last measure will give you, as well as many words, a conception of the strait to which we believed ourselves to be reduced. Not an officer of the command doubted that we would be overwhelmed with the first rush of the enemy upon our position in the morning; to retreat further by day, with our wounded men and property, was out of the question; to retreat slowly by night equally so, as we could not then be in condition to fight all next day; it was therefore necessary to relieve ourselves of all incumbrances and to fly. We had no horses able to carry the guns over 80 miles without resting, and if the enemy should attack us *en route*, as, from their ferocity, we certainly expected they would, not a soldier could be spared for any other duty than skirmishing. For these reasons, which I own candidly seemed to me more cogent at the time than they do now, I resolved to bury the howitzers. What distresses me is that no *attempt* was made to bring them off; and all I can add is that if this was an error of judgment it was committed after the calmest discussion of the matter, in which, I believe, every officer agreed with me.

Enclosed is a list of the killed and wounded. The enemy acknowledge a loss of 9 killed and 40 or 50 wounded, many of them mortally. It is known to us that this is an under estimate, for one of the officers informs me that on a single spot where Lieutenants Gregg and Gaston met in a joint charge twelve dead Indians were counted. Many others were seen to fall.

I cannot do justice, in this communication, to the conduct of the officers throughout the affair. The gallant bearing of each and all

was accompanied by an admirable coolness and sound judgment. To the skill and promptness of Assistant Surgeon Randolph the wounded are deeply indebted.

Be pleased to excuse the hasty appearance of this letter; I am anxious to get it off and have not time to have it transcribed.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. J. STEPTOE,

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel United States Army.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.

Endorsement.

This is a candid report of a disastrous affair. The small supply of ammunition is surprising and unaccounted for. It seems that Brevet Brigadier General Clarke has ordered up all the disposable troops in California, and probably will further reinforce Steptoe's district by detachments of the 4th and 9th regiments of infantry; and, on the 29th ultimo, I gave instructions for sending the 6th or 7th regiments of infantry from Salt Lake valley across the Pacific and *via* Walla-Walla, if practicable, in preference to any route south of that.

Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War.

WINFIELD SCOTT.

JULY 15, 1858.

Report of the killed, wounded, and missing in the battle at Te-hoto-nim-me, May 17, 1858.

COMPANY C FIRST DRAGOONS.

Killed—Brevet Captain O. H. Taylor, private Alfred Barnes.

Mortally wounded—Private Victor Charles De Moy.

Severely wounded—Privates James Lynch and Henry Montreville.

Slightly wounded—Farrier Elijah R. Birch.

COMPANY E FIRST DRAGOONS.

Killed—Second Lieutenant William Gaston.

Mortally wounded—First sergeant William C. Williams.

Severely wounded—James Kelly, William D. Micon, and Harriet Sneckster.

Slightly wounded—James Healy, Maurice Henly, Charles Hughes, and John Mitchell.

COMPANY H FIRST DRAGOONS.

Killed—Privates Charles H. Harnish and James Crozet.

Missing—First sergeant Edward Ball.

COMPANY E NINTH INFANTRY.

Severely wounded—Private Ormond W. Hammond.

Slightly wounded—Privates John Klay and Gotleib Berger.

FORT WALLA-WALLA, *May 23, 1858.*

MAJOR: I take the liberty to recommend, as the very first step in prosecuting the war with the northern tribes, the establishment of a post on Snake river, near the mouth of the Pelouse—a temporary work, from which the garrison can fall back to this point upon the approach of winter. The road to Colville crosses there, but the great advantage of having such an advanced post will be in thus obtaining a sure *ferry*. I had vast difficulty in getting the dragoon horses over Snake river, which is everywhere wide, deep, and strong, and without the assistance of Timothy's Nez Percés it would have been utterly impossible for us to cross, either going or returning. Besides this, the Pelouse tribe ought to be the first one struck at, as it is the most hostile, and was guilty, a few weeks since, of murdering two white men on the Colville road.

A few companies of infantry could construct a kind of entrenchment there in a few days, which one company could easily defend, and at the same time guard the ferry-boat. There is absolutely no other way of crossing the stream with certainty.

I hope the general will send us as strong a force as possible, and with all the despatch possible. The tribes around this post are watching eagerly to see what they can gain by joining the hostile party. One of my keenest regrets growing out of the late affair is the consciousness that our defeat must, until something is done to check it, encourage the wavering to active hostilities.

All the companies here are now busily drilling as skirmishers, in which branch of instruction the dragoons, although very gallant, showed themselves not at all proficient the other day, and they will soon be ready to take the field again; but I hope the force here will not, for manifest reasons, be reduced before the arrival of other troops from below.

There is a band of Nez Percés, perhaps fifty or seventy-five, at present here, who took their arms as soon as they heard of my difficulty, but met me on my return. Their services can easily be secured, I think, if the general desires it, and no doubt they would be valuable auxiliaries—if in no other way, certainly as instructors to our soldiers in the mode of Indian warfare.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. J. STEPTOE,

Brevet Lieut. Colonel U. S. Army, Commanding Post.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.

No. 11.—*Colonel Steptoe to Major Mackall.*

FORT WALLA-WALLA,

May 23, 1858.

MAJOR: I received by last mail the order to furnish Lieutenant Mullan an escort of one officer and sixty-five soldiers.

Of course the present state of our relations with the northern tribes will make it impossible for Lieutenant Mullan to proceed with his survey.

In this connexion I may inform you that the fight with my command only committed the Indians to hostilities a little earlier, and probably under more fortunate circumstances for us. A few minutes before the attack upon us, Father Joseph, the priest at Cœur d'Alene mission, joined me and stated to me that most of the excitement among the tribes was due to mischievous reports that the government intended to seize their lands, in proof of which they were invited to observe whether a party would not soon be surveying a road through it. He added that the Cœur d'Alenes, Spokanes, and Flatheads, had bound themselves to massacre any party that should attempt to make a survey. I do not doubt in the least the truth of this statement, and make no question that Lieutenant Mullan's party has been saved from destruction by late occurrences.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. J. STEPTOE,

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel U. S. A., Commanding Post.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.

No. 12.—*Colonel Wright to Major Mackall.*

HEADQUARTERS FORT DALLES, O. T.,

May 26, 1858.

SIR: By the next steamer you will doubtless receive the report of Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, recounting the unfortunate termination of his northern expedition. That all the Indians in that section of country have combined for a general war there is not a shadow of doubt. They are numerous, active, and perfectly acquainted with the topography of the country; hence a large body of troops will be necessary if, as I presume, it is designed to bring those Indians under subjection, and signally chastise them for their unwarranted attack upon Colonel Steptoe.

It is my opinion that one thousand troops should be sent into that country, thus enabling the commander to pursue the enemy in two or three columns.

The posts east of the Cascades are small, and I do not think it would be prudent at this moment to reduce them, as there is much agitation among the friendly Indians in consequence of this affair of Colonel Steptoe's; and south of us, distant seventy miles, there is a large body of Indians on the "Warm Spring" reservation; they are now perfectly friendly, but should they be tampered with by the hostiles and no military force at hand to overcome them, it is difficult to say what their course would be.

The steamboat which was built to run on the upper Columbia

unfortunately went over the Cascades; this is a serious detriment to us, as well as to the owners; were she now running above the Des Chutes her services would be of the greatest importance. The supplies at Walla-Walla at this moment are very limited; in fact a few days since they were almost destitute of flour; however, a supply is now on the way to that place.

I think that we may now look forward to a protracted war, and it behooves us to prosecute it systematically, with an ample supply of the *personnel* and *material*, to guard against a possibility of failure.

Should the difficulties with the Mormons have been terminated, (as is rumored,) probably a force could be drawn from that country to aid in the coming struggle.

Lieutenant Mullan with his party will remain near here until he hears from Colonel Steptoe, but there is no probability that he will be able to construct the road this year; in fact, it is said that this proposed opening a road through the Indian country was a primary cause of the attack on Colonel Steptoe, and had Lieutenant Mullan preceded Colonel Steptoe his whole party would have been sacrificed.

I have temporarily suspended the order for Lieutenant Hughes to proceed to Fort Walla-Walla, as I presumed that the design of the general in sending a subaltern there was to enable the commander of that post to furnish the escort to Lieutenant Mullan; should the party advance Lieutenant Hughes will proceed with it.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters Department of the Pacific, San Francisco, Cal.

No. 13.—*Colonel Steptoe to Major Mackall.*

FORT WALLA-WALLA,

May 28, 1858.

MAJOR: In my report of the 23d instant it was stated that five company officers were with my command in the late fight, but their names were omitted. They were as follows:

Captain C. S. Winder, in charge of the howitzers; Brevet Captain C. H. Taylor, 1st dragoons; Lieutenant D. McM. Gregg; Lieutenant James Wheeler, jr., upon whom the command of company C devolved at the fall of Captain Taylor; Lieutenant William Gaston, 1st dragoons,

It may be superfluous for me to say that each one of these officers discharged his duties with the truest courage; but I feel constrained to add that they displayed, throughout, the greatest zeal, cheerfulness, and coolness. It was, no doubt, due to the severe punishment which, by their exertions, the enemy received, that we were not pursued and attacked at the crossing of Snake river, where a bold attack must have been disastrous to us.

The other two commissioned officers with me were Assistant Sur-

geon Randolph, who was mentioned in my report, and Lieutenant H. B. Fleming, acting assistant quartermaster and acting commissary of subsistence.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. J. STEPTOE,

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel U. S. A., Commanding Post.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.

No. 14.—*Colonel Steptoe to Major Mackall.*

FORT WALLA-WALLA,

May 29, 1858.

MAJOR: Since my return to this post the Indians in this vicinity who began to show much restlessness have become quiet again. Reports were busily circulated amongst them that my command had been utterly destroyed, and many of them were disposed to take advantage of our supposed condition.

I ought to advise you that, from the best information to be obtained, about half of the Spokanes, Cœur d'Alenes, and probably of the Flat-heads, nearly all of the Pelouses, a portion of the Yakimas, and I think a small number of Nez Percés, with scattered families of various petty tribes, have been for some time, and are now, hostile.

It is impossible to say what force they can bring together, but of course they cannot keep together long a force of any size.*

A good strong column of three or four hundred infantry, with two or three companies of mounted men, would be able to beat them, I think, under all circumstances, or else to disperse them thoroughly, which would have nearly the same effect. It is unfortunate that such a column cannot be sent out before the season for gathering roots has passed.

There is much doubt on my mind where the Indians obtained their ammunition, of which they had abundance. Some persons believe that the Cœur d'Alene priest furnished it, but I do not credit that; my impression is that it was obtained either from the Colville traders or the Mormons. The priest, in conversation with me, alluded to the report so injurious to his reputation, and added that it was a charge too monstrous for him to notice it in a formal way.

Of one thing the general may be assured, and that is that the tribes through whose lands the proposed road to Fort Benton will run are resolved to prevent it, and before even a survey can be made they will have to be chastised.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. J. STEPTOE,

Brevet Lieutenant Colonel, U. S. A. Commanding Post.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General U. S. A., San Francisco.

No. 15.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
San Francisco, California, June 2, 1858.

SIR : I go to Washington Territory and have directed troops to follow me ; arriving I shall primarily have in view a retrieval of the ground lost by Colonel Steptoe, by occupancy of the point he suggests, and the recovery of the howitzers ; and in order to check the hostile Indians also, to adopt such other steps as exigencies may demand.

Should a war become general by combinations of tribes, it will become necessary to concentrate a larger military force. I suggest, therefore, a movement of troops as soon as possible from Utah, to operate against whatever tribes may be in hostility.

In reference to friendly Indians and such as may at a future day be disposed to treat, I suggest authority be given to form such treaty stipulations as the nature of the case or cases may seem to demand. Doubtless meantime the hostiles will have learned the departure south of the Mormons who have, I believe, instigated them and who now abandon them. The moral effect upon them of such abandonment will probably dampen their ardor, and lead them to sober reflection upon the consequences of their rashness.

I repeat that such chiefs as may be disposed should be invited to repair at the expense of government to Washington. Doubtless on their return they would make a serious impression upon others of their people as to the folly of hostility to the United States.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Col. 6th Infantry, Brevet Brig. Gen'l, Commanding.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Headquarters Army, New York.

No. 16.—*Colonel Steptoe to Army Headquarters.*

FORT WALLA-WALLA, *June 17, 1858.*

SIR : In compliance with a requirement of General Orders, No. 9, of this year, I have the honor to submit the following names of enlisted men who were most conspicuous for good conduct in an action between the troops and the Indians on the 17th of last month. The combat did not result in our favor, but it furnishes many instances of personal gallantry amongst the soldiers, and was maintained from an early hour of the morning till near sunset against overwhelming numbers and with every advantage on the side of the enemy.

COMPANY C, 1ST DRAGOONS.

First Sergeant Jas. A. Hall, Bugler R. A. Magan, Farrier E. I. Birch, Privates J. S. Montague, Alfred Barnes, (killed,) Victor C. De May, (severely wounded, since dead.)

COMPANY E, 1ST DRAGOONS.

First Sergeant Wm. C. Williams, (severely wounded, since dead,) Private R. P. Kerse, who with a few others gallantly defended the body of Brevet Captain Taylor, (lying mortally wounded,) when the Indians made a desperate charge to get possession of it.

COMPANY H, 1ST DRAGOONS.

First Sergeant Edward Ball, who displayed the greatest courage and determination throughout the action, and with a few men repulsed the attack of a large number of Indians at one of our most important points. Privates Francis Poisell, who assisted in rescuing and bearing off Captain Taylor, under a heavy fire from the enemy; C. H. Hamish and James Crozet, (both killed.)

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. J. STEPTOE,

Brevet Lieut. Colonel United States Army.

Colonel L. THOMAS,

A. A. Gen'l, Headquarters Army, New York.

No. 17.—*Father Joset to Father Congiato.*

VANCOUVER, June 27, 1858.

MY REVEREND FATHER: I am going to try and satisfy the demand that you have made of me for a detailed relation of the events of the unfortunate 17th of May, and of the causes which have brought such sad results.

Do not think my reverend father that I am beknowing to all the affairs of the savages, there is a great deal wanting; they come to us about the affairs of their conscience, but as to the rest they consult us but little.

I asked one day of Michel the question if a plot was brewed among the Indians? Do you think that there would be any one in it who would warn the missionary? No one, he replied. This was to tell me implicitly that he himself would not inform me of it. However the half-breeds should know it, added I, much less still than the father. After the battle, Bonaventure, one of the best young men in the nation, who was not in the fight, and who, as I will tell later, has aided us a great deal in saving the lives of the Americans who were at the mission at the time of the battle, Bonaventure said to me, do you think that if we thought to kill the Americans we would come to tell you so? You appear also to think that we can do almost anything with the Indians. Far from it. Even among the Cœur d'Alenes there is a certain number that we never see, that I do not know in any manner. The majority mistrust me when I come to speak in favor of the Americans. Those who were present at the assembly called by Gov-

ernor Stevens, in the Spokane prairie, will not have forgotten how much the Indians insisted the troops should not pass the river Nez Percés. I have heard the Indians insinuate several times that they had no objections to the Americans passing through their country in small numbers, but much to their passing in force, as if to make laws. Last winter Michel still said to me: "Father, if the soldiers exhibit themselves in the country (of the mountains) the Indians will become furious." I had heard rumors that a detachment would come to Colville; it was only rumor, and having to go down in the spring—having also written to you to that effect, I intended to go to inform Colonel Steptoe of this disposition of the Indians. Toward the beginning of April it was learned that an American had been assassinated by a Nez Percé. Immediately rumor commences to circulate that the troops were preparing to cross the Nez Percé to obtain vengeance for this crime. Toward the end of April, at the time of my departure, the chief Pierre Prulin told me "not to go now, to wait some weeks to see what turn affairs are going to take." I am too hurried, I replied to him, I cannot wait, and as the parents of the young men whom I have chosen appear troubled, I will choose other companions and country. Arrived at the Gomache prairie I met the express of the great chief Vincente; this told me to return, his people thought there was too much danger at that moment. I replied that I was going to wait three days, to give the chief time to find me himself; that if he did not come, I would continue my route. I said to myself if Vincente believes really in the greatness of the danger, however bad or however long the road may be, he will not fail to come. In the meantime, I saw several Nez Percés. Their conversation was generally against the Americans; one of them said in my presence, we will not be able to bring the Cœur d'Alenes to take part with us against the Americans. The priest is the cause; it is for this that we wish to kill the priest.

Vincent marched day and night to find me: below are in substance the reasons he instanced to make me return. "Of the danger on the part of the Americans," I well know that there is none; neither is there any danger for your person on the part of the Indians. You would be able, however, to come back on foot, but we are not on good terms with the Pelouses and the Nez Percés; they are after us without cessation to determine us in the war against the Americans. We are so fatigued with their underhand dealings that I do not know if we will not come to break entirely with them. Their spies cover the country in every sense. When the young men go for the horses they will kill them secretly, and start the report that they have been killed by the Americans; then there will not be any means to restrain our people. We hear the chief of the soldiers spoken of only by the Nez Percés, and it is all against us and to excite our young people. I have great desire to go to see him. It was agreed that when I should go down I would take him to see the colonel; it is then I learned a part of the rumors which were spreading over the country. A white man had said "poor Indians you are finished now," the soldiers are preparing to cross the river to destroy you; then another five hun-

dred soldiers will go to establish themselves at Colville; then five hundred others will rejoin them; then others and others until they find themselves the strongest; then they will chase the Indians from the country. Still another white had seen five hundred soldiers encamped upon the Pelouse preparing themselves to cross the river. All the above passed three weeks before the last events. Among other things, he said to me "if the troops are coming to pass the river, I am sure the Nez Percés are going to direct them upon us." I did not then pay much attention to this statement, but later I saw that he had not been deceived in his predictions, as difficult as it is for a white to penetrate an Indian, just so difficult is it for one Indian to escape another. To return to the mission; I was not without anxiety about what might happen in case the troops should come into the country. I was almost sure of the dispositions of the chiefs and of the majority of the nation; but I knew also a part of the youths are hot-headed, not easy to be governed in a first moment of irritation; also that Kenuokin might make a great many proselytes. I had not forgotten the infernal maxim of Voltaire, "*mutons toujours, il en restera quelque lieu*," was true, and that there ought to remain something in the hearts of our people of the thousand and one stories of this horrible Indian. I do not know, however, yet that he repeated without cessation to the Indians: the father is white like the Americans; they have but one heart; they treated the young Cœur d'Alenes like women, like prairie wolves, who only knew how to make a noise.

On the 15th of May I received another express from Vincent. The troops had passed the Nez Percés; they had said to the Cœur d'Alenes that it was for them the soldiers wished; he desired me to go to aid him in preventing a conflict; he told me to be quick, the troops were near; I set out in an instant; I had enough trouble to stop these young men who were working at the mission, it was an excitement that you could scarcely imagine. The good old Pierre Vincent not only refused to conduct me in his canoe to the lake, but bluntly refused to loan me his canoe; never before was I in such a situation. The distance from the mission to Vincent's camp was, I think about ninety miles; as the water was very high I could only arrive on the evening of the 16th. Vincent told me he had been kept very busy to retain his young men; that he had been at first to the chief of the soldiers and had asked him if he had come to fight the Cœur d'Alenes, that upon his negative reply he had said "well go on," but to his great displeasure he had camped in his neighborhood (about six miles); that then he had made his people retire, still a blood-thirsty Pelouse was endeavoring to excite them; later other Indians confirmed to me the same report; they were Vincent and the Spokans' chief, who prevented the fight on the 15th instant. The chiefs of the different tribes and a quantity of other Indians collected around me. I spoke to them to persuade them to peace. I told them that they did not know with what intention the chief of the soldiers was coming, that the next day they should bring me a horse, and that they might accompany me till in sight of the camp of the soldiers; that I would then go alone to find the officers in command, and would make them

to know then what was now doubtful; they appeared well satisfied. I said still to Vincent to see that no person took the advance. The same evening they came from the camp of the Pelouse to announce that one of the slaves of the soldiers (it is thus that they call the Indians who accompany the troops) had just arrived. The chief of the soldiers would have said, according to him, "you Cœur d'Alenes, you are well to do; your lands, your women are ours." I told the Cœur d'Alenes not to believe it, that no officer ever spoke in that way; tomorrow I will ask the chief of the soldiers if he has said that. The next morning I saw the Spokane's Tshequyseken "Priest." Said he to me, "yesterday evening I was with the chief of the soldiers, when a Pelouse came to tell him that the priest has just arrived; he has brought some powder to the Cœur d'Alenes to encourage them to kill the soldiers;" then turning round towards the Cœur d'Alenes, "do you see now the deceit of this people." Said I they go and slander us before the soldiers, and slander the soldiers here. When they had brought me a horse, I went to the camp of the soldiers; they were far off. I set out in their direction to join them. I saw Colonel Steptoe; made him acquainted with the disposition of the Indians, the mistrust the presence of the troops would inspire, and how I had been kept from going to inform him in the spring. He told me that, having heard by letter from Colville that the whites had had some difficulty with the Indians, he had at first resolved to go there with a few men, to talk with the whites and Indians, and to try and make them agree, but, having learned that the Pelouses were badly disposed, he had determined to take a stronger escort; that, had he known the Spokans and Cœur de'Alenes dreaded the presence of the armed force, he would not have come without having notified them; that he was much surprised the evening before to see the Indians; that they had always talked peaceably to him, then to come to meet him with such hostile demonstration, he had well thought they would come to blows; that he was happy to return without spilling blood. I asked him if he did not desire to see the chiefs; upon his reply that his dragoon horses were too much frightened to stop long, I observed to him that they could talk in marching; he then said he would take pleasure in seeing them. I went to seek them. I could only find Vincent; him I conducted to the colonel; he was fully satisfied with him. One of the Indians who accompanied the troops gave Vincent a blow over the shoulders with his whip, saying to him "Proud man, why do you not fire?" then accused one of the Cœur d'Alenes who had followed Vincent of having wished to fire upon a soldier. Vincent was replying to the colonel, when his uncle came to seek him, saying the Pelouses were about commencing the fire. I warned the colonel of it, and then went with Vincent to try and restrain the Spokanes and Cœur d'Alenes; when we had made them acquainted with the disposition of the colonel, they appeared well satisfied. Victor, one of the braves, who has since died of his wounds, said we have nothing more to do here, we will each one go to his home. Jean Pierre, the chief, supported the proposition of Victor; then Malkapsi became furious. I did not at the time know

why. I found out later that he wished all to go to the camp of Vincent to talk over their affairs. Malkapsi slapped Jean Pierre, and struck Victor with the handle of his whip. I seized the infuriated man; a few words sufficed to calm him. I set out then with a few chiefs to announce at the camp that all was tranquil; a half hour or an hour afterwards what was my surprise to learn that they were fighting. I had well indeed to ask for a horse; there was in the camp only old men and women; it was about 3 o'clock when they brought me a heavy wagon horse. I set out, however, with the hope of getting there by night, when I was met by an Indian, who told me it was useless to fatigue myself, the Indians are enraged at the death of their people, they will listen to no one, whereupon I returned to my tent, the dagger in my heart. The following is the cause of this unhappy conflict as it has been related to me: The parents of Malkapsi, irritated and ashamed of his passion, said to him: "what do you do? you maltreat your own people! if you wish to fight, behold your enemies," (pointing to the troops;) then saying: "Oh, well, let us go and die," they ran towards the troops; I do not think there was more than a dozen of them. The affair did not become serious until Jacques, an excellent Indian, well beloved, and Zacharia, brother in-law of the great chief Vincent, had been killed; then the fury of the Indians knew no bounds. The next day I asked those that I saw "What provocation have you received from the troops?" "None," said they. "Then your are only murderers, the authors of the death of your own people." "This is true; the fault can in no way be attributed to the soldiers; Malkapsi is the cause of all the evil." But they were not all so well disposed. When I asked others what the soldiers had done to them, they replied to me: "And what have we done to them, that they should come thus to seek us; if they were going to Colville," said they, "why do they not take the road, no one of us would then think of molesting them. Why do they go to cross the Nez Percé so high up? Why direct themselves in the interior of our country, removing themselves further from Colville? Why direct themselves, then, upon the place, where we were peaceably occupied in digging our roots? Is it us who have been to seek the soldiers, or the soldiers who have come to fall upon us with their cannon? Thus, although they avow that they fired first, they pretend that the first act of hostility came from the troops. I asked them if they had taken scalps. They told me no, with the exception of a small piece that had been taken by a half fool. I asked them, also, if they had interred the dead. They replied that the women had buried them, but that the Pelouses had opened the graves which were at the encampment. It is then, also, that the Indians told me: We see now that the father did not deceive us when he told us that the soldiers wished peace. We forced them to fight; we fired a long time upon them before they answered our fire. As to the actual disposition of the Indians (Cœur d'Alenes), I think they can be recapitulated as follows: 1st, Regret for what has happened; all protesting that there was nothing premeditated; seeing that all the chiefs and the nation in general were decided upon peace;

it was an accident that brought to life the anger of the older men. 2d, Disposition to render up what they have taken from the troops, in order to have peace. 3d, If peace is refused them, determination to fight to the last. I knew, from Colonel Steptoe, that his guide had told him he was conducting him to Colville by the nearest road. Now that the guide mistook himself so grossly, is absurd to suppose. It appears necessary to conclude that in conducting the troops straight upon the camp of the Indians, he had design. It cannot be supposed that he ignored the irritation that the presence of the troops would produce upon the Indians; and as for the rest, the intriguing of this guide is well known. I see no other way to explain his conduct, than to say he laid a snare for the Cœur d'Alenes, whom he wished to humiliate, and that seeing afterwards the troops fall in the ditch that he had dug for others, he has done everything possible to draw them from it. The Cœur d'Alenes say, also, that it was cried to them from the midst of the troops: "Courage! you have already killed two chiefs;" that one of the Nez Percés who had followed the troops, came back to say to his people: It is not the Cœur d'Alenes, but, indeed, the soldiers who killed the two Nez Percés, because they said that they wished to save themselves on the side of the Indians; neither the Cœur d'Alenes, nor the Spokanes, nor the Chaudries, the Pend d'Oreilles, and the Petes Plattes had spilt white blood; they pride themselves for it. If the war commence now, it is probable it will terminate only by the extermination of all these tribes, for their country is so difficult of access that it will be impossible to terminate it in a year or two, and almost equally impossible that it continue without all these tribes, including the Pieds Noirs, taking part in it. When Governor Stevens was to see the Pieds Noirs to make a treaty with them, they said to our Indians: Until now we have quarrelled about one cow, but now we are surprised by a third; we will unite ourselves against him; if the Americans attack you, I will aid you; if they attack me, you will aid me. The war will cost thousands of lives, and all for an affair unpremeditated, and for which the Indians feel much regret. You will easily believe me, my reverend father, when I tell you I would purchase back with my life this unhappy event; not on my own account; I have been, and will be, much slandered; but what are the judgments of man to me, when God is my witness that I have done everything in my power to preserve peace? Your reverence knows very well that we have always threatened our Indians to quit them if they exhibit themselves hostile against the whites. They expect to see themselves abandoned; I have told them positively we will go. To quit them, actually would be to deliver them to the deceit of Kanuokin, and to light, I think, a universal war throughout the whole country. What pains me is to see the ruin of so many good Indians. What breaks my heart, is to see Colonel Steptoe, the zealous protector of Indians, exposed to the blame which ordinarily attaches itself to bad success; however, in the eyes of reflecting men, who know his situation, his retreat will do him infinite honor. It is not, I think, the first officer you will meet who could thus have drawn himself out from so bad a situation, sur-

rounded by an army of ferocious beasts, hungry after their prey; of Indians sufficiently numerous to relieve each other, and who had always the means of procuring fresh horses. It appeared impossible that the troops could escape. Besides, the plan of the Indians was not to give them any rest until they had crossed the Nez Percé; the Spokanes were to be there early on the morning of the eighteenth to relieve the Cœur d'Alenes. In a position so critical, the colonel deceived the vigilance of his enemies, and throwing them his provisions, as an inducement to delay, he defeated their plan. He foresaw, without doubt, that the Indians on the one hand had let him take the advance, and on the other tempted by the booty abandoned the pursuit; so that if the troops have escaped, they owe it to the sagacity of the colonel. At the mission they were on the point of having a tragedy. Four Americans had arrived there with some half breeds and Canadians. After my departure to go to see the colonel from Colville, they went to the Flathead country. On the evening of the 18th the news reached them of the battle, and of the death of Jacque, Zacary and Victor. Immediately the women commenced to cry that it was necessary to avenge their deaths. Our two brothers got wind of what was passing. Whilst brother McGeon harrangued them at his best to try and bring them back to humane sentiments, the good old Francois ran with all his might around the marsh, through water and brushes to their encampment, to inform them of the danger. They immediately hid themselves. The next day, the nineteenth, one of them came back to the encampment, saying he would as soon die by the hands of the Indians as by starvation in the woods. The half breeds saved him by saying he was not an American, but a Dane. The Indians were now ashamed of their conduct. Adrian, who had been one of the most ardent, showed himself afterwards one of the most faithful; he came to warn us when there was any new danger. The Indians told the half breeds to go and seek the Americans, who were miserable in the woods. One of the Indians opposed it. He since declared to me that his anger was not yet allayed, and that he was afraid of being carried away by his passion to commit some bad deed. In fact, the Americans who came in in the evening were very near being killed. Adrian having warned us that his life was in danger, we made him come to our house. They are all in safety now. No person has aided us in saving them more than the Indian Bonaventure. When I had set out, he had gone to accompany them to Clark's river, showing them a new road, the ordinary road being still impracticable.

Je suis avec respect, mon révérend père, votre tres humble serviteur,

P. JOSET, S. J.

No. 18.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, W. T., July 23, 1858.

SIR: I enclose herewith copies of instructions to Colonel Wright and Major Garnett, of 9th infantry.

The formulas of agreement, which they are both ordered, if circumstances admit, to reduce to form, is intended to pave the way to more formal negotiations, and to that end may be deemed an act of conciliation; moreover, once made it will paralyze the hostile parties or factions, and probably create distrust among the different tribes, and so prevent a general combination of various distinct ones against the United States.

There are hostile Indian advocates for war, probably the most numerous, and friendly ones less numerous, but nevertheless earnest in dissuading war. The latter I desire to bring into the interests of the United States, and with such views I seek occasions to have intercourse with them. I will foster their friendly dispositions by a frank and kind demeanor, and have caused presents to be made, and will continue to follow this policy as long as the hope of good to the United States shall be probable.

In this connexion, I desire medals may be sent for distribution to friendly chiefs.

I have already promised a medal to *Spencer*, friendly and influential, actually now engaged earnestly in counteracting the machinations of the hostiles. *Spencer* is worthy of great consideration, by reason of his misfortune of losing his whole family by the whites, a massacre either through wantonness or by misapprehension, nevertheless he has continued constant in his friendship. Above all, I desire to confer upon him a medal such as is often given to friendly Indians; besides I have assured him I will endeavor to procure him some compensation for his misfortunes.

I add a wish to be supplied with such an amount of Indian goods as may enable me to be generous to such Indians as may be worthy of government bounty.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Col. 6th Infantry, Bvt. Brig. Gen., Commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Ass't Adj't Gen., Headquarters Army, West Point, N. Y.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, W. T., June 25, 1858.

SIR: I am persuaded by your statement and by your assurance that the Cœur d'Alene Indians were misled by the misrepresentations

of Kamiakin and the Nez Percés; that by these parties they were deceived as to the objects of the march of Colonel Steptoe, and that the attack on him was even then the acts of a few insubordinate men of the tribe, acting in disobedience to the orders of the chiefs, and in opposition to the wishes of the tribe.

I am also satisfied that the Cœur d'Alenes are repentant, persuaded of their guilt, and ready to make atonement and submission.

Believing this to be the case, and remembering that the Cœur d'Alenes have until this time been peaceable, and belong to those Indians whose boast has been that they had never dipped their hands in the blood of the whites, I have decided that I will listen to them.

You may say this to the chiefs: tell them I will receive them here and talk with them, or, as they may not be able to travel through the lower Indians with safety, I will authorize the officer in command of my troops to talk with them. And I will direct him to say to them, "Cœur d'Alenes, I do not wish your permission to send troops through your country, this is already my right. I will use it when I please. They will not injure you or your wives, and you must not disturb them.

"He does not ask you to permit the road to the Missouri to be made; the government of the United States has this right, and will make the road when it is proper. Parties working on it must not be disturbed, and whites travelling through your country must not be molested. All these things must be done by you at all times.

"Cœur d'Alenes and Spokanes, you have committed a great crime. You have attacked the troops who were friendly with you, and have plundered the government property, and for this you must atone. You must restore the property you retain. You say that you were deceived by the lies of the Nez Percés, by the lies of Kamiakin. Well, I am going to make war on these people. You must drive them out of your country, and not permit them to hide there from me.

"You say some of your tribe fired upon the troops in disobedience of the orders of their chiefs, and against the wishes of your people. If so, they must suffer for their disobedience, and atone for the guilt into which their bad acts have brought their people. You must give them up.

"If you come and see me and do these things I will grant you peace. If you go to my officer commanding the troops and do these things I will tell him to give you peace.

"I am going to send my troops into your country; if you do these things they will enter your country and leave it without doing you any injury; if you do not they will treat you as enemies. I will believe that it was not the lies of the Nez Percés that excited and misled you, and not the rashness of a few of the tribe that led to the attack on the troops, and I will use all my power to punish you as faithless Indians.

And now, sir, it only remains for me to thank you for your efforts in the cause of humanity, and to express my sincere wishes for your suc-

cess in preserving a people among whom you have so long been a laborer.

I am sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, Commanding.

FATHER JOSEPT,

Catholic Priest, Cœur d'Alene Mission.

Delivered him Fort Vancouver, June 26, 1858.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, Washington Territory, July 4, 1858.

SIR: Brigadier General Clarke directs me to inform you that he has decided to place you in command of the troops to be employed against the Indians north and east of Fort Walla-Walla. Six companies of the 3d regiment of artillery are now in march for fort Walla-Walla, and from these and the present garrison of that post the column will be drawn.

The general's orders are as follows: that you proceed to Fort Walla-Walla, assume command of the troops; leave Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe a sufficient garrison to secure Walla-Walla, and prepare to move with a column of not less than six hundred men, as early as practicable after the first day of August.

The objects to be attained, are the punishment and submission of the Indians engaged in the late attack on the command of Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, and the surrender of the Palouze Indians who murdered two miners in April last; these men are known to Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe.

I enclose you memoranda (marked "A") of a conversation had by the commanding general with Father Joset, a Catholic Priest, and a copy (marked "B") of a letter given to him by the general.

From these you will find, first, that the Cœur d'Alenes and the Spokanes claim that they were misled by the Nez Percés, and finally engaged through the insubordination of some of the tribe. Second, the conditions on which the general has authorized Father Joset to tell them that their submission will be received.

The Catholic Priests Congiato and Joset are now on their way to the Cœur d'Alenes, and they are in possession of the general's safeguards for such parties of Cœur d'Alenes and Spokanes as may come to visit the general or either of the officers in command of the columns or posts intermediate.

Should any of the chiefs of the Cœur d'Alenes or Spokanes visit you for the purpose of offering the submission of their people, the paper above referred to and marked "B," will be your guide in fixing the terms. The delivery of the insubordinate Indians who fired on the troops, and the restoration of the howitzers abandoned by the troops, must be conditions precedent to any accommodation; these conditions complied with, you are authorized to make such reduction in the lesser demands as may seem to you proper on the spot.

I enclose a copy of the terms of a treaty that the commanding general

has directed Colonel Steptoe to make, if possible, with the friendly Nez Percés; a similar one should be attempted with the Cœur d'Alenes and the Spokanes, after their submission; but whether such treaty be or be not made, hostages must be taken for their future good conduct.

If the offenders of the Cœur d'Alenes and the Spokanes are delivered up to you, you are directed to guard them securely and keep them safely, until you receive special orders from the general for their disposition, or until you return to Fort Walla-Walla, where they will be placed in the charge of the commanding officer of that post, with these orders of the general for their safety and security.

The general gives you distinctly to understand that the arrangements contemplated with the Cœur d'Alenes and Spokanes are not to embarrass your march for one moment; they will know the terms on which they can obtain peace; if they meet you and accept them well, if not you must make on them, as on the hostile Nez Percés and Palouze, vigorous war. You will attack all the hostile Indians you may meet, with vigor; make their punishment severe, and persevere until the submission of all is complete.

Your column must enter the Cœur d'Alenes' country, whether this be done by force or peacefully, after the submission of these people; they must feel that in peace or war it is open to the army.

If it can be done without the sacrifice of more important objects of the campaign, visit the Colville miners.

You are authorized to employ as many of the friendly Nez Percés as you think judicious. Clothing of the old pattern and condemned, has been sent to Walla-Walla for issues to the Indians; this you can use, and you are also authorized to supply them with arms and ammunition for the campaign.

Your intention to declare martial law and to forbid whites to enter the Indian country so soon as you cross Snake river, has been made known to the commanding general; the absolute necessity to which such an act must appeal for its justification, is not apparent, and the general forbids it.

The Hudsons Bay Company has the right of entry, guarantied by treaty, and this must not be denied on the mere suspicion that some of its employés are ill disposed, and our own citizens from whom no danger is to be apprehended, must not be injured in their interests.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Colonel GEORGE WRIGHT,

9th Infantry, Commanding Expedition &c., Fort Dallas, O T.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, W. T., July 18, 1858.

SIR: Brigadier General Clarke has put in march two companies of the 4th infantry, for Fort Simcoe and your command, they will reach

that point by the end of the present month; the stores and means of transportation necessary will precede or accompany this battalion.

The following are the orders and instructions of the commanding general, viz: as soon after the arrival of these troops as you can make your preparations, leave a sufficient force to secure Fort Simcoe, and take the field with the remainder of your command.

The objects to be obtained are, first, the punishment of the Indians who made the attack in June last on the party of miners in the Yakima country.

Second, making such impression on and arrangements with these and the other tribes in that region, as will secure the whites in their lives and property in the future.

The particular tribe, by whom the attack in question was made, must deliver to you the individual offenders, or you must drive the whole to submission by severe punishment.

Your rear must be secured from danger from the Indians, in your vicinity or on your route, by hostages given for their good behavior. These you will demand and keep securely. If they refuse to comply with the demand they must be treated as hostiles, and all must be driven to feel that in future the demands of the government must meet with obedience.

The interests of the government and the safety of the Indians equally require that the Indians be established and maintained in a state of pupillage.

Arrangements for temporary neutrality are of no avail; both parties live in a state of distrust and every accident is likely to produce war.

This state of things can no longer be tolerated; the Indians must not only give promise to be peaceable under such regulations as the government may think proper to make for them, but they must give in hostages, that the army may not again be needed to insure its performance. Kamiakin and Qualchan, cannot longer be permitted to remain at large in the country, they must be surrendered or driven away, and no accommodation must be made with any who will harbor them; let all know that an asylum given to either of these troublesome Indians, will be considered in future as evidence of a hostile intention on the part of the tribe.

I enclose you a copy of a treaty which will be attempted with the Indians to the east of your fields of operations, if occasion presents itself make a like treaty with those among whom you will be operating.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. W. MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Major ROBERT S. GARNETT,
*9th Infantry, United States Army,
Commanding Fort Simcoe, W. T., &c., &c.*

1. The Nez Percés agree to perpetual peace with the United States.
2. They agree to aid the United States against all their enemies or opposers whomsoever.

3. The United States will aid the Nez Percés against their enemies or opposers whomsoever.

4. The United States and Nez Percés agree to treat at all times for mutual benefit, in order to give further sanction to these and other agreements.

No. 19.—*General Clarke to Mr. Graham.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, W. T., August 6, 1858.

SIR: The following are extracts from letters received from Fort Colville, and dated July 11 and 16, 1858, and to these I invite your attention:

“I met at Colville the Cœur d’Alene chief, with some ten others of the same tribe. They came well mounted on United States horses and mules; they are offering the mules for sale; some were bought by the Hudson’s Bay Company. I told the gentleman in charge that I had no orders to stop it, but I did not think it right to furnish a market for stolen animals to the enemy.”

“The Hudson Bay Company’s train, some two hundred head of horses, starts in a few days for Fort Hope for the year’s outfit.”

“I think they are to bring some two thousands pounds of powder, with a proportionable quantity of ball. This, as a matter of course, will find its way into the hostile camp, or at least a large portion of it. The trade of ammunition might be stopped here, but, as the gentleman in charge told me, we could not prevent the company from trading at Fort Forty-Nine, which is another post thirty miles above Colville.”

If these things obtain, (and the authority on which they are stated is reliable,) they present a state of affairs which neither your government nor mine has anticipated.

It must be that your agents have violated the spirit of your instructions. These could never have permitted them to purchase the property of the United States seized by Indians, nor to make preparations for large sales of ammunition to Indians in rebellion against the government.

It must be known to you that the privilege of trading was guaranteed to the company only in articles that the Indians had a right to sell; that the Indians within the borders of the United States make no lawful captures in war, and that unlawful seizures transfer no right of property.

It must be equally well known to you that while Indians are at war with the government ammunition is contraband.

If your agents have, as stated, purchased from the Indians horses or other property, knowing it to have been seized by the Indians, they have acquired no title thereto, and have, in addition, violated the obligation to respect the laws of the country.

Neither Great Britain nor the United States would permit citizens or corporations to supply arms and ammunition to Indians with whom they were waging war, and the latter government cannot be supposed to have secured such immunity to the Hudson's Bay Company by treaty.

The trade of the company in these articles would, under such circumstances, be stopped in British territory, and must be stopped here.

I therefore call upon you to give instructions to your agents, and to enforce them, neither to purchase from the Indians property of the government or of citizens of the United States taken by them, nor to furnish them with arms or ammunition during the continuance of hostilities, nor until this prohibition is withdrawn.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brig. General, Commanding.

JAMES A. GRAHAM,

Chief Trader Hudson's Bay Company

In charge at Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 20.—*Mr. Graham to General Clarke.*

VANCOUVER, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,

August 7, 1858.

SIR: I beg to acknowledge receipt of your communication of 6th instant, which I have perused attentively.

I regret that appearances should for a moment place us in a false position, or tend to break up the friendly relations that have ever existed between the Hudson's Bay Company and the military authorities of the United States, and would beg to submit to your notice the fact that no preparations have been made at Colville to make larger sales of ammunition than previously to the Indians, as no more than the usual year's supply has been ordered if your informant is correct in his estimate.

In proof of the sincerity of our desire to do what is right, I promptly comply with your request regarding the stopping the supply of ammunition to the Indians at Colville, and furthermore will instruct our agent at that place to discontinue the trade in that article at the establishment on the Pend d'Oreille river, until he can receive advices from Governor Douglas, to whose department that fort properly belongs.

The trade of United States property and of its citizens taken in war shall also be discontinued, if it has ever been carried on, and should any of said property have unfortunately fallen into our hands, I now send instructions to cause its surrender, and I feel confident your government will not suffer us to sustain any loss thereby.

Accompanying I send you a copy of my letter to our agent at Col.

ville on this subject, which will I trust satisfy you that we wish to do what is right, and live in peace with all men. At the same time, as the lives of our employés and our establishment will be seriously endangered as soon as my instructions begin to be carried out, I beg to draw your attention to the fact that our means of defence at Colville are almost useless, the fort being even without pickets, and any damage we may sustain in consequence of your prohibition will be brought as a claim by the company against your government.

As I have no means of forwarding letters to Colville during these disturbed times, and am anxious that my instructions should reach that place at as early a date as possible, I should feel much obliged if you would permit my despatch to be forwarded by one of the expresses which I presume you make use of to communicate with your command in the field, if not contrary to regulations.

On the 4th instant, I addressed Major Mackall officially, regarding the tearing down and removal of one of our old buildings at this place, by order of the United States quartermaster of this post. To it I have as yet received no reply, and in case it may have been overlooked, I beg to draw your attention to it.

I have the honor to be, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JAMES A. GRAHAM,
Chief Trader, Hudson's Bay Company.

Colonel N. S. CLARKE,
*Brevet Brigadier General, United States Army,
Fort Vancouver, W. T.*

VANCOUVER, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,
August 7, 1858.

DEAR SIR: Accompanying I beg to hand you copy of correspondence between Brevet Brigadier General Clarke, United States army, and myself, regarding the trade of ammunition and United States property at Colville.

Upon receipt of this you will stop altogether the issue of ammunition within American territory until the prohibition now enforced is withdrawn, and suspend the trade in that article at the Pend d'Oreille Fort until advices shall have reached you either from Governor Douglas, the Western Board, or myself.

Any ammunition your brigade may be bringing up this season from Fort Hope or elsewhere, you will store at Thompson's river with Mr. McCean for the present.

Should any animals or other property belonging to the United States or American citizens, which had been unlawfully acquired by the Indians, have unfortunately been traded by you or those under your orders, you will deliver up such animals or property to the United States authorities when called upon to do so, furnishing them

with a statement of the expenses incurred in the purchase and keep of the same, and taking duplicate receipts.

Hereafter let no trade, either of animals or any other property, unlawfully acquired by the Indians, be made by yourself or any of the company's employés attached to your district.

I shall communicate immediately with the Western Board regarding the trade of ammunition at the New Fort, and strongly urge it to instruct you without loss of time as to your future guidance.

Hoping that by good management and the exercise of prudence you may avert the peril you and all at Colville will incur by stopping the trade of ammunition, I am, dear sir, your obedient servant,

JAMES A. GRAHAM,

Chief Trader, Hudson's Bay Company.

GEORGE BLENKINSOP, Esq.,
Fort Colville.

No. 21.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, W. T., August 12, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to inform the General-in-Chief that the advance of Colonel Wright's column moved from Fort Walla-Walla against the Cœur d'Alenes and Spokanes on the morning of August 7.

Before leaving he succeeded in carrying into effect my instructions in relation to the Nez Percés, and this powerful tribe has now formed a treaty with us and promised its active assistance against the hostile Indians, as allies; a portion of the tribe will accompany the troops.

A copy of the treaty will be forwarded by the next mail.

Major Garnet has not yet reported, but doubtless is now prepared to march against the Yakimas with a sufficient force.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.*

No. 22.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC.
Fort Vancouver, W. T., August 13, 1858.

SIR: I enclose herewith a treaty made with the Nez Percés.

The negotiation, based upon the formula transmitted with my letter of July 23, was intrusted to Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, "appre

hending," however, "from certain remarks of the Nez Percés," (to use Colonel Steptoe's language in his report,) "that they might suppose Colonel Wright and myself (himself) to entertain different sentiments," the lieutenant colonel suggested to the colonel to conduct the negotiation.

The treaty is more amplified and especial than I would have sought to make it; but, however, as it embodies the spirit suggested by my formula, I have approved it and hope it will be sanctioned by my superiors.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lientenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

TREATY OF PEACE AND FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE NEZ PERCES TRIBE.

ARTICLE 1.—It is agreed that there shall be perpetual peace between the United States and the Nez Percés tribe.

ARTICLE 2.—In the event of war between the United States and any other people whatever, the Nez Percés agree to aid the United States with men to the extent of their ability.

ARTICLE 3.—In the event of war between the Nez Percés and any other tribe the United States agree to aid the Nez Percés with troops.

ARTICLE 4.—When the Nez Percés take part with the United States in war they shall be furnished with such arms, ammunition, provisions, &c., as may be necessary.

ARTICLE 5.—When the United States take part with the Nez Percés in war, they (the United States) will not require the Nez Percés to furnish anything to the troops unless paid for at a fair price.

ARTICLE 6.—Should any misunderstanding arise hereafter between the troops and the Nes Percés, it shall be settled by their respective chiefs in friendly council.

HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES TROOPS,

Camp in the Walla-Walla valley, August 6, 1858.

Alayana.

Ick-he-hat-ite-e-mee-ham,

Hates-e-mah-li-kan, his x mark.

his x mark.

Te-pe-lat-tee-me-nay, his x mark.

We-ast-kat-shuck,

his x mark.

Tosepl, his x mark.

Captain John,

his x mark.

Tkotee, his x mark.

Sim-le-huste,

his x mark.

Quie-Quie-Nee-Mat, his x mark.

Kosh-le-nuck-hat,

his x mark.

Hat-hat-hishe-e-sat, his x mark.

Tooke-tah-le-mat-ham,

his x mark.

Alat-lat-lim-e-tah-kan, his x mark.

his x mark.

Three Feathers, his x mark.

Nuste-nuke-ne-wat-ne-han,

his x mark.

Speaking Eagle, his x mark.

his x mark.

Wat-tah-ye-hat-hi-at-kim,	his x mark.	Wat-hat-tie-mat-hat-nat,	his x mark.
Ko-lay-i-at-kim,	his x mark.	Ne-he-list-hat-kol-so-men,	his x mark.
Ko-yo-at-mat-ah-ham-skin,	his x mark.	Yu-me-ite-e-pihe,	his x mark.
He-ne-mat-ah-tu-ne-pan,	his x mark.	Tee-te-hu-nat,	his x mark.
Richard,	his x mark.	Nat-lat-nat-lat-how-list,	his x mark.
Jessie,	his x mark.	It-mut-last-tee-ne-mat,	his x mark.
Te-pe-li-at-hat-tie-mee-pat,	his x mark.	Hin-net-mat-lust-la-wute,	his x mark.
Wapt-last-tee-mat-hee-nat,	his x mark.	Ki-ye-ki-at-nast,	his x mark.
Timothy,	his x mark.	Wat-hie-lat-stork-e-mat-hie,	his x mark.
Mit-lat-ekin,	his x mark.	Mat-lee-mat-lee-slat-stee-e-ne-mat,	his x mark.
Itse-ee-hae-hat-wutre,	his x mark.		

G. WRIGHT,

*Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.**Witnesses.*I. F. HAMMOND, *Assistant Surgeon United States Army.*JAS. A. HARDIE, *Captain 3d Artillery.*G. B. DANDY, *2d Lieutenant 3d Artillery.*JOHN MULLAN, *1st Lieutenant 2d Artillery.*J. HOWARD, *2d Lieutenant 3d Artillery.*P. A. OWEN, *1st Lieutenant 9th Infantry,*
*Acting Assistant Adjutant General.*HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, August 13, 1858.

Approved.

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

No. 23.—*Major Garnett to Major Mackall.*HEADQUARTERS YAKIMA EXPEDITION,
Camp on the Upper Yakima river, August 15, 1858.

MAJOR: It has become my painful duty to communicate to you, for General Clarke's information and that of the adjutant general of the army, the sad intelligence of the death of Second Lieutenant *Jesse K. Allen*, of the 9th infantry, who expired at this camp at half-past 2 o'clock to-day. Lieutenant Allen died the death of a soldier. He fell at 3 o'clock this morning, at the moment of accomplishing a successful surprise of a camp of hostile Indians. There is reason,

however, to fear that he was shot accidentally, by one of his own men, in the darkness of the hour.

I must be permitted to express here my own sorrow at the untimely end of this young officer, and to offer thus officially my tribute to his worth. He was an officer of rare energy and zeal, and an acquaintance with our army of seventeen years' duration warrants me in uttering the conviction that his place will not again be readily filled in our service. His loss to this command can scarcely be overestimated. His remains will be taken back to-night to Fort Simcoe, by his company commander and personal friend, Captain Frazer, 9th infantry, who will take the charge of his effects required by the regulations. It is, perhaps, proper to report, in this connexion, that Lieutenant Allen's party (fifteen mounted men) captured, in this sad affair, 21 men, about 50 women and children, 70 head of horses, and 15 head of cattle, besides considerable other Indian property. Three of the men, having been recognized as participants in the attack on the miners, were shot, in compliance with my general instructions on this subject.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. S. GARNETT,
Major 9th Infantry.

Major W. W. MACKALL,
*Assistant Adjutant General, United States Army,
Fort Vancouver, Washington Territory.*

No. 24.—*Father Congiato to General Clarke.*

CŒUR D'ALENE MISSION,
August 3, 1858.

GENERAL: We reached this place the 16th of July, and immediately went about in search of the Indians, in order to discharge the mission we received from you. It took us over three weeks before we were able to see all the Cœur d'Alenes and Spokane Indians, as they were scattered about in small parties, at great distances from each other, some fishing, others digging roots or gathering fruits, and making provision for winter. When we arrived the Cœur d'Alenes were as yet under great excitement, and all their conversation was about war matters. We were not a little astonished to find them so different on this point from what Rev. Father Joset had left them, when he went down to the Dalles. They were then, or seemed to be, very sorry at what they had done, and asked for peace. Not so on our return. The poor creatures spoke as boldly as ever, and manifested the greatest desire to have another encounter with the troops. Some of them wore as yet the war garments, and their camps resounded with the war song day and night. We did not know how to account for this great change. We attributed it to the influence of Kamaykan, who has been living, and still lives, among them. But no sooner did we begin to speak

to them of how matters really stood, and explained clearly to them, first, what the soldiers are; second, their peaceful and protecting mission; third, the difference which exists between soldiers and other citizens, or Americans, as they call them; and, lastly, their number and power, the many and terrible means they have at their command, in order to subdue their enemies and punish those who do wrong to them, than their boldness began to cool down wonderfully. They cast away their war garments, and the war song was no longer to be heard. After all this, we read to them the several papers you gave to us. At first they did not say much. By little and by little they began to express their opinions on the conditions offered to them, in order to obtain the peace they asked for. Some found them impossible to be complied with, as they have no form of government, and each one is responsible for himself. Indeed, I could not find out that there is among them any really constituted authority to punish the guilty or give satisfaction for wrongs inflicted. The chiefs have no power at all, and the only thing which distinguishes them from the others is the mere name. But they do nothing, and cannot do anything; and should they dare to exercise any authority, such as to punish a guilty party, they run the risk of being killed. This, as far as I know, is the case among the Cœur d'Alenes. Thus, Vincent, the great chief, is at present very much disliked, and very badly spoken of, by a number of his people, because he made proposals of peace to the soldiers without first consulting the relations of those who were killed at the last battle, to whom only, they say, belongs, by custom, the right of making peace or declaring war; wherefore, he is now determined not to say a word any more on the subject of the war, and, should his people declare themselves for it, not to take any part in the same. Others would say (in regard to the aforesaid conditions) that such is not the Indian fashion of making peace. We make peace with our enemies by forgiving each other the wrongs committed and by making to each other mutual presents. Others, on the contrary, though not many, are for war to the knife.

Two things chiefly they find difficult to comply with in the conditions proposed to them for the peace; and these are, first, to restore the government property; second, to give up the authors of the attack made on the troops. As to the first, they have disposed already of a good many things. There remain only some horses and mules, about which they have been quarrelling a great deal among themselves. Most of these horses and mules have been branded, and have passed from hand to hand, and those who got them last are unwilling to give them up unless paid for, as they say they bought them. As to the latter condition, they are decidedly against it. You have no idea, General, what pains we took to ascertain the feelings mostly prevailing among the Indians concerning the war. The poor creatures see that they are in a bad scrape, are anxious to get out of it, but cannot agree as to the manner and means to be employed. As far as we could gather from the speeches we heard of the most influential men among the Indians, and from the many conversations we held with them, here is, in a few words, in our opinion, how matters and things

stand in regard to the war: By far the greater majority dislike the war, and are strongly against it; but they show no disposition either to restore the government property or to give up the authors of the attack made on Colonel Steptoe's command; but, at the same time, should the troops come up, it would appear by their talking that they will not make any resistance, but will keep away and take to the mountains in small parties, and disperse here and there. It may happen that some of them will dare to make some warlike demonstration, but very probably they will find no support or aid in their maraudings.

I say all this of the Spokanes and Cœur d'Alenes. As to the Pelouses, the two last mentioned tribes say they do not care anything about. They are regarded as the cause of all the troubles in which they (the Cœur d'Alenes and Spokanes) find themselves, and should the soldiers attack them, they (the Cs. and Ss.) will leave them to take care of themselves. As you will see from the letters they write, some of the Spokanes and Cœur d'Alenes held a meeting. It took place August 3. There were very few present, and most of the sentiments they express cannot be said to be the prevailing ones. I had a long conversation with the Spokane Gary. He is strongly for peace, but he says he is for a general peace; that is, that all the nations which are at war with the government, and have either murdered or plundered Americans, should be included in it. He is for a meeting of all the chiefs of these nations. He thinks a great deal of good would follow from it, and there would be an end put to the many murders committed by some of these Indians on Americans and on miners. Since my arrival to this mission I paid a short visit to Colville. The Indians there had become more quiet. From what I heard, it would appear that, a few young men excepted, the most of the Indians there are for peace, and should the soldiers go thither they would encounter none, or very little opposition. As to the Flat-heads, Pend d'Oreilles, &c., they are all peaceful. One of our Fathers has just arrived from there. Those Indians seem greatly displeased at the blow struck by the Spokanes and Cœur d'Alenes against the troops. It seems that some of the two last mentioned tribes sent a word to Victor, the chief of the Pend d'Oreilles d'en bas, urging him to join them in the war against the Americans, and that he answered he had no reason for so doing. Alexander, the chief of the Pend d'Oreilles d'en haut, to a similar proposal, answered: that he not only would not join in the war, but would kill any man who will take refuge among his people, after having joined the war party and fought the Americans. He added that last year, in a journey he made to the Dalles, he had seen and learned a great many things about the soldiers, their power, and their kindness, as well as about the Americans, and was not so foolish as to plunge his country in a war against such a people. Allow me here, General, to remark that all this confirms the truth of what you told me when I had the pleasure of seeing you at Vancouver, namely that a great deal of good would follow by sending to Washington from this country a number of the most influential Indians. What Alexander says is true. I took him last year down

to the Dalles with me, for the very purpose of impressing his mind, as far as possible, with the greatness and power of our soldiers and of our country. When at Walla-Walla, I requested Colonel Steptoe to show Alexander the cannons, as the colonel kindly did himself, and I know that it made a great impression on the mind of the chief, who related afterwards everything he had seen to his people.

I have, General, nothing more to say. We will continue to do everything in our power in order to open the eyes of these poor savages, and prevent them from going to war. For this reason we have not left them as yet. They say that should we leave them they will all, without exception, rush to the war. Nobody can tell what they will do. As all communication between this and the country below is broken, and there is no means for sending down letters, I send to Walla-Walla one of the Fathers, whom I brought down with me from Colville for this purpose. He is well acquainted with everything, and will give every information they may wish at Walla-Walla.

Requesting you, General, to remind me to the kindness of Major Mackall, I have the honor to be, General, your most obedient servant,
N. CONGIATO, S. J.

P. S. To-morrow I leave for the Flatheads.

SAULOTKEN: The practice of the Indians is different from what you think; when they want to make peace, when they want to cease hostilities, they bury the dead and talk and live again on good terms. They don't speak of more blood. I speak sincerely. I, Saulotken, let us finish the war; my language shall not be twofold; no; I speak from the heart. If you disapprove my words you may despise them. I speak the truth; I, Indian; I don't want to fight you. You are at liberty to kill me, but I will not deliver my neighbors. If it should be my practice, I would do according to it, and deliver them. But that's a practice of your own. Those Indians who are yet at peace, are biting me with their words, and cause me to get angry. Should they hold their peace, my heart would already be good again. On account of the gold, may be there shall be no end of hostility. If you want peace, let peace be made with all Indians. When you know my words, if you say well, that's finished. I will be glad to, but my land I shall not give up. Until now, I was used to go to war against the Blackfeet and the Crows; but now I won't move from my country.
SAULOTKEN.

P. S. One of my people went of his own accord to Walwalla, *Omtachen* is his name. I would like to know what he told you.

MELKAPSI: I feel unwilling to give you up my three brother, for I think though we fought, I won't begin to make peace. I want you to begin if you want to make peace; come in my country. I don't believe there is difference between us two in the hostilities; if you want to deceive me, we won't have peace; if you don't want to deceive me, I will see you. If I see you, I will be glad. I desire to see you; when I see you, I don't think it will be difficult to make peace, to avoid

more bloodshed. You killed three of my relations; it weighs heavy on my heart; I don't like you to speak any more of the things you have abandoned. It was by the deceit of other Indians that I have lost my relatives, and that you lost some of your people. Though you think that I am poor, I do not think so. If you want to have peace, peace must be made with all the Indians of the country. It is not for your goods' sake that I came to hostilities. As long as I live I don't want you to take possession of my country. I don't disbelieve the words you sent me, but I don't set great value on the goods you have abandoned. If you come further than the place where we fought, then I will disbelieve you.

My heart is made anew bad, for the news I receive. Tell your friends the Lager's band to be quiet; if you come with a good mind, let none of them be along. I want to have a good talk with the soldiers, but I can't when they are along; I don't want to hear any more of their lies. Your soldiers, you have good chiefs; we have some too; I hope that on both sides they will be unwilling of more bloodshed, and that things will come to a good understanding. I have no mind to deceive you. When I shall hear you, I will tell you the truth, and throw away my bow and gun. Only when you come here, and you see me in want, you will be kind to me, and let me have means to kill my game. I wish to hear of you as soon as possible.

GARRY: You, General Clarke, you are my friend. I am very much sorry for the battle which took place. I think that you have fought for nothing. The blood of your soldiers and of the Indians has been spilled. If there should have been a just cause of fighting, I would not regret it; though there should be killed on both sides, I would not be much sorry for it. Now, I am at a loss what to think of it, for you say, you white people, this is my country; you, American and English, claim the land, and the Indians, each on his side of the line you have drawn. Then you make a useless war with Indians; you cause trouble to the whites living hereabout, and you have nothing to gain from this war. Now I hear that somebody—you, perhaps, General Clarke—want to make peace. I would be very glad no enmity should be left. I, Indian, am unacquainted with your ways, as you with mine. When you meet me, you Americans, you are ignorant of the uses of the Indians. When you meet me, we walk friendly; we shake hands. Two years after you met me, you American, I heard words from white people, whence I concluded you wanted to kill me for my land. I did not believe it. Every year I heard the same. Now you arrived, you my friend, you, Stevens, in Whiteman valley; you called the Indians to that place. I went there to listen to what should be said. You had a speech—you, my friend Stevens, to the Indians. You spoke for the land of the Indians. You told them all what you should pay them for their land. I was much pleased when I heard how much you offered: annual money, houses, schools, blacksmiths, farms, &c. And then you said, all the Cayuses, Walla-Walla, and Spokanes should emigrate to Layer's country; and from Colville and below all Indians should go and stay to Camayaken's country;

and by saying so you broke the hearts of all Indians; and, hearing that, I thought that you missed it. Should you have given the Indians time to think on it, and to tell you what portion of their land they wanted to give, it would have been right. Then the Indians got mad, and began to kill you whites. I was very sorry all the time. Then you began to war against the Indians. When you began this war, all the upper country was very quiet. Then every year we heard something from the lower Indians. I told the people hereabout not to listen to such talk. The governor will come up; you will hear from his own mouth; then believe it. Now this spring I heard of the coming of Colonel Steptoe. I did my best to persuade my people not to shoot him. He goes to Colville, I said, to speak to the whites and to the Indians. We will go there and listen to what he shall say. They would not listen to me, but the boys shot at him; I was very sorry. When the fight was over, I was thinking all the time to make peace until I was told that Colonel Steptoe had said, "I won't make peace now with the Cœur d'Alenes and Spokanes. I will first shoot them, (he said,) and then, when they shall be very sorry, I will grant them peace." Hearing that, I thought it was useless for me to try to make peace; and when I hear now what you say, what you write here to the Indians, there is one word which won't do. Until now you never came to an understanding with these Indians to let them know your laws. You ask some to be delivered up. Poor Indians can't come to that. But withdraw this one word, and sure you will make peace. Then, calling a meeting of the chiefs, you will let them know your law, and the law being known, all those who shall continue to misbehave, red and white, may be hung. The Indians will have no objection to that.

I am very sorry the war has begun. Like the fire in a dry prairie, it will spread all over this country, until now so peaceful. I hear already from different parts rumors of other Indians ready to take in. Make peace, and then American soldiers may go about; we won't care. That's my own private opinion. Peace being made, it won't be difficult to come to a good understanding with these Indians. You, General Clarke, if you think proper to withdraw this word, peace will be easy.

Please answer us, for we want it.

No. 25.—*General Clarke to Father Congiato or Father Joset.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, W. T., August 19, 1858.

REVEREND SIR: Your letter of August 3 reached me last evening, (18th.) I find therein with more regret than surprise the failure of your efforts, kindly made, to avert war and the ruin of the people among whom you have been long laboring.

I knew the conditions I imposed would be hard in the opinion of the Indians; they were nevertheless called for by the case, and less cannot be demanded or received.

I found it necessary to ask the Hudson's Bay Company to suspend all trade with the Indians in powder and ball; they have promptly complied, and issued orders to that end; and also for the restoration of such public property as they had purchased from the Indians. Will you be so kind as to let this be known among the Indians. If it has no other good effect, it may prevent them from becoming hostile to the company, seeing they, in this, act on compulsion, not advice.

I must beg you to prevent the missions placed among the hostiles from giving them any ammunition until the return of peace.

The information you communicate of the peaceful and friendly disposition of the Flatheads and Pend d'Oreilles is cheering and most acceptable.

With sincere thanks, sir, for the efforts you have made in the cause of humanity, and an earnest wish that your visit to the Flatheads may confirm them in their present disposition, that your own mission may be successful, and your return in safety and health, I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Rev. N. CONGIATO, S. J., or Rev. J. JOSET, S. J.,

Cœur d'Alene Mission, Washington Territory.

Official copy:

W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 26.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,

Fort Vancouver, W. T., August 27, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report the arrival of Captain A. J. Smith, 1st dragoons, at this post, with a detachment of dragoon and general service recruits.

Since the 15th of August, the date of the report of Major Garnett, enclosed heretofore, nothing has been heard from his column.

Colonel Wright was on the Snake river; expected to cross and move into the Indian country on the 24th of this month. His supplies were all on the Snake, and the appointment of his command complete.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel THOMAS,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

No. 27.—*Major Garnett to Major Mackall.*

CAMP OF THE YAKIMA EXPEDITION OF 1858,
Wenatcha River, W. T., August 30, 1858.

MAJOR: Since my letter of the 15th instant, reporting the capture of a party of 21 Indians, by Lieutenant Allen, and the untimely death of that officer, I have now to report that the operations of my command have been chiefly confined to the upper waters of this stream. We arrived in this camp on the 20th instant. On the following day I despatched a party of sixty men under Lieutenant Crook, 4th infantry, with Lieutenants McCall and Turner, of the same regiment, to follow up the principal branch of this stream into the mountains, where it was understood some eight or ten of the hostiles were secreted. On the third day out, this party, through the instrumentality of the friendly chief, Skinar-wan, and some of his people, succeeded in entrapping five of these men. They were shot, in compliance with my orders. Some incorrect information as to the locality of the remaining hostiles, and a shortness of rations, compelled this party to return. They got in on the 24th. On the next day I put another party of sixty men in motion, under Captain Hager and Lieutenant Camp, 9th infantry, to hunt up these remaining men. After clambering over mountain trails, the difficulties of which can only be conceived of by one acquainted with this region of country, this party came upon the hiding place of these fugitives, but only a few hours after they had been warned and taken flight. They were followed through the mountains with great labor for two days, but on the third day their trail was lost, and could not be recovered. This party returned yesterday.

According to the best information I can get, there are now only six of these hostiles, men who were engaged in the attack on the miners, at large in the mountains between this river and the Yakima river. Ten of them have been caught and shot, viz: five by Lieutenant Crook's party, three by Lieutenant Allen's party, one killed by Lieutenant Allen's party, in attempting to run when the camp was surprised, and one found some distance from the camp and shot by the men. The summary treatment of these men has very badly scared all the Indians in this region, and I am of the opinion that, even if the expedition should meet with no other success, (and I fear this will be the case,) it has already produced a very salutary effect upon these Indians. I think that they will not again be so readily seduced, by the mere prospect of plunder, into an attack upon whites.

The Indians here allege that there were only twenty-five engaged in the attack upon the miners. Ten of these we see have already met with their merited punishment. Six, as I have just said, are still at large in the mountains west of us. The balance of them are with Owhi, Qualchin, "Moses," Quintenenis' brother, and Skloom. All these, as I predicted to you in my letter of July 4, (I think,) have fled to the country east of the Columbia. The three former, until a few days after the capture of Katihotes' party by Lieutenant Allen,

were encamped on the opposite side of the Columbia, between the mouths of the Wenatcha and Su-te-at-kwa rivers. I presume it was the news of that event that caused them to move further off. They are now opposite Fort O'Kanagan, some distance back from the river, and on their way, the Indians say, either to the mountains north of that place, in the British possessions, or towards the Blackfoot country. Skloom has joined Kamiakin, who is said to be in the country about the headwaters of the Spokane river. If I knew whether Colonel Wright's route would be such as to drive these Indians towards me, I would wait for them. As it is, however, I shall move to-morrow for O'Kanagan, to show my force in that region, and to see what chance I may have of catching Owhi and his party. The Indians here state that the Indians at and north of O'Kanagan are friendly, and have committed no act of hostility against whites. Into this, however, I propose to inquire further. The story of the massacre of the 25 miners from Walla-Walla by these Indians is here said to be untrue. One of their number was killed in "Moses" camp, on the other side of the Columbia, and nearly opposite the Priest's Rapids. The remaining 24 went through safely.

I find, upon further information, that it will be impossible for foot troops to traverse the country from the mouth of the Spokane river to the Buckland Rapids, on the Columbia river, for the want of water, there being intervals between water on the trail which only a horse at a gallop can accomplish in one day. I shall therefore cross the Columbia river at O'Kanagan, follow it down on the eastern side to the Priest's Rapids, there recross it, and return to my post. Unless I am detained much beyond my expectations, I shall accomplish this march by the 20th proximo. I hope I shall then find at my post General Clarke's instructions for the disposition of the two companies of the 4th infantry, under my command, and of Assistant Surgeon Kerney. Should I meet none there, I shall send them to Vancouver, the headquarters of their regiment.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

R. S. GARNETT,

Major 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 28.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,

Fort Vancouver, W. T., September 7, 1858.

SIR: I enclose herewith reports from and orders issued by Colonel Wright, (marked "A," "B," and "C.") If the colonel crossed Snake river on the day he announced his intention to cross it he has now been twelve days in the field. I therefore take it for granted, no report having been received from him, that he has not encountered

any serious obstacle or met the hostiles. If they have or shall have fled, as may be the case, to the mountains, the colonel will probably proceed as far as Colville, whence he may forward intelligence of his movement and its results. I apprehend the great difficulty will be the evasion of fight on the part of the hostiles, though it may be admitted that the burning of the grass may seriously embarrass the operations of the troops.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General, United States Army,

Headquarters of the Army, West Point, New York.

ORDERS NO. 3.

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP NEAR FORT WALLA-WALLA,

Washington Territory, August 3, 1858.

I. The artillery battalion and one company of dragoons, under command of Captain Keyes, will march on the 7th instant.

II. The supply train will be sent forward with Captain Keyes, and returned from Snake river, escorted by the dragoon company.

III. Assistant Surgeon Hammond will march with Captain Keyes, and Assistant Surgeon Randolph with the 9th infantry.

IV. First Lieutenant Mullan, acting topographical engineer, will accompany Captain Keyes.

Before marching, Captain Keyes will receive written instructions from the colonel commanding.

By order of Colonel Wright.

P. A. OWEN,

First Lieutenant 9th Infantry, A. A. A. G.

ORDERS NO. 5.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,

Camp near Fort Walla-Walla, W. T., August 14, 1858.

I. The residue of the troops for the northern expedition will march from Fort Walla-Walla to-morrow, and unite with the advance at the Snake river.

II. Marching from Snake river the order will be as follows:

1. The dragoons.

2. The mountain howitzer company.

3. The battalion of artillery serving as infantry.

4. The rifle battalion of 9th infantry.

5. Pack train of corps and headquarters.

6. One company of infantry as rear guard.
7. General trains of quartermaster and commissary.
8. One troop of dragoons as rear guard.

III. The mounted troops will not precede the howitzer company more than four hundred yards, and on approaching cañons or defiles where dragoons cannot operate on the flanks, they will be halted and the rifles advanced.

IV. No firearms of any description will be discharged, either on the march or in camp, except in the line of duty, without the special authority of the commanding officer.

V. No person except the employés of the staff departments and officers' servants will be allowed to accompany the troops or to encamp with them without the written authority of the commanding officer.

VI. Habitually the guard will consist of one company, and mount at retreat.

VII. It is announced for general information that a body of friendly Nez Percés Indians have been engaged to serve with the troops. These Indians have been equipped in soldiers' clothing in order to distinguish them from the hostiles. Company commanders will caution their men particularly in regard to these friendly Indians.

VIII. Whether in camp or on the march, the companies will parade with arms; at retreat and reveillé roll calls the arms and ammunition will be inspected. The men will habitually wear and sleep in their belts.

By order of Colonel Wright.

P. A. OWEN,
First Lieutenant 9th Infantry, A. A. A. G.

ORDERS NO. 6.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp on Snake river, at mouth of the Tu Cañon, August 19, 1858.

I. The field work erected at this place will be called "*Fort Taylor.*"

II. Captain Keyes, commanding the battalion of the 3d artillery, will designate a garrison for Fort Taylor, of one company, or at least sixty-five rank and file, exclusive of officers. The two six-pounders will be mounted in Fort Taylor. The two mountain howitzers, with ammunition, &c., complete for field service, will be turned over to an officer to be designated by Captain Keyes.

III. Assistant Surgeon Brown is assigned to duty with the garrison of Fort Taylor.

IV. The troops of all arms will be held in readiness to cross the river as soon as the fort is completed.

By order of Colonel Wright.

P. A. OWEN,
First Lieutenant 9th Infantry, A. A. A. G.

No. 8.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp near Fort Walla-Walla, W. T., August 13, 1858.

SIR : The return train from Snake river will reach here to-day, and I shall march on the morning of the 15th.

Captain Keyes is encamped on the Snake river at the mouth of the Tu Cañon, which has been selected as the point for crossing.

I must again ask that *shoes* and *clothing* may be sent forward with despatch.

I have with me a body of thirty Nez Percés, armed and equipped from our stores, in order to distinguish them from the hostile Indians.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,
Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters Department of the Pacific, Fort Vancouver, W. T.*

No. 9.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp near Fort Walla-Walla, W. T., August 14, 1858.

SIR : I march hence to-morrow against the hostile Indians beyond the Snake river. I have a body of troops, both officers and men, in the highest order, and on whom I feel that I can rely with perfect confidence; yet, with all these circumstances in my favor, I am greatly apprehensive that the results of the campaign may fall short of what is expected by the general and by the country. From all that I can learn, we must not expect the enemy to meet us in a pitched battle; although haughty, insolent, and boastful now, when I approach he will resort to a guerilla warfare, he will lay waste the country with fire, and endeavor by every means in his power to embarrass and cripple our operations. The season is too late for troops to operate in that country, the small streams and ponds are dried up, and the grass can easily be burnt. I have had several conversations with persons well acquainted with that country, and with the Indians. They say that the Indians will suffer us to advance, probably as far as the Spokane, without firing the grass; that they will then burn the entire country in our rear. I have no doubt such may be their policy, and if they can accomplish it, serious consequences may follow. With all these difficulties before me, I shall advance into their country, and, if possible, chastise them severely; and should they burn all the grass in my rear, we can live on our animals, and if they die, we can take our provisions on our backs and march.

I have no doubt that we shall have some hardships to undergo; but I shall advance cautiously and prudently, and try to do all that

can be done at this season of the year, without sacrificing the means of prosecuting the war another season, should it be necessary.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Pacific, Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 10.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,

Camp on Snake river, at mouth of Tu Cañon, August 19, 1858.

SIR: I reached this point yesterday, and Captain Kirkham, with the pack train and residue of the supplies, arrived this morning. The field work at this place is progressing rapidly, and will be ready for occupation within four days. On my march from Fort Walla-Walla the weather was intensely hot, and the dust suffocating; the footmen suffered severely. The grass, for the greater portion of the way from the Touché, has been destroyed by fire, but at this point, and for miles up the Tu Cañon, we have an abundance of grass, wood, and water. Fort Taylor is on the left bank of the Snake river, which is about two hundred and seventy-five yards wide. I apprehend no serious difficulty in making the passage; our artillery can cover the landing should there be any attempt made to oppose us. From the best information that can be obtained, the Indians are in considerable force, both on the Pelouse and some five days' march further north. What their designs are I cannot say. The friendly Indians say that they will fight, but I am inclined to the opinion that they will retire as we advance, and burn all the grass. For several days past a large portion of the country to the north of us has been enveloped in flames; Possibly we may find sufficient grass left to subsist our animals. Should it prove otherwise, it would be worse than madness to plunge into that barren waste, the inevitable result of which must be the sacrifice of men and animals. I hope that our anticipations may not be realized. It will be mortifying, after all our preparations, to fail in accomplishing the objects of the expedition; but we cannot contend against the elements. We have a lake of fire before us, but no human efforts will be spared to overcome all obstacles. I hope to march from the Snake river on the 25th.

The communication for Mr. Blankenship, at Fort Colville, will be forwarded by the earliest opportunity.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Headquarters Department of the Pacific,

Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 29.—*Colonel Wright to the Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp at the Four Lakes, W. T., lat. 47° 32' N., long. 117° 39' W.,
September 4, 1858.

COLONEL: I have the honor to enclose herewith a return of United States troops under my command for the month of August; also documents, marked "A" and "B," for the record of events, to include the first day of this month.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,
Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Colonel S. COOPER,
Adjutant General United States Army, Washington, D. C.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp at the "Four Lakes, W. T., 121 miles north of
Fort Walla-Walla, August 31, 1858.

SIR: A severe storm prevented my crossing the Snake river on the 23d and 24th, but on the 25th and 26th I made the passage with my entire command, without loss or accident, and encamped on the right bank of the river with five hundred and seventy regulars, thirty friendly Nez Percés, one hundred employés, and eight hundred animals of all kinds, with subsistence for thirty-eight days. I left Brevet Major Wyse, with his company "D," 3d artillery, to occupy Fort Taylor, protect the stores and boats, and keep open our line of communication.

Marching from Snake river on the morning of the 27th, our route lay over a very broken country for a distance of fourteen miles, where we struck the Pelouse river, and encamped on its right bank. Resuming our march on the 28th, I halted, after a march of six miles and a quarter, at a point where the trail divides—that to the left leading to Colville direct, and that to the right more to the eastward. After consulting our guides, and examining our maps and itineraries, I determined to march on the trail to the right; accordingly, on the 29th, we advanced; the country presented a forbidding aspect; extensive burnt districts were traversed, but at the distance of twenty miles I found a very good encampment, with sufficient grass, wood, and water. Up to this time we had *seen* no hostile Indians, although Lieutenant Mullan, my engineer officer, with our eagle-eyed allies, the Nez Percés, had been constantly in advance, and on either flank; *signs*, however, had been discovered, and I knew that our approach was known to the hostiles.

Advancing on the morning of the 30th, occasionally a few of the enemy were seen on the hill-tops on our right flank, increasing during the day, and moving parallel with our line of march, but too remote and too few in number to justify pursuit. After marching eigh-

teen miles I encamped, and about 5 p. m. the Indians approached our pickets, and a sharp firing commenced. I immediately moved out with a portion of my command, and the Indians fled; I pursued them for four miles over a very broken country, and then returned to camp at sunset. All was quiet during the night, and at 6 this morning we were again on the march. Soon the Indians were seen in small parties at the distance of two or three miles on the hills, and moving as yesterday, with their numbers gradually increasing, and occasionally approaching a little nearer, but I did not deem them worthy of notice, only taking the precaution to halt frequently and close up our baggage and supply trains as compactly as possible. Our march this day was ten miles longer than we anticipated, and for a long distance without water; and, at two miles from this camp, the Indians made a strong demonstration on our supply train, but were handsomely dispersed and driven off by the rear guards, and infantry deployed on either flank.

My men and animals require rest; I shall remain here to-morrow; I have a good camp, with an abundance of wood, water, and grass.

The Indians, in considerable numbers, have been assembled on a high hill, about three miles distant, ever since we encamped, about 4 p. m., until now, 7 p. m., when they have retired. I shall look after them to-morrow, after my men have had a night's rest.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

*Asst. Adjt. Gen., Headquarters Department of the Pacific,
Fort Vancouver, W. T.*

No. 12.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,

Camp at the "Four Lakes," W. T., lat. 47° 32' N.,

Long. 117° 39', September 2, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of the "Four Lakes," fought and won by the troops under my command on the 1st instant. Our enemies were the Spokane, Cœur d'Alenes and Pelouse Indians.

Early on the morning of the 1st I observed the Indians collecting on the summit of a high hill, about two miles distant, and I immediately ordered the troops under arms, with a view of driving the enemy from his position, and making a reconnoissance of the country in advance. At half-past 9 a. m. I marched from my camp with two squadrons of the 1st dragoons, commanded by Brevet Major W. N. Grier; four companies of the 3d artillery, armed with rifle muskets, commanded by Captain E. D. Keyes; and the rifle battalion of two companies of the 9th infantry, commanded by Captain F. T. Dent;

also one mountain howitzer, under command of Lieutenant J. L. White, 3d artillery; and thirty friendly Nez Percés Indian allies, under command of Lieutenant John Mullan, 2d artillery. I left in camp all the equipage and supplies, strongly guarded by company "M," 3d artillery, commanded by Lieutenants H. G. Gibson and G. B. Dandy; one mountain howitzer, manned; and, in addition, a guard of fifty-four men, under Lieutenant H. B. Lyon; the whole commanded by Captain J. A. Hardie, the field officer of the day.

I ordered Brevet Major Grier to advance to the north and east around the base of the hill occupied by the Indians, with a view to intercept their retreat when driven from the summit by the foot troops. I marched with the artillery and rifle battalion and Nez Percés to the right of the hill, in order to gain a position where the ascent was more easy, and also to push the Indians in the direction of the dragoons. Arriving within six hundred yards of the Indians, I ordered Captain Keyes to advance a company of his battalion, deployed, and drive the Indians from the hill. This service was gallantly accomplished by Captain Ord and Lieutenant Morgan with company "K," 3d artillery, in co-operation with the 2d squadron of dragoons under Lieutenant Davidson; the Indians were driven to the foot of the hill, and there rallied under cover of ravines, trees, and bushes.

On reaching the crest of the hill I saw at once that the Indians were determined to measure their strength with us, showing no disposition to avoid a combat, and firmly maintaining their position at the base of the hill, keeping up a constant fire upon the two squadrons of dragoons, who were awaiting the arrival of the foot troops. In front of us lay a vast plain, with some four or five hundred mounted warriors, rushing to and fro, wild with excitement, and apparently eager for the fray; to the right, at the foot of the hill, in the pine forest, the Indians were also seen in large numbers.

With all I have described, in plain view, a tyro in the art of war could not have hesitated a moment as to his plan of battle.

Captain Keyes, with two companies of his battalion, commanded by Lieutenants Ransom and Ihrie, with Lieutenant Howard, was ordered to deploy along the crest of the hills, in rear of the dragoons, and facing the plain. The rifle battalion, under Captain Dent, composed of two companies of the 9th infantry, under Captain Winder and Lieutenant Fleming, was ordered to move to the right, and deploy in front of the pine forest; and the howitzers, under Lieutenant White, supported by a company of artillery, under Lieutenant Tyler, was advanced to a lower plateau, in order to gain a position where it could be fired with effect.

In five minutes the troops were deployed; I ordered the advance; Captain Keyes moved steadily down the long slope, passed the dragoons, and opened a sharp, well-directed fire, which drove the Indians to the plains and pine forest; at the same time Captain Dent, with the rifle battalion, Lieutenant White, with the howitzer, and Lieutenant Tyler, with his company, were hotly engaged with the Indians in the pine forest, constantly increasing by fugitives from the left.

Captain Keyes continued to advance, the Indians retiring slowly; Major Grier, with both squadrons, quietly leading his horses in rear. At a signal, they mount, they rush with lightning speed through the intervals of skirmishes, and charge the Indians on the plains, overwhelm them entirely, kill many, defeat and disperse them all; and in a few minutes not a hostile Indian was to be seen on the plain. While this scene was enacting, Dent, Winder, and Fleming, with the rifle battalion, and Tyler and White, with company "A" and the howitzer, had pushed rapidly forward and driven the Indians out of the forest beyond view.

After the charge of the dragoons, and pursuit for over a mile on the hills, they were halted, their horses being completely exhausted; and the foot troops again passed them about a thousand yards, but finding only a few Indians in front of us, on remote hill-tops, I would not pursue them with my tired soldiers. A couple of shots from the howitzer sent them out of sight. The battle was won; I sounded the recall, assembled the troops, and returned to our camp at 2 p. m.

It affords me the highest gratification to report that we did not lose a man, either killed or wounded, during the action—attributable, I doubt not, in a great measure, to the fact that our long-range rifles can reach the enemy where he cannot reach us.

The enemy lost some eighteen or twenty men killed, and many wounded.

I take great pleasure in commending to the department the coolness and gallantry displayed by every officer and soldier engaged in this battle.

1. Brevet Major Grier conducted his squadron with great skill, and at the decisive moment, after Captain Keyes had driven the Indians to the plain, made the most brilliant, gallant, and successful charge I have ever beheld. The major commends particularly the coolness and gallantry of Lieutenants Davidson, Pender, and Gregg, each in command of a troop, for the handsome and skilful manner in which they brought their men into and conducted them through the fight. The major also speaks in the highest terms of Assistant Surgeon Randolph, who was with the second squadron during the action, exhibiting great coolness and courage, and ever ready to attend to his professional duties. Major Grier also reports the following named men of his squadrons as having been mentioned by their company commander for distinguished conduct.

"C" troop, first dragoons.—First Sergeant James A. Hall, Sergeants Bernard Horton and Patrick Byrne, bugler Robert A. Magan, and privates James Kearney and Michael Mearda.

"E" troop, first dragoons.—First Sergeant C. Goetz, Sergeant J. F. Maguire, and privates J. G. Trimbell, J. Buckley, William Ramage, and F. W. Smith.

"H" troop, first dragoons.—First Sergeant E. Ball, Sergeant M. M. Walker, and bugler Jacob Muller.

"I" troop, first dragoons.—First Sergeant William H. Ingerton and Sergeant William Dean.

Lieutenant Davidson reports of First Sergeant E. Ball: "I saw him

charge upon some Indians, unhorse one of them, dismount himself and kill him."

2. Captain E. D. Keyes, commanding the third artillery, brought his battalion into action with great skill, and, after deploying, made a gallant and successful charge in advance of the dragoons, driving the Indians from the hill-sides far into the plain; and again, after the dragoon charge, Captain Keyes pushed vigorously forward in pursuit as long as an enemy was to be seen. Captain Keyes reports the gallantry of the officers and men of his battalion as admirable, and so uniform among the officers that he cannot attempt to discriminate; the position of some of the officers, however, brought their conduct under the special notice of the captain, and in that connexion he mentions Lieutenants Tyler, White, and Ihrie. The captain also says: "The *activity* and *intelligence* displayed by Lieutenant Kip, adjutant of the battalion, in transmitting my orders to all parts of the line, was most commendable."

3. Captain F. T. Dent, commanding the rifles, composed of two companies, "B" and "E," ninth infantry, with Captain Winder and Lieutenant Fleming, brought his battalion into action with great spirit; and after deploying on the hill, in front of the pine forest, dashed gallantly forward, and, sweeping through the woods, drove the Indians before him, and came out on the plain, forming the right wing of the whole line of foot troops. Captain Dent speaks in high terms of Captain Winder and Lieutenant Fleming, and the men of both companies, for the intelligent and fearless manner in which they behaved throughout the battle, and further says, "I feel I have a right to be proud of my battalion."

4. Lieutenant John Mullan, second artillery, topographical engineers, and commanding the friendly Nez Percés Indians, moved gallantly forward in advance, and to the right of the foot troops, in the early part of the action, giving and receiving from the enemy a volley as he skirted the brush to the east of the main hill. Lieutenant Mullan speaks in glowing terms of the conduct of the Nez Percés throughout the action: at one time charging the enemy lurking in the brush and timber on the Spokane plain, driving him out and pursuing him beyond view; and again a small party under the chief Hutes-e-mah-li-kan and Captain John met and engaged the enemy that were endeavoring to attack our rear, recapturing a horse left by an officer while moving over the rocks and ravines. Lieutenant Mullan expresses his approbation of the good conduct generally of this band of friendly Nez Percés, and mentions *Hutes-e-mah-li-kan*, *Captain John*, *Edward*, and *We-ash-kot* as worthy of special notice for their bravery.

5. It affords me additional pleasure to present to the department the gentlemen on my staff: 1st Lieutenant P. A. Owen, 9th infantry, acting assistant adjutant general; 1st Lieutenant John Mullan, 2d artillery, engineer officer; Captain R. W. Kirkham, assistant quartermaster; and Assistant Surgeon J. F. Hammond, chief of the medical department.

These gentlemen were with me on the field, cool and collected, ever ready to convey my orders to every part of the line, or to attend to

their professional duties as circumstances might require. Their good conduct and gallantry commends them to the department. Enclosed herewith is a topographical sketch of the battle-field, prepared by Lieutenant Mullan, illustrating the tactical part of this report.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*

Headquarters Department of the Pacific, Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 30.—*General Clarke to the Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, Washington Territory, September 23, 1858.

SIR: I have the gratification of submitting despatches received from Colonel Wright, 9th infantry.

I presume that the success narrated in these despatches is a surety of peace henceforth with these Indians.

I forward copies only by express, and will send the originals by the next mail; and am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, Commanding.

Colonel S. COOPER,

Adjutant General, United States Army, Washington, D. C.

No. 14.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp on the Spokane river, Washington Territory,
1½ mile below the Falls, September 6, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report of the battle of the "Spokane plains," fought by the troops under my command on the 5th instant. Our enemies were the Spokanes, Cœur d'Alenes, Pelouses, and Pen d'Oreilles, numbering from five to seven hundred warriors:

Leaving my camp at the "Four Lakes" at 6½ a. m. on the 6th, our route lay along the margin of a lake for about three miles, and thence for two miles over a broken country, thinly scattered with pines; when emerging on to the open prairie, the hostile Indians were discovered about three miles to our right, and in advance, moving rapidly along the skirt of the woods, apparently with the view of intercepting our line of march before we should reach the timber. After halting and closing up our long pack train, I moved forward, and soon found that the Indians were setting fire to the grass at various points in front and on my right flank. Captain Keyes was now directed to

advance three of his companies, deployed as skirmishers, to the front and right; this order was promptly obeyed, and Captain Ord, with company "K," Lieutenant Gibson, with company "M," and Lieutenant Tyler, with company "A," 3d artillery, were thrown forward. At the same time Captain Hardie, company "G," 3d artillery, was deployed to the left, and howitzers, under Lieutenant White, supported by company "E," 9th infantry, under Captain Winder, were advanced to the line of skirmishers. The firing now became brisk on both sides—the Indians attacking us in front and on both flanks. The fires on the prairie nearly enveloped us, and were rapidly approaching our troops and the pack train. Not a moment was to be lost. I ordered the advance. The skirmishers, the howitzers, and 1st squadron of dragoons, under Brevet Major Grier, dashed gallantly through the roaring flames, and the Indians were driven to seek shelter in the forest and rocks. As soon as a suitable position could be obtained, the howitzers, under White, opened fire with shells; the Indians were again routed from their cover, closely pursued by our skirmishers, and followed by Grier with his squadron leading. At this time our pack train was concentrated as much as possible, and guarded by Captain Dent, 9th infantry, with his company "B," Lieutenant Davidson, 1st dragoons, with his company "E," and Lieutenant Ihrie, 3d artillery, with his company "B," advancing; the trail bore off to the right, which threw Ord and Tyler, with their skirmishers, to the left. A heavy body of Indians had concentrated on our left, when our whole line moved quickly forward, and the firing became general throughout the front, occupied by Ord, Hardie, and Tyler, and the howitzers, under White, supported by Winder, with Gregg's troop of dragoons following in rear, waiting for a favorable opportunity to make a dash. At the same time Gibson, with company "M," 3d artillery drove the Indians on the right front. An open prairie here intervening, Major Grier passed the skirmishers with his own and Lieutenant Pender's troops, and charged the Indians, killing two and wounding three. Our whole line and train advanced steadily, driving the Indians over rocks and through ravines. Our point of direction having been changed to the right, Captain Ord found himself alone with his company on the extreme left of the skirmishers, and opposed by a large number of the enemy; they were gallantly charged by Captain Ord, and driven successively from three high table rocks where they had taken refuge. Captain Ord pursued the Indians, until, approaching the train, he occupied the left flank. In this movement Captain Ord was assisted by Captain Winder and Lieutenants Gibson and White, who followed into the woods after him.

Moving forward towards the Spokane river, the Indians still in front, Lieutenants Ihrie and Howard, with company "B," 3d artillery, were thrown out on the right flank, and instantly cleared the way; and after a continuous fight for seven hours, over a distance of fourteen miles, we encamped on the banks of the Spokane; the troops exhausted by a long and fatiguing march of twenty five miles, without —, and for two-thirds of the distance under fire. The battle was won, two chiefs and two brothers of the chief Garey killed, besides

many of lesser note either killed or wounded, A kind Providence again protected us, although at many times the balls flew thick and fast through our ranks; yet, strange to say, we had but one man slightly wounded.

Again it affords me the highest pleasure to bear witness to the zeal, energy, perseverance and gallantry displayed by the officers and men during this protracted battle.

1. Brevet Major W. N. Grier, commanding a squadron of the 1st dragoons, composed of his own company and that of Lieutenant Pender, made a gallant charge at the right mount, killing two and wounding three of the enemy. The major speaks in the highest terms of the gallantry of Lieutenant Pender, commanding company "C." Lieutenant Davidson, with company "E," was rear guard to the general train, and that duty was well performed. Lieutenant Gregg, with company "H," was posted in rear of the howitzers with a view of making a dash at the enemy; but the ground was so broken that dragoons could not operate effectively.

2. Captain E. D. Keyes, 3rd artillery, commanding battalion, persevering, energetic, and gallant throughout the whole day; although his troops extended over a mile, yet the captain was always in the right place at the right time. Captain Keyes reports the following companies and officers as particularly distinguished:

Company K, Captain E. O. C. Ord and Lieutenant M. R. Morgan.

Company G, Captain J. A. Hardie and Lieutenant Ransom.

Company M, Lieutenants Gibson and Dandy.

Company A, Lieutenants Tyler and Lyon.

The howitzer battery, under Lieutenant White, with a detachment of 20 men belonging to company D, 3rd artillery, behaved most gallantly throughout the action; light shells were thrown into the midst of the enemy during the fight, and with good effect.

The conduct of Lieutenant Kip, adjutant of the battalion, is noted by Captain Keyes as having been excellent throughout the day.

3. The rifle battalion, companies B and E, 9th infantry, under Captain F. T. Dent.

Captain Dent, with his company, was on the rear guard to protect the pack train; this duty was handsomely performed, and the train moved along unharmed by the enemy or the fires.

Captain Winder was detached, with Lieutenant Fleming and company E, to support the howitzer battery. This service was admirably performed, bravely advancing with the howitzers, and pouring in a fire with their rifles, wherever an opportunity offered, until the close of the battle.

4. The friendly Nez Percés were employed chiefly as spies and guides, and, towards the close of the action, in guarding the pack train and animals; as usual, they behaved well.

During the battle a chief was killed, and on his body was found the pistol won by the lamented Gaston, who fell in the affair with Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, in my last.

Again I have the pleasure of presenting to the Department the gentlemen of my staff:

1st Lieutenant P. A. Owen, adjutant 9th infantry, and acting assistant adjutant general.

1st Lieutenant J. Mullan, 2d artillery, engineer officer, and commanding friendly Indians.

Captain R. W. Kirkham, assistant quartermaster.

Assistant Surgeon J. F. Hammond, United States army.

Assistant Surgeon J. F. Randolph, United States army.

These gentlemen were all on the field, cool, energetic and brave, whether conveying my orders to distant points of the line or attending to their professional duties. A memoir and topographical sketch of the field, by Lieutenant Mullan, acting engineer officer, is herewith enclosed. Very respectfully,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Asst. Adj. Gen., Headquarters, Department of the Pacific,

Fort Vancouver, Washington Territory.

No. 15.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,

Camp on the Spokane River, W. T., 16 miles above the "Falls,"

September 9, 1858.

SIR: I remained during the 6th at my camp, three miles below the falls, as my troops required rest after the long march and battle of the previous day. No hostile demonstrations were made by the enemy during the day; they approached the opposite bank of the river in very small parties and intimated a desire to talk, but no direct communication was held with them, as the distance was too great and the river deep and rapid.

Early on the morning of the 7th I advanced along the left bank of the Spokane, and soon the Indians were seen on the opposite side, and a talk began with our friendly Nez Percés and interpreters. They said that they wanted to come and see me with the chief Garey, who was near by. I told them to meet me at the ford, two miles above the falls.

I halted at the ford and encamped; soon after Garey crossed over and came to me; he said that he had always been opposed to fighting, but that the young men and many of the chiefs were against him, and he could not control them. I then told him to go back and to say to all Indians and chiefs, "I have met you in two bloody battles; you have been badly whipped; you have lost several chiefs and many warriors killed or wounded. I have not lost a man or animal; I have a large force, and you Spokanes, Cœur d'Alenes, Pelouses, and Pen d'Oreilles may unite, and I can defeat you as badly as before. I did not come into this country to ask you to make peace; I came here to fight. Now, when you are tired of the war, and ask for peace, I will tell you what you must do: You must come to me with your arms, with your women and children, and everything you have, and lay them

at my feet ; you must put your faith in me and trust to my mercy. If you do this, I shall then dictate the terms upon which I will grant you peace. If you do not do this, war will be made on you this year and next, and until your nation shall be exterminated."

I told Garey that he could go and say to all the Indians that he might fall in with what I had said, and also to say that if they did as I demanded no life should be taken. Garey promised to join me the following (yesterday) morning on the march.

After my interview with Garey, the chief Polotkin, with nine warriors, approached and desired an interview. I received them. I found this chief was the writer of one of the three letters sent to you by Congiato; that he had been conspicuous in the affair with Colonel Steptoe, and was the leader in the battles of the 1st and 5th instant with us; they had left their rifles on the opposite bank. I desired the chief and warriors to sit still while two of his men were sent over to bring me the rifles. I then told this chief that I desired him to remain with me, with one of his men whom we recognized as having been lately at Walla-Walla with Father Ravelle, and who was strongly suspected of having been engaged in the murder of the two miners in April last. I told the chief that I wished him to send his other men, and bring in all of them, with their arms and families. I marched at sunrise on the morning of the 8th, and at the distance of nine miles discovered a cloud of dust in the mountains to the front and right, and evidently a great commotion in that quarter. I closed up the train and left it guarded by a troop of horse and two companies of foot, and I then ordered Major Grier to push rapidly forward with three companies of dragoons, and I followed with the foot troops. The distance proved greater than was expected; deep ravines intervening between us and the mountains, but the dragoons and Nez Percés under Lieutenant Mullan, were soon seen passing over the first hills. The Indians were driving off their stock, and had gone so far into the mountains that our horsemen had to dismount, and, after a smart skirmish, succeeded in capturing at least eight hundred horses; and when the foot troops had passed over the first mountain, the captured animals were seen approaching under charge of Lieutenant Davidson, with his men on foot, and the Nez Percés. The troops were then re-formed and moved to this camp, I having previously sent an express to the pack train to advance along the river. After encamping last evening I investigated the case of the Indian prisoner suspected of having been engaged in the murder of the two miners; the fact of his guilt was established beyond doubt, and he was hung at sunset.

After sunset last evening I sent two companies of foot and a troop of horse three miles up the river to capture a herd of cattle, but they were so wild that it was found impossible to drive them in; another attempt was made this morning, but they could not be obtained.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assist' Adjut. Gen., Headquarters Department of the Pacific,

Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 16.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp on the Spokane river, W. T., 16 miles above the "Falls,"
September 10, 1858.

SIR: I have this morning received a despatch from Father Joset, at the Cœur d'Alene mission. He says that the hostiles are *down* and suing for peace; that there was great rejoicing amongst the friendly Indians when they heard of our two victories over the hostiles; had we been defeated, all those who did not join the hostiles would have been sacrificed.

I have just sent off Father Joset's messenger. I said to the father that he could say to those who had not been engaged in this war that they had nothing to fear—that they should remain quiet with their women and children around them; to say to all Indians, whether Cœur d'Alenes or belonging to other tribes, who have taken part in this unhappy war, that if they are sincere and truly desire a lasting peace, they must all come to me with their guns, with their *families*, and all they have, and trust entirely to my mercy; that I promise only that no life shall be taken for acts committed during the war. I will then tell them what I do require before I grant them peace. As I reported in my communication of yesterday the capture of 800 horses on the 8th instant, I have now to add that this large band of horses composed the entire wealth of the Pelouse chief Tilco-ax. This man has ever been hostile; for the last two years he has been constantly sending his young men into the Walla-Walla valley, and stealing horses and cattle from the settlers and from the government. He boldly acknowledged these facts when he met Colonel Steptoe, in May last. Retributive justice has now overtaken him; the blow has been severe but well merited. I found myself embarrassed with these 800 horses. I could not hazard the experiment of moving with such a number of animals (many of them very wild) along with my large train; should a stampede take place, we might not only lose our captured animals, but many of our own. Under those circumstances, I determined to kill them all, save a few for service in the quartermaster's department and to replace broken down animals. I deeply regretted killing these poor creatures, but a dire necessity drove me to it. This work of slaughter has been going on since 10 o'clock of yesterday, and will not be completed before this evening, and I shall march for the Cœur d'Alene mission to-morrow.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters Department of the Pacific,

Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 17.

HEADQUARTERS, EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp at the Cœur d'Alene Mission, W. T., September 15, 1858.

SIR: I marched from my camp on the Spokane river, 16 miles above the falls, on the morning of the 11th instant; after fording the river, our line of march was pursued along its right bank for fourteen miles, when I struck the Cœur d'Alene lake and encamped. Resuming our march on the 12th, we soon lost view of the lake on our right, and struck into the mountains, with a forest on either hand, and a trail which admitted only the passage of a single man or animal at a time. After marching twelve miles I found a small prairie, with a fine running stream of water, and encamped.

Marching early on the 13th we found the trail infinitely worse than that of the previous day; passing through a dense forest, with an impenetrable undergrowth of bushes on both sides, and an almost continuous obstruction from fallen trees, our progress was necessarily slow, having to halt frequently and cut away the logs before our animals could pass over. The column and pack train could only move in single file, and extended from six to eight miles, but it was perfectly safe, the front and rear were strongly guarded, and nature had fortified either flank. No communication could be had with the head of the column and its rear, and thus we followed this lonely trail for nineteen miles to this place. The rear of the pack train with the guards did not reach here until 10 o'clock at night. I found the Indians here in much alarm as to the fate which awaited them, but happily they are now all quieted. Father Joset has been extremely zealous and persevering in bringing in the hostiles. They are terribly frightened, but last evening and to-day they are coming in quite freely with the women and children, and turning over to the quartermaster such horses, mules, &c., as they have belonging to the United States.

The hostile Spokanes have many of them gone beyond the mountains and will not return this winter. The Pelouses with their chiefs Kamiaken and Til-co-ax, are not far off, but it is doubtful whether they will voluntarily come in. If they do not, I shall pursue them as soon as I can settle with the Cœur d'Alenes.

The chastisement which these Indians have received has been severe but well merited, and absolutely necessary to impress them with our power. For the last eighty miles our route has been marked by slaughter and devastation; 900 horses and a large number of cattle have been killed or appropriated to our own use; many horses, with large quantities of wheat and oats, also many caches of vegetables, kamas, and dried berries, have been destroyed. A blow has been struck which they will never forget.

I hope to march from this place on the 18th or 19th in the direction of Colonel Steptoe's battle-ground, having in view to intercept, if possible, the Pelouses, and also to hold a meeting with several bands of the Spokanes, if they can be collected.

The troops are in fine health and spirits. I have provisions which, by economy and a slight reduction of the ration, will last until the 5th of October. We shall soon feel the want of bootees very sensibly. The days are warm, but ice a quarter of an inch thick is made every night.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters Department of Pacific,

Fort Vancouver, W. T.

31.—*General-in-Chief to the Adjutant General.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

New York, November 13, 1858.

SIR: I respectfully enclose Colonel G. Wright's record of events in Washington Territory from September 15 to October 1, 1858.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Colonel SAMUEL COOPER,

Adjutant General, Washington, D. C.

No. 18.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,

Camp 35 miles SW. of Cœur d'Alene's Mission, W. T., Sept. 21, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to submit a *resumé* of operations since my communication (No. 17) of the 15th instant.

On the 17th instant the entire Cœur d'Alenes nation having assembled at my camp near the mission, I called them together in council. I then stated to them the cause of my making war upon them. I made my demands specifically: 1st, that they should surrender to me the men who commenced the attack on Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, contrary to the orders of their chiefs; 2d, that they should deliver up to me all public or private property in their possession, whether that abandoned by Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, or received from any other source; 3d, that they should allow all white persons to travel at all times through their country unmolested; 4th, that, as security for their future good behavior, they should deliver to me *one* chief and

four men with their families, as hostages, to be taken to Fort Walla-Walla.

After a brief consultation, they announced their determination to comply with all my demands in every particular, in sincerity and good faith.

All the Cœur d'Alenes nation, with the exception of some six or eight, were present at the council; and as an evidence that they had previously determined to make peace on any terms, they brought with them their families, and all the property they had belonging to the government or to individuals, ready and willing to submit to such terms as I should dictate.

The chiefs and headmen came forward and signed the preliminary articles of a treaty of peace and friendship, and in the course of the day fulfilled, as far as practicable, my demands by delivering up horses, mules, and camp equipage.

The chiefs and headmen expressed great grief and apparently sincere repentance for their misconduct, which had involved them in a war with the United States. I have never witnessed such a unanimity of feeling nor such manifestations of joy as was expressed by the whole Cœur d'Alenes nation, men, women, and children at the conclusion of the treaty. *They know us, they have felt our power,* and I have full faith that henceforth the Cœur d'Alenes will be our staunch friends.

I marched from the Cœur d'Alenes mission on the morning of the 18th, having with me the prisoners, hostages, and many other Cœur d'Alenes, as guides, &c. Our route lay down the right bank of the Cœur d'Alenes river for thirteen miles, where I encamped at a point where the river has to be ferried. It occupied most of the 19th in crossing the troops, animals, and stores, assisted by the Indians with their canoes.

Leaving camp on the 20th, we pursued our march still in the mountains, and the trail obstructed by fallen trees, until we struck the St. Joseph's river at thirteen miles and encamped. Again we found a river which could not be forded, and our two boats with the Indian canoes were instantly called into requisition. By sunset the general supply train was crossed, and recommencing at daylight this morning, by 12 o'clock m. the rear of the column was ready to move.

I shall march to-morrow for the vicinity of Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe's battle-ground to obtain the abandoned howitzers, and in the expectation of meeting the Spokanes and Pelouses.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*

Headquarters Department of the Pacific, Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 19.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp on the Ned-ghauld River, W. T., Lat. 47° 24' N.,
September 24, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to submit a continuation of the history of my operations since the 21st, the date of my last communication, (No. 18.)

Marching from my camp on the morning of the 22d, at the distance of three miles we emerged from the woods on to the open prairie, and after pursuing a west southwest course for eighteen miles over a rolling country thinly studded with pines we reached this place and encamped.

Before reaching here I was advised that the whole Spokane nation were at hand, with all their chiefs, headmen, and warriors, ready and willing to submit to such terms as I should dictate.

Yesterday at 10 o'clock a. m. I assembled the Indians in council, and after enumerating the crimes they had committed, I made the same demands upon them which had been made upon the Cœur d'Alenes.

Speeches were made by the principal chiefs. They acknowledged their crimes, and expressed great sorrow for what they had done, and thankfulness for the mercy extended to them. They stated that they were all ready to sign the treaty and comply in good faith with all its stipulations.

The chiefs Garey, Polothin, and Mil-kap-si were present; the first two are Spokanes, the last is a Cœur d'Alenes. It will be recollected that each of those men wrote a letter to the general in August last. That of Mil-kap-si was particularly significant, haughty, and defiant in tone, and willing to make peace if *we* desired it, but unwilling to take the initiative. This man was not present when the treaty was made with the Cœur d'Alenes. Now he comes in and humbly asks for peace, and that he may be allowed to sign the treaty. I granted his request, but I took occasion before the whole council to remind him of his letter to General Clarke, and to say to him that *we* had not asked for peace.

Amongst this assemblage of Spokane Indians were representatives from the Calespelles and some other small bands, who stated that they had not engaged personally in the war, but that some of their young men had been in the fights. I did not make any special treaty with them, but told them that they might consider themselves on the same footing as the Spokanes, so long as they refrained from war and conformed to the articles of the Spokane treaty.

The entire Spokane nation, chiefs, headmen, and warriors, expressed great joy that peace was restored, and promised, before the Great Spirit, to remain our true friends forevermore. They have suffered, they have *felt* us in battle, and I have faith that they will keep their word.

Enclosed herewith are copies of the treaties made with the Cœur d'Alenes and Spokanes.

I cannot close this communication without expressing my thanks to Father Joset, the superior of the Cœur d'Alenes mission, for his

zealous and unwearied exertions in bringing all these Indians to an understanding of their true position. For ten days and nights the father has toiled incessantly, and only left us this morning after witnessing the fruition of all his labors.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,
Colonel 9th Infantry.

Major W. W. MACKALL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*
Headquarters Department of the Pacific, Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 20.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp on the Ned-Whauld (Lahtoo) River, W. T.,
September 24, 1858.

SIR: At sunset last evening the Yakima chief, Ow-hi, presented himself before me. He came from the lower Spokane river, and told me that he had left his son, Qual-chew, at that place.

I had some dealings with this chief, Ow-hi, when I was on my Yakima campaign in 1856. He came to me when I was encamped on the Nah-chess river, and expressed great anxiety for peace, and promised to bring in all his people at the end of seven days. He did not keep his word, but fled over the mountains. I pursued him, and he left that country. I have never seen him from that time until last evening. In all this time he has been considered as semi-hostile, and no reliance could be placed on him.

This man Qual-chew, spoken of above, is the son of Ow-hi. His history, for three years past, is too well known to need recapitulation. He has been actively engaged in all the murders, robberies, and attacks upon the white people since 1855, both east and west of the Cascade mountains. He was with the party who attacked the miners on the We-nat-che river in June last, and was severely wounded; but recovering rapidly he has since been committing assaults on our people whenever an opportunity offered. Under these circumstances, I was very desirous of getting Qual-chew in my power. I seized Ow-hi and put him in irons. I then sent a messenger for Qual-chew desiring his presence forthwith, with notice that if he did not come I would hang Ow-hi. Qual-chew came to me at 9 o'clock this morning, and at 9 $\frac{1}{4}$ a. m. he was hung.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,
Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*
Headquarters Department of the Pacific, Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 21.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp on the Ned-whauld (Lahtoo) River, W. T.,
September 25, 1858.

SIR: Yesterday I sent Brevet Major Grier with three troops of dragoons to Colonel Steptoe's battle-ground, twelve miles south of this place. The major has this moment returned, bringing with him the remains of Captain Taylor and Lieutenant Gaston, who fell in the battle, and also the two howitzers abandoned by the troops when they retreated.

I shall march to-morrow morning for the Pelouse river.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,
Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL, *Assistant Adjutant General,*
Headquarters Department of the Pacific, Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 22.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp on the Pelouse River, W. T., September 30, 1858.

SIR: My last despatch to department headquarters (No. 21) was dated on the 25th instant. On the evening of that day many of the Pelouse Indians began to gather in my camp. They represented themselves as having been in both battles, and when Kamiakin fled over the mountains they seceded from his party, and were now anxious for peace. I seized fifteen men, and after a careful investigation of their cases I found that they had left their own country and waged war against the forces of the United States, and one of them had killed a sergeant of Colonel Steptoe's command, who was crossing the Snake river. I had promised those Indians severe treatment if found with the hostiles, and accordingly *six* of the most notorious were hung on the spot. The others were ironed for the march.

I left my camp on the Ned-whauld (Lahtoo) on the morning of the 26th, and after a march of four cold rainy days reached this place last evening.

On the 27th I was met by the Pelouse chief, *Slow-i-archy*. This chief has always lived at the mouth of the Pelouse, and has numerous testimonials of good character, and has not been engaged in hostilities. He has about twenty-five men, besides women and children, probably one hundred in all. He told me that some of his young men had, contrary to his advice, engaged in the war, but that they were all now assembled and begging for peace. *Slow-i-archy* had five men with him, and he despatched two of them the same day he

met me high up the Pelouse to bring in the Indians from that quarter, whom he represented as desirous of meeting me.

After I encamped last evening Slow-i-archy went down the river about two miles and brought up all his people, men, women, and children, with all the property they had, and early this morning a large band of Pelouses, numbering about one hundred, men, women, and children, came in from the upper Pelouses. These comprise pretty much all the Pelouses left in the country. A few have fled with Kamiakin, who is represented as having gone over the mountains and crossed Clark's fork.

I shall have a talk with these Indians to-day, and I will then communicate to you the result.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Asst. Adjt. Gen., Headq'rs Dept. of the Pacific,

Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 23.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,

Camp on the Pelouse River, W. T., September 30, 1858.

SIR : I have this moment finished with the Pelouses. After calling them together in council, I addressed them in severe language, enumerating their murders, thefts, and war against the United States troops. I then demanded the murderers of the two miners in April last. One man was brought out and hung forthwith. Two of the men who stole the cattle from Walla-Walla valley were hung at my camp on the Ned-whauld, and one of them was killed in the battle of the "Four Lakes." All the property they had belonging to the government was restored. I then brought out my Indian prisoners, and found three of them were either Walla-Wallas or Yakimas. They were hung on the spot. One of the murderers of the miners had been hung on the Spokane.

I then demanded of these Indians one chief and *four* men, with their families, to take to Fort Walla-Walla as hostages for their future good behavior. They were presented and accepted.

I told these Indians that I would not now make any written treaty of peace with them, but if they performed all I required that next spring a treaty should be made with them.

I said to them that white people should travel through their country unmolested; that they should apprehend and deliver up every man of their nation who had been guilty of murder or robbery. All this they promised me. I warned them that if I ever had to come into

this country again on a hostile expedition no man should be spared; I would annihilate the whole nation.

I have treated these Indians severely, but they justly deserved it all. They will remember it.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Asst. Adj. Gen., Headq'rs Dept. of the Pacific,

Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 24.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,
Camp on the Pelouse River, W. T., September 30, 1858.

SIR: The war is closed. Peace is restored with the Spokanes, Cœur d'Alenes and Pelouses. After a vigorous campaign the Indians have been entirely subdued, and were most happy to accept such terms of peace as I might dictate.

Results.

1. Two battles fought by the troops under my command, against the combined forces of the Spokanes, Cœur d'Alenes, and Pelouses, in both of which the Indians were signally defeated, with a severe loss of chiefs and warriors, either killed or wounded.

2. The capture of one thousand horses, and a large number of cattle from the hostile Indians, all of which were either killed or appropriated to the service of the United States.

3. Many barns filled with wheat or oats, also several fields of grain, with numerous *caches* of vegetables, dried berries, and *kamas*, all destroyed, or used by the troops.

4. The Yakima chief, Ow-hi, in irons, and the notorious war chief Qual-chen, hung. The murderers of the miners, the cattle stealers, &c., (in all eleven Indians) all hung.

5. The Spokanes, Cœur d'Alenes and Pelouses entirely subdued, and sue most abjectly for peace on any terms.

6. Treaties made with the above named nations; they have restored all property which was in their possession, belonging either to the United States or to individuals; they have promised that all white people shall travel through their country unmolested, and that no hostile Indians shall be allowed to pass through or remain among them.

7. The delivery to the officer in command of the United States troops of the Indians who commenced the battle with Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe contrary to the orders of their chiefs.

8. The delivery to the officer in command of the United States

troops of *one* chief and *four* men, with their *families*, from each of the above named tribes, to be taken to Fort Walla-Walla, and held as hostages for the future good conduct of their respective nations.

9. The recovery of the two mounted howitzers abandoned by the troops under Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters Department of the Pacific, Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 25.

HEADQUARTERS EXPEDITION AGAINST NORTHERN INDIANS,

Camp on the Pelouse River, W. T., October 1, 1858.

SIR: Your communication of the 23d instant was received last evening; my despatches (22, 23, 24,) herewith enclosed will fully inform the general of the state of affairs in this quarter.

Captain Keyes, with the artillery battalion, one troop of dragoons, and the pack train, will cross the Snake river to-day. The residue of the command and headquarters will cross to-morrow. I shall then await further orders.

Lieutenant Mullan left this morning with orders to report at department headquarters.

I have also ordered Lieutenant Owen to proceed to Fort Dalles and resume his duties as adjutant; his services at my regimental headquarters being indispensably necessary owing to my protracted absence.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Major W. W. MACKALL,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters Department of the Pacific, Fort Vancouver, W. T.

No. 32.—General Clarke to Army Headquarters.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,

Fort Vancouver, W. T., October 2, 1858.

SIR: Since my letter of the 23d ultimo to the adjutant general I have received a report from Major Garnett, of September 24, announcing his return to Fort Simcoe with the column under his command, after a march of five hundred and five miles.

He reached a point fifty miles north of the fort on the O'Kanagan, sending out from point to point in his course expeditions to scour the valley to the right and left to the distance of fifty miles.

The Indians would not meet him in battle, but by great enterprise he succeeded in taking and doing justice upon the greater number of those who attacked the miners; the hostile chiefs, Ow-hi and Qual-chan, fled the country, either unable to unite the tribes for war, or despairing of meeting the troops with success.

The major destroyed much of the provisions and seized much of the stock of these Indians, and in the general opinion has so impressed the Indians that further hostilities are not to be apprehended.

The hostile Indians sent some few stock to the Salmon river Indians for protection or for sale; the impression already made by the troops was so salutary that these Indians delivered the cattle to the Indian agent, and the Indian who brought them from the hostiles was surrendered by the friendly Indians and executed by the order of Major Garnett.

This short campaign of forty-four days has illustrated the capacity of the commander, the energy of the officers and soldiers, and amply repaid the government. From Colonel Wright I have dates to September 25, of which I give the following summary, viz: On September 17 he made a pacification with the Cœur d'Alenes, whom he found anxious to submit to any terms as the price of peace.

On September 23 the Spokanes sought his camp in the same spirit, and yielded ready submission to the same demands.

The terms granted were, in general, such as were stipulated in my letter of June 25 to the agent of the Cœur d'Alenes, the Rev. Father Joset, who sought me, at their request, before the troops were put in motion. These are: the surrender of the authors of the attack upon Colonel Steptoe; the delivery of all property taken by them; the free and unmolested passage of all whites through their country, and hostages for good behavior.

Some of the stipulations made by Colonel Wright were in violation of the spirit of his instructions, and such as I cannot sanction. The treaty will, therefore, be retained for transmittal at a future day. On the same day, (23d,) Ow-hi, principal chief of the Yakimas, who had been driven from his own country by Major Garnett, entered Colonel Wright's camp. He was placed in irons. His son, Qual-chen, arrived the next morning. This man was implicated in the murder of the Indian agent, Bolen, previous to the outbreak of 1856, and since then has been most determined in hostility. He was executed.

On the 25th the howitzers, abandoned by the troops in the spring, were recovered, and also the remains of Captain Taylor and Lieutenant Gaston, who fell at that time, &c. Colonel Wright marched for the Pelouse on the same day.

All engaged in hostilities have been beaten, and all except the Pelouses have been driven to terms. It is not probable that they, single handed, will make a stand; and I am prepared to find, in the next despatches from Colonel Wright, their submission.

The short, and on our side nearly bloodless, campaign is over.

The sudden assembling of the troops took the Indians by surprise; their energy and superior arms threw them into consternation; the expenditure of life and treasure in a long war has been saved, peace is obtained, and a control over the most warlike of the Pacific tribes, which need never be lost. The energy and good leading of Colonel Wright and Major Garnett are seen in the fruits obtained. Their officers and men received their commendations, they have proven good soldiers, patient, enduring, and active. I commend the zeal of all concerned to the General-in-Chief.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

*Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General,
Commanding.*

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

*Assisting Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army,
West Point, New York.*

No. 33.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Puget's Sound, W. T., October 10, 1858.

SIR: The results anticipated at the date of my last letter (October 2) in relation to the Pelouse Indians have been realized.

On September 30 the Pelouses submitted to the demands of Colonel Wright, and gave hostages for their good behavior.

Some of these people, known to have been murderers and robbers, were then executed.

There are now no hostile Indians; the work of the troops is finished, and I am enabled to withdraw to the seaboard the summer reinforcement for operations elsewhere.

The state of affairs at Humboldt, California, requires attention and troops; two companies are now under orders for that point, and will, I trust, be sufficient for the work.

In the spring troops will be sent through the field of operations of this summer to observe the Indians, and let them see that the power to punish is present.

This movement will be attended with but little expense, and not more than healthful labor for the troops.

I enclose the treaties made by Colonel Wright with the Cœur d'Alenes and Spokanes.

With the form of some of these articles, and the matter of others, I have been obliged to record my disapproval.

In my letter to Joset, the agent of these people, and before the campaign opened, I told them plainly that the passage of soldiers and citizens through their country was not asked as a concession, but it was held of right, and any interference on their part would be punished. Under these circumstances it would have been better had the right been recognized, not a concession received.

The objections to the acceptance of the conditional surrender of prisoners are patent. Nevertheless enough has been done to secure the submission of the Indians and give security to the frontier; and though I feel obliged to note these departures from the spirit of my orders, I have no desire to magnify them into grave evils.

At my earliest leisure I will make known to the General-in-Chief my views for the future management of that frontier.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brig. Gen., commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General, Headquarters of the Army,

West Point, New York.

Preliminary articles of a treaty of peace and friendship between the United States and the Spokane nation of Indians.

ARTICLE 1. Hostilities shall cease between the United States and the Spokane nation of Indians from and after this date.

ARTICLE 2. The chiefs and headmen of the Spokane Indians, for and in behalf of the whole nation, promise to deliver up to the United States all property in their possession belonging either to the government or to individual white persons.

ARTICLE 3. The chiefs and headmen of the Spokane Indians, for and in behalf of the whole nation, promise and agree to deliver to the officer in command of the United States troops the men who commenced the attack upon Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, contrary to the orders of their chiefs, and further to deliver as aforesaid at least *one* chief and *four men* with their families as hostages for their future good conduct.

ARTICLE 4. The chiefs and headmen of the Spokane nation of Indians promise, for and in behalf of the whole tribe, that all white persons shall at all times and places pass through their country unmolested, and further, that no Indians hostile to the United States shall be allowed to pass through or remain in their country.

ARTICLE 5. The foregoing conditions being fully complied with by the Spokane nation, the officer in command of the United States troops promises that no war shall be made upon the Spokanes, and further, that the men delivered up, whether as prisoners or hostages, shall in nowise be injured, and shall, within the period of one year, be restored to their nation.

ARTICLE 6. It is agreed by both of the aforesaid parties that this treaty shall also extend to and include the Nez Percés nation of Indians.

Done at the headquarters of the expedition against the northern

Indians at camp on the Ned-Whauld (or Lahtoo) Washington Territory, this twenty-third of September, eighteen hundred and fifty-eight.

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding United States Troops.

Pohlatkin		Its-che-mon-nee,	his x mark.
Spokan Garry		It-tem-mee-koh, (son of Polatkin,)	
Skul-hull,	his x mark.		his x mark.
Moist-turm,	his x mark.	Schil-cha-hun,	his x mark.
Ski-ki-ah-men,	his x mark.	Meh-mah-icht-such,	his x mark.
She-luh-ki-its-ze,	his x mark.	Be-noit,	his x mark.
Mol-mol-e-muh,	his x mark.	So-yar-ole-kim,	his x mark.
Ki-ah-mene,	his x mark.	Se-may-koh-lee,	his x mark.
Hoh-hoh-mee,	his x mark.	Sil-so-tee-chee,	his x mark.
Huse-tesh-him-high,	his x mark.	See-che-nie,	his x mark.
Nul-shil-she-hil-sote,	his x mark.	Ko-lim-chin,	his x mark.
Che-lah-him-sko,	his x mark.	Ho-ho-mish,	his x mark.
Huit-sute-tah,	his x mark.	Ski-ime,	his x mark.
Keh-ko,	his x mark.	Se-ra-min-home,	his x mark.
Qualt-til-tose-sum, or Big Star,	his x mark.	We-yil-sho,	his x mark.
Chey-yal-kote,	his x mark.	Che-nee-yah,	his x mark.
Quoi-quoi-yow,	his x mark.	Sko-moh-it-kan,	his x mark.
In-sko-me-nay,	his x mark.	Quoit-quoit-il-nee,	his x mark.
		Pe-daltze,	his x mark.

Witnesses.

E. D. KEYES, *Captain 3d Artillery.*

WM. N. GRIER, *Brevet Major United States Army.*

J. F. HAMMOND, *Assistant Surgeon United States Army.*

R. W. KIRKHAM, *Captain, Assistant Quartermaster.*

F. F. DENT, *Captain 9th Infantry.*

CHARLES S. WINDER, *Captain 9th Infantry.*

JAMES A. HARDIE, *Captain 3d Artillery.*

A. B. FLEMING, *1st Lieutenant 9th Infantry.*

JNO. F. RANDOLPH, *Assistant Surgeon United States Army.*

R. O. TYLER, *1st Lieutenant 3d Artillery.*

H. B. LYON, *2d Lieutenant 3d Artillery.*

LAWRENCE KIP, *2d Lieutenant 3d Artillery.*

J. HOWARD, *2d Lieutenant 3d Artillery.*

Preliminary articles of a treaty of peace and friendship between the United States and the Cœur d'Alene Indians.

ARTICLE 1.—Hostilities between the United States and the Cœur d'Alene Indians shall cease from and after this date, September 17, 1858.

ARTICLE 2.—The chiefs and headmen of the Cœur d'Alene In-

dians, for and in behalf of the whole nation, agree and promise to surrender to the United States all property in their possession belonging either to the government or to individuals, whether said property was captured or abandoned by the troops of the United States.

ARTICLE 3.—The chiefs and headmen of the Cœur d'Alene nation agree to surrender to the United States the men who commenced the battle with Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe, contrary to the orders of their chiefs, and also to give at least one chief and four men, with their families, to the officer in command of the troops as hostages for their future good conduct.

ARTICLE 4.—The chiefs and headmen of the Cœur d'Alene nation promise that all white persons shall travel through their country unmolested, and that no Indians hostile to the United States shall be allowed within the limits of their country.

ARTICLE 5.—The officer in command of the United States troops, for and in behalf of the government, promises that if the foregoing conditions are fully complied with no war shall be made upon the Cœur d'Alene nation; and further, that the men who are to be surrendered, whether those who commenced the fight with Lieutenant Colonel Steptoe or as hostages for the future good conduct of the Cœur d'Alene nation, shall in nowise be injured, and shall, within one year from the date hereof, be restored to their nation.

ARTICLE 6.—It is agreed by both of the aforesaid contracting parties that when the foregoing articles shall have been fully complied with, a permanent treaty of peace and friendship shall be made.

ARTICLE 7.—It is agreed by the chiefs and headmen of the Cœur d'Alene nation that this treaty of peace and friendship shall extend also to include the Nez Percés nation of Indians.

Done at the headquarters of the expedition against northern Indians, at the Cœur d'Alene mission, Washington Territory, this 17th day of September, 1858.

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, commanding.

Mil-kap-si,	his x mark.	Paul,	his x mark.
Sal-tize,	his x mark.	Bonaventure,	his x mark.
Vincent,	his x mark.	Cassimere,	his x mark.
Joseph,	his x mark.	Bernard,	his x mark.
Jean Pierre,	his x mark.	Anthony,	his x mark.
Pierre Pauline,	his x mark.	Leo,	his x mark.
Louis Margeni,	his x mark.	Patricia,	his x mark.
Cypronani,	his x mark.	Pierre,	his x mark.
Augustin,	his x mark.	Jean Pierre,	his x mark.

Witnesses.

E. D. KEYES, *Captain 3d Artillery.*

W. N. GRIER, *Brevet Major United States Army,*

R. W. KIRKHAM, *Captain and Assistant Quartermaster.*

F. F. DENT, *Captain 9th Infantry.*

C. S. WINDER, *Captain 9th Infantry.*
 J. F. HAMMOND, *Assistant Surgeon United States Army.*
 JAS. A. HARDIE, *Captain 3d Artillery.*
 H. G. GIBSON, *1st Lieutenant 3d Artillery.*
 R. O. TYLER, *1st Lieutenant 3d Artillery.*
 JNO. F. RANDOLPH, *Assistant Surgeon United States Army.*
 H. B. DAVIDSON, *1st Lieutenant 1st Dragoons.*
 W. D. PENDER, *2d Lieutenant 1st Dragoons.*

Endorsement.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, W. T., October 7, 1858.

The 5th article in each of these treaties is disapproved, in so far as it accepts a conditional surrender of those Indians guilty of commencing the attack on the troops.

An unconditional surrender was demanded by me before the troops were sent into the field; less should not have been accepted afterwards.

A surrender of the guilty conditioned on their immunity from punishment is futile.

It is now too late to repair the error; the prisoners are but hostages and as such will be kept as long as it may be proper to do so.

The agreement to admit troops and citizens to pass through the country had better have been a demand than a part of the treaty, but this matters not much, as we have the substance.

N. S. CLARKE,
Colonel 6th Infantry, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

ORDERS No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Fort Vancouver, W. T., October 7, 1858.

Brevet Brigadier General Clarke tenders to Colonel Wright and Major Garnett, 9th infantry, his thanks for the zeal, energy, and skill displayed by them in leading the troops against hostile Indians. Also to the troops for their bravery and intrepidity in action against the Indians.

By command of Brigadier General Clarke.

W. W. MACKALL,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 34.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA,
San Francisco, October 19, 1858.

SIR: I shall detain here until further orders the 6th infantry. This step is taken after consultation with General Harney, who engages

to state his acquiescence thereto. The quiet and security against Indian aggression of California demand troops to replace those ordered to Washington Territory in June last.

Besides, I see the necessity of establishing two new posts—one at San Bernardino and one in Carson or Honey Lake valley, at which points the Indians need to be curbed. Also more troops are required at or in the vicinity of Humboldt, in which district a great deal of alarm has existed, and to such a degree as to induce Governor Welles to assemble volunteers there during my absence at the north. So serious was the aspect of affairs there that I brought down a company from Fort Vancouver and sent it to the Klamath, and ordered a second company to embark for Humboldt immediately on arriving at Fort Vancouver. Of this I notified the governor, in order to enable him to withdraw his volunteers.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel, Brevet Brigadier General, commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General,

Headquarters of the Army, New York.

No. 35.—*General-in-Chief to General Clarke.*

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

New York, November 13, 1858.

GENERAL: Your communications of the 10th and 19th of October have been received, and the latter, announcing the termination of the Indian war in Washington Territory, and enclosing copies of the treaties with the Cœur d'Alenes and Spokanes, has been forwarded to the adjutant general.

The General-in-Chief fully approved of your intention to detain the 6th infantry in your department.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Brigadier General N. S. CLARKE,

Commanding Department of California,

San Francisco, California.

No. 36.—*General Clarke to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF CALIFORNIA,

San Francisco, California, October 29, 1858.

SIR: In my report of the 10th instant I promised to the department my views on the Indian relations of Washington and Oregon.

Relieved from the command in those Territories, I hesitated as to the propriety of speaking further on the subject.

After reflection suggested that it was a proper supplement to the work lately done, and that having been in command for some time in these Territories and for as long a time having had these affairs under consideration, it would not be a work of supererogation to state to the department the policy I thought ought to be pursued and the military means by which that policy could be made effective.

Some time since I was persuaded that the treaties made by Governor Stevens, superintendent of Indian affairs for those Territories, with the Indian tribes east of the Cascade range, should not be confirmed. Since then circumstances have changed and with them my views.

The Indians made war and were subdued; by the former act they lost some of their claims to consideration and by the latter the government is enabled and justified in taking such steps as may give the best security for the future.

The gold discovered in the north in the past year will carry a large emigration along the foot hills of the eastern slope of the Cascades, and not improbably gold will be mined from every stream issuing from these mountains.

This emigration must graze and cultivate the valleys of these rivers or draw supplies from long distances at great expense and at times with great suffering.

That the country will soon be filled with emigrants, led on by the irresistible temptation of mining, admits of no doubt, and as little that the Indians will then be dispossessed by force if not by treaty.

The pacification now made to be lasting must now be complete; the limits of the Indians should now be drawn, not to be again disturbed.

Influenced by these views I decided to urge on the department the immediate confirmation of these treaties or of modifications of them, the payment of the stipulated price, and the opening of the lands to settlers.

I was prepared to summon a council of all the tribes at Walla-Walla in the spring, notifying them that the tribes not sending delegates would be considered as enemies. When assembled I intended to make known to them the views of the government and show them my sufficient means to enforce them.

The force I proposed to assemble was a regiment of infantry, one company of artillery and four of dragoons; this force I proposed to assemble at Fort Walla-Walla previous to the time of assembling the Indians, and to make it the winter garrison of that post.

Had the Indians refused compliance with the demands of the government I would then have been fully prepared to enforce them.

If, on the other hand, they rendered compliance I would have sent one portion of this command to cover the road party to Fort Benton, and at the same time to visit the fishing and camas grounds of the Cœur d'Alenes, Spokanes, and Pelouses; another to observe the emigrant road to Fort Hall and relieve and protect the emigration; and a third, consisting of the garrisons of the Dalles and Simcoe, to

skirt the western bank of the Columbia and the slopes of the Cascades as far north as the 49th parallel.

These means are simple and I believe would be sufficient. The march of the columns would cost nothing and the exercise be good for the troops.

For this country summer excursions are preferable to advanced posts; they give larger forces at the points requiring an effort, and are better for discipline and instruction, and much more economical.

The system of small posts necessary on some of our frontiers is here unmixed evil.

When, if ever again, the tribes unite for war, small posts, if even found self sustaining, are useless for offence.

On this frontier we must have peace or extensive combinations requiring prompt suppression by a respectable force.

Better means than these proposed may suggest themselves to others; these are the result of my reflection, and on these I would have fully relied for the quiet of the frontier.

I recommend the establishment of a large post between Fort Laramie and Fort Walla-Walla for the better protection and relief of emigrants.

On this route the emigration is likely to be large, and the security should be as perfect as may be.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

N. S. CLARKE,

Colonel 6th Infantry, Bvt. Brig. Gen., commanding.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General United States Army,

Headquarters of the Army, New York.

No. 37.—*General Harney to Army Headquarters.*

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF OREGON,

Fort Vancouver, W. T., October 29, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to submit a report from Colonel G. Wright, of the 9th infantry, in relation to the present disposition and feeling of the Indians, who were but recently in a hostile attitude to the government and citizens of this country.

Copies of three treaties, which have been made with the Spokanes, the Cœur d'Alenes, and Nez Percés, are also enclosed.

It will be seen from these communications that a material change has been effected in the minds of these savages, as regards the power as well as the determination of the government to carry out its measures concerning them. They have accordingly made very fair promises, and have thus far fulfilled the conditions prescribed.

Two of the principal instigators of the late disturbances are still at large, and it is reported they have fled to the Flathead country. I shall insist upon their being given up, and then, from all the informa-

tion I can obtain from every quarter, I am inclined to believe the Indians in this department can easily be controlled.

At an early date, I shall submit my views of the proper disposition of the troops to command the Indians in future, and to protect the emigrant routes to the Territories included in this department.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

WM. S. HARNEY,
Brigadier General, commanding.

ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Headquarters of the Army, New York City.

The original sent direct. Copy respectfully furnished for the information of the War Department.

A. PLEASANTON,
Captain 2d Dragoons, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

FORT VANCOUVER, W. T., October 28, 1858.

SIR: I have this moment received your communication of this date.

With regard to the present disposition and feeling of the various Indians with whom I have been brought in contact during the late campaign, I can assure the general that we have nothing to apprehend. The Nez Percés, Spokanes, Cœur d'Alenes, Pelouses, Walla-Wallas, and other tribes residing on both banks of the Columbia river and its tributaries, are now regarded as entirely friendly. Written treaties have been made with the Nez Percés, Spokanes, and Cœur d'Alenes, and verbal treaties with the smaller bands. The Pelouses were severely punished. Ten of the worst of them were executed, and a chief with four men, with their families, carried to Walla-Walla as hostages. I have also taken hostages from the Spokanes and Cœur d'Alenes, and retain them at Fort Walla-Walla.

With regard to the Indians in the neighborhood of Colville, there are doubtless some bad men among them who should be punished. Their acts are confined to robbing and stealing, but I have no information that any murders have been recently committed. A gentleman residing in Colville valley wrote to me a few days since. He says nothing of the miners having been driven off, or of the Indians having committed any hostilities. I would recommend that an expedition be sent through that country next spring, and such Indians as deserve it severely punished, and then I think we shall have no more trouble in that quarter.

I am not in favor of establishing permanent posts in advance of Walla-Walla. Annual expeditions, at little expense, can be made through the Indian country north, east and south of Fort Walla-Walla, and in this way I think that tranquillity and peace can easily be maintained.

Should it be desired to establish a post in the Colville valley, it

would be well to defer it until another season, after an expedition has been made, and the localities well examined. It is too late now; the ground will be covered with snow before the troops could reach that country.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry.

Captain A. PLEASONTON, *Acting Assistant Adjutant General,*
Headquarters Department of Oregon, Fort Vancouver, W. T.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF OREGON,
Fort Vancouver, W. T., October 29, 1858.

Official:

A. PLEASONTON,

Captain 2d Dragoons, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

VII.

INDIAN DISTURBANCES NEAR FORT ARBUCKLE.

No. 1. Captain Montgomery to the adjutant general, March 13, 1858.

No. 2. Lieutenant Powell to the department of the west, July 27.

No. 3. Captain Prince to Lieutenant Ruggles, August 6, enclosing letter to department of Texas, same date.

No. 4. Captain Prince to Major Buell, August 26, enclosing report from Lieutenant Powell, same date.

No. 5. Same to same, August 27, enclosing letter from Mr. Neighbors to Captain Martin, August 9.

No. 1.—*Captain Montgomery to the Adjutant General.*

FORT SMITH, ARKANSAS, *March 13, 1858.*

COLONEL: Messrs. Lemuel Caldwell and Thomas J. Daniels, United States deputy marshal, arrived here last night from beyond Fort Washita, where they have been to arrest some Chickasaw Indians, bringing intelligence that the Kickapoos had a fight on Wednesday, the 3d instant, in the vicinity of Fort Arbuckle, C. N., with some Comanche and Pawnee native Indians; that Black Beaver, with the Delawares and Kickapoos, had occupied Fort Arbuckle, and were drawing subsistence and forage from the public stores there; and that, having killed four of the Comanches, the Kickapoos are in expectation of being attacked in their position on Fort Arbuckle by the Pawnees

and Comanches as soon as the latter shall be reinforced. Messrs. Caldwell and Daniels obtained their intelligence from a white man direct from Fort Arbuckle, who left Black Beaver in possession of the fort, as stated above. The former are reliable men, and I am told that they give full credence to the report. I have no confirmation of the report by express from Fort Arbuckle, but it is possible that it may not have occurred to the ordnance sergeant in charge there to despatch an express immediately on the occupation of the fort by Black Beaver and his party.

The intelligence comes in such shape that I consider it proper to communicate it. This will be taken direct to Napoleon by a steamer which leaves this evening for that port.

It appears that the fight occurred about some horses which the Pawnees and Comanches had stolen from the Kickapoos.

The agent for the Wichitas, Mr. McKissack, leaves Fort Gibson to-day for Fort Arbuckle. He will probably hear of the difficulties in that section of the country before crossing the Canadian, and may return or send an express to this place.

I am, colonel, most respectfully,

A. MONTGOMERY,
Captain and A. Q. M. U. S. A.

Colonel SAMUEL COOPER,
Adjutant General, Washington City, D. C.

No. 2.—*Lieutenant Powell to the Department of the West.*

FORT ARBUCKLE, C. N., *July 27, 1858.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that Robinson Thompson, a Chickasaw, came in yesterday before reveillé, and stated that as he returned from camp meeting on Sunday evening, July 25, he stopped at the house of Smith Paul, a white citizen, distant from the post about two miles. While there, Paul entered, and said that a great many horses were tied under the trees near his fence. He (Thompson) went out to look at them, and thought a party of Wichitas had arrived, and were about to encamp. Knowing many of the tribe, he left the house, intending to visit them; not seeing their horses when he left for that purpose, it occurred to him that they were Comanches, and he immediately mounted to come to the post and report it. A short distance from the house he was surrounded by a number of Indians, who asked him in Caddo if he was an American; he said no, he was a Chickasaw; on which one of them, shaking his lance with one hand, struck his breast with the other, and exclaimed that he (the Indian) was a Comanche. Several of the Indians immediately shot at Thompson, whose horse fell dead under him, and he himself escaped with extreme difficulty to a thicket, where he concealed himself. About half an hour after this he heard tattoo beat in the garrison, but dared

not move, as he could still hear the Comanches. Next morning, at daybreak, he came in and reported these facts.

The same day, immediately after reveille, John Wilkins, a white citizen, came and reported that his horses had been stolen the same morning. He stated that he returned from camp meeting late on the previous evening, and did not go to bed till towards morning. He saw all his horses safe in his yard at 2 o'clock a. m., but at daylight he saw that the fence had been taken down and his horses stolen.

Smith Paul, a white citizen, came in soon after, and reported his herd of horses stolen by the Comanches. He said that he missed his horses when he got up, and went to look for them. He found one of them in the lane near his house, shot with an arrow; soon afterwards he found a bell that had been cut from his horse's neck, and some hobbles that had been taken from their legs.

Perry Linnery, Casey, Kearney, and Mrs. Hall, all citizens of the Choctaw nation, came in soon after and reported the loss of all their horses.

I immediately ordered a scout, consisting of two non-commissioned officers and twenty-five men, under the command of Lieutenant Offley, to follow the Comanche trail. The scout started at once, accompanied by Black Beaver, a Delaware, and by its rapid pursuit compelled the Comanches to abandon their breakfast, (hot roast meat.) They then started their booty at a gallop, and, of course, were soon lost to the infantry. I enclose Lieutenant Offley's report.*

Mrs. Hall says that she lives four miles west of this post. About sundown she heard a noise, and saw some Indians approaching. She was frightened, and hid herself in the corn field close to the house. The Indians, who were Comanches, (she thought fifteen or sixteen,) stopped in her yard, whooped and yelled, and danced a war dance, with many savage demonstrations, and concluded by stealing her entire herd of horses. This party carried a large red flag, and passed very near the place where she lay concealed.

All these horses were stolen from houses distant from the post from two to six miles, and I am assured by the Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Delaware trailers that not less than seventy Comanches were engaged in this transaction, having separated into small parties, which operated among different herds at the same time. Up to this time I have certain information of more than seventy horses which they either shot or carried safely off on Sunday night and Monday morning last. Mr. Major, the United States astronomer, has made a requisition on me for aid to the surveying party under A. H. Jones, United States surveyor, now engaged on the 98th meridian. I cannot send any soldiers to his assistance, as there are no public animals at this post, and the men could not reach him time enough and carry their own provisions. Mr. Jones' party also has only sufficient provision for its own subsistence. Under these circumstances, I procured a trusty body of Kickapoos who start to his assistance immediately, and trust you will approve my action in this case. I also enclose a copy of Mr. Major's communication.*

* The report was not received.

This morning (July 27) the principal Wichita chief came in and said he wished for a "talk." He was accompanied by three Keechies. He said that, in conformity with the advice given by Indian Agent D. H. Cooper, he had been endeavoring to conciliate the Comanches near him, but they still continue to steal his horses and still profess friendship; and when remonstrated with, they acquiesce in everything that is said, but steal more horses before they leave his camp. A few days ago they stole a Wichita woman. As soon as the gross outrage was discovered some of his young men pursued and caught the perpetrators (nine Comanches) and recovered the woman. They abstained from harsh measures with them, and, following Indian Agent Cooper's directions, simply repeated his advice for the tribes to live in peace and honesty.

"I wish," said he, "to ask the white chiefs a question. How long am I to forbear? They steal our horses and outrage our people. Must I stand quietly by and see them kill my young men, and wait till some are dead before I resist? I am already sure they are full of treachery and are not our friends. They come around my village every night committing some outrage. The friendly talk which followed the recovery of the woman was derided by the Comanches, who came and stole the best horses of all our chiefs the same night. Paraconunup, a Comanche chief, boasts that he has recently sacked a white settlement on the Arkansas river and destroyed every soul, and his people say that they are here to avoid the pursuit of the Americans. Every night the horses of our chiefs and young men are taken to the Wichita villages. What shall I do? If I fight, they will overpower my people and kill us all. If I do not resist, they will steal everything we have, and we shall starve to death. About one hundred and thirty miles from my village, near the Antelope Hills, are the lodges of Comanches, Kioways, Cheyennes, Apaches, and Arrapahoes, all Comanches in plunder and robbery, and counting altogether more than four thousand people. Where shall I look for help?"

The two principal chiefs of the Kickapoos were present, and said that they and their young men were willing to help their friends, the white men, the Choctaws, the Chickasaws, and the Wichitas, against the Comanches, who they knew had determined to do all the injury in the nation they could.

The Wichita chief further said that the Comanches said they intended to steal in the nation a sufficient number of horses to enable them to make a strong attack on the Texan frontier.

I advised the Kickapoos to unite with the Caddoes and Delawares, and send as many fighting men as they could to the Great Spring, about six miles east of the Wichita village, and forty miles from this post, there to form a camp for their mutual protection until the return of the Indian agent, or until I could receive instructions from department headquarters. This they agreed to do at once, and the principal chiefs will hold a council on Thursday next, and then proceed to the vicinity of the Wichita village.

In the number of stolen horses carried off by the Comanches, I have not included those stolen from the Wichitas and Keechies, who have lost a very large number within the last three weeks.

I have the honor to remain your most obedient servant,

T. E. POWELL,

1st Lieut. 1st Infantry, Commanding Fort Arbuckle.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL.

Department of the West, St. Louis, Missouri.

No. 3.—*Captain Prince to Lieutenant Ruggles.*

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ARBUCKLE, C. N.,

August 9, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to state that since the depredations which were committed by the Comanche Indians on the 25th of last month, and reported upon by Lieutenant Powell, nothing further has occurred to disturb the peace and quiet of this section of country. Friendly relations appear to exist between the several tribes of this locality, and much zeal is manifested by them to recover the stolen property and guard against the further incursions of the Comanches.

Confidence is also being gradually restored among the citizens; and should the inference be correct that the Comanches were forced to commit these depredations on account of the recent acts of the Texans, we may expect tranquillity for the future.

In consequence of the exposed condition of a surveying party on the ninety-eighth meridian, Lieutenant Powell engaged, without any specified terms of agreement, a party of Delawares and Caddoes, to the number of twenty-four, to proceed to their assistance, and also operate between the Canadian and Red rivers, with a view to give the earliest information respecting the incursion of any hostile parties towards the settlement.

These Indians are still engaged in this duty, which I regard as highly important, and recommend that they should receive from the proper department a compensation for the services thus rendered.

I enclose herewith a copy of a communication addressed to the headquarters of the department of Texas and to the commanding officer at Fort Belknap, upon the subject of the probable movement of the Comanches upon Texas.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. E. PRINCE,

Captain 1st Infantry, Commanding,

Lieutenant GEORGE D. RUGGLES,

Acting Assistant Adjutant General,

Department of the West, St. Louis, Missouri.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ARBUCKLE, C. N.,

August 9, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that the Wichita chiefs report that large bands of Comanche, Apaches, Cheyennes, and other wild

tribes of Indians, are collected on the Canadian, near Antelope Hills, professedly for hostile purposes, and that the depredations which have recently been made upon the settlements of this nation are for the purpose of procuring horses to make an incursion upon the frontier of Texas.

As these declarations are supported by the concurrent opinion of all the friendly Indians of this region, and generally entertained by others, I deem it important information for the commanding general of the department of Texas.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. E. PRINCE,

Captain 1st Infantry, Commanding.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Department of Texas, San Antonio, Texas.

No. 4.—Captain Prince to Major Buell.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ARBUCKLE, C. N.,

August 26, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to inform you that on the 21st instant I received an express from the chiefs of the Wichitas, informing me that two chiefs of the Comanche Indians were then in his camp, and that they desired (whilst admitting the depredations committed near this post on the 25th of last month as acts of Comanches) to state that they were unauthorized by the chiefs of their nation, and that so soon as they were apprised of them they adopted these means to disavow the proceedings and assure me of their sincere desire to remain at peace with the Indians and white men of this locality; they also sent me word that it was their wish to restore such of the property as they had been able to recover from their young men, and for this end desired me to send to their camp some one to identify it.

Accordingly I despatched Lieutenant Powell, and such citizens as were willing to accompany him, to the Wichita camp, with instructions to demand of the Comanche chiefs the restoration of the property either at that camp or this post; they preferred the latter, and promised to restore it in about ten days.

Lieutenant Powell returned yesterday, (the 25th.) I herewith enclose his report.

In a former communication I expressed the opinion that the recent Comanche depredations are attributable to the invasion of their territory a few months since by the Texans; recent events have confirmed this opinion. The Texans upon that expedition captured all their horses, thereby forcing the Comanches to depredate upon the citizens near here for a remount in order that they might retaliate upon the Texans.

It being the policy of the Comanches to be at peace with the Choctaws, Chickasaws, and other friendly tribes upon this frontier, they now disavow the acts of their young men, and promise to restore the property.

When it is considered that these are the only acts of aggression which they have committed, and the promptness of their disavowal, I regard it politic to entertain their desire for peace, and cultivate, if possible, such relations.

The Comanches, Kioways, Cheyennes, and other wild tribes, are, without doubt, in great force near Antelope Hills; the Wichitas and other Indians concur in the opinion that they number several thousand; and although my command is sufficient for the ordinary protection of this immediate locality, yet I think it is important that a large mounted force should be permanently stationed near the Wichita mountains to afford protection to the frontiers of Texas, be near the habitual resort of the Comanches, and on or near the 35th parallel. This parallel was selected by Congress, at its last session, for a wagon road, and an appropriation was made for its construction.

I understand Lieutenant Beale has been ordered to travel it to Albuquerque, and make an early report upon the subject; he is expected here daily.

The surveying party under Mr. A. H. Jones, engaged in running the Chickasaw boundary, returned to this post a few days since, in consequence of the unsettled condition of these affairs and the gathering of so many hostile Indians near the Antelope Hills. Mr. Jones has left for Fort Smith, where he will report his proceedings to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs at Washington.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

W. E. PRINCE,
Captain 1st Infantry, Commanding.

Major D. C. BUELL,
Assistant Adjutant General.
Department of the West, St. Louis, Missouri.

FORT ARBUCKLE, C. N., *August 26, 1858.*

SIR: In accordance with your order, I left this post on the evening of the 20th of August to meet the chiefs of the Wichitas and Comanches in council.

Arriving at the Wichita village the following evening, I was received by the assembled chiefs with great kindness and many expressions of friendship.

The following morning having been set for the chiefs to meet, I went to the council lodge at the hour appointed. Chiefs of the Comanches and Wacoes, and Keechies, and Wichitas were present at the council.

The council having been opened in customary form by Lasadovah, the great chief of the Wichitas, I stated the reason why I had been ordered to meet the chiefs of the Wichitas and Comanches in council; and after speaking of the kind feelings of the United States towards the Comanche and other tribes living north of Red river, I expressed myself ready to listen to the explanations the Comanche chiefs had to give respecting the late outrages committed on friendly tribes in the Chickasaw nation.

The Comanche chiefs present then addressed Lasadovah, and asked him to deliver the messages they had brought, and to speak in place of their great chiefs. Lasadovah consented to do so. He then said that Parracoonanup and three other principal chiefs of the Comanches had sent a message through him, expressing their sorrow for the recent occurrences, and disclaiming all part in or knowledge of them; their young men having told them that they had brought the horses from Texas. The message they had received from him, (the Wichita chief,) complaining of the injuries inflicted on his tribe by the Comanches, was the first intimation the chiefs had received of the matter. As soon as they had ascertained the facts they were very angry, and seized as many of the horses as they could, in order to return them to their owners.

This statement was corroborated by the Comanches present.

I then demanded the cause of the recent outrages; to which the Comanches replied, that a party of Texans, under Captain Ford, accompanied by a body of Indians from the reservation near Fort Belknap, crossed Red river last spring, and came north into their country, near the Wichita mountains; and while their young men were out hunting the buffalo, the Texans had made an unprovoked attack upon a small party of men and women who were left in camp to take care of the horses, and had taken five scalps and carried off some of their women and children prisoners, and took about three hundred horses, and got back with them into Texas, although their young men immediately came in from the hunt and pursued the Texans and tried to recapture their animals and women, some of whom succeeded in escaping. Among the Indians from the reserve in Texas who accompanied Captain Ford, the Comanches had recognized a Keechi who had formerly lived in the Wichita village, and the Comanches had therefore supposed that the Wichitas had joined the whites for the purpose of commencing a war on this side of Red river. This was the reason why some of their young men had gone down, without the consent or knowledge of their chiefs, and stolen the horses, in order to mount themselves and be ready, as well as to be able to hunt the buffalo, without which they could not subsist on the plains.

On telling the Comanches that if they really wished for peace they must, first of all, prove their sincerity by restoring the horses they had stolen from all the tribes now in the Chickasaw and Choctaw nation, they replied that their great chiefs had said they would do all in their power to make restitution and to punish the offenders, more especially so as the chiefs earnestly desired their people to abandon their wild and wandering habits, and establish a durable and lasting peace with the whites, that they may be permitted to build and occupy a village on land west of and near the Wichita village. The chiefs had already seized some of their horses, and only awaited the result of this council to bring them in and restore them; but some of their young men, when they found that the chiefs were so displeased and angry, had run off with some of the best of the horses. After some further consultation, it was agreed that the principal chiefs of the Comanches should come into Fort Arbuckle and talk with the commanding officer

at that post, and bring as many horses as they could. During the consultation that followed, the Comanches asked if they would be permitted to settle down and cultivate land near the Wichita's, provided they did all they could to make restitution for their late offences, and preserved amicable relations for the future.

On my representing that the United States had already appropriated the tract of land spoken of, and lying between Red river on the south, and the Canadian on the north, and the 98th meridian on the east, and 100th meridian on the west, for the use of and permanent settlement of certain tribes who may wish to cultivate land and secure homes, and which included the band of Comanches now represented in council,* all the assembled chiefs expressed their satisfaction; and Lasadovah, the principal Wichita chief, said that he would go with the Comanche's chief himself to their village, and carry the council talk to the great chiefs of the Comanches, who would then return with him to Fort Arbuckle. On stating that it was the intention of the United States to have the western boundary of the tract in question surveyed and defined immediately, Lasadovah ultimately promised, on the part of the Comanches, that the surveying party should suffer no annoyance from them. He further said that he himself would accompany the surveyors, and would induce the Comanche chiefs to do the same, and thereby secure the safety of the party. The council having closed, I started on my return next morning.

I have the honor to be your most obedient servant,

J. E. POWELL,
Brevet Lieutenant 1st Infantry.

Second Lieutenant OFFLEY,
1st Infantry, Post Adjutant.

No. 5.—*Captain Prince to Major Buell.*

HEADQUARTERS, FORT ARBUCKLE, C. N.,
August 27, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that Texas volunteers have again been sent into this nation.

Captain Marlin, with twenty-seven of his party, reported at the post yesterday. The remainder of his command, twenty-one Indians—Delawares, Shawnees, and Caddoes—belonging to the reserve in Texas, have been ordered to the Wichita mountains. I enclose herewith a copy of Captain Marlin's instructions.

As these proceedings on the part of the authorities of the State of Texas are in violation of existing treaties with the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations, and expressly against the acts of Congress, which refused at its last session to pass a law authorizing the State of Texas to invade at pleasure this territory, I have respectfully to report the facts for your information, and to state that if this interference on the part of the State of Texas is permitted, it will be impossible to preserve intact our obligations with the tribes of this nation.

*See treaty of 1856 between the United States and the Choctaws and Chickasaws, article 9.

Upon my representation of these matters to Captain Marlin, he concluded to return with his immediate command to Texas.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

W. E. PRINCE,
Captain 1st Infantry, Commanding.

Major D. C. BUELL,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Department of the West, St. Louis, Mo.*

BRAZOS AGENCY, TEXAS, *August 9, 1858.*

SIR : There have been within the last three days about forty head of horses stolen from this reserve. The trails have been followed as far as the Little Wichita, and on each trail shod horses were ridden by those who stole the horses, which leads us to believe that white men are connected with the gangs of horse-thieves on this frontier, and connected with the Indians (Kickapoos, &c.,) east of Red river—all concert in the thefts.

You will proceed with your command, with the Indians of this reserve as trailers, and follow the thieves if possible, arrest them; and bring them to proper punishment.

Should you have to cross Red river in following the trail of the thieves, you will, whenever it is at all practicable, report yourself to the commanding officers of the several military posts, especially at Fort Arbuckle, and to all the Indian agents or officers of the United States Indian service, and ask their co-operation in arresting the parties (whether they are Indians or white men) who prove to be connected with the horse stealing, and who have so much harassed our frontier citizens.

Should you approach a military post or Indian agency you will please show this requisition, which will insure their co-operation; and if you should fall short of supplies or the means necessary to supply your men, call on them, and request them to furnish you, and send their bills to the United States quartermaster at Fort Belknap, which I will see that they are paid.

I hope you will use all due diligence and energy in following the thieves, and as soon as you return report your success and proceedings to me at San Antonio.

I will see the governor and explain to him the nature of the service upon which you are requested to go, and send him a copy of this letter.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ROBERT S. NEIGHBOURS,
Superintending Agent Texas Indians.

Capt. N. N. B. MARLIN,
Commanding Company Texas State Volunteers.

A true copy :

J. E. POWELL,
Bvt. Lieut. 1st Infantry, Acting Post Adjutant.

VIII.

Colonel Sumner to Army Headquarters.

HEADQUARTERS, 1ST CAVALRY,
St. Louis, Missouri, October 5, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to submit the following report: In compliance with General Orders No. 17, Headquarters of the Army, and General Orders No. 7, Headquarters Utah Forces, I left Fort Kearney, with six companies of the 1st cavalry, on the 23d of July, 1858, for an excursion through the Indian country. As my route was not pointed out, and the season was far advanced, I decided, after due reflection, to open a wagon road from the Platte to the Arkansas; to remain some time on the latter river, in the heart of the Indian country, and then to return to Fort Leavenworth by the Santa Fé road. I thought I should find those Indians on this route that it was particularly desirable to meet, and it proved so. I met a party of Cheyennes, who were perfectly humble, and afterwards a considerable band of the Kioways, with the principal chief of the nation (Little Mountain) at their head. I had several conferences with this man, and some of the sub-chiefs and elders of this tribe, and they all assured me of their strong desire to remain at peace with the whites, of which I have no doubt, as they are fully sensible of their own weakness. They have, however, a great deal of difficulty in restraining their turbulent young men. In all Indian towns there is a set of vagabonds, as there is in our own towns; and these Indians having no moral restraint, or fear of the laws, it is next to impossible to keep them quiet. These restless men will go off in small parties under the pretext of hunting, or the like, and commit depredations, not only without the sanction of their chiefs, but entirely without their knowledge. These principal men pledged themselves to do all they could to keep these marauders in check.

I enclose a sketch of my route from the Platte to the Arkansas. This road may be considered as the western limit of Kansas, for all agricultural purposes; the country west of it, to the mountains, is only fit for pasturage, and hardly that. The country over which I passed is by no means an inviting one; the soil is not good; there is but little timber, and, in common seasons, there would not be sufficient water. The grass is short, and mostly of the perennial kind.

I reached the Arkansas on the 14th of August, and left it on the 9th of September, arriving at Fort Riley on the 17th, and Fort Leavenworth on the 24th of September. I have the pleasure to report that my command, both men and horses, returned in high order.

I would respectfully remark that the best position, and I believe the only one to protect the Santa Fé road effectually, is the site of old Fort Atkinson. This point is above the two roads and below the two crossings, and all travel to New Mexico must pass that point. Besides this, the Indians congregate in large numbers every summer in that vicinity, and, if there are no troops there, travellers have no safety but in the forbearance of the Indians. The great objection to the site of this post is the scarcity of wood, but this can hardly be

considered insuperable, when wood can be got at the distance of twelve miles. I would respectfully and earnestly recommend the re-establishment of this post. I think it should be built of stone, which is found in the vicinity, and for a garrison of four companies—two of horse and two of foot. This would seem to be one of the few points on the frontier for a permanent post, for the country is so sterile on the upper Arkansas there will be no inducement to push settlements in that direction for a long period.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. V. SUMNER,
Colonel 1st Cavalry, commanding.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,
Headquarters of the Army, New York City.

IX.

Report of an expedition of Companies B and F, 10th regiment of infantry, to the Red River of the North, in 1856.

HEADQUARTERS, FORT SNELLING, MINNESOTA, *December 30, 1856.*

SIR : The battalion of the 10th regiment of infantry, (companies B and F,) which left this post under my command on the 23d of July, ultimo, on an expedition to the Red River of the North, pursuant to "General Orders," No. 5, from the headquarters of the army, dated June 9, 1856, (see appendix, marked "A,") returned here on the 27th ultimo, after a march of nine hundred and fifty-two and a half miles, having been absent one hundred and twenty-eight days.

The objects to be accomplished by the expedition are set forth in orders from the War Department, (a letter,) dated Adjutant General's office, June —, 1856, (see Appendix, marked "B;") and in orders from the headquarters of the army, (a letter,) dated June 9, 1856, (see Appendix, marked "C.") Substantially, these orders are the same, and to the effect—

I. To note the features of the country with reference to the selection of sites for the establishment of military posts.

II. To hold interviews with the Indians occupying the opposite sides of the Red river, with the view to require them to keep within their own districts of country ; to keep at peace with the United States, and to discontinue hostilities with each other ; and to commit no depredations on the whites or on each other ; and

III. To notify all British subjects who are in the habit of entering the territory of the United States for the purpose of hunting and trapping, &c., that such depredations will no longer be permitted.

In addition to these general directions, the same orders contained specific instructions to visit Lake Mini-waken,* in going or returning, for the object indicated in No. 3 ; to examine the mouth of the Shay-enne† with reference to its fitness as a site for a military post ; and to return on the east side of the Red river.

* Commonly called "Devil Lake." In the Indian tongue it signifies *Spirit Lake*.

† Its original name, or rather that given to it by the early French hunters and trappers, is understood to be "*Bois de Chien*," from the quantity of *dogwood* that fringes its banks.

As the orders for the expedition were not received by me until the 20th of June, (see Appendix marked "D,") in a very late period to accomplish the objects set forth and return to this post before the winter had fairly commenced, regard being had to the necessity of procuring the necessary funds and means of transportation for four months' supply of provisions from St. Louis, (see Appendix, marked "E,") the character of the road, in connexion with the kind of transportation usually furnished by the government, and the shortness of the summer, *time* was an essential element, and hence not to be wasted in going over any portion of our route a second time. I determined, therefore, to go to Pembina, the terminus of the expedition, by the way of Lake Mini-waken and *St. Joseph*,* and to examine the mouth of the Shayenne on my return, which could as well be done from the east as from the west bank of the Red river.

The route of the battalion to Pembina, as far as the crossing at the south branch of Goose river, was by the "middle road," that is to say: By the east bank of the Mississippi to Sauk Rapids, crossing the river at St. Cloud; thence westerly and northwesterly until we turned the great bend of the Red river; thence northerly to Graham's Point, on the Red river; thence northwesterly to the crossing at the south branch of Goose river. To this point the route coincides, in general, with that followed by Major Wood's expedition in 1849, except that the major went northwesterly from Elbow lake, crossing the Red river twice, the second time at Graham's Point, whilst we turned west from that lake so as to follow the bend of the Red river.

That my description of the route may be intelligible without entering into tedious details, I have marked it in *red* ink on the accompanying copy of the map of Minnesota, prepared by Captain *John Pope*, of Topographical Engineers, who accompanied Major *Wood's* expedition in 1849.

* The town of St. Joseph is laid out on the north bank of Pembina river, about three miles south of the boundary line. Commencing at the foot of Pembina mountain, about thirty-one miles from Pembina, it extends (eastward) in the direction of that town some fifteen to sixteen miles. Its most thickly settled part, its commencement, in fact, is at the base of this so-called mountain, and has from eighty to one hundred buildings. The houses are substantially built of squared logs, six to eight inches, the timber of the country, as a usual thing, not admitting of larger size. The entire population, consisting principally of the descendants of Canadian Frenchmen and Cree, Chippewa, and Assiniboin Indians, is represented at fifteen hundred souls. Barley and oats are cultivated to some extent; also the usual vegetables. It is represented that the men prefer getting their subsistence rather as Nimrods than as tillers of the soil. The town may be regarded as in its infancy, having been settled but about four years since by the inhabitants of Pembina, who were driven from their houses by an unusual rise in the Red river, which inundated the town and country for miles back. Pembina mountain is but a portion of a ridge, which, commencing some thirty to forty miles south of the town, here rises to an elevation of about two hundred feet above the level of the river.

The town of Pembina, or that part of the township usually so called, is also on the north bank of the Pembina river, at its junction with the Red river, about two miles south of the boundary line. It extends westward some fifteen or sixteen miles to the township line of St. Joseph. Its most thickly settled part contains perhaps two dozen buildings, some of which are on the east bank of the Red river. The entire population, consisting principally of half-breeds, as at St. Joseph, is represented at one thousand; but I must think that number greatly beyond the reality. The site of the town, and for miles back, is liable to overflow from the annual rise of the Red river, though I can quote but two instances in which this has been the case since the settlement of the country by British subjects in 1812, viz: in 1826 and 1852. It was the latter flood which caused the exodus of its inhabitants to St. Joseph.

From the crossing at the south branch of Goose river, we diverged from the usual and direct road north to Pembina, and proceeded in a northeasterly direction to the southeast point of Lake Mini-waken, passing to the east of Lake Chicot; thence northeasterly to the source of Little Salt river, a few miles from which passes the direct road to Pembina; thence following that road in its northeasterly direction to within a short distance from Tongue river, where we took a northwest course to St. Joseph; and from thence due east to Pembina.

The distance to Pembina, as thus marched, is $504\frac{1}{4}$ miles; by the direct route (*vide* Captain *Pope's* table of distances) it is $446\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The length of the direct road from this place to St. Joseph, diverging as we did near Tongue river, is about the same as that to Pembina, viz: 448 miles.

Returning on the east side of the Red river, the route as far as Red Lake river was by the only road yet traced, which runs generally parallel to the course of the Red river, and at an average distance from it of (say) 20 miles.

There is no road on the bank of the Red river from Pembina to Red Lake river, owing to the marshy nature of the soil; all of its small tributaries from the east thus far, with the single exception of the *Two Rivers* river, passing into it through a marsh, instead of open mouths.

From the crossing at Red Lake river we left the eastern or Wood road, and took a southwest and southerly direction to the mouth of Buffalo river; from whence I proceeded to examine the mouth of the Shayenne, the latter emptying into the Red river some four to five miles above the former.

From the mouth of Buffalo river our course was eastward, to strike the "Timber" or "Wood" road again; having regained which, the route was by Otter-tail lake, Crow Wing, and Fort Ripley, to this place.*

It had been my intention, before leaving Pembina, to follow the "river road" south from Buffalo river, so as to cross the Red river at its great bend, and thus return, as we went, by St. Cloud; but the necessity of obtaining grain for the mules, at the earliest moment, became so obvious soon after leaving there, that I changed my determination, and resolved to go by the "Wood" road to Fort Ripley, the nearest point at which grain or supplies of any kind could be procured.

The general aspect of the country, after leaving the settlements in the Sauk River valley, is that of a high and rolling, or else a slightly undulating prairie, intersected by numerous small streams, dignified by the name of rivers, tributaries of the Minnesota or of the Red river. The only wood to be found is that which fringes these streams and the largest lakes, consisting of *oak*, *elm*, *ash*, *bass*, and *maple*, and which cannot, in the usual sense of the term, be called *timber*; that on the

* After leaving Red Lake river there are three routes southerly. The eastera, called the "timber" or "wood" road, (from its passing through forests,) which winds its tortuous course amidst the numberless small lakes and marshes, in which both the Mississippi and Red rivers have their origin, to St. Paul *via* Otter-tail lake, Crow-wing, and Fort Ripley; the "river" road, which keeps along the bank of the Red river at various short distances; and the "middle road," (the most recent of the three,) which keeps generally parallel with the river road and some twelve to twenty miles from it. Both of the last two are on an open prairie, and, after crossing the great bend of the Red river, intersect in the vicinity of Elbow lake.

Pembina may be stated as an exception. The Red river is heavily wooded with a growth that may be fairly called *timber*.

The country east of the Red river presents a different aspect. It is an admixture of woodland—high and open or low, dense, and marshy—with a high, rolling and broken prairie; is heavily wooded; *birch* and several varieties of the *pine* being in addition to the trees already named as growing on the west side; has its surface dotted with a countless variety of small lakes—the sources of the Mississippi and Red rivers; and has many extensive marshes (*terres tremblantes*) of formidable character.

It may be stated, as a general thing, that the country through which we passed, after leaving St. Cloud in going, and before reaching Crow Wing in returning, owing to the marshy nature of the soil, offers, during the spring and summer, the greatest possible difficulties to travel, with the means of transportation generally used in the United States. And this leads to the remark, that our wagons were only enabled to get through to Pembina by the fact that the season, both before and after our departure from here, was unusually dry, and that we started from six to seven weeks after the usual period of going on such an expedition, (early grass,) which allowed the prairie to become measurably dry.

In this connexion, it would be, perhaps, appropriate, before proceeding to report on the objects of the expedition, that I should state why the average day's march throughout the entire journey, including the halts necessary for refreshing the men and animals, and those from the necessity for labor, were only seven and three-fifths ($7\frac{3}{5}$) miles per day.

To avoid tediousness of detail in explanation, I beg to refer to an *itinerary* of the march, appended and marked "F."

In general terms, then: Starting with heavily loaded wagons—the weight of one of which alone is over a ton—with teams of young and unbroken mules, and teamsters without experience, we contended, in advancing, against the marshy soil of an open prairie, with only grass to bridge its difficult places; the necessity of ferrying or bridging numerous small, rapid, and muddy streams, miscalled rivers; excessive heat, and the partial failure of the mules just before reaching St. Joseph from the want of other food than grass. Hence the average day's march to Pembina ($504\frac{1}{4}$ miles in 49 days) was but ten and one-third ($10\frac{1}{3}$) miles, very nearly.

As only a very limited supply of grain (barley and oats) could be obtained during our ten days' sojourn at St. Joseph and Pembina—the grain, though cut, was not yet threshed—the mules were in a sorry plight for further travel; so that in returning we had, as obstacles to a rapid prosecution of the march, enfeebled animals; want of food for them, the grass being killed or injured by the early frost and ice; constant loss of time, from one to three days in each case, in ferrying or bridging numerous streams, or *corduroying* marshes, (*terres tremblantes*;) cutting roads through forests; and very inclement (winter) weather, which caused the half-starved and enfeebled mules to perish. Hence the average day's march from Pembina, back, ($448\frac{1}{4}$ miles, deduct 18 miles for the true distance between the points, in 75 days,) was barely six (6) miles.

From the night of the 14th of September, the date on which the return march commenced, we had a heavy frost or ice every night throughout the march. With the exception of perhaps some twenty (20) days altogether of mild weather, resembling the Indian summer, the days were cold and cheerless; the sky overcast; chilling rains and snow-storms being of frequent recurrence, the rule rather than the exception. From seventy-five (75) to eighty (80) mules (about two-fifths of the whole number with which we started) died from the effects of cold and lack of food.

I now proceed to treat, in their order, of the specific objects of the expedition, to wit:

I.—*The selection of sites for military posts.*

To express an opinion as to the sites for military posts proper to be selected in the extended country through which we marched, one ought to know the policy which dictates their establishment. As that policy is not stated in terms, I presumed it was to be inferred from the other requirements of my orders, (see Nos. 2 and 3 of the substance of the same,) and have acted accordingly.

The generally peaceful relations of the *Chippewas* with the whites, coupled with the fact that the trespassing upon our territory occurs far to the west of the Red river, sets aside any speculations as to proper points for such posts on the east side of the river.

A post in the vicinity of *St. Joseph* would answer the required conditions quite well, *provided* the garrison consisted, in part, of mounted troops, and was of sufficient strength to make a detachment from it during the summer and autumn, with the view to an encampment on the southern shore of Lake Mini-waken, from whence to scour the country as circumstances might dictate. Indeed, I know of no other place in all that part of the country that would answer so well. It has the requisite timber for building; good clay for bricks; sand; a sufficiency of stone, boulders of granite, for foundations; is perfectly healthy; has plenty of wood for fuel, with an abundance of excellent grass, and a good soil for barley and oats, both of which are already cultivated to some extent; can be readily supplied with subsistence and other stores by the Red and Pembina rivers;* would be at the precise point to intercept or pursue trespassers upon our soil; and from whence detachments could be readily sent to Lake Mini-waken and elsewhere to overawe the Indians and coerce them into proper behavior. The geological structure of the country forbids the expectation of limestone being found to any extent on our side of the line, but this is of the less moment since lime can be procured from the Red River (Selkirk) Settlement at a reasonable rate.

A post at Pembina, or within about seven (7) miles from it, even if eligible in all other respects, I regard as out of the question, on account of the hazard of inundation from the annual rise of the Red river. This overflow may not occur more than once in a quarter of

* The Red river is navigable from a short distance above Graham's Point, during five months of the year, by boats having a draught of four feet. The Pembina is navigable for the same kind of boats for about six weeks during the annual rise in May and June.

St. Joseph is at the head of navigation of this river.

a century,* but it may happen in any year, and for years in succession. But, apart from this decided objection, there is no place within the limits I have indicated that would so well subserve the contemplated purposes as would a post much further west.

At first view, it might seem that the south shore of Lake Mini-waken presents the most eligible site for a post;† for it is between this lake and the Shayenne river, which rises some sixty (60) to seventy (70) miles west of it, that the buffalo do most congregate, and where the hunting parties as well of the Red river people as of the Indians—Sioux and Chippewas—are usually met. But the want of suitable building material, the scrub oak of enlarged size, and other trees which abound on its northern and western shores, being only fit for fuel; its remoteness from supplies as compared with any point on the Pembina, as also that a spot on or near that river is better adapted to put a stop to trespassing; with the fact that a detachment sent during the summer and autumn from any post near the boundary would have all the results that would flow from its establishment at this point, puts it, I think, decidedly out of the question.

But a post in the Pembina region would, in my judgment, but partially meet the case. It would undoubtedly put an end to trespassing, and would probably be the means of inducing from two to three thousand of the Red river people (half-breeds) to leave the Selkirk Settlement and establish themselves under our flag.‡ Still, the long distance which separates Lake Mini-waken from Fort Ridgely forbids the supposition that it would wholly meet the other conditions; and hence the necessity for at least one post intermediate between these two points.

* It rose about twenty feet above its usual rise of fifteen to twenty feet in 1826, and the same in 1852. (See also note No. 3.)

† Lake Mini-waken is about thirty miles long from northwest to southeast, with an average breadth of (say) three miles. It has no visible outlet, and its waters are brackish. It bears an evil reputation among the Indians, whose superstitious fears invest its waters and shores with all imaginable horrors; and hence they never reside there, though they resort to it for the purpose of hunting. Neither Sioux nor Chippewas ever come here singly or in small parties, each fearing the other; so that when they do go in its vicinity it may always be regarded as a numerous war party; but, with the usual Indian habits, each will keep out of the way of the other unless some chance of advantage over the enemy presents itself, or is suggested to their minds. Lakes of brackish water abound in its vicinity, and, as usual, indicate a rather poor soil.

The direct distance from the southeast point of the lake (by which passes the usual route of the hunting parties) to St. Joseph, is about seventy-five miles; but, owing to the hilly and broken character of the country, the entire absence of fuel except "Buffalo chips," and the small supply of fresh water, this route is seldom travelled except by horsemen pressed for time.

The distance from the same point to St. Joseph, as travelled by us, is $89\frac{1}{2}$ miles, the first forty-two of which to the source of Little Salt river (a tributary of Park river) is over a high rolling prairie without a stick of wood, though it has an abundance of water—small lakes at quite short intervals. From the source of the Little Salt to St. Joseph the road is over ground still more broken, with an abundance of wood and water.

The space between Lake Mini-waken and the Shayenne is a great resort of buffalo. From an elevated ridge about two miles south of the lake we saw them literally by thousands dotting the prairie as far as the eye could reach.

‡ I was assured from a source in which I place great confidence, that the presence of troops to protect those living just within our boundary from the incursions of the Sioux, coupled with the notice I gave British subjects, in the name of the President, not to trespass on the territory of the United States as hunters or trappers, would cause the immediate immigration of about 2,500 of the Red river people, who are desirous and anxious to live under the protection of our laws.

That post would naturally be in the vicinity of Lake Traverse, the waters of which find their way into the *Bois de Sioux*. It is along the shores of this lake that some portion of the Sioux dwell throughout the year, and by which their hunters usually descend into the Red river prairies for buffalo and game. A post here would be well situated (in a general sense) with respect to Forts Ridgely and Ripley, as well as to any other that might be established near the 49th parallel of latitude; but our guide, on whose statement I rely, assured me there was no timber, or even trees, at or near the lake—no material for building, in fact. This induces the necessity of selecting some other spot not far from it.

The nearest and most eligible place to it is Graham's Point, about forty miles distant, in a northeasterly direction. It is thirteen miles below the mouth of the *Bois de Sioux*, and is at the head of navigation of the Red river.—(See Captain Pope's report, Wood's expedition of 1849.) It has heavy timber in abundance; clay for brick; sand; an abundance of excellent grass; a capital soil for grain; is above the reach of any rise in the river; can be readily supplied with subsistence and other stores from this post, and is, I presume to say, perfectly healthy.

The mouth of the *Shayenne*, about one hundred and thirty (130) miles lower on the Red river, (see Captain Pope's table of distances,) is also a good site for a post. It presents the same facilities for establishing one as at Graham's point, with the single exception, that it is further from the point of supply for subsistence and other stores. I was assured by the guide to the expedition, whose statements in such a matter may be relied on, that some years since he descended the Shayenne from near its source to its mouth in a canoe, at a low stage of water, and found in no place less than three feet of water. This fact may prove of importance in the transportation of supplies to any post or detachment in the line between Lakes Traverse and Mini-waken. The river, where I bridged it, say at 60 or 70 miles from its mouth, is sixty feet wide, with a depth of nine to ten feet, and a current of (say) two and one-half knots, and this at a low stage of water.

A post at either of these points, with a garrison consisting, in part, of mounted troops, of sufficient strength to send out a detachment during the summer and autumn to Lake Traverse, and beyond it, or more directly west, would, in my judgment, have all the effect of a post at the lake itself, with the additional advantage of greater facility for receiving stores from the depot here, besides serving as a depot from whence supplies could be readily forwarded to the post in the Pembina region.

Of the two, Graham's point has, I think, the preference, from its being nearer to Lake Traverse, as well as to the point of supply, (this post;) as also that it is at the head of navigation of the Red river.

II.—Interviews with the Indians.

Until the battalion reached St. Joseph, not an Indian was visible, nor were there indications of a single one being in our vicinity at any

The Selkirk settlement, which commences about forty miles north of the boundary and extends down the Red river to Lake Winnepeg, (some fifty or sixty miles,) also extends up the Assiniboin for about fifteen miles, contains, I am told, between 7,000 and 8,000 souls.

period of the march to that place. This is explained by the fact, which I learned at St. Joseph, that the Sioux were embodied on Mouse river, some three hundred (300) miles west of us.

At St. Joseph I was visited by La-kik-wa-nel, (in English, *Green Feather*,) the head chief of the Pembina band of the Chippewas, which band numbers about one hundred (100) warriors. He was accompanied by two other chiefs and several of his principal warriors, all in full costume. Green Feather was elected principal chief by his band, under the auspices of Major Woods, in 1849. He exhibited to me his letter of appointment as such, signed by the major.

I said to them in substance: That their Great Father, the President, was very desirous that they should continue at peace with the United States, and that hostilities between themselves and the Sioux should cease, and they live at peace with each other; that he was anxious for this for the sake of all parties, that the country might be travelled in safety by every one; that if they failed to comply with this wish, he was determined to enforce it by placing soldiers among them, who would deliver up to the opposite party the perpetrators of any murder or other outrage, to be dealt with as the outraged party or the relatives and friends of the same might see fit; that he desired each of the hostile parties to remain within their own districts of country, and thus avoid occasion for collision; that as the buffalo and game were fast disappearing, (as must be evident to them,) he desired they should turn their attention to the cultivation of the soil, in order to furnish themselves with a sufficiency of food, which he would aid them to do to the same extent that other tribes were assisted by the government on their expressing such a wish, and making a treaty with the United States.

Green Feather replied: He thought they would like to get implements of labor and the other things, but about the treaty he should have to consult his people. This was the substance of the only answer he would make.

In returning from Pembina as I could only have communicated with any considerable number of the Chippewas after reaching Red Lake river, by sending to Red lake and beyond it at an expenditure of probably two weeks of time that was exceedingly valuable and daily becoming more so, I made no attempt to have an interview with them. I saw but a few of them, straggling hunters, until we reached the agency near Crow Wing. From our guide and interpreter, who conversed with these hunters, I gathered that as a general thing all the Chippewas in the northern part of Minnesota who had not yet concluded treaties with the government, including those whose chiefs I saw, would gladly do so on the terms usually made.

3.—*Notice to trespassers on the Territory of the United States.*

On the 28th day of the march, between Maple and Rush rivers, about two hundred and eighty-three miles from here, we crossed the trail of the annual summer hunting party from the Red river country. Their place of encampment for slaughtering buffalo, &c., was only a few miles from the route we were pursuing, and presented the

appearance of having been occupied by about one thousand (1,000) persons, with probably six hundred (600) carts. The guide thought the party had left it about ten days or two weeks previous. We crossed their trail several times afterwards, and at length followed it to Lake Mini-waken, but did not see a hunter. At St. Joseph's I learned from some of the inhabitants who had been with the party, that they returned about three weeks before our arrival; that the party consisted of about nine hundred (900) persons, men, women, and children, three hundred (300) of whom were Chippewa warriors; that the hunt had not been half so successful as usual from the fact that the Chippewas being in reality a war party against the Sioux, finding they could not induce the hunters to enter into their scheme of aggression on their hereditary enemies, in revenge broke the rules of the hunt, and succeeded in driving the buffalo off.

Thus I had no opportunity of giving the contemplated notice to the parties in person; but I drew up and had circulated in St. Joseph, at Pembina, and at the Red river (Selkirk) settlement, in both French and English, the notice herewith appended, and marked "G."

I consider it not inappropriate that I should before concluding say a few words on the kind of transportation proper to be employed in all future operations of troops in the Red river country.

The heavy government wagon, excellent as it is in all respects for the roads generally travelled in the United States—I have never seen them of such good material or so well put together as those furnished for this expedition—is altogether unsuited to the country over which we passed after leaving St. Cloud; in fact it cannot be used at all.

I regard the small French *cart* used by the Red river people, drawn by a single ox, to be the only feasible mode of transportation by land. *Iron* does not enter into its composition; the felloes of the wheels being doweled. It will carry one thousand pounds. Its cost in the Pembina country is seven and one-half dollars. There is one at this post which I caused the quartermaster of the expedition to purchase as a model.

I desire to state my most emphatic approval of the four corrugated iron wagon bodies (ponton wagons) with which the expedition was furnished. They were invaluable as boats or floats in ferrying or bridging streams; we could not have done without them.

In conclusion it gives me much pleasure to bear testimony to the cheerfulness, zeal, and activity with which the battalion met the constant labor imposed upon it from necessity in bridging numerous streams, cutting roads, corduroying marshes, &c., &c., in the worst possible weather. Labor in some form was of almost daily occurrence throughout the march, and the axe, the spade, and the pick, were as familiar to the hands of the soldier as the rifle.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

C. F. SMITH,

Lieut. Col. 10th Infantry, and Brevet Colonel, commanding.

The ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL,

Headquarters Department of the West, U. S. A.,

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

APPENDIX.

A.

GENERAL ORDERS, No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

New York, June 9, 1856.

Instead of establishing a post at or near the Red River of the North, as directed in "General Orders," No. 4, the two companies of the 10th infantry, under a field officer, pursuant to instructions from the War Department, will make an expedition through that section of the country and return to Fort Snelling.

By command of Brevet Lieutenant General Scott:

L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

B.

ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE,

Washington, June 7, 1856.

GENERAL: Instead of establishing a post on the Red River of the North, as indicated in "General Orders," No. 4, of May 9, from army headquarters, the Secretary of War desires that the two companies make an expedition through that section of the country and return to Fort Snelling. You are respectfully requested to give instructions accordingly.

I am, General, with much respect, your obedient servant,

S. COOPER,

Adjutant General.

Brevet Lieutenant General WINFIELD SCOTT,

General-in-Chief, United States Army,

New York city.

C.

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,

New York, June 9, 1856.

GENERAL: I enclose herewith a copy of "General Orders," No. 5, of this date, and the General-in-Chief desires that you give the officer in command of the two companies the following instructions, in addition to what you may deem necessary respecting supplies and means of transportation.

In travelling the Red river country great care should be taken in observing and noting its features, expressly with reference to the selection of suitable sites for the establishment of military posts, whether suitable building materials could be obtained and of what nature, together with the necessary forage and fuel for troops. It is said that a good position could be found on the Red river, at or near the junction of the Shayenne—Ojee; but one nearer our northern boundary is desirable.

The commanding officer will hold interviews with the Indian tribes on both sides of the river, and require them to keep within their own districts of country, to commit no depredations on each other, and to live in peace, also to continue in peace with the United States, and commit no depredations whatever upon the whites.

It is understood that the inhabitants of the British Possessions are in the habit of crossing the boundary line, for the purpose of hunting and trapping, &c. The commanding officer will be particular to notify all British subjects he may fall in with that such depredations will no longer be permitted. The country around Mini-waken lake is resorted to by them for such purposes, and it would be proper for the troops to visit that region, either going to or returning from Pembina.

Ample time must be taken for the accomplishment of all these objects, and the commanding officer, on his return to Fort Snelling, will make a detailed report of the expedition.

I have the honor to be, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

L. THOMAS,

Assistant Adjutant General.

Brevet Brigadier General N. S. CLARKE,

Commanding Department of the West,

St. Louis, Missouri.

D.

HEADQUARTERS, 10TH REGIMENT OF INFANTRY,

Fort Snelling, M. T., June 20, 1856.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose a copy of "Orders" No. 54, by which you will perceive that you are assigned to the command of the two companies (B and F) detailed for the expedition to the Red River of the North.

The estimates furnished by Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Canby will, perhaps, be a guide to you in making your own, and you are requested to consult with Colonel Canby on the subject. The enclosed copies of letters from the assistants adjutant general at the headquarters of the army and the department of the west, contain all the instructions necessary, and I can only add to them the necessity of making a start in the shortest possible time. The season is already far advanced, and from my own observation of the winter in this country I can say that the expedition should return to this post by the 1st of December

at the furthest. If the objects of the expedition can be attained in time to return by the 1st of November it will be better.

There is no medical officer whom I can attach to your command, and you will therefore report immediately to the surgeon general for one to be assigned.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

E. B. ALEXANDER,
Colonel, commanding.

Brevet Col. C. F. SMITH,
Lieutenant Colonel 10th Infantry, Fort Snelling, M. T.

[Enclosure in the preceding letter.]

ORDERS, No. 54.

HEADQUARTERS, 10TH INFANTRY,
Fort Snelling, M. T., June 20, 1856.

1. Pursuant to instructions received from the headquarters of the army and headquarters of the department of the west, dated June 9, 1856, and June 13, 1856, companies B and F, 10th infantry, are detailed to make an expedition to the Red River of the North.

2. Brevet Colonel C. F. Smith, lieutenant colonel 10th infantry, is assigned to the command of the expedition, and will make, as soon as possible, estimates for stores and transportation.

* * * * *

4. First Lieutenant William Clinton is temporarily attached to company B, and will remain on duty with it until the return of the expedition.

* * * * *

6. The commanding officer of the expedition to the Red river country will designate an officer to perform the duties of acting assistant quartermaster and acting assistant commissary to the command, and will take steps to procure an immediate supply of subsistence and transportation.

By order of Colonel Alexander.

HENRY E. MAYNADIER, *Adjutant.*

E.

SPECIAL ORDERS, No. 69.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE WEST,
St. Louis, Missouri, June 13, 1856.

The quartermaster's and commissary's departments will provide the necessary transportation and subsistence for two companies of the 10th regiment of infantry, to be sent on an expedition to Pembina, on the Red River of the North.

Subsistence will be furnished for not less than four months, and at as early a date as practicable.

By order of Brigadier General Clarke.

JAMES L. CORLEY,
Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

F.

Itinerary of a march of companies B and F, 10th regiment of infantry, from Fort Snelling, Minnesota, to Pembina, Minnesota, and back, in 1856.

A battalion of the 10th regiment of infantry, consisting of companies B and F, six officers and one hundred and sixteen enlisted men, left its camp one mile from Fort Snelling, Minnesota, on the 23d of July, 1856, on an expedition to the Red River of the North, to return to Fort Snelling. [The orders for the expedition will be found in the appendix to the report of the commanding officer.]

The officers of the expedition were:

Brevet Colonel Charles F. Smith, lieutenant colonel 10th infantry, commanding.

Kirtly Ryland, M. D., acting assistant surgeon.

Captain Franklin Gardner, company B.

First Lieutenant William Clinton, of company C, temporarily attached to company B.

First Lieutenant John H. Forney, company F, acting assistant quartermaster and acting assistant commissary of subsistence, commanding the company.

Second Lieutenant William Kearney, company F, acting adjutant.

Second Lieutenant Timothy M. Bryan, company B.

The train consisted of thirty-four wagons, army pattern, four of them corrugated iron, (pontoon wagons,) each drawn by five or six mules, with subsistence stores for four months. The mules of the train, one hundred and eighty in number, were, with the exception of about one dozen, young and unbroken when they arrived at Fort Snelling, just a week before the march. The teamsters employed to drive them had little or no experience as such, particularly with mules.

Wednesday, July 23, 1st day.—Marched 8 miles and encamped on the Mississippi, on the outskirts of St. Anthony, a mile from the suspension bridge; the route was by Minneapolis; distance from Fort Snelling 9 miles; intensely hot day; six of the men fell in convulsions from the effects of the heat; slow progress from green mules and ignorant drivers; it took two hours to accomplish the first mile.

Thursday, July 24, 2d day.—Remained in camp until 5 o'clock, p. m., then marched 4 miles and encamped at Cold Spring, on the Mississippi; whole distance 13 miles; day hot; mules working badly; progress impeded by a large steam boiler going to Wahtab, which blocked the road at a small stream, and prevented the wagons from passing.

Friday, July 25, 3d day.—Marched 5 miles and encamped at Alder creek; whole distance 18 miles; wood, water, and grass in abundance at the place of encampment; (these requisites for an encampment will always be understood as existing at every place of encampment hereafter, unless the exception is stated;) day hot; mules working

badly; slow progress due to having to help the train up two severe sand hills (one of them at Wild Rice creek) by hand, with ropes.

Saturday, July 26, 4th day.—Marched $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles and encamped on Rum river, a mile beyond Anoka; whole distance $28\frac{1}{2}$ miles; day hot; mules still working badly; the wagons helped up two severe sand hills by hand, one of them being at the bridge at Anoka; road through heavy sand in part; water at Coon creek, $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles from last encampment; heavy fall of rain at night.

Sunday, July 27, 5th day.—Did not march, to allow of rest, and to repair damages to harness, &c.; inspection of troops and train in the afternoon.

Monday, July 28, 6th day.—Marched $14\frac{3}{4}$ miles and encamped on Elk river, at the bridge; whole distance $43\frac{1}{4}$ miles; road good; mules working better; day hot; terrific thunder storm at night; water at Ataska, $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and again at Elk-river House, 3 miles.

Tuesday, July 29, 7th day.—Marched 16 miles and encamped on the Mississippi, opposite Bear island; whole distance $59\frac{1}{4}$ miles; good (prairie) road; mules improving; water at Big lake, 6 miles from preceding encampment.

Wednesday, July 30, 8th day.—Marched 19 miles, and encamped at St. Cloud, opposite Lowry's or the upper ferry; whole distance $78\frac{1}{4}$ miles; road good; mules working better; day hot; water at Clear lake 6 miles from preceding encampment; again at two small lakes, $1\frac{1}{2}$ and 1 mile, but at no other place.

Thursday, July 31, 9th day.—Crossing the river at Lowry's ferry, and helping the wagons up its steep bank, consumed nearly all day: marched 3 miles, and encamped on the further side of Sauk river; a good ford; whole distance $81\frac{1}{4}$ miles; road good, with appearances of much marsh in wet weather.

Friday, August 1, 10th day.—Marched $14\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on Sauk river a second time; whole distance $95\frac{3}{4}$ miles; half a mile back there is a small stream called Cold Water creek, the water of which is deliciously cold; road fair.

Saturday, August 2, 11th day.—Marched 5 miles, and encamped half a mile beyond the Sauk river, (2d crossing;) whole distance $100\frac{3}{4}$ miles; three bad places in the road, particularly at the crossing of the river; a ford of coarse sand. As the mules required rest, and no wood is to be had for several miles ahead, the march of to-day was made short.

Sunday, August 3, 12th day.—Marched $17\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on Lake Henry; whole distance $118\frac{1}{4}$ miles; prairie road, over which in a wet season the wagons could have made no progress; water in small ponds at intervals along the road; day hot.

Monday, August 4, 13th day.—Marched 15 miles, and encamped on Lake McLeod, (the Lightning lake of Captain Pope's map;) whole distance $133\frac{1}{4}$ miles; prairie road; two bad places where the marsh had to be bridged with grass, and the wagons assisted over by hand, one of these places being Crow river, the bed of which was nearly dry; a fine spring in this marsh. In a wet season these marshes would have been impassable for the wagons.

Tuesday, August 5, 14th day.—Marched $18\frac{5}{8}$ miles, and encamped on a branch of Chippewa creek; whole distance $151\frac{7}{8}$ miles; rolling prairie; one bad crossing on the Chippewa river. Had the prairie been ordinarily wet it would have been impassable almost for the wagons. Small lakes at short intervals; White Bear lake about half a mile to the left of the road; violent thunder storm at night.

Wednesday, August 6, 15th day.—Marched $8\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on a small lake about 4 miles beyond Pike lake; whole distance $160\frac{1}{4}$ miles. A delay of some hours in crossing the stream on leaving the encampment this morning; the road much affected by the rain of last night; hence slow progress.

Thursday, August 7, 16th day.—Marched 14 miles, and encamped on the Tipsinah or Pomme de Terre river; whole distance $174\frac{1}{4}$ miles; delayed at starting by a bog; no wood; had to send back 3 miles for it; prairie running into hills; a constant succession of small lakes covered with ducks.

Friday, August 8, 17th day.—Marched $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on Elbow lake; whole distance $187\frac{1}{6}$ miles; several hours consumed in crossing the Tipsinah, on account of a bad marsh on both sides of it; other marshes on the road; plenty of small lakes; hilly prairie.

Saturday, August 9, 18th day.—Did not march, to allow of rest to the men and animals, and to repair wagons and harness. Inspection of the troops and of the train.

Sunday, August 10, 19th day.—Marched $10\frac{2}{3}$ miles, and encamped on Rabbit river; whole distance $197\frac{5}{6}$ miles; no wood; brought some. Direction of the march westerly; flat prairie with indications of many marshes in a wet season, not passable for the wagons.

Monday, August 11, 20th day.—Marched westerly and northwesterly $17\frac{5}{12}$ miles, and encamped on the hither side of the Bois de Sioux river, about 4 miles from its mouth; whole distance $215\frac{1}{4}$ miles; some detention from wet prairie; country perfectly flat; two buffalo and several elk seen; one of each killed.

Tuesday, August 12, 21st day.—Ferried half the stores over, using the ponton wagon bodies as boats; swam the mules, and snaked the wagons over by the mules, assisted by the men. A bad crossing; muddy banks and bottom, with swimming depth for horses in part, and the further bank quite steep.

Wednesday, August 13, 22d day.—Finished crossing the stores; marched 13 miles, and encamped on the Red river, 9 miles below the mouth of the Bois de Sioux and 4 miles above Graham's Point; whole distance $228\frac{1}{4}$ miles; country flat; road good.

Thursday, August 14, 23d day.—Marched $10\frac{1}{4}$ miles, and encamped on the further side of Wild Rice river; whole distance $238\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Crossed this river about 5 miles from its mouth, on a bridge of logs made by Mr. Rolette, of Pembina, some weeks before; occupied two hours in strengthening the bridge for the wagons. Four miles from the encampment of last night passed Graham's Point; found there the post put up by Major Woods in 1849, with the following inscription cut on it in deep characters, viz: "163 miles from Sauk Rapids, July 14, 1849." The distance from Fort Snelling to this point, by

our route, is $232\frac{1}{4}$ miles; as marched by Wood's expedition it is $239\frac{1}{2}$ miles. This is the head of navigation of the Red river. The current of the river seems to be about $2\frac{1}{2}$ knots; its banks are say 25 feet high, and the depth of water 5 feet. From this point down the river is heavily wooded, particularly on the east bank.

Friday, August 15, 24th day.—Marched 15 miles, and encamped on the hither side of the Shayenne river, some 60 to 70 miles from its mouth; whole distance $253\frac{1}{2}$ miles. High prairie, crossed by marshy ravines; road good; no water for $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles, where there is a large, deep lake with quite cold water in the middle. The Shayenne is here about 60 feet wide, 9 to 10 deep, and a current of say $2\frac{1}{2}$ knots, with banks of say 25 feet high. Its true name is *Bois de Chien*, from the quantity of *dog-wood* that fringes its banks.

Saturday, August 16, 25th day.—Occupied all day in constructing a bridge to cross the river.

Sunday, August 17, 26th day.—Finished bridge by $12\frac{1}{2}$ o'clock; occupied an hour and a half in crossing the wagons, the banks being steep; marched 13 miles and encamped on the hither side of Maple river, about 50 to 60 miles from its entrance into Rush river, (the latter being tributary to the Shayenne); whole distance $266\frac{1}{2}$ miles. A buffalo killed to-day. The mosquitoes in camp in dense clouds, from which both men and animals suffered considerably.

Monday, August 18, 27th day.—Marched $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on a small creek which empties into Maple river; whole distance 277 miles. No wood; used willow twigs and buffalo chips. At $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from last encampment crossed Maple river by fording, but there being a marsh and a sharp hill on the further side, it took three hours to get the wagons over.

Tuesday, August 19, 28th day.—Marched $15\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on the further bank of Rush river; whole distance $292\frac{1}{2}$ miles. No wood; brought some from $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles back, where Rush river is first met. Our distance from Red river is about 20 miles.

After marching 6 miles this morning we crossed the trail of the annual summer hunting party of the Red river people. The guide followed it for about six miles, and came to where their camp for slaughtering buffalo had been. It was filled with the remains of the buffalo, on which numbers of wolves were feasting; the stench intolerable. From appearances the guide supposed the party to consist of about one thousand persons, with six hundred carts, and that they had been gone ten days or two weeks before.

Wednesday, August 20, 29th day.—Marched 15 miles, and encamped on a small branch of Elm river; whole distance $307\frac{1}{2}$ miles. No wood; had to use buffalo chips. Rain all night.

Thursday, August 21, 30th day.—Marched $11\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on the hither bank of the south branch of Goose river; whole distance $318\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Rain all day until we halted.

Friday, August 22, 31st day.—Did not march to-day to allow rest to all, and that the men might put their arms and clothes in order. Inspection of troops and train in the afternoon. A buffalo killed. The camp is at the usual crossing in going to Pembina by the middle

road, and it is from here our route diverges to Lake Mini-waken. No wood between this and that lake, distant $65\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

Saturday, August 23, 32d day.—Marched 15 miles in a northwest direction, and encamped on a small branch of Goose river; whole distance $333\frac{1}{2}$ miles. No wood; at last encampment put wood in the wagons for four days. Left the direct road at starting, and took the direction for Lake Mini-waken. Rolling prairie; road good. Small lakes of good water throughout the march of to-day.

Sunday, August 24, 33d day.—Marched $15\frac{1}{4}$ miles, (northwesterly,) and encamped on the margin of one of the numerous lakes which we pass continually; whole distance $348\frac{3}{4}$ miles. No wood. The guide chased and killed a buffalo to-day in presence of the men. Rolling prairie, here and there marshy.

Monday, August 25, 34th day.—Marched $15\frac{1}{2}$ miles, (northwesterly,) and encamped on a small branch of the Shayenne, about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Lake Chicot; whole distance $364\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Rolling prairie; marshy; no wood. Two buffalo killed by the guide. Saw for the first time a herd of buffalo cows. Diarrhœa among the men from eating so much buffalo meat lately.

Tuesday, August 26, 35th day.—Marched 12 miles, (north northwest,) and encamped on a small lake near Lake Chicot, and $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the southeast point of Lake Mini-waken; whole distance $376\frac{1}{4}$ miles. No wood. Passed to the east of Lake Chicot, which is a long lake of blackish water, with plenty of wood on its shores. High rolling prairie, with here and there a marsh.

Wednesday, August 27, 36th day.—Marched $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles, (north northwest,) and encamped on the southeast part of Lake Mini-waken; whole distance $383\frac{3}{4}$ miles. High rolling prairie. Three buffalo killed to-day. Had we come by the west side of Lake Chicot the distance would have been shortened probably six to 7 miles, but the guide feared an extensive marsh on its west side.

Lake Mini-waken is about thirty miles long from northwest to southeast, with an average breadth of three miles. It is quite heavily wooded on its western and northern shores with oak, elm, ash, &c., but the wood cannot be regarded as building material, save for rude huts. Its waters are brackish. It is said to be full of good fish, pike particularly. Good clay for brick in the vicinity. The prairie rises here into ridges of respectable height. Soil comparatively poor. This lake has an evil reputation among the Indians as the abode of evil spirits. Its name in the Sioux language signifies Spirit lake. During an examination of the country, from an elevated ridge about 2 miles south of the lake, buffalo were seen literally by thousands dotting the prairie below and around as far as the eye could reach.

Thursday, August 28, 37th day.—Did not march, that the animals might be rested, and in the hope of seeing some Indians. Several of the officers and men went after the buffaloes seen yesterday, and killed several. Weather cold and lowering. Night cold.

Friday, August 29, 38th day.—Marched 18 miles in a northeasterly direction for St. Joseph, taking wood for two days, and encamped on several small lakes; whole distance $401\frac{3}{4}$ miles; no wood; high rolling

prairie; passed small lakes of fresh water continually. In a wet season portions of this route must be marshy to a degree.

Saturday, August 30, 39th day.—Marched $15\frac{1}{4}$ miles in a northeasterly direction, and encamped on two small lakes; whole distance 417 miles; no wood; aspect of the country the same as that of yesterday; small lakes at short intervals throughout; mules failing from want of grain.

Sunday, August 31, 40th day.—Marched 9 miles in a northeasterly direction, and encamped on the hither bank of *Little Salt* river, (a tributary of *Park* river,) near its source; whole distance 426 miles; aspect of the country the same as for the last two days. Inspection and muster in the afternoon.

Monday, September 1, 41st day.—Detained an hour in crossing the river, on account of a marsh on the further side. Marched 17 miles, and encamped on *Clear Water* river; whole distance 443 miles. After marching about 6 miles in an east by northeast direction, we struck and followed the direct road for *Pembina*; this was near *Cart* river, (*Riviere la Charette*,) improperly printed *Cant* river on the map. Road generally good; marshy in places.

Tuesday, September 2, 42d day.—Marched $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on the far side of *Tongue* river; whole distance $459\frac{1}{2}$ miles. A bad crossing at this river; muddy banks, and hill to ascend. About two miles before reaching *Tongue* river we left the road for *Pembina* and took that diverging (northwest) to *St. Joseph*. Had a detention of two hours in crossing *Steep Hill* river. Timber seen all along a high ridge one to two miles on our left; the first time we have seen trees growing apart from a lake or a stream. This ridge runs northerly to *St. Joseph*, where its highest elevation is called *Pembina mountain*. Passed through the "*Poplar islands*." A horrid road throughout in a wet season.

Wednesday, September 3, 43d day.—Marched $13\frac{3}{4}$ miles in a northwest by north direction, and encamped on the further (or north) bank of the *Pembina*, at *St. Joseph*; crossed by a good ford—rocky bottom; whole distance $473\frac{1}{4}$ miles; water half way during the march; wooded country, much broken and hilly, with indications of shocking marshes in wet weather. Mules failing for the past six days; some of them given out.

Thursday, September 4, 44th day.—Remained to rest the animals, get grain, &c., &c. A few bushels of barley brought in; barley and oats cut but not threshed. Published notice that British subjects must not trespass on our territory to hunt, &c., (see order book.) Had an interview with *La-kik-wa-nel*—in English, *Green Feather*—principal chief of the *Pembina* band of the *Chippewas*, and about a dozen of his principal men; told them that the President desired them to, &c., &c., &c.

Friday, September 5, 45th day.—Small quantities of grain brought in, the inhabitants showing but little energy to meet our wants in this respect.

Saturday, September 6, 46th day.—Finding no reliance could be placed on the people to furnish grain, an express was sent across the

country to Fort Garey, (in the British settlement) at the mouth of the Assiniboin, distant about 90 miles, to have a supply of oats sent up the Red river to meet us at Pembina. Directed the quartermaster to purchase a *cart*, as a model.

Sunday, September 7, 47th day.—Marched $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles, (eastward,) and encamped at Mitchel's point, on the Pembina river; whole distance $485\frac{3}{4}$ miles; gently undulating prairie, with indications of much marsh in a wet season. A chilling rain all day, very cold at night; a sharp frost, the first of the season.

Monday, September 8, 48th day.—Marched 12 miles, and encamped at a point on the Pembina, $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the town of that name; whole distance $497\frac{3}{4}$ miles; flat prairie; frost.

Tuesday, September 9, 49th day.—Marched $6\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped in the town of Pembina, a quarter of a mile from the junction of the Pembina and Red rivers; whole distance $504\frac{1}{4}$ miles; road over a flat prairie, with extensive marshy places. The distance to this place, as marched by Major Woods, is $446\frac{1}{2}$ miles.—(See Captain Pope's table of distances.) Not exceeding two dozen wooden buildings in the place; town gone to decay. The Pembina river about thirty feet wide, with steep banks twenty feet high; muddy bottom and small depth of water; current gentle. The Red river one hundred and twenty-five yards wide; steep and muddy banks of twenty feet; fifteen feet deep, and a current of, say, four knots.

Wednesday September 10, 50th day.—Preparations to cross the Red river.

Thursday, September 11, 51st day.—Commenced crossing the wagons, &c. This was done by stretching a rope across the river and ferrying them over, using the four ponton wagon bodies (lashed together) as a boat.

Friday, September 12, 52d day.—Continued crossing the wagons and stores, and established the camp on a small lake one mile east of the river.

Saturday, September 13, 53d day.—Continued crossing the wagons, &c. Received from Fort Garey one hundred and ten bushels of oats. The reason assigned for not sending the quantity required was that the hunters who were to bring it declined to come on account of the notice given them not to trespass on our soil.

Sunday, September 14, 54th day, 1st day from Pembina.—Finished crossing the mules; marched $11\frac{1}{2}$ miles in an easterly and southeasterly direction, and encamped on the hither side of the north branch of the Two Rivers river; whole distance from Pembina $12\frac{1}{4}$ miles; level prairie, with indications of marsh repeatedly; ice in the tents at night one-eighth of an inch thick.

Monday, September 15, 55th day, 2d day from Pembina.—Occupied all day in bridging the river; ice in the tents at night one-fourth of an inch thick. Some of the mules given out.

Tuesday, September 16, 56th day, 3d day from Pembina.—Finished bridge; marched $4\frac{1}{4}$ miles, (southerly,) and encamped on the near side of the south branch of the Two Rivers river; whole distance from Pembina $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles; undulating prairie, with marshy places;

commenced constructing bridge; ice in the tents at night three-eighths of an inch thick; mules generally exhibiting symptoms of weakness; some more of them given out.

Wednesday, September 17, 57th day, 4th day from Pembina.—Occupied all day, in a chilling rain, in bridging the river, in continuation of yesterday's work; ice at night.

Thursday, September 18, 58th day, 5th day from Pembina.—Finished bridge; marched 11 miles, (southerly,) and encamped on a small stream, (name unknown,) supposed to be a branch of the Riviere aux Marais; whole distance $27\frac{1}{2}$ miles; level prairie; bad road in a wet season; cold day; ice at night.

Friday, September 19, 59th day, 6th day from Pembina.—Marched $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles (southerly) and encamped on the Tamarac river, (Riviere aux Epinees;) whole distance 44 miles; level prairie; marshy in several places; bad road in wet weather; day cold, with high wind; ice at night.

Saturday September 20, 60th day, 7th day from Pembina.—Marched four miles, (southerly,) and encamped on Middle river; whole distance 48 miles; the greater part of the day consumed in cutting down the steep bank on the further side of the Tamarac, and then in helping the wagons up the still quite steep ascent by hand; afterwards in making a corduroy with the silver poplar, (aspen,) over a bog, belly deep to oxen and mules, of one hundred and fifty yards in length; and towards night, by cutting down the bank at Middle river to descend to the ford; good fords at both the Tamarac and Middle rivers; road through woods, (aspen,) and good, with the exception of the marsh; ice at night.

Sunday, September 21, 61st day, 8th day from Pembina.—Marched $17\frac{1}{2}$ miles, (southerly,) and encamped on a small lake, with but little water and poor grass at the best; whole distance $65\frac{1}{2}$ miles; prairie road, marshy in places; bad in wet season; cold all day; ice at night; some spading in crossing Snake river; the Tamarac, (Riviere aux Epinees,) Middle, and Snake rivers are the three branches of the Riviere au Marais (see Pope's map) which enters the Red river through a marsh instead of an open mouth; this is the case with all the small tributaries to the Red river from the east, between Pembina and the mouth of Red Lake river, with the single exception of the Two Rivers river; timber on our left all day 8 to 10 miles distant; ice at night.

Monday, September 22, 62d day, 9th day from Pembina.—Marched 18 miles (southerly,) and encamped on Red Lake river; whole distance, $83\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Level prairie, with appearance of extensive marshes. The camp about 25 miles from Red river, and (say) 60 miles from Red lake. Average distance of the road from Red river thus far, about 20 miles. One mule left in a dying condition, from exhaustion, this morning. Ice at night.

Tuesday, September 23, 63d day, 10th day from Pembina.—Occupied in preparations for crossing the river. This is the best looking river seen on the march; it is about 80 yards wide, with a very rapid current; has sandy shores and a good gravelly ford of (at this low stage

of water) about 3 feet. The river below the ford is from 10 to 12 and 14 feet deep. Very large oak trees are on the north side. As the ford was crooked and too deep for the mules in harness, the preparations for crossing were by means of a *flying bridge*, using the four pontons wagon bodies as a float or boat. Severe frost at night.

Wednesday, September 24, 64th day, 11th day from Pembina.—Finished preparations for crossing the river. Sharp frost at night.

Thursday, September 25, 65th day, 12th day from Pembina.—Crossed the train; marched $9\frac{1}{4}$ miles in a westerly direction, and encamped on Red Lake river; whole distance $92\frac{3}{4}$ miles. Immediately after crossing, we left the beaten track, the eastern or “timber,” or “wood” road, and our course tended southwest for the mouth of Buffalo river. Crossed several streamlets, tributaries of the Red Lake river, which, owing to the deep ravines in which they flow, and the marshy soil, must have proved impassable obstacles to the wagons in a wet season. Heavy frost at night.

Friday, September 26, 66th day; 13th day from Pembina.—Marched $10\frac{1}{2}$ miles (southwesterly) and encamped on a small stream, tributary to Red Lake river; whole distance $103\frac{1}{4}$ miles. No wood; nothing but small poplar twigs. Clear, cold morning; overcast and chilling rain at noon. The last $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles was over one continuous marsh (*terre tremblante*,) in the worst parts of which the mules sank up to their bellies with the least effort. Late in the evening only the company and staff wagons brought into camp by hand, with small assistance from the mules, the men working in water mid-leg deep; the remainder of the wagons at various distances, not exceeding a mile or so, back in the marsh. Chilling rain at night; cleared up towards morning very cold, with high wind. Ice. Mules worn out.

Saturday, September 27, 67th day, 14th day from Pembina.—Occupied in getting the wagons into camp; a cold drizzling rain all day; the wagons were *snaked* along by the mules being placed at the end of a long pole with always one company, and sometimes both, hauling on it in their rear; the water middle deep in many places; by the time one-half of the remainder of the wagons were in camp the men were exhausted from labor and cold; ice at night; four mules died from exhaustion and cold during the night.

Sunday, September 28, 68th day, 15th day from Pembina.—The remainder of the wagons got into camp; as on yesterday cold chilling rain until 12 o'clock m., when it cleared up very cold; ice at night.

Monday, September 29, 69th day; 16th day from Pembina.—Marched about 10 miles in order to accomplish the five which separated us (southwesterly) from Sand Hill river, and encamped on the hither bank of that river, about four miles from its junction with the Red river; whole distance $108\frac{1}{4}$ miles; doubling the distance was occasioned by having to meander to avoid the worst places in the marsh; as it was four or five very bad places had to be crossed by taking out the mules and *snaking* the wagons over by the men and the mules; by night the company and staff wagons only in camp; the remainder at two principal points of difficulty, three and five miles in the rear; ice at night; five mules died during the night from exhaustion and cold.

(It would have been much better perhaps to have continued along or near Red Lake river from the encampment of Thursday night, until near the Red river and then turned south. We should have found deep water instead of the marsh, and that would have been preferable.)

Tuesday, September 30, 70th day, 17th day from Pembina.—Occupied all day in getting the wagons into camp; weather moderating; frost at night.

Wednesday, October 1, 71st day, 18th day from Pembina.—Wagons all in; commenced bridging the Sand Hill river; Indian summer temperature during the day; frost at night.

Thursday, October 2, 72d day, 19th day from Pembina.—Working in continuation at the bridge; pleasant day; frost at night.

Friday, October 3, 73d day, 20th day from Pembina.—Finished bridge; marched 10 miles (east by south,) and encamped on the *Riviere aux Marais*, half a mile from the Red river; whole distance $118\frac{1}{4}$ miles; left one mule dying from exhaustion; undulating prairie; severe marshes in places in wet weather; pleasant day; heavy frost at night.

Saturday, October 4, 74th day, 21st day from Pembina.—Moved the camp up the river about three miles, and bridged the latter; about the time the bridge was finished (2 o'clock p. m.,) the prairie was discovered to be on fire at the last encampment, with a high wind to bring it down upon us with race horse speed; struck the camp and made a hasty retreat to the opposite bank of the river and encamped, just saving our distance; pleasant temperature during the day; frost at night.

Sunday, October 5, 75th day, 22d day from Pembina.—Marched (east by south) $9\frac{3}{8}$ miles, and encamped on a small lake about $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile from Wild Rice river, and near where it empties into the Red river; whole distance $127\frac{5}{8}$ miles; level road; pleasant day; frost at night.

Monday, October 6, 76th day, 23d day from Pembina.—Marched (east by south) $0\frac{3}{8}$ miles and encamped on Wild Rice river, about four miles from its mouth; whole distance 134 miles; a bad river to cross; muddy (clay) banks 20 feet high, and muddy bottom with a considerable current, and 10 feet deep at the crossing; preparations for bridging it; prairie slightly rolling to-day with marshy ravines; pleasant day; frost at night.

Tuesday, October 7, 77th day, 24th day from Pembina.—Labor on bridge; Indian summer temperature.

Wednesday, October 8, 78th day, 25th day from Pembina.—Labor on bridge; pleasant weather; frost at night.

Thursday, October 9, 79th day, 26th day from Pembina.—Finished bridge; pleasant day; frost at night.

Friday, October 10, 80th day, 27th from Pembina.—Marched (east by south) 9 miles, and encamped on the hither bank of Buffalo river, about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from its junction with the Red river, level prairie. Crossed the river, and rode to the Red river to examine the mouth of the Shayenne, which is about 5 miles above the mouth of the Buffalo. It has a more rapid current at its entrance into the Red river than the latter, with high banks and plenty of wood, and a depth of

water (at this low stage) of twelve to fourteen feet; it is not wider than where we bridged it 60 to 70 miles above. It is (according to Captain Pope's table of distances) 130 miles below Graham's Point. There is a high level prairie running back from its banks. Pleasant day; frost at night.

Saturday, October 11, 81st day, 28th day from Pembina.—Marched (southeasterly) 15 miles, and encamped near a small stream on the western slope of Leaf mountain; whole distance 158 miles. Dead level prairie without wood or water; fortunately it was dry. The indications were abundant that in a wet season it would have been impassable for the wagons. Day pleasant; heavy frost at night. One mule left this morning in a dying condition.

Sunday, October 12, 82d day, 29th day from Pembina.—Bridged the small stream on which we had encamped. Marched (easterly) $4\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on a small lake; whole distance $162\frac{1}{4}$ miles. High rolling prairie, with plenty of marshy places. Cold, with high wind during the day; ice at night. A mule left in an exhausted and dying condition this morning.

Monday, October 13, 83d day, 30th day from Pembina.—Marched (easterly) 6 miles, and encamped on a small stream, supposed to be a branch of Buffalo river; whole distance $168\frac{1}{4}$ miles. A high rolling prairie, with plenty of small lakes. The prairie burnt throughout the march. Cold day; wind high; preparation for crossing the stream. Two mules left in a dying condition from exhaustion. Sent out the guide to find the wood road. Ice at night.

Tuesday, October 14, 84th day, 31st day from Pembina.—Crossed the train by a floating (pontoon) bridge. The guide returned late in the morning, and reported that the middle road was about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles in front (east) of us; that he had gone eastward about 11 miles without finding the wood road, and that the country was so exceedingly hilly and broken, and so marshy, that he thought it better, in the weakly condition of the mules, to take the middle road for some 35 to 40 miles, from whence he thought he could find his way across to the wood road by Otter-tail lake.

Marched $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, (east,) and struck the middle road, (leading to St. Cloud,) which we followed for $3\frac{3}{4}$ miles, and encamped on a large lake; whole distance $174\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Hilly and broken prairie, with evidence of bad marshy places; open woods in every direction. After striking the road, the course was southwest. Day clear and cold; ice at night. Two mules left in a dying condition this morning.

Wednesday, October 15, 85th day, 32d day from Pembina.—Marched 8 miles, (the first 5 on the road southwest, the last 3 off the road, and due east,) and encamped on a small lake; whole distance $182\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The prairie high and rolling, with numerous marshes in the hollows. The trees gradually disappeared as we advanced on the road. After proceeding in the road several miles, we entered upon a burnt surface, which extended as far as the eye could reach. As the mules were failing continually, and there was no wood on the prairie, the east course was taken to get at the nearest timber and grass. Clear, cold, and windy day; ice at night. One mule left dying this morning.

Thursday, October 16, 86th day, 33d day from Pembina.—Determined to keep on in an easterly direction, so as to strike the wood road, by passing through the timber. On account of the exhausted condition of the mules, marched only three miles, and encamped on one of the thousand small lakes of this part of the country; whole distance $185\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Prairie high and rolling, and covered with open timber. Direction of march due east. Had to cut the road through the wood from time to time. Very cold all day; ice at night. Three mules died this morning.

Friday, October 17, 87th day, 34th day from Pembina.—The guide sent out to find the road. Day cold, with high wind; ice at night. Commenced feeding the mules on flour.

Saturday, October 18, 88th day, 35th day from Pembina.—Did not march. Awaiting the return of the guide. Weather as on yesterday.

Sunday, October 19, 89th day, 36th day from Pembina.—Awaiting the return of the guide. A rather pleasant day; frost at night.

Monday, October 20, 90th day, 37th day from Pembina.—The guide returned at 9 o'clock this morning, and reported the wood road far to the north and east of us. The camp struck at once, and the march resumed, with the view of getting into the road as soon as possible. Retraced our steps as far as the encampment of the 16th instant; then north $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and then east for $1\frac{1}{2}$ mile—in all 7 miles—and encamped on three small lakes (wild celery in one of them;) whole distance $192\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Had to open the road through the woods for the last mile and a half. Country hilly, with small lakes in all directions and open woods. A severe storm of rain and hail at night. Two mules died during the night.

Tuesday, October 21, 91st day, 38th day from Pembina.—Marched (northeasterly) 6 miles, and encamped on a small lake; whole distance $198\frac{1}{2}$ miles. General aspect of the country a high rolling prairie; an infinity of small lakes and marshes, with woods at intervals, through which the road had to be cut. Chilling rain; ice at night. Two mules died during the night.

Wednesday, October 22, 92d day, 39th day from Pembina.—Marched (northeastely) 8 miles, and encamped on a large lake; whole distance marched, $106\frac{1}{2}$ miles; distance from Pembina $188\frac{1}{2}$ —18 miles having been lost in our meandering to find the road. Aspect of the country the same as yesterday: hilly, marshy, and full of lakes, with open woods. Bridged a small stream; cut road through the timber where it occurred. Cold, raw day; ice at night.

Thursday, October 23, 93d day, 40th day from Pembina.—Marched (northeasterly) 4 miles, and struck the wood road, which trends from here southeast; then 1 mile on the road, and encamped on a small lake; whole distance $211\frac{1}{2}$ miles; from Pembina $193\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Character of the country the same as for the past two days: hilly, lakey, and marshy, with timber at intervals, through which the road had to be cut. Very cold day, with a high chilling wind; ice at night. One mule left dying. Lieutenant Clinton ordered to start in the morning for Fort Ripley, to procure grain for the animals, and as many yoke of oxen as possible; the mules being now so weakly, although with a

partial feed of flour, that a march of 4 or 5 miles was a hard task for them.

Friday, October 24, 94th day, 41st day from Pembina.—Lieutenant Clinton started for Fort Ripley. (Fort Ripley was supposed to be about 80 miles distant; it proved to be $126\frac{3}{4}$ miles.) Marched $5\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and encamped on Lake de Truas; whole distance 217 miles; from Pembina 199 miles. This lake nearly circular, with a diameter of about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles. It is also called Lake Detroit, and Lake No. 44. Chilling rain. Rolling prairie and marsh. Made a corduroy, with small poplars and brush, of one hundred and fifty yards in length, over a villainous marsh; other bad places on the road employing the men in constant labor. A cold snow storm commenced in the afternoon and lasted all night. Five mules died during the night.

Saturday, October 25, 95th day, 42d day from Pembina.—At work widening the road through the wood for about $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles. Rain and snow at night; four mules died during the night.

Sunday, October 26, 96th day, 43d day from Pembina.—Constructing a road over a narrow, wooded causeway of 200 yards, between the lake and a horrid terre tremblante. Snow and rain alternately throughout the day. Cold at night, very; ice. Two mules died during the night.

Monday, October 27, 97th day, 44th day from Pembina.—Occupied most of the day in bridging two streams and corduroying with tamarac two respectable marshes, a mile or so in advance of the causeway. Marched $2\frac{3}{4}$ miles, and encamped in the wood on the margin of the lake (De Truas) near the causeway; whole distance $219\frac{3}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $201\frac{3}{4}$ miles. Lowering weather and cold; ice at night. Three mules died during the night.

Tuesday, October 28, 98th day, 45th day from Pembina.—Marched 2 miles, and encamped in the woods near an immense tamarac swamp, which bars our progress; whole distance $221\frac{3}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $203\frac{3}{4}$ miles; slow progress, from having to widen the road through the forest. Commenced corduroying the swamp with tamarac, which grows here in the greatest abundance—a swamp of the worst character, 150 yards wide. The road from where we first struck Lake De Truas runs first on the margin of the lake, partly in the water; then through the woods skirting the lake; then on a causeway between a marsh and the lake; then, for half a mile through the waters of the lake, on its margin; and then through the forest, leaving the lake at a right angle, until brought up by the tamarac swamp. This swamp is of great extent—many miles—and is drained by the lake. Very cold at night; ice. Four mules died during the night.

Wednesday, October 29, 99th day, 46th day from Pembina.—Corduroying the swamp, in continuation. Snow and sunshine alternately every few minutes throughout the day, which was very cold. Very cold at night, with high wind; ice.

Thursday, October 30, 100th day, 47th day from Pembina.—Finished the corduroy. Day and night exceedingly cold; ice half an inch thick in the tents; five mules died during the night. [The corduroy spoken of (150 yards long) was laid on sleepers of tamarac, and road-

way of the same. It is a very creditable piece of work, that will probably last for twenty years.]

Friday, October 31, 101st day, 48th day from Pembina.—Marched 5 miles, and encamped on *Les deux lacs*; whole distance $226\frac{3}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $208\frac{3}{4}$ miles; slow progress, from having to widen the road through the forest; country hilly, lakey, and swampy. Day cold; muster at eight o'clock at night, in a snow storm. Seven mules died during the night.

Saturday, November 1, 102d day, 49th day from Pembina.—Marched 4 miles, and encamped on the hither side of Otter-tail Lake river; whole distance $230\frac{3}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $212\frac{3}{4}$ miles; slow progress, from having to widen the road through the wood. Ice at night; exceedingly cold. One mule died during the night; four left dying in the morning.

Sunday, November 2, 103d day, 50th day from Pembina.—The road crossed the river at this point by a ford of two to three feet deep, with coarse, sandy bottom, the approach to which is over a marsh of one hundred yards or so and the exit by another marsh of three to four hundred yards, both of which would have to be corduroyed throughout. The timber, though abundant for such a purpose in the neighborhood, was not sufficiently near for rapid operations. It would have cost ten days to effect the work. These difficulties induced an examination, which presented a feasible route, with (comparatively) little trouble or labor, by crossing at a new ford, near the camp, and cutting a road through the woods of a mile and a quarter, avoiding all marsh but an inconsiderable piece of thirty feet or so.

Occupied all day in the reconnaissance and cutting the road through the woods, also in making a slip or sloping platform into the water on each bank, to allow of easy entrance and exit for the mules and wagons. Ice at night. Very cold. One mule died during the night.

Monday, November 3d, 104th day, 51st day from Pembina.—Finished the work commenced yesterday. Cold at night as usual.

Tuesday, November 4th, 105th day; 52d from Pembina.—Crossed the river. Marched five miles and encamped on the hither side of Otter-tail Lake river. Second crossing. Whole distance $235\frac{3}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $217\frac{3}{4}$ miles. Extremely cold all day and night. Ice. Prairie road of slightly rolling character.

Wednesday, November 5th, 106th day, 53d day from Pembina.—Occupied all day in snaking the wagons across the river (a good ford, rather wide,) and in bringing up six wagons left at the last encampment, for want of animals to haul them.

Lt. Clinton arrived from Fort Ripley at three o'clock, with seven yoke of oxen, a pair of horses, and a supply of oats and hay; also with a pair of shoes for each soldier, the most of the men at this time being shoeless, or nearly so. Freezing weather day and night. Two horses and three mules died during the night.

Thursday, November 6th, 107th day, 54th day from Pembina.—Marched 12 miles and encamped in the woods on Lake des Roseaux, one mile from the mouth of Rush river. Whole distance $247\frac{3}{4}$ miles;

from Pembina $229\frac{3}{4}$ miles. A rolling prairie with lakes and wood. A cold snow storm day and night. Two mules died during the night.

Friday, November 7th, 108th day; 55th day from Pembina.—Marched $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles and encamped on a small lake about two miles from Otter-tail lake. Whole distance $251\frac{1}{4}$ miles; $223\frac{1}{4}$ miles from Pembina. Occupied all day in snaking the wagons across the mouth of Rush river. A deep ford with hard bottom in Lake des Roseaux. A snow storm with high wind. The day and night exceedingly cold. Two horses and two mules died during the day and night.

Saturday, November 8th, 109th day, 56th day, from Pembina.—Marched $6\frac{1}{4}$ miles, and encamped on the further side of Leaf-lake river. Whole distance $257\frac{1}{2}$ miles; from Pembina $239\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Much of the day occupied in snaking the wagons across the river. A good ford with steep exit. Day and night excessively cold, the thermometer for the last two nights several degrees below zero. Five mules died during the night.

Sunday, November 9th, 110th day, 57th day from Pembina.—Left six wagons this morning, for want of animals to haul them. Marched $12\frac{3}{4}$ miles and encamped on a small stream. Whole distance $270\frac{1}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $252\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Freezing throughout the day, but moderating. Level prairie with small streams and marshes, the latter fortunately bridged by frost.

Monday, November 10th, 111th day, 58th day from Pembina.—Marched 11 miles and encamped on the hither side of ——— river. Whole distance $281\frac{1}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $263\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Prairie, extensive marshes and small streams; a horrid road in a wet season, fortunately now frozen hard. Very cold day and night. One mule died during the night.

Tuesday, November 11th, 112th day, 59th day from Pembina.—After cutting down the steep exit from the ford, snaked the wagons over and marched 10 miles, encamping on the hither side of Crow-wing river. Whole distance $291\frac{1}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $273\frac{1}{4}$ miles. The day mild and pleasant. Night quite cold. A bad, marshy road, now frozen hard.

Wednesday, November 12th, 113th day, 60th day from Pembina.—Occupied in preparing to cross the river by a flying ferry. The river filled with floating ice. It is about 125 yards wide, fordable through coarse sand, but too deep for mules in harness. The entrance into the water abrupt, two feet at least, to get at which there is a marsh of more than one hundred yards of bad character to cross, fortunately now frozen hard. This is the region of the Pineries. Discharged the guide. Very cold at night; freezing all day. One mule died during the night.

Thursday, November 13, 114th day, 61st day from Pembina.—Occupied until nearly dark in ferrying the loaded wagons on ponton float; then marched 6 miles and encamped in a fine open forest of pine, on the bank of the Crow-wing, about a mile from the Little Swan river; whole distance $279\frac{1}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $299\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Country hilly and marshy, through woods all the way; the marshes frozen. Very cold at night. One mule died during the night.

Friday, November 14, 115th day, 62d day from Pembina.—Bridged Little Swan river; then marched 4 miles and encamped on the great marsh; whole distance $301\frac{1}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $283\frac{1}{4}$ miles. The road principally through open forest of pine, with here and there a marsh. Had to widen the road. Very cold, with high wind at night.

Saturday, November 15, 116th day, 63d day from Pembina.—Marched 13 miles and encamped on Crow-wing river, (2d time;) whole distance $314\frac{1}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $296\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Wood land of pine, and marsh. Had to straighten the road through the former; the latter was fortunately frozen. It would have taken weeks to have corduroyed the marsh; in one reach it was half a mile of veritable *terre tremblante*. Bright cold day, with high wind; very cold at night. One mule died during the night.

Sunday, November 16, 117th day, 64th day from Pembina.—Marched 8 miles and encamped on the further side of Gull river, one mile from the Chippewa agency, which we passed en route; whole distance $322\frac{1}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $304\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Road good, with indications of bad marsh in several places. Bright, cold day; very cold at night; ice, of course.

Monday, November 17, 118th day, 65th day from Pembina.—Marched $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the ferry on the Mississippi at Crow Wing; whole distance $324\frac{3}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $306\frac{3}{4}$ miles. The river filled with large masses of floating ice. Occupied until late in the afternoon in ferrying the train. Encamped at Crow Wing, near the ferry. The night very cold, as usual.

Tuesday, November 18, 119th day, 66th day from Pembina.—Marched $6\frac{3}{4}$ miles and encamped on the Mississippi, opposite Fort Ripley; whole distance $331\frac{1}{2}$ miles; from Pembina $313\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Bright, cold day. A mule left dying this morning. Very cold at night.

Wednesday, November 19, 120th day, 67th day from Pembina.—Occupied in having surplus wagons and stores and weak mules turned over to the quartermaster at Fort Ripley, and in receiving grain and subsistence stores for continuing the march to Fort Snelling. A cold snow storm in progress day and night.

Thursday, November 20, 121st day, 68th day from Pembina.—Occupied as on yesterday. Snow storm in continuation.

Friday, November 21, 122d day, 69th day from Pembina.—Marched $16\frac{1}{2}$ miles and encamped on the Mississippi river, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles below Swan river; whole distance 348 miles; from Pembina 330 miles. Cold night, very.

Saturday, November 22, 123d day, 70th day from Pembina.—Marched 18 miles and encamped on Rock creek; whole distance 366 miles; from Pembina 348 miles. Cold day and very cold night.

Sunday, November 23, 124th day, 71st day from Pembina.—Marched $15\frac{1}{2}$ miles and encamped on a small lake, $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Stevenson's, on Clear lake; whole distance $381\frac{1}{2}$ miles; from Pembina $363\frac{1}{2}$ miles. Temperature as on yesterday.

Monday, November 24, 125th day, 72d day from Pembina.—Marched $23\frac{1}{2}$ miles and encamped at our former encampment on Elk river;

whole distance 405 miles; from Pembina 387 miles. The cold throughout the day and night excessive, with a snow storm at night.

Tuesday, November 25, 126th day, 73d day from Pembina.—Marched $14\frac{3}{4}$ miles and encamped at our old encampment on Rum river; whole distance $419\frac{1}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $401\frac{3}{4}$ miles. A snow storm throughout the day; the night cold.

Wednesday, November 26, 127th day, 74th day from Pembina.—Marched 16 miles and encamped a half a mile nearer to St. Anthony than our former encampment at Cold Spring; whole distance $435\frac{3}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $417\frac{3}{4}$ miles. Cold day, sunshine, with high wind; cold of the night excessive; mercury several degrees below zero.

Thursday, November 27, 128th day, 75th day from Pembina.—A march of $12\frac{1}{2}$ miles took the battalion to Fort Snelling; whole distance $448\frac{1}{4}$ miles; from Pembina $403\frac{1}{4}$ miles. Exceedingly cold all day, with cutting wind. Whole distance marched $952\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

G.

Notice to all whom it may concern.

HEADQUARTERS, BATTALION 10TH INFANTRY, PEMBINA EXPEDITION,
Camp at St. Joseph's, Minnesota, September 3, 1856.

The undersigned, the commanding officer of a military expedition which arrived here to-day from Fort Snelling, *via* Lake Mini-Waken, has the instructions of the President of the United States to notify such of the inhabitants of the British Possessions as are in the habit of crossing the boundary line between the United States and Great Britain (49th parallel of north latitude) for the purpose of hunting and trapping, &c., on American soil, that such depredations will no longer be permitted. The undersigned, accordingly, hereby warns all such persons not to enter the territory of the United States for the above mentioned purposes.

C. F. SMITH,
Lt. Col. 10th Inf. and Bvt. Col. commanding.

X.

Mr. De Leon to the Secretary of War.

CONSULATE GENERAL OF THE U. S. OF AMERICA IN EGYPT.
Alexandria, May 6, 1858.

SIR: Herewith I have the honor to forward you per post and ocean steamer, a practical treatise on the treatment of the camel and drom-

edary in health, sickness, gestation, and all other conditions, as well as the method of training adopted in the countries where the animal in all its varieties is in daily use as a courier or a bearer of burdens.

This treatise has been prepared at my special request by Hekekyan Bey, an Egyptian gentleman educated in Europe, whose literary and scientific attainments have given him a high reputation abroad, and whose authority on all subjects connected either with ancient or modern Egypt is second to that of no other.

During long years of research in the interior of the country and in the desert, principally for geological surveys, Hekekyan Bey has had the dromedary for his chief companion, and has thus been compelled to study the character, habits, diseases and treatment of the animal under circumstances calculated to impress the matter vividly upon his mind and keep it fresh in his recollection. The fruits of that ripe experience he has been kind enough to collect in the unpretending but invaluable little book which accompanies this communication.

I had myself collated many facts and suggestions on this topic, which it was my purpose to have contributed to the department, but this treatise coupled with the department publications and the late experiments made by Lieutenant Beale, as published in American papers, render my hints unnecessary.

Upon two most important points I can confirm the testimony of Lieutenant Beale, from my personal experience, points which most writers upon the subject have mistaken.

1st. The aptitude of the burden camel to bear burdens and travel without injury over rocky or flinty soils, of which the long caravan trains over the bleak mountains of Judea furnish daily illustrations; and

2d. The readiness with which every species of camel or dromedary will take to the water and ford or swim over it. These points both of primary importance, now having been set at rest by Lieutenant Beale, require no further elucidation, and must dispel grave doubts hitherto existing in the minds of many.

Allow me also to subjoin an additional suggestion to those contained in my letters to Hon. Jefferson Davis, then Secretary of War, under date of August 14, 1856, in reference to the best mode of obtaining another supply of dromedaries from this vicinity, all now in America being the gift of the Viceroy, through me to our Government.

Should more of the "desert courier" be desired, I can easily make arrangements through the Sheiks of the Hedjas, to have any given number of those animals ready for embarkation at the port of Alexandria at an expense very far below Captain Porter's estimate, if three months notice in advance be given so that the vessel sent may save the loss of time and money involved in her detention here, while an expedition in search of dromedaries is travelling over the country.

The Viceroy of Egypt has constantly to increase his stock from the Hedjas, has none to spare, and has given all the permission requisite for the exportation hence when obtained from the best quarter; and, I, therefore, cannot comprehend the utility or propriety of asking or

receiving useless facilities or favors; such a course strikes me as equally repugnant to public policy and common sense, and hence my disinclination to repeat the experiment in that way.

Should the "Supply" again be sent for dromedaries, I would suggest the early spring as the most favorable season to secure a smooth passage back, and pledge myself to have her cargo ready for her if due notice be given as stated above.

In addition to the copy of Hekekyan Bey's treatise forwarded to the department, I have caused another to be made which I have forwarded to the Hon. Jefferson Davis, to whose untiring energy and zeal under difficulties and discouragements, the country owes the introduction and successful adoption of this useful animal. As one of the earliest co-operators with him in the practical development of the experiment, I feel the deepest interest in its continuance on a larger scale, and confident in your energy and enlightened zeal, place myself without reserve at your disposition in the matter, now, and henceforth, in all ways in which my co-operation can be made available.

I remain, dear sir, very respectfully yours,

EDWIN A. DE LEON.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,

Secretary of War, Washington City.

CAIRO, November 17, 1857.

DEAR SIR: I beg you will receive the following short pages on the dromedary, its treatment and its use in war and commerce, which I sometime ago promised to draw up in accordance with your particular request. I have no other apology to make than to beg to be excused for deferring its completion for so long a time.

I hope it may be of some little use to those in your great country, who have at heart the introduction of this valuable animal in the desert districts of Central America.

I remain yours, sincerely,

HEKEKYAN BEY.

EDWIN DE LEON, Esq.,

Agent and Consul General of the U. S. of America in Egypt.

ON THE DROMEDARY.

Millions of years must have elapsed ere the human race substituted the use of sheeps flesh for that of their fellow creatures, and ere they were initiated into the secrets of Ceres and Proserpine.

The selection and domestication of animals was the work of long periods of time. Compared with the numbers of the different kinds of animals now known to men, those which have been rendered useful are yet few. The discovery of America taught the inhabitants of the old world the use of the llama.

Many thousands of years will elapse before another sort of animal will be added to man's aids in agriculture, food, locomotion, &c. Yet it is evident, that there is not an animal in existence which is not destined to be useful to man. Even those reptiles we deem to be noxious and enemies of man, have useful qualities in them which we ignore at present. But like the poisonous plants which have been at last recognized to be powerful aids in the medical art; so even snakes and scorpions will some time or other be made useful to mankind.

Among the few animals tamed by man, the camel, for its utility, should be classified among the first in the order of importance. We know nothing of the first attempt of man to domesticate the camel. Our oldest books make mention of the camel used for riding upon and for carrying loads.

The camel can live and thrive in all parts of the world when assisted by the provident care of man. But when left in a state of nature it will live best in the tropics, and in those parts of the tropics which are rather hilly and barren. Because in those areas denominated deserts, the plants appear to be nutritive in inverse proportion to their fewness.

Isolated thorny bushes even in a dry and withered state, impart the most nourishment to the camel.

When it descends to well watered and green valleys, it will readily adapt itself to more abundant though less succulent food. There is nothing green with few exceptions, which the camel refuses. The camel is known to eat of every kind of tree growing in the Nile valley, with the exception of the orange and lemon trees. It prefers the trees yielding mucilaginous and bitter leaves, and delights in every species of thorny trees and shrubs. But when the camel is domesticated and is employed in serving man, it requires the absorption of the greatest possible quantity of nourishment in the least time, and in as light a form as possible. Whence in the stable, the food of the camel is beans and barley. For camels of burden a *roub* of beans, and a few pounds of straw suffice. Camels doing no work are put on half allowance. The dromedary which is a light camel, (like the hunter compared to a cart horse,) when in work requires three-fourths of a *roub* in beans or in barley. Some people habituate their dromedaries to barley; others give half of barley and half of beans. The beans are split and moistened in water for an hour before they are issued. The barley is also moistened.

The best way of feeding dromedaries is to give them only half a *roub* of beans and barley, and to let them feed on trees and bushes also. This mixture of dry and green keeps them in better health, and enables them to bear sudden transition from towns into the desert much better. For in the deserts it is impossible to carry food for dromedaries beyond a couple of days or so. The camel is not out of his place in civilized life, provided he is properly taken care of and has daily exercise. The conditions for health are cleanliness, proper nourishment to be measured out according to the work it does, and kindness. Camels neglected, kept dirty, fed regularly with the same quantity of food whether in repose or activity, and roughly

treated, beaten and even angrily talked to, will turn out vicious and unhealthy. When a man will do justice to his dromedary, he must give up his whole time to tend it, night and day he will not separate from it; he will be ever watchful to remove evil from it, and to supply its wants. Those who submit to the drudgery of constantly tending to their dromedaries, acquire a certain affection for them, in degree not much inferior to that which they feel for their own children. For in a moment's notice, a dromedary will be able to convey his master and his family to the heart of a wilderness out of the reach of horsemen, when he is driven from the fields and cities by the dread of the exactions of unbridled power.

The Bedouin therefore, has reason to treat his dromedary with care and affection.

The dromedary is fond of climbing steep elevations. Nature has not refused it means of defence against its enemies. Its kick is very powerful. It will stun most animals, and kneeling on them tear them to pieces with its powerful jaw and strong leverage of neck. Its speed is great, and, perhaps, not inferior to that of horses in general.

There are as many varieties of camels as there are of horses. In Egypt the fleetest are the Bishareen and Ababdeh breeds; those esteemed for their good qualities and docility are the camels of the peninsula of Arabia; those best adapted for carrying burdens are the camels of the Nile valley.

There are mixed breeds of a thousand shades; which are all good for travelling as well as caravan purposes. The best saddle camels, or dromedaries, are those of Muscat and the Nââmani breed.

When a dromedary in good health is overfed and kept in repose the superabundance of nutrition is not nearly equally divided over the entire muscular system, as it will do in many sorts of animals, but it gets collected in the hump, which enlarges with fat.

This fat is, as it were, lodged as a reserve against a time of need, when, in consequence of a diminution in the quantity or quality of food, the body, lacking nourishment, may draw gradually from it until the back gets reduced to its normal dimensions.

The extension and the diminution of the hump, owing to causes above referred to, give rise to a peculiar arrangement in the dromedary saddle, which has not been attended to by all those who have written on the camel.

The cushions which interpose between the back of the camel and the wooden frame-work of the saddle, being stuffed with straw or cotton, or soft dry plants, are never closed, but are left open in order that their contents may be diminished or augmented, according to the state of repletion of the hump. The cushions are two in number, one for each side. Each cushion is sewed, vertically, into two sacks or divisions. The front divisions of the two cushions fall over the shoulders of the animal, and the rear divisions over the hump.

It is by constantly attending to the business of abstracting from the rear divisions to add to the front ones, and *vice versa*; or by diminishing or augmenting the total quantity of stuffing, according

to circumstances, that a certain equilibrium is maintained, and the back of the camel kept from becoming sore.

Want of attention to this particular tortures camels, and makes them restive and savage; for, as they cannot speak, they are obliged to show that they suffer pain by other means. Sometimes they bite their masters; and they serve them right for their negligence and inattention. Man has duties to perform to animals that serve him, and has no more the right of injuring inferior animals than his own fellow creatures.

The saddle of the dromedary may be denominated a differential saddle. The frame-work is simple. It is in imitation of the primitive frame-work, composed of the shoulder blades and bones of the skeleton of a camel. Its component pieces are fastened together with strings of rawhide wetted. The remainder of the necessary accoutrements of a dromedary is manufactured with the hair of the animal. The saddle is made fast to the body with two girths. One of them passes around the belly of the animal, turning round the hind part, and in the close vicinity of the pectoral callosity of the animal. The other is made to turn round the bottom of the belly, and consequently the least circumference of the body. The front girth turns round the next greater circumference of the body after that which has for its diameter the vertical, let to fall from the centre of the hump.

The bridle has no bit; it is composed of a headstall and a single rein. They are often made of a single woollen cord, which is soft and does not injure the animal. When the headstall is made of leather it is ornamented with tassels, in the view of driving away flies, and the rein is connected with it by means of a metallic chain and rings. It is necessary to proportion the lengths of the lower parts of the headstall and the chain so that the animal may have full play for its jaws; for one of the peculiarities of the dromedary is, that it will stretch down its long neck to pick up anything it pleases, and take in mouthfuls from trees and bushes, whilst it is travelling and without stopping a moment. The girths are made of wool and hair, and so is the sack which is thrown over the saddle. Bread and clothes are put into these sacks. They are frequently ornamented with pendant tassels. But it is to be recollected that all those adjuncts which appear simply ornaments are made with the object of protecting the animal. A sheep's skin thrown across the saddle affords a soft seat and a covering at night as well as day. When the wind blows cold the sheep's skin is turned on the body against the wind. Thrown over the head, with the fur side inward, it becomes an excellent protection against rain. At night, a slight cavity being scraped in the sand, sufficient in size to receive the body, the sheep-skin, with the fur down, becomes a good night covering; and taken over the head, during a halt in the day time, it serves for a tent. A little bag of flour, and a small goat's skin of water, with a rifle, sharp knife, with flint and steel, complete the accoutrements.

The water-skin is suspended by the four legs from the two vertical pins of the saddle, and kept so low as to swing on a line with the

inferior curve of the belly. The rider must be ever watchful that no accident should happen to the water-skin. It is easily damaged by the dromedary brushing the skin-side of its body against rocks or thorny bushes. When there is a halt, the first thing done is to disengage the water-skin and deposit it carefully in a safe spot. It is kept covered with loose clothes, and close to the sheep's skin. The girths of the dromedary are loosened, and the saddle with its cushions gently raised. A tourniquet of strong rope is passed around the leg simultaneously above and below the knee, whilst the animal is still leaning. It is the signal for it to rise to go and look out for food, whilst his master is occupied in his own affairs. The dromedary hops on three legs and cannot stray far. A fire being lighted, and the cake of unleavened bread being cooked, the dromedary is sure to approach the fire at sunset if you keep to the habit of giving it a morsel of your bread; and it will kneel by you and remain with you the whole night and keep watch if you are alone. But if you have not habituated it to that attention and kindness, you will have to walk sometimes far enough to lead it unwillingly to the fire.

The rutting season is in spring. It is necessary to muzzle the male camel or dromedary, to prevent his biting people. The female also, during that season, often becomes difficult to ride.

It is usual for the Arabs to give assistance to the male in the act of impregnating the female. It is also the custom as soon as the male throws himself off, to raise the female and make her trot away rapidly, whilst Arabs, with lighted sticks of fire-wood, run after her and burn the parts that she may not, as they affirm, eject the impregnating fluid.

The period of gestation is twelve months. Pregnancy becomes known when the female erects her tail in running. She is expected to do the same work during the first ten months of the period of gestation as before, but during the remainder of the time her burden is lightened. She is kept to work even to the day of her foaling.

It is usual for the Arabs to assist the female in the act of foaling. The female foals every second or third year. The period of lactation lasts about six months. The young stand on their legs the day of their birth. They learn to kneel from their mothers; they kneel close to them, their mothers sheltering them from the wind. When there are two camels they make the young one kneel between them.

At the end of six months the young are separated from their mothers and are taught to eat plants, shrubs, and trees. They go free two years, but in the third year they are taught to be mounted and are commenced to be trained.

When they are to be ridden for the first time, a small bag of beans is put before them, whilst one of the extremities of the rein is attached to it, and the other fastened to its head in the form of a halter.

Afterwards, the bag emptied of its beans having been filled with sand, the young are muzzled with a double tie of a strong cord with its extremities left sufficiently long to serve as reins in the hands of

the rider, generally a boy, who jumps up on the woolly hump, and hauling up the bag, keeps it on his lap.

The young rise and start off, performing many evolutions which require their riders to hold fast by the long wool on their backs, or to tighten their muzzles if it should be required. After which, when they are required to be stopped, the bag of sand is thrown down on the ground; it acts as an anchor and keeps the young to the spot. Gradually the bag is made to contain less sand, until it is itself dispensed with, and the mere act of throwing down the rein, even when a dromedary is going at its fullest speed, will have the effect of suddenly arresting it in its course.

In the fourth year they are saddled, and the cartilage of the right nostril is pierced, and a thin, light but strong cord is attached to it. It is necessary to be very punctual with the young, and never out of caprice to let go unchecked, any act the trainer would have the young animal refrain from; never to caress it, or to speak roughly to it when it does not deserve it. When it becomes unruly it may be checked by slightly pulling at the nozzle. Sometimes the saddle bags are filled with sand, and the dromedary made to go at a rapid rate for a longer time than usual. But when it is necessary to inflict a beating, it must be done severely until the huge beast rolls on the ground and remains silent in sign of having surrendered. For that purpose an instrument of hard wood with a handle is used. It weighs about fifteen pounds; it is in the form of a broad and short cricket bat. The place to be struck is on the left side of the neck, about six inches below the jaw.

But a trainer who understands his business will never have occasion to inflict such severe punishment, and a necessity for it will be generally owing to his own mismanagement.

Arabs do not make use of stirrups; they sit sideways on the saddle and turning the right leg around the front vertical pin of the saddle, they introduce the instep of the right foot under the calf of the left leg. The rein is held in the left hand. Strike gently the left shoulder of the dromedary with your left heel; pull the rein tight up, let the crescent or hook at the end of your stick, held in the right hand, fall gently on the head between the two ears, and as the animal in feeling the stick tends to lower down his head, give him rein suddenly and it will take an ambling pace which will take you from thirty to forty miles a day, on smooth ground, for many months, without injuring the animal.

On long journeys the Bedouin fashion is to walk an hour early in the morning, dragging their dromedaries after them. After that they mount, and keep the dromedaries to their natural pace for about an hour and a half or two hours. During the rest of the journey the dromedaries are made alternately to amble and to walk. When it is necessary to make a dromedary gallop the driver introduces the sharp hook of his stick into its fundament. The gallop of the dromedary is not so disagreeable as it has been supposed by some who probably never tried it. It is easier than that of a horse.

Dromedaries are not usually made to deviate to the right or left

whilst in motion with the pulling of the rein, but by showing and gently tapping with the stick on the side opposite to which it is intended to turn. When it is necessary to stop, the rein is thrown down on the ground by being cast over the head of the dromedary. In getting down you hold the head of the front vertical pin of the saddle with your left hand and the head of the rear pin with your right, whilst you draw up your right leg over the saddle and slide so as to bring the sole of the left foot on the neck of the animal. It is the first step of the descent whilst the animal is standing; the other step is better imagined than I am able to describe it.

But if it be desired to make the dromedary kneel, the right shoulder is gently struck with the right heel and the German *Rh* is aspirated with a long, strong, and often-repeated aspiration, and the body being projected forward over the saddle, the right knee of the animal is gently touched with the stick. The animal looks out for a proper place not only for his front legs, but also for his hind legs, and the rider allows it time to make the selection of the spot. It first bends the right knee, and afterwards descends suddenly on both knees; it then puts its hind legs together and kneels on his hind knees; it then doubles its front legs, and after that its hind legs; and, lastly, it shoves out its front knees to lie firmly and at its ease. In rising the motion is the reverse; but it is to be remarked that there is a moment when the whole weight of the front part of the body, which is about two-thirds of the entire weight of the body, and the weight of the rider in addition, is supported on the instep of the left foot in front. The front legs are built more strongly than the hind legs, and the front feet have a greater capacity of expansion than the hind feet, and have a greater diameter.

Camel's milk is much esteemed for its lightness and facility of being digested. It, however, partakes of the flavor of the predominant species of plants in the valley it has fed during some time. Many Bedouins have nothing else to maintain them for months running. During this milk diet they are healthy, active, and in possession of all their faculties raised to the highest pitch of perfection—a piercing sight, clear hearing, exquisite sense of smelling, and of taste sharpened by the diet in a pure air, and perfect liberty without fear or apprehension.

When a dromedary is seen to ruminate on a march it is a sign that it enjoys a perfect state of health; but if it refuses food, and perspires in a state of repose, and loses the gloss of its hair, it is a sign of illness. Its endurance is such that when even overloaded it will march on until it falls never to rise again. Yet it must feel extreme fatigue and pain, and those masters who kill their camels so cruelly deserve punishment. A dromedary is so sensible to kindness that it only wants speech to express its thankfulness and gratitude.

The easiest place for riding is the seat on the small of the back behind the saddle. When a dromedary carries a servant with him, the servant sits behind the saddle and takes hold of the hind pin of the saddle—a thin padded cushion is suspended from the hind pin on which the servant sits. Dromedaries are not overloaded by carrying

two men at once. I have been informed that in Persia the master sits behind, and the servant in front of the hump to guide the dromedary.

Sometimes a square platform is fastened on the back of a camel sufficiently capacious to afford accommodation for four grown-up persons and a couple of children, besides traps, sheep, geese, &c. Often covered palanquins are fixed on a camel containing room for a couple of grown-up persons; but as the palanquins are of wood, and have sides and a roof, they are heavy, and require powerful camels.

Heavy palanquins, artillery, timber of the largest dimensions, &c., are sometimes suspended between two camels.

Camels and dromedaries are often trained to be yoked to the plough. It is a common sight in Egypt to see a camel allied with oxen, mules, asses, and buffaloes to a plough. They can also draw wheeled carriages and turn machinery for raising water.

A camel lives from twenty-five to thirty years. Dromedaries, unless they be blood dromedaries from Arabia, become camels when they gain in flesh and weight through age. They acquire strength, but lose agility, fleetness, and endurance. Dromedaries soon recover strength after a course of extraordinary fatigue; but camels require a longer time, and often succumb under unusual fatigue.

High bred dromedaries are said to preserve their good appearance to the last. They are less subject to maladies than others; and those affecting them are fewer in number and less complicated.

The usual cause of disease is filth and inattention to cleanliness; and next to that, damp and unwholesome food, insufficiency, or too much food, and absolute repose from neglect of exercise.

Though the camel has a thick skin, yet it is highly sensitive. The itch is the most common form of cutaneous diseases affecting them. It is supposed to be brought on by dirt and filth. Whatever may be its origin, the disease appears generally in small blackish spots caused by the hair on the places attacked falling away and exhibiting the skin. These spots get more numerous, and increasing in size run together. The animal loses its hair, its skin gets hardened and corrugated. The process of perspiration is altered to other channels, and the skin gets as dry as parchment, particularly on the breast and the inner parts of the thighs. The following is the process of cure. Firstly, whatever may remain of hair or wool on the skin is carefully removed from the lips down to the feet. Secondly, the whole skin, without any distinction is well scraped with a sharp knife, the scurfy matter detached being carefully removed. The scraping is carried so far as to make the skin raw, and to bleed, especially in those parts the disease has hardened the most. Thirdly, a mixture of melted butter, salt, and native sulphur in powder, is well rubbed into the skin, commencing from the ears and terminating with the feet. The breasts and thighs are well and strongly lubricated. The animal is then made to stand in the sun; if possible, between two walls forming an angle and receiving the sun and sheltered from the wind. The usual rations are reduced in quantity. A little powdered sulphur is sprinkled on its food previously moistened; and a little mixed with

its drink. On the second day the application of another dose of the unguent is repeated after a second scraping with the sharp knife. At the termination of the fourth day the skin is cleaned with warm bran or with clean desert sand. It is necessary to give the animal a change of air and diet by sending it out into the deserts and making it feed on shrubs and wild plants, for the disease is generated in cities or in farm stables. In about three months time it is necessary to repeat the operation of clipping and lubricating, until the hair grows beautifully glossy and clean, and the skin becomes softened and restored to health.

I worked eighteen months to get my dromedary rid of the itch. It is so difficult to remove that Arabs who wish a great calamity to befall their enemies, say to them, "may you have the camel's itch."

This disease may be easily communicated from one camel to another. It is therefore necessary to keep those which are attacked removed from the others. It is generally the sign of neglect and gross inattention to the health of the animal. I have seen hundreds of beautiful dromedaries belonging to the corps of the present Pasha, affected by the itch. They had mostly lost that air of happiness and satisfaction most animals, and particularly dromedaries, show when they are in good health.

The poorer Arabs who cannot afford to give temporary rest to their dromedaries when they are greased for the itch, sometimes hire them to European and other travellers. Of course, there is nothing more disagreeable to the sense of smelling than rancid butter and sulphur; but some travellers who have noticed the camel in their writings have attributed it to the animal itself. A dromedary in good health has no other odor than that of the aromatic plants it feeds on. When fed on beans and straw it has no odor. It is perfectly clean; it requires no washing. When it inhabits cities, the soil of which is impregnated with animal salts and other offensive matter, it is necessary to brush the skin, when dry, with a hard brush, and to comb the wool on its head and under the chin, on its hump and two front shoulders.

I do not think the currycomb would do unless its teeth were a little rounded. After the cleaning the skin may be rubbed down with a damp cloth. But in the deserts, and more especially in vast plains of quartzose sand, the camel keeps as clean as other animals and birds in their natural state.

The next great inconvenience the camel is exposed to is the sore back. When a saddle from being badly made, or from inattention to the differential cushions under it, the hump has been injured, it will grow to an obstinate ulcer if it be not immediately attended to. Ulcers, swellings, lameness, proceeding from acrid humors are treated with the actual cautery. The wounds are covered with a mixture of rock pitch and naptha.

A little tar in naptha is rubbed on the tender parts of the fundament and between the thighs of the dromedary to keep off flies and insects from those highly sensitive parts, for the repose of the animal. The application may be repeated once a week. But in travelling in the deserts, the application is not necessary; for, although the deserts

abound in insects also, they are not so troublesome as those of cities and bad stables, and the animal can keep away its tormentors by the use of its tail, which is lined with two rows of hair strong as bristles.

Of all the insects, that which attacks the camel the most readily is a species of tick, called "géné." It is the camel's louse. It attaches itself to the skin when very small, say about the size of a mustard seed, and, deriving nourishment from it, augments to the volume sometimes of a large olive. It is a kind of sepia, and probably an instrument of nature to ease the animal of an exuberance of blood. Ticks abound most in the soil of old camel stables and in the deserts at watering places. The Arabs say that it is generated from the dung of the animal. Unless a tick be thrown into the fire it will revive, though it should be made to disgorge by crushing. There are seasons in the year, and certain conditions of health in camels, when the tick, though it should abound in the animal's vicinity, ceases to attack them. They crowd on a camel mostly at those periods when it is suffering from the mange.

A sudden transition from the city into the desert, and from the desert into the city, will often bring on an attack of diarrhœa. The camel thus attacked will seek for bitter and astringent plants. When the attack takes place in the desert, the animal will generally find its remedy; but in the towns, it will be prudent to diet it, and to take it out gentle walks into the desert skirts, and allow it to nibble on acacias and other bitter thorny herbs.

When a dromedary is observed to stumble whilst walking at a slow pace it is a sure sign that it has the opthalmia. A smooth, slippery excrescence, resembling the head of a leech, is observed to grow out of the inner part of the upper conjunctive of the eyes. An opaque fluid constantly exudes from these excrescences, and disturbs the clearness of the animal's vision. Strong thread is passed through the excrescences with a sharp needle, and the threads being pulled and the excrescences stretched out, they are lopped off with a pair of common scissors. The operator spirts into the eyes, after the operation, salt and water he keeps ready in his mouth, where the water gets warmed and mixes with a little saliva. To render a camel powerless previous to an operation which will be painful, the hind legs, in the act of kneeling, are made to fall on a stout rope laid perpendicularly to the axis of the body, and both ends being brought up between the interior side of the knees and the exterior flanks of the animal, they are tied over the small of the back. Both of its front legs being also tied with strong tourniquets to prevent its stretching them out, another rope is passed over the neck, and its ends made tight to the legs to prevent the animal from rising. A strong man next takes hold of the nostrils and the lower lips of the poor animal, and bending the neck towards its hump, fixes it in that position for an eye to be operated on. The neck is turned on the opposite direction for the operation of the other eye.

The camel requires nearly as much liquid as most other animals of the same bulk and transpiratory area. But as it does not require to drink every day like other animals, it is erroneously supposed that it

requires less liquid, and is consequently adapted to bear thirst better than other animals. The observation may be true in a certain sense; but it is essential to remark that the camel requires nearly the same quantity of water in four days as most other animals in the same space of time, but that instead of drinking four times in four days, it lays in a capacious pouch nature has provided it with as much water in one draught as the others would drink in four draughts. Out of this pouch the camel brings up small quantities of water to moisten the dry shrubs it delights in. Previously to striking off into the deserts, camels in a caravan are urged to replenish their water pouches with water. In the deserts the wells are often several days apart, and when the camels reach a well they lay in a stock to carry them to the next well. When camels are in their stables they should have access to water without impediment. They will then be found to drink every day, like other animals, as if they would not willingly burden themselves with more water than is necessary.

Camels and dromedaries have their wool and hair cut with shears twice a year. The first time they are shorn is when they return from grass in the beginning of summer, and the second time in October, in order that time may be had for the wool to grow before January, which is the commencement of cold weather. They are shorn quite close, and very frequently; they are then greased with butter and sulphur as a precautionary measure, though they should not absolutely require it, from the total absence of anything like the symptom of mange.

The camel has the same marks as those of the common ass down the back and shoulders. These marks are often so slight that they escape notice; sometimes they are very visible. My dromedary has the two front legs white from the foot up to the callosities of the elbows, the remainder of the body is of a golden fawn color; but the patches are black and well delineated; they extend even down the haunches.

In loading a camel, or even a dromedary, it is necessary to attend to keep the weights on each side equal. Though the entire weight should be small compared to that which the animal could carry conveniently, yet any appreciable excess on one side, destroying the balance, affects the camel injuriously on a long march. This is so important to be attended to that it often happens that when the equilibrium cannot be effected in any other way, recourse is had to stones or bags of sand to establish the so much desired equipoise.

The Arabian breeds of dromedaries, so well adapted for the saddle, owe their easy pace to their being taught to hold their heads down whilst in motion. Both nature and art contribute to give the animal the habit of keeping the head down. Where the country produces nothing but short plants, and the dromedary is not fed at home, it is allowed to feed as it walks along. A small bag of sand, with a piece of cloth over it, is tied to the mouth of the young dromedary to give it the habit of keeping its head down, and to walk with its hind legs open and kept apart; the weight prevents the animal from springing up suddenly at each pace, by causing it to break the pace. Thus the body is kept rather lower in level, and moves horizontally.

Again: a small wound is kept open on the ridge of bone between the ears, and when the wound is slightly touched with a stick by the rider the animal is reminded that it has to keep its head down. But this is a cruel mode of securing an easy seat. When the dromedary has once learned to keep its head down, it will do so whenever it is gently touched between the ears, without its being necessary to have a raw kept up there, which attracts flies and puts the animal to unnecessary pain. But the Bishory and Ababdeh dromedaries keep their necks high up, because they feed on trees. Those of the Nile valley, having as it were an artificial existence, constantly in files, bearing burdens, the head of one being tied to the tail of the other preceding it, have the habit of carrying their necks nearly horizontally.

When a dromedary is put to a sudden journey after a long period of repose, and the ground is loose and stony, it will become foot-sore and lame. The only remedy is repose. Sometimes water in the leg is brought on by too violent a transition from repose to labor. Dromedaries kept for the saddle should be constantly exercised and made to go over all sorts of ground. The ground of their stables should be mixed with stones; the best ground is sand containing quartz pebbles.

As a general rule, keep your dromedaries rather low than well fed, nourishing them just sufficiently to give them a moderate hump, without a voluminous belly. Indulge them on the road, when there is an opportunity and time, but never in the time of repose.

The most favorable condition of keeping and rearing dromedaries, is to keep them, if possible, constantly out of inhabited places, in the deserts and open air, where they may change place constantly and remain clean; constantly out in the sun and in the open air at nights, they will not be affected by sudden changes in temperature. The best dromedaries and camels are spoiled in covered stables. Provided the dromedary is constantly out in the open air and in motion, it will bear the greatest heat as well as cold or damp. With the assistance of man, the dromedary might defy the severest cold; but it must have man for its constant companion and protector.

When a she camel ejects her embryo at the completion of a month after her impregnation, and after the usual period ejects a second embryo after the second month of her impregnation, then after the usual period, being impregnated the third time, a roub of wheaten flour boiled in water to the consistency of gruel is given to her to drink at once about the completion of the third month of her pregnancy. It generally has the effect of averting abortion and to cure the habit of ejecting for the future.

As soon as the foal is born the navel string is cut and its extremity tied into a knot. Immediately after the expulsion of the bed of the foal, the womb of the mother is fumigated with odoriferous shrubs. The first day the foal is allowed to take a small quantity of the first milk; the remainder of the milk, which is thick, is drawn off artificially. The foal takes about six days before it can stand firmly on its own legs without the assistance of man; but this becomes necessary, because men think it necessary to assist the foal, and consequently

the foal becomes tardy in acquiring confidence to stand on its own legs. The dam kneels on her front knees to bring her udders within reach of her young.

When, during the period of lactation, an obstinate diarrhœa afflicts the foal, and it is not in the power of the dam to feed on certain herbs to communicate to her milk the medicinal properties the malady of the little one would require, the hind part of the foal is cauterized from the root of the tail to the small of the back, thus :



If the parts cauterized swell and fester, it is a good sign ; if not, the foal will die. Tar is applied on the wound to seclude it from the action of the atmosphere and injury from insects.

When, at the end of six months, the foal is separated from its dam, the distended udders of the mother are washed every morning at sunrise with the coldest water that can be procured. The coldest water is that which has been allowed to hang during the night in a goat skin, the surface of which is constantly damp by the water imperceptibly exuding from the pores of the skin. When the atmosphere is dry the evaporation goes on more rapidly, and the temperature of the water is lowered considerably in winter, nearly to the freezing point. The udders are laved, by cold water being suddenly thrown up to them, until they contract in volume to their original size.

Bleeding is performed only in one case, that is, when the dromedary becomes affected with madness by congestion of blood in the head. The animal becomes sullen ; the eyes lose their brightness and become red. It staggers in walking. It becomes dangerous in sudden paroxysms of rage and fury.

The dromedary so attacked must be muzzled, tied down, and operated upon in the following manner : About ten pounds of blood is taken from one of the temporal arteries, from the vein which is

tumified, and situated between the ear and the eye. The blood is stopped by introducing the end of a metallic ramrod, heated red hot, into the aperture. Afterwards the region about the nostrils and the upper lip is cauterized circularly, thus :




Sometimes blood is taken from a vein in the interior side of the tail, about halfway down from its root. The wound is bound up with a piece of cotton steeped in linseed oil and a bandage, and the region around the fundament is cauterized circularly. These bleedings and cauterizations appear to be inseparable ; and in some cases both ends, the head and the tail, are submitted to the double operations.

When a female dromedary ejects the matter of impregnation soon after the act of copulation, it is customary to extract from the interior membrane of the proper channel of communication in the female an excrescence of the size of a lentil, which is of a dark red color. The wound being rubbed with salt, the male is immediately brought to cover. The operation is said to have the effect of compelling the female to retain the impregnating fluid.

When it is necessary to saddle a dromedary that has acquired a voluminous hump through repose and overfeeding, the skin on both sides of the hump is turned up, and sufficient fat is sliced away to reduce the hump to the required dimensions. The skin is then properly sewn with twine dipped in linseed oil and besmeared with tar. A cloth of linen steeped in oil is laid over the hump, and the saddle fixed on it in its proper place. The fat, which is very pure, has the consistence of thick, firm cream, and is esteemed to be a high treat. But by proper attention to the feeding and health of the animal, this barbarous operation will never become necessary.

The usual defect in the conformation of a camel, and particularly of a dromedary, is a certain deformity in the muscles of the front legs close to the breast. When these muscles are too flabby and voluminous they chafe against the sides of the breast, and prevent the animal from taking strides freely and keeping up with the others. To remedy the defect, is to apply the cautery rather deeply into the flesh in a semi-circular form, and afterwards to tie up both legs of the animal close together, and keep it standing until the wound is sufficiently healed.

In certain tumors, to reduce them, setons are attached in the parts most proper. These setons are strips of cord, or twisted leather, passed through the skin and *flesh*, and tied up at both ends with a rose knot. At stated intervals the cord is drawn sufficiently to shift a new part. But it is necessary to keep the wound covered with naptha and tar to prevent the annoyance from flies and insects.



There is in those parts of the Nile valley where the soil is sandy from its vicinity to the deserts, a kind of gad fly which makes its appearance when dates ripen, and the sting of which is said to be mortal to camels as well as horses and other cattle. In 1830 I lost a beautiful Marcaty dromedary, in the Wady Tomeilat, from the sting of this formidable fly. The dromedary took me very gaily to the Wady, distant about forty miles from Cairo, knowing that she would meet friends there—other dromedaries in stables at the Tel. I set off from Cairo after sunrise, and reaching the Tel about a couple of hours before sunset, I gave her a loaf of bread, and at sunset she had her *roub* of beans. On the following day she was well, and a Bedouin took her out to walk. In the evening she refused her food, and on the following day she died. Everybody said that she had been stung in the belly by the gad fly. The experienced affirm that if, during the season of the gad fly, dromedaries are taken out to water before sunrise, the sting of the fly will not affect them; and that if a dromedary does not die after being stung once, it will never be affected by it during the whole of its lifetime. The fly is of a pearl color, with black spots. The tail is rather long. Its poison must be very active, in proportion to the smallness of its volume. Yet I have observed the Wady full of cattle in the days of the gad fly. Those who have

expensive horses clothe them in shirts of thin and loose cotton cloth, taking care that the breast and belly are well protected.

During the last months of lactation, and afterwards, the foal being young, the dam has been known to slip into its little mouth cuds of her own chewing. The udders of the she camel, after the separation of her young, are put into a linen bag, to prevent the little one from sucking.

The young are made to be accustomed early to the detonation of guns. In the deserts they are led into stony and rocky ground, and every kind of ground, that they may not fear solitary trees or rocks.

The great secret is not to accustom the dromedary to violence and vociferation. It will otherwise take to the habit of starting and crying, which is a capital defect in warlike operations, and disagreeable at all times.

When in the midst of an encampment of hundreds of dromedaries in groups, some kneeling, others standing, and some in motion, with or without their riders, you see a dromedary threading its way between the others without altering its pace or turning its face to the right or left, and coming opposite to the tent its rider is bound to, it kneels down without being apprised to do so, otherwise than by a slight motion of the body of the rider, keeping its head to the door of the tent as if it saluted its inmates, and, after its rider has dismounted, remains kneeling steadily and perfectly upright, leaning neither to the right nor to the left, that dromedary is a well-bred dromedary.

Arabs never handle their dromedaries as men do who pat and stroke horses, &c.; but, keeping their hands down, they approach quietly their face to that of the dromedary, who will recognize the caress by approaching its mouth to the face of its master. Some of them like to inhale the smoke of tobacco.

In travelling, they are certainly cheered by the songs of their riders. They seem to keep time, and to delight in the voice of their masters.

Even a well trained dromedary will make an attempt to throw off a stranger, but after the first attempt it will not repeat the trial.

In winter the saddled dromedary has a breast-cloth and a square piece of cloth on the small of the back to keep it warm. After a journey the saddle is not taken off; it is merely loosened when its load has been disengaged on both sides. They are made to kneel with one side to the wind. The tents, if any, are raised to the windward. Isolated dromedaries, without loads, invariably turn their backs to the wind when in a state of repose. In a hail-storm, they wish to kneel down and turn their backs to the pelting element. The same in heavy showers of rain, with much wind. They do not like to march against the wind when it blows a dust-storm. In the deserts when, after a calm, the heated air, in volcanic and sulphur districts, is slowly put into motion in the valleys, dromedaries caught in such torrents of hot wind turn their backs to the current, and, kneeling, stick their noses into the sand, or into such cavities or inequalities in the ground as may afford them the greatest possible

immediate protection from the pernicious wind. The riders also find relief by applying to their mouths and nostrils wet cloths.

When, in a valley in the desert, you observe plenty of green shrubs, it may be that they are rooted up by the dromedary in its effort to disengage a part for a mouthful. In that case you must push on until you come to soils in which the plants have taken strong root, and bear being broken without being drawn out, root and all. Such unfavorable localities would make your dromedary lose time from its fruitless and tantalizing efforts to feed.

In riding young camels, before they are saddled, it is usual to place the body on the small of the back, taking hold of the wool growing on the hump to have a firmer hold. The best trainers do not use any whip or stick, but guide the young animal more by the bending of the body and the knees and voice than with anything else. The secret seems to be, that the trainer must contrive to keep his seat on the back of the little one for seven or eight hours. Although it may be allowed to have its own way in the beginning, it will soon learn that it can get rid of the burden on no other condition than by doing what the burden requires. All this is done without beating or violence.




After a couple of months from its birth, the foal can accompany its dam in long journeys without injury. It is allowed to run free. It delights in frisking about ahead of the caravan, suddenly galloping back to return to its mother's side. In the second year it is tied to its mother's tail. It is at this age that foals are mounted for the first time, with the double coil around their muzzles, and halter and bag of sand.

When they allow themselves to be mounted, the reins and halter are not used. Sometimes the halter merely is continued to be used.

In the third year they are saddled ; but it is only in the fourth year that they are loaded, and expected to carry their riders and loads long journeys.

When they are very young a handful of dates or a little bread held out to them, and only given to them when mounted, will make them desire to be mounted without grumbling. Immediately a young dromedary is so mounted it will rise up, and, after a few paces, will turn up its neck, and present its mouth to its rider for the expected "bakshish," or present. After some time the usual bakshish may be deferred on the road, until gradually it may be dispensed with ; but it is proper, from time to time, to treat it with something nice. They appreciate and remember acts of kindness. Camels kindly treated are sure to be more healthy, and stronger, and more docile, than those that work on without notice being taken of them.



The double-coiled noose.


Dromedaries run no danger in streams. They swim with facility, and can take any direction they please in the water. They do not, however, enter a river readily, requiring to be habituated to take to water early. They may be made to ford a river best by leading them on by their halters from a boat crossing the river. Sometimes their riders are transported across by their sitting on the small of the back of the animal. They do not like the rapid transition from dry, hot ground, in a state of perspiration from a long march, into cold water, though it should be a mere puddle, or even a piece of ground slightly wetted. But once fairly in the water, the first shock being over, they can walk in it up to their bellies any distance without injury, provided they are allowed to cool a little, if they be overheated in a long march, when they come to the water.

Ferry-boats for dromedaries and camels are the same as those for horses and cattle. I speak of ferry-boats used on the Nile. They have square sterns and broadish beams, decked, covered with straw, &c. The passage from the shore to the boats is along a species of bridge made of sections of palm trees covered with earth and straw.

When on board the dromedary is made to kneel. Its front legs are tied up and the halter held in its rider's hand. If it be feared that the dromedary will rise and struggle during the passage, particularly if it be windy and rough, it will have to be fixed in the following manner, the rider holding it firmly by the nostrils:

The eye of the dromedary is so constructed and placed that it has a complete view of the ground in front, under, and behind it, simultaneously; but to see an object a little raised above the ground level the animal raises its head. It can also look up vertically by turning its neck round sideways and backwards, the posture it adopts when

it is fed by its rider, or wishes to have a look at him, as it frequently happens with good dromedaries that love their masters. The dromedary sees well in the night time, but at daylight its sight is as sharp as



that of any Bedouin. Venomous snakes generally bury themselves up in sand, just leaving out their little eyes, which would appear like small berries of a dark reddish color, in wait for their prey. But they do not elude the vigilance of the camel or dromedary, which, in approaching them, either makes a sudden start off laterally, or crushes the reptile by quickly treading on it with one of his feet.

The sense of hearing of the dromedary is peculiarly fine. Before men are aware of the approach of other camels, the dromedary is the first to give the signal long before those approaching are visible. In 1857, being on the Isthmus of Suez with a party, we contrived to separate and to lose each other. After an entire day's absence I had to pass the night under a bush, on which my dromedary, of the Marcati breed, fed. The night was dark and stormy. About three hours after sunset I observed my dromedary looking attentively towards the east, and showing symptoms of uneasiness, as if it would free itself of its trammels. I caressed it and pacified it, fearing the approach of unknown parties of Bedouins in the night. I mounted at the first light, intending to ride rapidly back to the last "beyton-tel," or night camp, and from thence follow the traces of the party over the sands until I came up with them; but I had not gone above a couple of miles when I fell in with their traces, and found they had passed me in the night, certainly not less than half a mile to the east of my bush. Now, had I mounted my dromedary at the time it showed so much uneasiness it would have brought me to the party, and also to bread and water.

When, in a march, the dromedary comes to a place it has never been in before, it will generally stand still at the summit of the road and view the horizon attentively for a minute. It will then, of its own accord, continue the route as if it had been satisfied with its recon-

noitring, and had got a sufficient idea of the topography. Dromedaries are said never to forget a place they have visited, though but once.

Providence has given to the camel an instinctive knowledge of the approach of danger to a degree that is most admirable. If, in the season of rain, you observe your dromedary in a broad valley hastening its steps to cross it, neglecting dainty mouthfuls from plants and shrubs, do not retard its pace, but urge it on, for a mountain torrent is approaching, though you have seen no indication of rain, and have a cloudless sky over head. I had an example of this instinctive power in one of the valleys of the peninsula of Sinai. My dromedary hurried me across the valley; and when it reached high ground it stopped and looked at the approaching wave, and remained until it passed us. It looked like a dike of thick muddy water, perhaps ten feet in height, rolling down the valley, and carrying with it trees, bones, rags, &c., &c., destined to be lodged in the sea.

Many wonderful stories are told of the intelligence of the dromedary. I will relate the two following, because I think them to be true:

Sheikh Rashoud, of the Maazi tribe, and my guide in the Arabian deserts and the Saïde, informed me that, when he was a young man, he started from the reef, with "Helweh," (the "Sweet," the name of his dromedary,) in quest of a camel his father had left to roam in the deserts some months before. He followed its footsteps leisurely during three days, and had not reached the camel when his provision of water got exhausted. He was obliged to quit the track in order to make a hasty march to the nearest ravine, in which he was certain of finding water. The Sheikh said: "During this march my throat got dry and bitter, and my tongue clove to the roof of my mouth. At the entrance of the ravine I dismounted, and, leaving the dromedary to wait for me, I took the water skin and climbed up the burning rocks a long way, when I reached the hoped-for spot and found no water in it; I immediately returned with trembling knees, faltering at each step; and, mounting Helweh, I had strength to say to her: 'In the name of God, the compassionate and the merciful! now, my sister, take me down to our tent.' The 'Naggiáh' seemed to comprehend the danger of my position. She commenced trotting down the valley with wide and equal steps, carrying her head up high and snuffing the air of the Nile, yet far away. I felt giddy and sleepy; yet I tied myself fast to the saddle with my turban. Soon after my eyesight began to fail me, and I heard the waves of the sea roaring in my ears, and I awoke in the shade of my tent, surrounded by my friends and 'Helweh,' who was quietly chewing the cud of repose and happiness at the door."

"Do many Bedouins die of thirst in the desert?" "Many; many young men, from inexperience and confidence in themselves, get overcome by thirst alone in the hills. They lie down to sleep under some rock or bush, and they never wake again. Hyenas devour them; and their bones and shirts may be found by accident long after."

“What did they do to you to recover you in the tents?” “I was wrapped up under a load of hair cloths and woolen sacks, with my head a little raised, to which moistened linen was kept applied. Some drops of salt and water had been put into my ears. Water was given to me in very small quantities. When the skin remains dry there is no hope; and too much water at once is death.”

“What became of Helweh?” “Helweh died after bearing us a son and two daughters; but they will never equal their mother. She was a pilgrim.”

“Where did you bury her?” (I asked this question anticipating the answer.) “Before she died she was taken to the village and slaughtered, and her flesh sold.”

Such is the general custom with the Bedouins and Fellahs also. When a serious accident happens to any of their cattle which cannot be repaired, and will disable them for life, or a fit of sickness which is conjectured to be mortal, their carcasses are sold for butcher's meat while there is time.

Camel's flesh is very much like beef; and I believe much of that which is sold for beef to Europeans is camel's flesh.

Haggi Amran, of the Hewatal tribe, now the keeper of Gemileh, my she dromedary, related to me the following anecdote, which I will exhibit in the form of a dialogue, as nearly as possible in the order the conversation took place:

“O, Haggi Amran, why do you not sell ‘Denha,’ who is always lame, and eats here, without any use to us?”

“She belongs to little Aamir, my son, who will not part with her.”

“Why not part with her?”

“Denha gave him milk and nursed him when he was nine years old. She bore a daughter, who died a couple of months old, and this lad took her place, for he was continually sucking ‘Denha's’ teats. She would not allow any other person to approach her but Aamir, (Aamir, looking at ‘Denha,’ said, ‘Sahih’—true,) and at night she would not lie quiet unless she had my son between her front legs, gently covering him with her neck to keep him warm.” “Well, Aamir, it is just that you should take care of ‘Denha.’” The boy, on hearing this, ran to kiss the dromedary, and she gently lowered her lips to his to receive the greeting.

A clayey soil after rains, when it is nearly dried up, but moist enough to become slippery, is dreaded by the camel. The inferior planes or soles of the feet being flat and smooth, they are apt to slide, and to cause the shoulder or hip joints of the animal to be dislocated by awkward falls. But it is far more dangerous when a portion of a road of the same soil during dry weather is rendered slippery by partial watering. For the dromedary, which generally goes at a shuffling pace on the dry part of the road, must draw up suddenly at the moistened part of the road, and walk over it slowly and carefully. The riders generally apprise the dromedaries on approaching such spots by crying out, “Hot, hot,” an expression the animals are accustomed to hear when they are to diminish their velocity of motion suddenly, and to be careful. Many camels, receiving accidental

falls under heavy loads in crossing over slippery ground of the nature above referred to, are so maimed that they have to be slaughtered on the spot.

The other kind of ground camels and dromedaries dread is that of flints that have been split into sharp-edged sections by the operation of the air. It is necessary to go over such ground slowly, if it cannot be evaded. Soft sand, or geologically subsiding districts reached by high sea tides having a thin crust of hard salt earth covering the sand below, are disliked by the camel, not so much from danger as from the fatigue it gives them to walk over, particularly when they are loaded.

The most favorable ground for dromedaries is a hard, dry, smooth, sandy soil, or the sandy shores of the sea which have been made compact and hard by the action of waves. In these kinds of ground the dromedary can go at full speed without danger.

All other sorts of ground, however rocky or inclined, (of course within certain limits,) are passable by camels and dromedaries at a climbing and slow pace. The feet of the animal would appear to have the power of adhering to the rocks by a kind of vacuum they produce, so sure is its tread in localities one would think scarcely practicable to pedestrians.

In 1843 I took dromedaries over the "flour-path,"* a most difficult and steep road across the mountains leading from the northern Coptic convents, close to the Red sea, to the southern convents. It is called the "flour-path" because the monks used to carry flour and other provisions between these convents along that road on their backs, preferring that route to that along the plain, on account of the plundering propensities of the Bedouins. The road was so bad that I had to lay loose stones together in several parts of it, to afford myself, as well as my dromedary and those following her, a secure footing. The dromedaries went through the work without any difficulty, and with no other damage than the loss of a little skin from their legs, which was caused more from my hurrying them on, in order not to be benighted on the hills, than from the awkwardness of the animals.

When the dromedary comes to a difficult step it stands still and examines the ground, and suddenly strides up easily, placing its feet where you would think it never would have ventured to place them.

TRACKING.

The impressions of a camel's feet on sandy soil in the deserts do not get effaced for several months, and sometimes for as much as a couple of years, unless a heavy shower of rain should come to smooth down the surface of the ground. The strongest winds do not destroy foot-marks, though they should lie in the way of drifting sand.

In tracking the footsteps of a camel, the times in the day they will be best visible are a little after sunrise and a little before sunset, being the least perceptible at noon. The most favorable position of the eye is when the object to be traced lies between it and the sun.

* "Sikket-il-Dakig."

When the line of direction of the search lies from the sun it will be necessary to sit fronting the hind part of the camel, or to walk, frequently looking back. It is best to keep a few yards to the right or left of the line tracked, in order that when a doubt should occur the tracker may be able to retrace his own steps without adding marks of his own to increase the uncertainty of the faint marks to be traced. When the trace ceases to become visible from the nature of the ground, it will be necessary to make a rapid circuit, observing every strip of soil crossed over susceptible of receiving deep impressions.

When indentures made in the sandy soil by the sharp nails of the feet of the camel are cleanly scarped and distinctly pointed, it will be an indication that they were made recently. The time elapsed since the passage may be approximated to by the degree of dampness of the soil on which the camel has urined, and of the dung of the animal, which should be crushed in the hand and well examined, to detect the nature of the food as well as the quantity of humidity it contains.

When a camel's footsteps are traced to trees and shrubs on which it has browsed, the examination of the parts nipped will be a guide to compute the degree of the recentness of the visit, by the more or less freshness of the recisions.

DESERT MARCHES IN A WAR.—EXPEDITION IN HOSTILE DISTRICTS.

It is a general rule to march in the night, and to lie ensconced in rocky ground or under shelter of some ravine during the day, as far as possible from springs, and never in localities containing much pasture.


As soon as the sun is fairly set the camels are strung together, the halter of one being attached at its other extremity to the tail of the one preceding it.

The foremost one belongs to the guide. The men walk, each by the side of his camel. During the march, anything green that may be seen is immediately taken up and thrown into the bag of provender, of which there is one for each camel.

At the dawn of day the party halt in the most convenient locality for shelter. Two or three of the most intelligent and trustworthy are deputed to reconnoitre the neighborhood; and when the camp is not far from a spring, or a valley in which rain has fallen, sentinels station themselves under cover of rocks commanding an extensive view, where they lie motionless and observe the country. Wrapped up in his fawn-colored garments the swarthy Bedouin, lying motionless, could not be distinguished from a stone by the most experienced eye.

The camels are made to kneel close to each other, having their front knees tied together, with the ligature brought over the neck to prevent them from rising up. The halter itself is made use of for this purpose. It is a strong rope of wool or goats' hair, about $\frac{7.5}{100}$ of

an inch in diameter, and from eight to ten feet in length. It is doubled in two for that purpose. The ligature is shown in the following sketch:



Their saddles are not taken off; a portion of the forage collected in the night is given to them in the morning, and the remainder at three o'clock in the afternoon. It is usual to put on their little bean sacks to keep them quiet. The brawlers are kept muzzled. Fires are dispensed with. The men lie down by their camels; some keeping awake and others sleeping.

THE ATTACK.

The last march is so timed as to bring the party to the vicinity of the enemy's tents about a couple of hours before sunrise. Some men, mounted on the fleetest dromedaries, are sent in advance, who approach the tents by a circuitous route, opposite to the direction of attack, to assist the attack by a diversion. The camels are disengaged, haltered, and five or six of them entrusted to the custody of one man. The remainder divide into two parties—one to attack, and the other to drive off the enemy's camels.

When a few camels have been taken the expedition is reckoned to have been successful, and the retreat is made almost with the same precipitation as if it had been caused by a defeat. The men now mount their dromedaries. A party, with the captured camels, take the road home; another, composed of the best mounted and armed, keep behind, retiring more leisurely, in order to keep in check the enemy, should they attempt a rescue after recovering from their first surprise.

THE RETREAT.

Should the event of the undertaking be unhappy, the retreat is made in all precipitation in companies of three or four dromedaries, not following the same direction, but spreading out. The nearest

gorge or mountain pass is the place of rendezvous. When it is determined to make a stand, the first thing to be seriously considered is to place the dromedaries out of danger. Then each man takes up the most advantageous position, according to his judgment, behind rocks and sometimes small breastworks of loose stones raised in the form of a horse shoe. With the match lighted he rests his musket on the stones, hiding his body, and taking aim at those who are advancing. At close quarters they defend themselves with long knives, slightly curved and double edged, and in the use of which they show considerable dexterity.

THE BOOTY.

The booty is divided among all the party as equally as possible. It is customary to kill the fattest camel at the end of the first day's retreat. Its carcass is roasted entire over hot stones, and an ample share is left to those who cover the retreat.

THE FOOD OF THE BEDOUIN.

Among Bedouins the idea of a corpulent man on a dromedary is like that of a pig flying among the civilized people of the west. The Bedouin is abstemious and frugal when at home and in peace. His food consists of unleavened cakes of wheaten, but most frequently of maize flour. To this he adds a little milk after rains, and dates during the season. His drink is water. He eats meat very seldom. Coffee, and, very rarely, a little sugar, are his luxuries. These people are free and independent in their deserts. The utmost scope of their ambition is to possess camels and children. They love their camels as tenderly almost as their wives and children. This is the natural consequence of their passing the whole of their time with a patient and intelligent animal, which enables them to maintain themselves and those dearest to them. The Bedouin feeds his camel with more care than himself.

In preparing for a long journey the Bedouin fills a little bag with the flour of corn broiled in the fire, to which he adds a little salt and linseed oil. A little of this, with a draught of water, which he keeps in a goat's skin, he prepares himself and suspends from the saddle of his dromedary, suffice to maintain him in health and strength for days. The best fed Bedouin is always of a spare habit, though he is far from being weak and incapable of bearing fatigue and the vicissitudes of the weather. They are not subject to many diseases which are common in more civilized communities.

THE EDUCATION OF BEDOUINS.

Perhaps there is more particular knowledge in a Bedouin family than in any family of the lower orders in any nation of the world.

They perfectly understand the rearing of camels, goats, and sheep. They have a certain knowledge of the veterinary art and skill in surgical operations, which suffice to keep their flocks in health.

They spin and weave their own wool, and dye the yarn blue, red, yellow, black, and green.

They make their own carpets, tents, shirts, burnouses, and ornamental sacks for their dromedaries.

Their women make gunpowder, and there is not a Bedouin possessing a musket who does not know how to take its component parts to pieces and to clean them.

They make their own bread, and convert the grain into flour in their own houses ; they all understand the operations of husbandry—cultivating their own fields ; they make bricks and build their own walls, and they manufacture their own coarse pottery.

They convert the skins of their flocks into useful articles, making their own sandals and water-skins.

Their women make cheese and butter ; I know many Bedouins who read and write their own language.

They are ready in mental calculation, and the judgment they form of public affairs is generally correct, though simply and tritely announced ; they understand perfectly all that concerns the date plant, which in other countries would form a specialty without the art becoming much improved.

But what is most extraordinary is their knowledge of the stars and the seasons, without the aid of almanacs. They will instantly indicate the cardinal points of the heavens and tell the hour of the day ; they can also tell the hour of the night, and know the stars which would direct them to Syria, to any part of Upper Egypt, and the wide deserts.

They also know the names of all the plants and shrubs produced by the soil in the deserts, and they also understand their medicinal virtues.

They are geologists without being aware of it. They know also where they can procure rock salt, sulphur, gypsum, iron, and copper. I have found them practicing the hydrotherapic system to cure the rheumatism and cutaneous diseases.

I attribute this peculiarity in the Bedouins, firstly, to their freedom ; secondly, to their sobriety and chastity ; and thirdly, to their ignorance of other languages and want of books, most of which (the most interesting to young persons) are bad in all countries where they abound. Just fancy a young Bedouin woman reading the Times, or a man of the deserts, instead of looking after his dromedary, should occupy himself with Afghanistan and the natural history of the polar bear. They speak Arabic in its greatest purity, and acquire a knowledge of the most necessary arts by tradition and example. The children are constantly with their parents, and never separate in life, assisting them in all things. Their way of living requires that they should know a little of many useful occupations.

THE FOOD OF THE CAMEL.

The natural food of the camel is the leaves and tender branches of trees, shrubs, and plants. The camel loves astringent, bitter, sour sweet, and pungent food, at stated seasons and intervals.

My dromedary eats the leaves and the tender branches of all the acacias growing in the Nile valley—of the mulberry, olive, and “nabkh,” tree, and the tamarish. With the exception of two or three poisonous plants, she eats every other shrub and plant, preferring those that are prickly and thorny. She prefers plants that are not too fresh. She will feed most on the apparently dry bushes peculiar to the desert. In town she is fed on dry beans, barley, chopped straw. She eats meal, treacle, sugar, dates, and bread; she delights in onions.

The ration of a town-kept dromedary is the twenty-fourth part of an Egyptian quarter, or “ardep” of beans, and about ten pounds of chopped straw, when it is worked. But when the dromedary is not worked half that quantity is considered sufficient.

The beans are broken in a mill, and steeped in water for half an hour to soften a little, and a few pieces of salt thrown on them when they are given.

The chopped straw is passed through a sieve, to separate from it its finest particles, as well as dust and fragments of earth.

The best water is well water, because it is pure and brackish. Once a week a little salt is added to the well water.

THE TIMES OF FEEDING AND WATERING.

It is a general rule never to give a camel its beans before sunset, whether it be in repose or on a journey. In town the camel drinks twice a week, and sometimes three times a week, and often daily. But camels can take in water that may suffice to last them from eight to ten days in winter, and about five days in summer, when they are not worked.

The chopped straw is given to them in two portions, the first in the morning and the second at noon.

STABLES INJURIOUS.

Although the camel is a hardy animal, it likes to indulge in shade during hot weather as well as the Bedouin its master. The shade of a rock or of a tree is the best, because the air, which is cool, circulates and refreshes the body. But the shade afforded by the roof of a stable surrounded by walls is injurious, on account of the want of circulation in the air. The sun of a stable also becomes insupportable; its rays burn—a current of air being wanting to operate a sufficiently rapid evaporation.

The soil of the stable, if it be the used soil of inhabited places, will in time bring on diseases of the skin. Paved areas are not at all fit for the camel. When it is possible to undergo the expense of laying a deep layer of desert sand for the ground of the stable, the condition of salubrity and comfort will be best attained; the sand will absorb the urine of the animal. Its droppings may be daily collected, sometimes by employing a proper sieve to separate them and their crushed particles from the sand. The dung of the camel makes capital fuel

for cooking coffee and bread—I mean unleavened cakes done on thin iron plates. But in time the sand will require to be renewed. In hot weather the poor animals become wet with perspiration, and uneasy. In winter the stable will be cold. Unless stables are spacious and airy, commanding wind and sun and shade, as well as open sheds for the camel to run under in wet weather, they are generally little calculated to keep a camel in health, and, consequently, in strength.

The proper place for the camel is in the desert, or in the desert skirts; but when it becomes necessary to lodge camels in stables, it will be proper to let them go out every day and pass as many hours in the open air as possible, and to pass the night at home.

Camels should not be tied up in the stables; they should be allowed to go free, and to roll themselves in the clean parts of the sand; and there should be trees for the convenience of rubbing themselves against their trunks and branches. They should also have command of water, that they may drink when they are thirsty. It has been observed before that the camel will drink a little every day when it can, instead of filling its water-pouch at once with water sufficient to last it for several days.

DISCIPLINED DROMEDARY CORPS.

The camel and dromedary are gregarious in habit. They are perhaps more docile than horses, and require less care than horses; that is to say, they will not require the trouble of shoeing, &c. They are more manageable than horses or mules, for they are not so apt to take panic suddenly by night or day. They are courageous and greatly more hardy, and will last, when driven to extremities, longer, with less food and water, than horses. They are consequently adapted for warlike purposes quite as well as horses, and much better than horses in deserts.

They may be taught to stand in lines, to wheel to the right or left, to walk, trot, gallop, and to halt suddenly, as well as horses. And they may be trained to keep their places in their respective squadrons, to swim over rivers, &c., as well as horses.

From the experience I have had with several breeds of dromedaries close to a battery firing a salute, I should say that they were not in the least impressioned by the sudden detonations, whilst a whole line of Spanish mules, and hundreds of horses, belonging to the same artillery and to grandees and military men, retreated, reared, and some broke loose on the same occasion.

A dromedary corps may be distributed and officered exactly like a regiment of cavalry.

The harness and accoutrements of a dromedary should be the following—

1. A pair of cushions for the saddle. They should be of leather outside, and of hair-cloth next to the skin.
2. A saddle of strong wood work, but light.
3. A double saddle-bag, to carry, 1st, an ammunition bag of some water-tight material; 2d, the rider's linen, &c.; 3d, a bag of flour,

&c.; 4th, a couple of spare bags of hair-cloth, to be put one in each saddle bag.

4. A shoulder piece, to cover the shoulders of the dromedary. It should be of wool or hair-cloth, and made double, so as to be converted into a bag.

5. Another covering for the hind part of the dromedary, also convertible into a bag.

6. A leather bag, to be suspended on the right side of the dromedary, for the reception of a double-barrelled rifle and a long two-edged sword, like those used by the Ababdehs, or a lance about seven feet in length.

7. A large sack, of wool or hair-cloth, for the collection of fodder.

8. A small water skin.

9. A hatchet or axe, with a longish handle, for cutting wood, rooting up plants, and to be used as an offensive weapon and a picket.



10. Spare halters, shreds of raw hide, packing needles, &c., sulphur, a bottle of naphtha, &c.

11. A good warm cloak, color of limestone on one side and of granite inside.

For every ten dromedaries there may be a camel or a picked dromedary, combining strength with fleetness, to carry other necessities, such as more flour, tea, sugar, coffee, medicines, clothing, and other necessities, a few cooking vessels, soap, "gadahs," spare water skins, &c., a couple of shovels and a pickaxe, pickets, &c.

Note.—The gadah is a semi-globular vessel of wood, out of a single piece; it serves for camels to drink out of, to knead flour in for the unleavened bread, and for drinking out of after meals. It should be strong enough to bear being thrown about.

The bugle may be used instead of the drum. It will be easy to instruct the dromedaries to regulate their motions from a slow walk to a charge with the sound of the bugle.

The Bedouin often trains his dromedary to start at its full speed merely at the voice of its rider, and also to halt at the signal given by the voice; consequently the bugle may be used with good effect.

It will be observed that the most part of the accoutrements of the dromedary is in the form of bags and sacks. Boxes, cases, and angular recipients of that nature, are not favorable for dromedary riding.

On an emergency, when it is necessary to raise up a stronghold in a sandy plain, the clothing, as well as the bags of the dromedary may be filled with sand, and raised up in the form of a breastwork against the enemy.

A dromedary corps may be trained to fight on foot, as well as on dromedaries like cavalry.

If the enemy be cavalry, unaccustomed to the sight of the dromedary, it will be difficult for the horses to stand the view and the scent of the dromedary.

The dromedary in pursuit of the horse will always overtake it, sooner or later. If the enemy be undisciplined infantry, the odds will be against them, with foes capable of moving with rapidity, carrying with them ammunition, clothing, and every other necessary.




The most efficient dromedary corps should be necessarily so constituted as to be as little dependent as possible on their wants being supplied, at small intervals of time, from their countrymen living in




houses. Consequently they would form a force less under the control of those living in houses than any other contrivance of active force, and, with small beginnings, they would in time become too powerful

to obey orders. The men would soon reconcile themselves to do without tea and sugar, &c. They would become independent savages. They would soon discover that they did not require money, and when pressed by want they would be inclined to plunder. Such is, I believe, the reasons that we Orientals have recourse to in order to do away with propositions to create a proper dromedary corps, disciplined and armed. But, as we have deserts occupied by Bedouins, whom it is necessary to keep in order, we employ Bedouins to keep in check other Bedouins. But the same reasoning should not hold in America, unless its inland deserts, and the tribes inhabiting them, are similar to those of Africa and Arabia. In the latter case the American government may employ native Indians, who, in possession of the dromedary and the camel, would form an independent body between the savage tribes and the civilized nation. Such an independent body would be more inclined to do the bidding of the government than that of the chiefs of the savage tribes.



Should the creation of a third and intermediate power, above adverted to, be not admissible, it will become necessary to curtail the efficiency of the dromedary corps by arranging matters so that the animals as well as their riders shall remain constantly dependent on their wants being supplied by those who live in houses, cultivate fields, and carry on commerce with other nations.



This will be done by preventing both man and beast from quitting a state of civilization, by supplying the wants of both regularly and abundantly. The camel will be civilized and *enslaved* by getting its

ample rations of beans, maize, barley, &c., at stated hours of the day; and the civilized man and officer kept so by having them kept furnished with regular supplies of those things they have been accustomed to in houses. Under this system the expenditure will be increased; the dromedary corps will no longer have for its object repression, but conquest; it will entail the necessity of having roads or camel paths from one station where water may be procured, from wells, &c, to another station, and so on; and unless such lines of stations across a desert infested by savage tribes do not necessarily lead to unoccupied, but fruitful districts, or to distant territories already inhabited by civilized man, the end to be obtained will not be commensurate with the great expenditure of money involved by the means.

Whatever principle may be adopted for the organization of a dromedary corps in America, the first step to be taken will be to stock the farms on the limits of the deserts with camels and dromedaries from all parts of the world. Experience will show the breeds best adapted for the American soil. With proper care and encouragement the breeds will multiply, and they will be found useful on the farms as beasts of burden, to convey the harvest from the fields to the roads, &c., and for riding on the roads and excursions. The way how we in Egypt lay some hold on the Bedouin is to employ him as a watchman, by day as well as night, to take care of the crops and farm property, principally against the unemployed portions of his tribe, and other desert tribes. If you employ the Indians in the same way they will soon make friends with the camel, and before long they will themselves rear them in the deserts, the country of the camel, and sell them to the farmers in exchange for produce and manufactures. In process of time these half civilized Indians, with the increase of the breed of camels and dromedaries, will naturally be constituted into an armed force admirably adapted to keep in check the predatory propensities of their less favored countrymen behind them.

If the question be the formation of a dromedary corps as rapidly as possible, its solution will be easy enough, and will be reduced to the simple question of expense. It would not be difficult to collect together from Muscat, Aden, Geddah, Suez, Cairo, and Thebes, three or four hundred she dromedaries and a dozen males, in the best condition. They might be conveyed to the desert borders and echeloned in colonies, to breed and to exercise at the same time.


The first corps should confine itself to the guarding of the frontiers. When the breed, after multiplying, should afford some hundreds of camels for burden, they could be employed to act as caravans for the supply of certain central stations in the heart of the deserts, which would then be the headquarters of the dromedary corps, destined to operate from them in all directions, to reduce the savage tribes, as represented in the following imaginary map.

A complete dromedary force may be thus composed:

1. A corps of the fleetest dromedaries, corresponding to light cavalry; the men, riding singly, may be armed with rifles, lances, and side arms.

2. A corps of those dromedaries that would be classed between the fleetest and those camels which, from their size, weight, and relative strength, would be best adapted for carrying burdens. Each beast could bear two men sitting on the same saddle, destined to fight on foot, when necessary, corresponding to the infantry of an army. The infantry might be armed with rifles and "Yataghan bayonets." The choice of the camels, for size and strength, might be trained to carry rockets, zembereks, and even light field pieces, made to be easily taken to pieces and put together. This corps would correspond to the artillery of an army.


Dromedary excursion, radius C, say 50 miles
from the magazine at C.



3. A corps of camels for conveying ammunition, stores, provisions, water, grain, &c. The drivers should be armed like the infantry, and the men destined to serve the rockets and zembereks, and light artillery.

The dromedary and the camel may be combined with cavalry, as it was practiced in Arabia during the wars of the Pasha of Egypt, against the Wahabies.

The soldiers of all arms (the Turkish cavalry and Arnaout infantry) rode on camels, the horses being attached to the camels without their riders.



Rifles on foot supporting an attack of lancers on a body of Indians on foot armed with muskets, bows, arrows, &c., &c.

After long and fatiguing desert marches, on approaching to the enemy, the Arnaouts dismounted from their camels to fight on foot, and the Bashibozouks also mounted their horses, which were *comparatively* fresh and strong and ready for action.


Infantry and horsemen were necessary against the Wahabies, because these last had abundance of horsemen with infantry, and tenements fortified with walls and even some artillery.

The theatre of war was not quite a desert; it contained a considerable population, civilized, living in houses, with a certain degree of agriculture, &c., &c.

Now, no dromedary corps could safely attack a regiment of cavalry, the discipline and courage and arms of both being supposed to be equal.

But no cavalry could follow a dromedary corps in difficult and rugged ground, deprived of water, in which the dromedary would be at home. Cavalry could act only within a certain radius from the topographical limits of the corn and water supplying areas; it could not venture to follow dromedaries into the deserts unless they were checkered with well supplied stations containing water and magazines of food, &c.

In a recent conversation with Mr. De Leon, I found the object of the American government in introducing the camel and the dromedary into America was to effect communication, postal and commercial, across desert areas of considerable extent, intervening between the present western limits of the ever-expanding cultivated areas of the States to the east and the settlements on the western coast of the



A soldier on a dromedary, by laying hold of the front piece of the saddle, can throw his body to the right and make a more extensive cut with a sabre than a horseman can fetch.

continent, effected comparatively in recent times. If I understood him correctly, the desert areas exhibited nearly the same features as the well known desert districts on the Libyan and Arabian sides of the Nile valley, and that the tribes inhabiting them, with few exceptions, resembled, in an economical and physical point of view, those inhabiting the African deserts. I can now fully comprehend the necessity of communication by means of the camel breed, and the extent of wisdom and patriotism in those who first conceived the design for the introduction of an animal so admirably adapted to live in deserts. I suppose the tribes generally live by hunting, and that those which occupy districts lying without the range of the horse, and without the possibility of agriculture, cannot be very numerous, but that they form an active minority of predatory bands. We need not put the cart before the horse in supposing the objective point is to make those tribes submit to law, to respect property, both of life and goods. Their first spontaneous step to civilization will be the natural consequence of camel transit being established across their wilds. *In time*, they may become camel breeders, and with the security of men who come with something to exchange for which there will always be demand, they will gradually, and of their own accord,

throng to the cultivated limits, and be induced to become citizens of the United States. That will indeed be a conquest more admirable than the pretended conquests of Alexanders and Tamerlanes. The native holders of camels will cease to become offensive, and, properly managed, will repress their less fortunate countrymen behind them, as they do in Egypt.

You will then have roads and camel stations in lines crossing the deserts. Your letters will be carried by light dromedaries, and goods by camels in caravans. You will also have parties of armed dromedaries on the road, to keep up the communications between the stations, or parties of horsemen at the stations, provided they (the stations) are not too wide apart. I wish you success with all my heart, and I feel so confident of the plan succeeding, and perceive so clearly the beneficial consequences, its present uses, and ultimate gain to civilization, that I consider myself most fortunate in having an opportunity afforded me, through my friend Mr. De Leon, of indirectly contributing a mite towards its realization.

HEKEKYAN BEY.

CAIRO, *November 17, 1857.*

NOTE.—In this “cahier” the first part contains seventy-five written pages, and the second part contains forty-three written pages; altogether one hundred and eighteen written pages, inclusive of those devoted to certain sketches.

XI.

Major Ramsay to the Secretary of War.

WASHINGTON ARSENAL,
December 2, 1858.

SIR: In reply to your inquiry of the 1st instant as to the "*condition* of the principal workshops at the Washington Arsenal," I cannot do better than to refer you to the appended extracts from a report made by my immediate predecessor in command to the Colonel of Ordnance on the 6th January, 1856.

Since this report of Major Bell, no attempt has been made to repair these buildings, as the insufficiency of the foundation would render any such attempt but a useless expenditure of money. I would further state that the locality of the principal workshops is entirely too low, as the late high tides have to a great extent inundated this portion of the arsenal grounds, and we have been obliged on several occasions to stop the machinery in consequence of the water from the river flowing into the engine room.

I do not consider the buildings referred to safe or appropriate; and in my opinion new shops on higher ground are absolutely necessary to carry on the work of the arsenal with convenience and economy.

The estimates for the arsenal for the fiscal year ending 1860 were predicated on instructions from the Ordnance Office, and exclusively refer to temporary repairs.

I have thus far confined myself to the subject of your inquiry; but as the opportunity is afforded me, (and I trust you will not deem me officious,) I cannot refrain from calling your attention to other matters connected with the improvement of the arsenal, such as draining the marsh—a sanitary measure urgently called for; the erection of quarters for officers and enlisted men; and the general improvement of the grounds recently purchased by Congress, now lying an idle waste.

Whilst the navy yard in this city has been greatly advanced in interest and utility by the erection of superior workshops and by the introduction of improved machinery; and whilst other arsenals throughout the country, some of but little importance, have been benefitted by liberal appropriations, this, one of the three arsenals of construction, and at the seat of government, would seem to have received but little countenance, and is now, and has been for very many years past, in a dilapidated condition.

I have the honor to be, sir, your obedient servant,

GEO. D. RAMSAY,
Brevet Major United States Army, commanding.

P. S. I would add that we have not store-houses sufficient for the safe keeping of ordnance stores. Two temporary sheds have been erected for the storage of gun-carriages; and thus a large and valu-

able amount of property is exposed to great risk, especially so in event of fire.

G. D. R.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.

Extracts from Report of January 6, 1856, by Major W. H. Bell to Colonel H. K. Craig, Chief of Ordnance.

“WORKSHOPS—AS REGARDS THEIR CONDITION.

“You will perceive by the drawings that all these buildings are located eastward of the red line running through the arsenal grounds, which line divides the solid grounds on the west, which is fit for building, from the unsolid ground on the east, which is unfit for buildings; the last being made land, or land filled in on a made bottom, which will not hold heavy buildings requiring solid foundations, such as all these require to be, excepting the charcoal-house and paint-shop; whence nearly all the above buildings with heavy foundations below the surface have given way, are cracked in various directions and ruined in their walls, so that the foundations of the steam engine and the great and smaller stacks have sunk; and the different sections of the main shafts of the machinery have also sunk in various directions, making angles with each other, in this manner deranging and throwing the rest of the machinery continually out of order, and thus producing great inconvenience in the public works, and totally excluding all improvements in the application of new machinery.”—Page 6.

“*Smith's shop, east end, No. 7.*—Building too small, 70 feet by 38. Only 9 forges; ground filled in mud; foundations given way; wall ruined; position, main shafting, and machinery deranged; built on piles in 1839; rebuilt in 1842; works 18 hands; brick, covered with slate.”

“*Engine house.*—Brick, covered with slate. In No. 7 room too small, 35 feet by 25. Foundation, engine, and boiler sunk and deranged; walls ruined as above; foundation main shaft sunk; connecting shaft with carriage maker's machine, shaft sunk and deranged. Boiler should not be in same room with engine, as in this house.”

“*Tilt-hammer shop.*—Brick, covered with slate. In No. 7 room too small, 25 feet by 35. Only one tilt-hammer. Should have three others, one large and two smaller. Tilt-hammer foundations sunk; walls ruined as above.”

“*Machine shop.*—Brick, covered with slate. In No. 7 room too small, 70 feet by 38. Foundation given way; walls ruined as above; machinery deranged; works 18 hands.”—Page 20.

True extracts from the report of Major W. H. Bell, of January 6, 1856.

GEO. D. RAMSAY,
Brevet Major United States Army.

WASHINGTON ARSENAL, December 2, 1858.

XII.

Memoir on the dangers and defences of New York City, addressed to the Hon. John B. Floyd, Secretary of War, by James St. C. Morton, first lieutenant engineers.

INTRODUCTORY LETTER.

WASHINGTON, D. C., *September 30, 1858.*

SIR: I beg leave to lay before you the accompanying memoir on the "Dangers and Defences of New York."

It contains practical ideas relating to a branch of American military science which has as yet been substantially overlooked or neglected by the bureau to whose province it belongs.

The branch in question, namely, the defence of our sea-board cities against great naval military expeditions, has indeed grown in importance of late years with electrical rapidity; and it is perhaps excusable that as yet no actual constructions are to be seen on the Atlantic coasts, attesting the watchfulness and promptness of our Engineer Department.

But the latter should have shown before now some indication that it has, at least, officially recognized and appreciated the dangers which, novel in magnitude, have lately begun to threaten the nation.

But as no warning of approaching disaster, much less any provision to meet it, has emanated from the proper official quarter, I conceive that it becomes individual officers to make the government acquainted with the exigencies into which it would be thrown by a war with England or France.

In the first part of the memoir I endeavor to show that America now lies exposed to the worst effects of a species of warfare which, though of secondary importance when, forty years ago, the *present system* of fortification was adopted, has received a ten-fold development, and has assumed the proportions of a vital danger, since the construction of steam navies by the great maritime powers.

The landing upon our shores of hostile armies in 1812 and '14 was productive of no greater injury than certain conflagrations, devastations, and plunderings, which served rather to irritate than subdue the spirit of the people; but the campaigns which result from similar expeditions at the present day exhaust the strength of first-class nations, and their issue decides the terms of peace.

I do not claim originality in this part of my memoir,* for General Gadsden, Major Chase, and Major Sanders prognosticated, years ago, the worst results from the neglect to provide against hostile descents.

If I succeed in placing their views, which coincide with mine as to the nature of the danger, in a striking light, I shall be satisfied; for by so doing I will secure to the second part of the memoir, which advances an original and entirely novel proposition, an attentive consideration.

This proposition consists of a plan or system of fortification for the

* With the exception that I am the first to point out the possibility of a foreign army landing on the outside of Coney Island and on the northern shore of the Sound.

defence of extensive lines, which, based on the immutable *principles* of the science, departs from old fashioned *rules*, and adapts itself to the latest improvements in the rifle, and which is likewise calculated on the supposition that the reliance of New York, in her necessity, will be her citizen soldiery.

In military statements and arguments, an all-important element is the topography of the country or district concerned; and in this respect I enter on the discussion with unsurpassed advantages.

My duties as light-house engineer of the New York district have given me every opportunity to render myself familiar with every part of New York harbor and all the waters which empty into it, and with its shores on every side; I am also well acquainted with the Sound and outer shores of Long Island; I have travelled habitually over the latter, in every direction; and, in fine, the descriptions of the topography and hydrography of the vicinity of New York and Long Island, which will be found in this memoir, are the result of thorough personal study and observation of the localities.

As to the existing fortifications of New York, I have certainly a perfect insight into their objects and capabilities, as I was formerly stationed, on regular military duty, at both Fort Hamilton and Sandy Hook.

In conclusion, permit me, Mr. Secretary, to express my profound sense of a two-fold obligation to you; for it was your assigning me to light-house duty that gave me the advantages which impart to my opinions on this subject all the merit they possess; and your habit of encouraging the expression of independent views, by officers of all grades, has emboldened me to advance mine.

I remain, sir, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,

J. ST. C. MORTON,

First Lieutenant Engineers.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,

Secretary of War.

PART I.

CHAPTER I.

At the present moment the United States present towards Great Britain and France an attitude which is parallel in many respects to that of Russia towards the same States in 1853.

The material wealth and integral power of both this country and Russia have rapidly increased to formidable dimensions.

The great extent of both countries, and their comparatively isolated geographical situation have been greatly relied on in each case as securities against foreign invasion, while both have seaports which have been left without adequate defences.

Russia, as well as ourselves, has a navy inferior in size to those of

her rivals, and here, indeed, the parallel is least to be insisted on, for our sailors and officers are the best in the world, as well the individual vessels of our fleet, while in both material and "personnel" the Russian navy is far inferior to the French or English. It may be added that while our immense commerce, which, according to tonnage, is the largest in the world, demands a large navy to protect it, that of Russia is small, and her navy is more designed as an aggressive force than to guard her merchantmen. But these points in which the parallel fails will be found to add additional strength to my argument, which, drawn from the comparison, deduces from the policy pursued towards Russia in the eastern war of 1854-'56, the inference that a similar course will be adopted by either of or both the allies in a future war with the United States.

That policy, of attacking the extremities of the State, and paralyzing them, in the hope of thereby weakening and disordering its vital parts, does not seem to have been premeditated at the outset of the war in question.

The weight and rapidity of the blows that were struck at Sevastopol, Odessa, Kertch, Kimburu, Bomarsund, and Sweaborg, do not seem to have been anticipated by the allies, any more than by the Russians.

Whether the governments of France and England were not fully alive to the almost incredible power which they wielded, in their yet untried steam navies, or whether a grand invasion of Russia seemed most likely to bring the Czar to terms, or whether the first proposition to harass the enemy into a peace was overruled by commanders who saw a greater prospect of glory in magnificent combined land operations; whatever, in short, may be the reason for it, this seems highly probable: that the policy pursued was the result of circumstances that took place subsequent to the declaration of war.*

This will seem less singular when it is considered that the eastern war is the first in which either side has placed its entire reliance in attempts to ravage and destroy all the military and naval power of the other, that could be reached by the guns of a fleet or by the operation of a land force, debarked from and co-operating with a fleet.

All maritime expeditions prior to this war have been either vehicles of invasion, of magnitude, directed against the capital of the States

* The main historical facts which support this view of the case are, the landing at Gallipoli, the construction of intrenchments there, and delay of the allies at this point while the Russians were advancing to the Danube, likewise the protracted stay at Varna, during the period that the Turks were so hard pushed to maintain themselves on the line of the Danube, and in Silistria.

These delays were considered inexplicable at the time, and seem so still, unless we adopt the hypothesis that the allies were at first in hopes of meeting, on Turkish soil, the entire strength of Russia, and that on finding that Nicholas was disposed to preserve a defensive attitude, they counted, at least, on being firmly opposed at the frontier by an army, the beating of which would be a serious blow to the empire; this expectation was also deceived by the tactics of the Russians, who plainly intended to retire before the allies, and not gratify their hopes of delivering a decisive pitched battle.

The vexation and disappointment of Marshal St. Arnaud were excessive on hearing that the siege of Silistria was raised, and that the enemy was retrograding towards the Pruth.

It seems to be at this period that the expedition against Sevastopol was planned, as a means of occupying the army, and as the most important part of the project of ruining the ports, harbors, military depots, and navy of Russia.

attacked, or they have had in view the conquest of some province or colony, or the capture of some valuable stronghold, or the ruin or possession of important naval establishments; in all these cases there is this distinctive essential to be remarked, which is, that they were regarded as either designed to gain a certain definite advantage which was to be attained for itself, without regard to its bearing on the main results of the quarrel, or otherwise were of so serious a nature that the fate of the contest turned inevitably on the issue of one invasion.

The only exception to this is to be found in the American war of 1812-'14 when was organized the policy which is lately proved to be the safest and most effective that can be selected, and which indeed was at that time practiced with terrible effect.

It may be thought that the war referred to, and its incidents, form a sufficient precedent to refer to in an American memoir; but if I limited myself to it I would be obliged to discuss at length some arguments that might be brought against my conclusions.

It would probably be asserted that the events of 1814 have already received due consideration at the hands of officers fully competent to produce a suitable plan for the defence of the country; or that it is unlikely that in the present enlightened age we should be subjected to a magnified repetition of the barbarous scenes of that war; which objections I am in no need of meeting, by taking the more enlarged scope of argument which I adopt.

It may be objected also, that we constituted, in 1812, a second rate power, and that any arguments drawn from the harassing mode of warfare then pursued towards us, and from its distressing effects on the country, might be answered by this objection: that we are now grown to be one of the foremost nations of the earth, and that we are beyond the reach of injury from the predatory and destructive system which once did us so much damage. But the system which Great Britain initiated in 1812 has been found effective, thanks to the power of her steam navy, even against the colossal empire of Russia, and hence we may reasonably expect that, in a similar conjuncture of circumstances, it will be adopted without hesitation or delay by either of the Allied Powers with which in future the United States may be engaged.

This supposition is reduced to a certainty by the nature of the additions which are being made to the navies of the former States: the despatch gun-boats, the bomb vessels, the iron floating batteries, and the immense screw steamers with capacity to transport thousands of troops, all indicate that the policy of 1814 and 1854 is now become a fixed idea with the governments of France and England to be adopted whenever the occasion serves.

We shall furnish the occasion or grounds of quarrel the moment that we indicate a design to acquire Cuba, or to extend our support to Mexico or the Central American States; then it will be said that, like Russia, we are growing too grasping and formidable, and must be checked and reduced again to a level that shall not endanger the balance of power.

But if our seaports are destined to receive the heaviest shocks

from the armaments which were irresistible at Sevastopol and Bomarsund, at least we shall have the satisfaction of acting on the offensive in other quarters.

Our policy would doubtless be to invade Canada for the third time, if England were our enemy, and Cuba, at any rate, besides; for we are irresistibly drawn to the occupation of that island in time of war with any maritime power by all possible military reasons; and such a course would be sufficiently justified by necessity, as, indeed, have been the precedents of the capture of Gibraltar in 1704, of Malta in 1798, and that of the Danish fleet in 1807.

But if we are to follow this programme, which is surely more congenial to Americans than a passive resistance, however obstinate, and if our regular army and disciplined and enlisted volunteers are to be employed in aggressive campaigns, then it becomes absolutely necessary to organize a seacoast defence, by means of fortifications and militia, that will prevent the necessity of recalling our active armies from the frontier to resist a naval expedition.

The small size, numerically, of our navy, will, in our next war, as in the last, occasion us to resort to privateering, except where our ships or squadrons meet with single vessels or fleets of not disproportionate size. We cannot, then, look to the navy for protection to our seacoast cities; and, indeed, if it were twenty times as large, it would be insufficient to guard so many points at once; or even if that were possible, the task should not be assigned to the navy—it should rather be occupied in convoying transports with troops and ammunition to Cuba, or in fighting the enemy's ships and destroying his commerce in distant seas.

It cannot be for a moment supposed that we might rely on the generosity or humanity of the enemy to spare our cities from bombardment. The events of 1812-'14 show that it is upon our own resources for defence that we must depend for security. The burning of the Capitol, the marauding expeditions of Admiral Cockburn in the Delaware and Chesapeake, and the expedition of Packenham against New Orleans, where "*booty and beauty*" was the watchword, as well as their Indian allies, with the massacres and scalplings which took place after the defeat of Winchester's army in January, 1813, show what is the nature of British warfare.

The following brief account of the atrocities committed along our seacoast during the war of 1812-'14 can be confirmed by many of our citizens, as well as by reference to the histories of the war, of Thomas, Breckenridge, Ingersoll, and others.

In February, 1831, Admiral Cockburn appeared in the Chesapeake, which he laid under blockade, and then commenced a series of attacks against farm houses, gentlemen's seats, &c. These were robbed, the cattle carried off, killed or maimed, and the slaves armed against their masters, or sent off to the West Indies.

The first town attacked was Frenchtown, which was plundered by a detachment of 500 marines, who burnt some houses and vessels at the wharf.

In May, Havre de Grace, Fredericktown, and Georgetown, were visited similarly, and after being thoroughly plundered were partially burnt. During this month reinforcements brought up the strength of the fleet to 7 ships-of-the-line, 12 frigates, and some smaller vessels. On the 18th, the repulse of Craney Island took place, and some circumstances were made the ground of excuse for the barbarous two days sacking of Hampton on the 25th. On this occasion murder and rape were added to the barbarities practiced at other points.

In July, Cockburn, proceeding to North Carolina, treated Ocracoke and Portsmouth as he had the other towns.

In 1814 the downfall of Napoleon enabled Great Britain to turn more land forces against us, and her minister threatened to "*chastise us well and to cripple the United States for fifty years to come.*"

This year, at the north, New York, New London, and Boston, were blockaded, and Saybrook, Wareham, and Scituate, attacked. At each of these places houses, factories, and shipping were burnt. The repulse at Stonington saved that town from the execution of the British commander's threat of "reducing it to ashes."

In June, operations were resumed in the Chesapeake by the pillaging of Benedict, Marlboro', Kinsale, and Tocomoco.

In August, the British received reinforcements, and, landing at Benedict, marched upon Washington, gaining on the road the battle of Bladensburg, (the details of this expedition are given at length in the chapter on Maritime Expeditions.) Having gained possession of our National Capital, these modern Vandals burnt the Senate House, the Representative Hall, the Supreme Court room, the President's House, and in a word, all the public buildings except the Patent Office, as well as some private ones.

This expedition likewise pillaged Alexandria, where the city was forced to deliver at the wharves all the merchandise in the storehouses and all the vessels in the vicinity.

Far from the atrocities of these campaigns being universally reprobated and disavowed in England, the spirit of the British seems to have warmed with approbation towards the commanders who executed them.

In an account of the expedition against Baltimore, written shortly after the war, by a British officer the reason for the admiral's not persevering in the attempt against the city is stated to be, that, from the distance and want of conveyances, the *booty* of the place could not be *removed to the ships*.

As the tone and arguments of the history in question were no doubt congenial to the temper of the British at the time it was published, and as I cannot express them as forcibly as I find them, I beg leave to insert the greater part of the author's conclusion. Comment upon it is unnecessary.

The recommendations of the author as to the policy to be pursued in a future war with America, are, in a word, to re-establish the system of 1814 on an immense scale.

"We have long been habituated to despise the Americans as an enemy unworthy of serious regard. * * * * Instead of 1,500, had 10,000 sailed from the Garonne under General Ross how differently might he have acted!"

"There would have been then no necessity for a re-embarkation after the capture of Washington, and, consequently, no time given for the defence of Baltimore, but marching across the country he might have done to the one city what he did to the other. And it is thus only that a war with America can be successfully carried on. * * * America must be assaulted only on her coasts. Her harbors destroyed, her shipping burned, and her seaport towns laid waste, are the only evils she has reason to dread. * * * *"

“To the plan proposed, of making desert the whole line of coast, it may be objected that by so doing we should distress individuals and not the government. But they who offer this objection forget the nature, both of the people whose cause they plead, and of the government under which they live.

“In a democratical government the voice of the people must at all times prevail. The members of the House of Representatives are the very persons who, from such proceedings, would suffer most severely, and we all know how far private suffering goes to influence a man’s public opinions. * * * * *

“By compelling the constituents to experience the real hardships and miseries of warfare, you will compel the representatives to a vote of peace. * * * Burn their houses, plunder their property, block up their harbors, and destroy their shipping in a few places, and before you have time to proceed to the rest you will be stopped by entreaties for peace.”

These expeditions, it will be remembered, took place when England was engaged in a mortal struggle in another hemisphere, and, consequently, at a time when her power was not commensurate with her malice; for this, and for another reason, we may look for still more convincing proofs of my presages of evil in our next war.

The maritime and military resources of England and France have developed wonderfully since 1815. Large fleets of screw steamships, of great tonnage and tremendous armaments; flotillas of shot proof floating batteries, and transport vessels in any quantity, replace the sailing fleets of the last war.

The eastern war of 1854-’56 astonished the world by the display of a colossal maritime power which surprised even the people of the two nations which had been accumulating it without becoming conscious of its true extent; and, by the way, it is certain that their present confidence of power is a strong incentive to the exercise of it.

In a former paper, on a kindred subject, I have given tabular statements of the naval and military forces displayed by the allies in the war referred to. Here, it is more to my purpose to give a comparative view of the strength of the expeditions simultaneously engaged in during that contest, and the distance from home at which they operated, and the same information with regard to the most celebrated expeditions of former times.

CHAPTER II.

ON MARITIME EXPEDITIONS.

Before a person can consider himself competent to form an opinion on a weighty military question, especially when probabilities and contingences are involved, and if he is not enlightened by some personal experience relating to the matter, he must at least acquaint himself

with all the precedents which history offers. In this way he will guard against running into extremes, and also will naturally be led to discuss the case in a plain and anti-theoretical manner.

For example: a man who has been at the pains of studying those parts of history which relate to invasions that have taken place across seas, will not believe that telegraphs and railroads protect this country from insult better than intrenchments or forts; neither will he be inclined to trust our defence altogether to gun-boats, or iron floating batteries; nor will he fully acquiesce in the more orthodox opinion, that the stone castles which dot our coast, completely provide for our safety.

It does not require, indeed, any great research for a person who has noticed the events of the last ten years, to form some notion of the formidable nature of the naval expeditions that foreign powers can set on foot at the present day; but it is necessary to estimate these also as compared with those of the last century, and still earlier times; this *comparative* power should be considered in order that the means of resistance may be proportioned accordingly.

Ten years ago we ourselves fitted out a maritime expedition that was almost unexampled for the brilliancy and completeness of its operations; and the expeditions of the British and French to China, the Crimea, and the Baltic, are still fresh in every one's recollection.

But Americans are slow to reflect on the probabilities of similar armaments being turned against their own country; and constantly dismiss the suggestion that such a contingency may arise, with the argument that we beat the British at New Orleans, and that we are better able to receive them now than in 1814.

This blindness with regard to the actual situation of the country is attributable to the fact that we do not realize and appreciate the aggressive power that the *steamship fleets* of England and France possess.

It would seem that with nations, as with individuals, wisdom must be bought at the price of experience; for, with the example of Russia before us, we remain apathetic in the matter of our coast defences.

Russia had, perhaps, a right to suppose Sevastopol too remote to need fortifications on the landward side of its port; but it would be inexcusable heedlessness in us to fail to profit by the lesson that Nicholas received.

Notwithstanding the clearness of the case, however, it seems that there needs some foil or contrast to set off vividly representations of it, which alone, would fail of receiving an attentive and reflective examination.

In a word, I can think of no better way of enabling the reader to judge of the magnitude, concentrated strength, and celerity of the present style of naval military warfare, than by presenting him with a condensed summary of the most celebrated maritime expeditions; since by reflecting on the means of national aggression developed in these, and on the *causes* which influenced their success, and by

considering afterwards the mutations which these causes have undergone, especially within the present century, we will naturally come to conclusions that will be better founded and more certain than could result from inferences, however logical, drawn merely from the events that have passed within our own knowledge.

I need not say that officers of personal experience, and whose judgment has been formed in the field, may dispense with the aid which is offered by the following historical sketch, but I hope that the latter will be found interesting at least by this class of readers. It will be seen that I have excluded from this sketch the expeditions of Mahomedan nations; these, though formidable and successful in many instances, such as the expeditions against Candia and Malta, have not been chronicled with much exactness as to numbers; and besides, there are perhaps more than enough to serve my purpose without them. As to the expeditions of ancient history, it would be pedantic to refer to them in this treatise.

It will be found upon inquiring into the impediments and causes of failure of maritime expeditions, that they may be reduced to three heads:

- 1st. The effect of winds and weather on *sailing* fleets.
- 2d. The attacks of the fleets by those of the enemy.
- 3d. The fatal epidemic diseases of certain climates.

As to the first cause, it has always been the main difficulty of maritime expeditions; and the chances of ill consequences from it have been more numerous in proportion to the distance from home at which the descent was to take place. From the time the transports weigh anchor at their point of departure till the conclusion of the expedition, we find the winds baffling all the calculations of the commander-in-chief.

To guard against the contingencies consequent on the weather, and the inequality in the rates of sailing of the different ships of the flotilla, it has been usual to appoint a rendezvous, at which the latter are all to assemble, within a day or two days' sail of the point of landing. This measure of precaution, though indispensable, has not in every case been successfully carried out. For example: Hoche's expedition, the Invincible Armada, and the projected Boulogne expedition, were all ruined by storms, which either wrecked or dispersed the fleets, and prevented any attempt at debarkation.

Where the objective point has been far distant, the provisioning of the troops, in view of possible detention from adverse winds, has been a serious difficulty.

In cases where the rendezvous has been effected according to the intention, sailing vessels have sometimes been prevented from venturing to lie off the beach selected for debarkation by the danger of being wrecked upon it, in the event of certain winds springing up, and making it a lee-shore. Sometimes the debarkation has been interrupted or suspended, after having commenced, from this cause. The length of time which must elapse between the departure of a fleet of sailing vessels and their arrival off of their destination is necessarily considerable, because the entire convoy must wait upon

the slowest vessel in it, and the voyage is thus rendered much longer than the average time. This detention will of course give the enemy so much additional time to prepare for the defence of the point menaced, and will besides increase the probabilities of meeting with bad weather.

The uncertainty of the weather has sometimes acted to prevent combinations, at a given time and place, of fleets which happened to be in distant parts, and which might be wanted to act in concert at a fixed time. In a word, the winds and weather, by their uncertainty, variableness, and violence, have always, previous to the invention of steam, been the grand cause of delay, disaster, and sometimes of failure to maritime expeditions; they have also indirectly confined within a certain rather low limit the strength of these expeditions, since the difficulties springing from them increase in a rapid ratio with the number of sailing vessels required.

But a consideration even of the few facts presented in the sketches of the Crimean and Bomarsund expeditions will show that future undertakings of this nature will enjoy an immunity almost complete from difficulties and dangers arising from the winds and waves.

The immense size* which is now given to steamships will render the number of vessels necessary to carry an army very small, so that a rendezvous can be more readily arranged.

The enormous vessels that will hereafter be used will also be perfectly safe from all the perils of the seas, and their power and speed will render them independent of wind and weather.

CHAPTER III.

SYNOPTICAL ACCOUNT OF MILITARY DESCENTS SINCE 1400 A. D.

Edward III besieged Calais with 40,000 men, whom he conveyed in 800 vessels of all sizes.

(1414 to 1417.) *Henry V* entered France with an army of 30,000

* The "Himalaya" steamship, which was used to carry troops to the Crimea, appears to have answered the purpose admirably, both as to speed and stowage of a great number of men; and the success of this trial, with the demonstration furnished by the building of the "Great Eastern," that the same can be done on a still grander scale, will probably result in the construction of a few monster ships by the British and French for purposes of distant warfare; indeed the latter vessel, which can carry 10,000 troops with all their baggage, is to be purchased by Napoleon for military purposes.

The British parliament is now considering the proposition of a Liverpool ship-builder to build six "mastodonian steamships," to be used for the transportation of troops to distant possessions. Each of these is to be 30,000 tons burden, and capable of steaming 500 miles a day; they are to be wind-proof, water-proof, and fire-proof, thereby making the perils of the seas a moral impossibility.

The "Napoleon" (French) war steamship is a full-rigged ship with a screw-propeller; her engine is 900 horse-power, and under steam alone her speed is $13\frac{1}{2}$ knots per hour.

The "Napoleon" was found capable of towing three ships at once, one of them a three-decker, at the rate of over five knots.

The "Great Eastern" steamship is capable of conveying 10,000 troops a distance as far as from England to India, at the same time carrying 18,000 tons of coal and cargo.

men, which were carried over in 1,500 boats and vessels, large and small.

Charles V took Tunis with 30,000 men and a fleet of 500 vessels.

(1578.) *Sebastian of Portugal* entered on his expedition to Morocco with 20,000 men.

The *Invincible Armada* of Philip II of Spain numbered 337 ships, and carried 11,000 sailors and 20,000 soldiers, with 2,630 brass guns; it is well known that a violent storm wrecked half the ships and caused to perish 13,000 men of this expedition.

(1630.) *Gustavus Adolphus* entered Germany with 15,000 or 18,000 men, conveyed thither by a fleet manned by 9,000 sailors.

(1660.) *Louis XIV* sent an expedition against Ireland which numbered 73 ships-of-war, 29,000 sailors, 5,800 cannon, and 6,000 troops: (this fleet was beaten at the Hogue.)

In 1700 *Charles XII* conceived and executed a descent upon Copenhagen, as a diversion which should save the Duchy of Holstein, belonging to his brother-in-law, and invaded by the King of Denmark. He had 20,000 soldiers in transports, and a fleet which kept at a distance that of the enemy.

Charles' fleet anchored off Humblebeck, three leagues from Copenhagen, and found the Danish army, with cavalry and artillery, drawn up behind intrenchments to contest the landing of the troops. The Swedes, however, entered their boats, carrying with them to the shore a great quantity of chevaux-de-frise and other military implements in flat-bottomed boats, which had been brought for that purpose.

In this order the army approached the beach, the king himself leading the division of 500 grenadiers which formed the advance. On nearing land and getting within wading depth, the whole army, at the example of Charles, threw themselves into the water, and charged the enemy under a violent fire of musketry and artillery. The Danes were driven from their works with precipitation, and Charles, who received next day a reinforcement of 12,000 men, advancing towards the city made preparations to bombard it.

The Danish king to save his capital, consented to evacuate Holstein, and to pay a ransom of 400,000 rix-dollars. Thus this entire campaign, which was completely successful, terminated in six weeks.

In 1747 a British expedition was sent to capture the French fortress of Pondicherry. It was commanded by Boscawen, and consisted of one ship of 74 guns, six of 60 and 64, five of 50, and five carrying from 14 to 40. After 31 days of open trenches, the besiegers were forced to abandon the enterprise.

In 1757 Lally's expedition sailed from Brest to the East Indies for the purpose of taking Fort St. David. This fleet, which carried 1,100 troops, was reinforced at Mauritius by 11 sail, and, on arriving at Pondicherry, by 1,000 European troops and a corps of Sepoys, bringing up the total force to 5,000 men, a half of whom were Europeans. This expedition was entirely successful, Fort St. David being taken and razed.

In 1775 *Charles II* of Spain sent an expedition to Algiers, commanded by General O'Reilly and Admiral Castejon. The land forces

numbered 19,200 picked troops, and were carried in 340 transports, protected by 44 ships-of-war, manned by 3,300 of the best sailors; the artillery numbered 100 large cannons, and 4,000 mules were taken along for its use, and that of the army generally.

This expedition landed (July 18) on the beach in the Bay of Algiers, in view of 80,000 Turks, of whom two-thirds were cavalry. In the battle which followed, the Spaniards were forced to retreat to their ships, which they did under cover of a slightly built *tête-de-pont*.

In 1796 Hoche's expedition to Ireland left Brest. It numbered 16,000 men, or, according to some accounts, 25,000. The difference is probably the force belonging to the Dutch fleet which was to have sailed from Antwerp and joined Hoche. This junction did not however take place.

The expedition was composed of—

15 ships-of-the line, with 600 troops aboard of each ;

12 frigates and 6 corvettes, with 250 troops in each ;

A razee, with 400 troops ;

6 large vessels, with 2,250 troops ;

And a couple of ships for carrying powder and ammunition.

The fleet eluded the British blockading fleet in a fog, and sailed for Bantry bay on the 16th of December. The same day a violent storm dispersed the vessels, and wrecked three of them. The expedition, however, reassembled off Cape Clear, and on the 24th had arrived at its destination, when another tempest forced it to leave the vicinity of the land. This storm was followed by others, and the expedition finally returned, disheartened, on the 1st of January, 1797.

1798. Bonaparte left Toulon with 13 ships-of-the-line, 90 other ships-of-war, and more than 300 transports, and with 23,000 soldiers. A part of this expedition stopped at Malta, and took that place, (though defended by 7,000 men,) and then proceeded to join the main body which had arrived at Aboukir. The signal victories this expedition gained over the Turks, prove that it would have been, but for the British counter-expedition, an example of a perfectly successful one.

In 1799 the Anglo-Russian expedition to Holland took place. It numbered 40,000 men, and was intended to menace the French on the Meuse and Rhine, and cause a rebellion in Belgium; and, also, it was intended to capture the Batavian fleet of nine ships-of-the line and some frigates. The latter part of the enterprise succeeded, but for the rest nothing was accomplished, except the driving of the French from their positions, and the occupying of a small tract of country.

In October, 1800, Admiral Keith appeared off Cadiz with a large fleet, and with numerous land forces. At that time the city was a prey to a violent yellow fever, and its governor appealed to the humanity of the admiral to spare it an aggravation of its misfortunes. Keith replied by requiring the surrender of all the ships-of-war in the harbor, and was about to enforce his demand by a debarkation, when he was checked by orders from home, which were the result of

fears for the health of the troops. This expedition afterwards formed part of the one next mentioned.

In 1801 Abercrombie's expedition to Egypt occurred. The land forces consisted at first of from 17,000 to 20,000 men; the fleet, under Admiral Keith, was composed of 4 ships of 80 guns, 3 ships of 74 guns, 5 frigates, 12 brigs, 40 other ships-of-war, and a flotilla of gun-boats. The landing was effected on a sand beach by means of 100 flat-bottomed boats, each of which carried 50 soldiers, besides the oarsmen. It was successfully executed, though opposed by 2,000 Frenchmen with some artillery. The fire of some of the smaller vessels of the fleet protected the operation.

In this landing 3,500 men gained the beach at once, and drove off the French, with a loss of 8 guns. Within two weeks Abercrombie gained the decisive battle of Alexandria. As he was joined shortly after by 16,000 more troops, from the East Indies and England, this expedition should be rated at 36,000 men.

In 1807 the British were at war with Napoleon. Both these nations were at the same time in a state of profound peace with Denmark—a state which possessed, as its only safeguard, boast, and power, a fleet of 18 ships-of-the-line, 15 frigates, and 25 gun-boats; besides these and their armaments, and their efficient crews, it possessed immense naval stores of all descriptions. To prevent this fleet coming into the hands of Napoleon, by treaty or otherwise, the British fitted out a *secret* expedition, which announced itself and the declaration of war at the same time. It was composed of 26,000 troops in an immense number of transports, and protected by a fleet which embraced 21 ships-of-the-line. Appearing before Copenhagen, Lord Cathcart summoned the Danish Prince to place the fleet of Denmark in the hands of the British; and on receiving a refusal to this outrageous demand, landed his troops between Kronenburg and Copenhagen, drove in the Danish outposts, and planted his heavy ordnance. After ineffectually summoning the city to surrender, Lord Cathcart ordered it to be bombarded, and from the morning of the 3d to the evening of the 5th it was subjected to an incessant storm of shot and shells from 60 mortars and howitzers and 52 twenty-four-pounders. In this barbarous and unequal warfare some two thousand of the inhabitants, of all classes, were killed and wounded, and between six hundred and seven hundred houses were burnt, when, finally, the Crown Prince consented to yield to all the British demands, and so saved the city from being laid in ashes.

In 1808 Sir Arthur Wellesley's expedition to Portugal took place. The mouth of the Mondego river was selected for the landing, because the French would not be apt to contest it. Between the 1st and the 5th of August, 12,300 men, with all their baggage, artillery, and *materiel*, were landed. On the 17th, marching toward Lisbon, they defeated 14,000 French under Laborde, and on the 19th another brigade was landed at the bay of Maceira, an open sandy beach, and joined Wellesley. And during the last week in August, Sir John Moore's division landed, also at the Bay of Maceira, (while a furious surf was

beating the shore.) All these troops brought the British force up to 25,000 effective men.

A few remarks are here called for by the importance of this successful descent, the difficulties that had to be surmounted, and the risks that were run by Wellesley, in calculating so securely on gaining the battle which must decide the fate of his army. Napier says, that the coast of Portugal, from the Minho to the Tagus, presents, with few exceptions, a rugged and dangerous shore; all the harbors which are presented by the rivers have bars which render access difficult in most cases, even to boats.

With the slightest breeze from the sea, a terrible surf breaks along the whole line of coast, and forbids all approach; and when the south wind, which commonly prevails from August to the winter months, blows, a more dangerous shore cannot be found in any part of the world.

But as rivers and mountains and even the Alps themselves, have proved ineffectual barriers to great captains, so in this case Wellington contemplated these dangers only with the resolve to overcome them.

A timid or cautious general would have been deterred by considering that a sea breeze might spring up during the debarkation that would leave half his force on land, while the rest was carried off in the vessels, which must gain the open sea or be wrecked on the lee shore; or he would picture to himself the army landed, and separated suddenly from its provisions and artillery by a storm which might drive off the transports before they could be unloaded. In either case he would expect the ruin of the expedition from an attack upon the force landed by the main body of the enemy.

Or, even if the landing were an entire success, the army would have a very uncertain retreat, or base of operations; and, if worsted by the French, its entire loss might be the consequence of the conjuncture of that event with stormy weather; for a gale from any quarter from south to northwest would have driven away the fleet. To gain a permanent base the British leader had to count on forcing the position of Torres Vedras and capturing the forts on the Tagus; thus opening the latter harbor to his vessels.

The result, however, demonstrated the wisdom of a bold course; for the weather was tolerably propitious, (though Sir John Moore's division wrecked nearly all its boats in reaching land,) and the French preferred to fight an offensive battle to receiving the attack, as was their best policy.

The convention of Cintra, by which Junot agreed to evacuate Portugal, was the speedy result of the descent just described; and certainly the magnitude of the gain warranted the risks of the undertaking.

In 1808 the English expedition against Antwerp and Flushing comprised 35 ships-of-the-line, 23 frigates, and other ships-of-war, making a total of 155 ships and 80 gun-boats, manned by more than 30,000 sailors, and carrying 42,000 troops, with 160 pieces of heavy land ordnance, besides the ships' complement of guns.

In the words of Napier, "above 40,000 of the finest of Britain's soldiers, a fleet of power to overthrow all the navies of the world combined; marine and land forces together, more than 80,000 fighting men."

That this expedition, after promptly reducing Flushing and Fort Bartz, was allowed to perish in the marshes of Walcheren, was not the result of military circumstances, but of the incapacity of its commander.

The army of invasion organized by Napoleon at Boulogne numbered 160,000 veteran soldiers; it was to cross in 3,000 gun-boats which were built expressly for the purpose, and which were to be protected from the British cruisers by 60 ships-of-the-line; the latter were to rendezvous at Boulogne after deceiving and leading off the enemy's fleet by a feigned expedition into other quarters.

Everything was as perfectly planned as possible, the troops were thoroughly drilled in embarking and disembarking with their arms, baggage, and artillery, and all that was necessary seemed to be the two days required for the crossing, when a conjuncture of unfortunate accidents prevented the occurrence of an event that would have been famous to the end of the world.

1816. Lord Exmouth's expedition to Algiers, in 1816, is pretty well known, and I will limit myself to giving the more important statistics of it.

The fleet consisted of 1 vessel of 108 guns,

1	"	104	"
3	"	74	"
1	"	50	"
2	"	40	"
2	"	36	"
3	"	16	"

4 bomb-ketches and 10 small vessels of 2 guns each, making a total of about 450 guns, with mortars in addition*; this force was joined at Gibraltar by the Dutch fleet of five ships of 36 and one of 24 guns, under Admiral Capellam, raising the number of guns to 652, (some writers have given it as "about a thousand.")

Sailing into the Bay of Algiers, this formidable fleet came to anchor opposite the fortifications, and poured upon them an incessant fire; no less than 50,000 solid shot, or more than 500 tons of metal, and 960 ten and thirteen inch shells, together with rockets, were showered upon the works and city within about six or eight hours.

The fortifications were ruined and the city nearly destroyed, while the loss of life, both in the Algerine troops and the inhabitants of the place, was enormous.

The entire Algerine fleet was, in addition, burnt or sunk at its moorings in the harbor.

1830. After a year's blockade of Algiers, the French finally resolved

to take the city, and on the 25th of May, 1830, an expedition sailed against it from Toulon ; it tarried some time at the bay of Palma in Majorca, but finally arrived in the bay of Torre Chica on the 14th of June.

The number of land forces amounted to 30,000 men, all of whom were landed between 4 and 12 o'clock,

The landing was protected by the fire of two steamers, which aided in repulsing the attacks of the Turkish cavalry, but the French suffered some loss from the fire of certain batteries which were served for several hours against them.

Three days after the landing, the French were attacked by 40 or 50,000 Turks, but repulsed them with loss, as they did also on the 24th and 25th.

The French then advanced on Algiers, and after a short siege, took the place. It contained 1500 brass guns, and money to the amount of \$10,150,000, and in its port were 12 vessels-of-war.

1854. I shall enter more into detail concerning the allied expedition to the Crimea than any former one, for the reason that it presents what I believe to be a presage of the events which will follow the next declaration of war which may be exchanged between this country and England or France.

Nations are hardly more apt than individuals to profit by any experience but their own ; but experience of this kind is so dearly bought, that it is worth considering whether a portion of the price might not be advantageously invested as an insurance against the payment of the whole.

In August, 1854, the allied generals resolved upon the expedition to the Crimea ; the army had been concentrated at Varna since May, and, tired of inaction, made its preparations with great rapidity.

The French constructed barges for the disembarkation of their artillery ; each one would carry two pieces complete, with 12 horses and 18 gunners and drivers. They were to be towed by towboats, and the arrangements were such that in 15 minutes from touching the shore the guns might open fire.

The English provided for the same purpose, platforms which were to rest upon two boats which were to be lashed together.

On the 1st of September, the troops embarked and sailed for the first rendezvous, which was the island of Baltchik : at this place there were assembled 250 vessel of all kinds, having on board 60,000 soldiers, in addition to the sailors and marines.

On the 5th the French sailing vessels left Baltchik, and on the 7th the steamships and the British fleet ; the general rendezvous was the Isle of Serpents. Three fast steamships were sent in advance to reconnoitre the coast and select a landing place.

On the 11th the British fleet was assembled twenty miles to the north of Cape Tarkeen, and the French fleet opposite the cape, ten leagues off shore ; the next day the reconnoitering vessels returned, and their report caused the point called "Old Fort," near Eupatoria, and only a few miles from the present position of the fleets, to be chosen for the landing.

The shore at that place presented a low strip of beach, which is separated from the shore by three sheets of water of say a mile in length by half a mile in width, and which is joined to the main land by two natural causeways between these sheets of water. Behind these rose a plateau, which was, however, easily accessible at the distance of a couple of miles from the landing place.

On the 12th the fleets and convoys, which covered a space of seven leagues, sailed for Old Fort; but a squall occurring during the night, the fleets anchored in the bay of Eupatoria, and waited there for the steamers to tow up the convoys,

The 13th was consumed in bringing in the convoys, and the landing took place next day.

The movement of the vessels commenced at 2½ a. m., and by 7½ a. m. they were anchored in their respective positions.

The French ships were drawn up in three lines, each a mile long, in the bay below Old Fort, and the British ones in the next bay, nearer to Eupatoria, further in or off, according to the draught of the vessels.

Each of the three French divisions was in a single line of ships, and their boats were distinguished by different colored flags; on the arrival of the first boats, the ground to be occupied by each division was marked by its flags.

No Russian troops appeared to contest the landing; but as a precaution, the boats of the three-deckers were sent ashore first, filled with troops, and provided with Congreve rockets; five vessels were also moored close to the shore, with their broadsides bearing on the beach, and enfilading the road by which the enemy's artillery must approach to annoy the troops.

At 8.30 a. m. the French commander gave the signal for debarkation, and the British one followed in about a half an hour; it would appear that the latter did not arrive in any designated order, but their landing was quite as rapidly effected as the French.

With regard to the latter, the entire first division was set ashore in one trip of the boats; making a force of 9,070 men, 9 guns, and the horses of the general officers, and with provisions for four days, which was transferred from the ships to the beach in fifty minutes.

By noon all the French infantry had landed, and 40 pieces of artillery, and by nightfall the entire debarkation had been effected, all but part of the horses and artillery. The landing of the latter was interrupted at dark by a storm of rain, which put a stop to the operation. On this day the 4th French division and a detachment of British troops, that had on the previous day been making a feint or diversion at Katcha, returned; they had been conveyed in steam-frigates.

On the 15th these troops were all landed, as well as the horses and artillery, in spite of a severe surf which beat upon the beach. As an instance of its violence, the boat which carried General Forey and his staff was capsized in the breakers, and the officers saved themselves only by swimming.

The force thus thrown, in a little more than a single day, upon an

exposed beach, and one which was likely to be defended by a powerful Russian army, consisted of over 60,000 men and 137 cannon.

The official accounts state the numbers as follows, viz:

English of all arms	27,600 men and	65 guns.
French of all arms	27,800 men and	72 guns.
Turks of all arms	6,000 men.	

Total 61,400 men and 137 guns.

After one day—the 16th—spent on the beach, the French army was ready to march upon Sevastopol; but, to the great chagrin of St. Arnaud, was compelled to tarry for the British, who were so much encumbered with baggage that they did not complete their preparations before the 18th.

On the 19th the allies took up the line of march, and on the 20th, or on the sixth day from that which saw their fleet cast anchor off the Russian coast, they attacked the enemy, under Menschikoff, and forced them from the redoubtable position of the Alma.

As I shall refer to this battle in my remarks on descents, it is worth while to give the statistics of it, as furnished by the French, English, and Russian official accounts.

The Russians were encamped on a position which crossed the great road about $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the sea; their front was two miles in extent and protected by the river Alma, which, though generally fordable, had steep banks; the troops were posted on the slopes of the hills in rear of the river; and on the summits, which varied in altitude from 350 to 400 feet, was their reserve. A heavy covered battery flanked the whole of the right of the position, and artillery was also posted so as to command the passages of the river and the approaches generally. A trench some hundred yards long, half way down the slope on the right, afforded cover against an advance.

The Russians had 42 battalions and 16 squadrons, a force estimated by St. Arnaud at 50,000 men, and by Lord Raglan at from 25,000 to 50,000, and they had 82 guns.

The battle, as is well known, was decided by the turning of the left of the position by Bosquet's division, and the Russians retreated behind the Katcha. Their loss amounted to 4,500 men, and that of the allies to 3,300 men.

Of the campaigns which succeeded this memorable descent it is not my province to speak, but it is important to my argument to mention the sum total of the troops who were, during the eleven months siege of Sevastopol, thrown upon the shores of the Crimea.

The French troops sent amounted in all to	309,268 men.
English	99,618 men.
The Sardinians amounted to 10,000, and 7,000 Turks were landed September 14	17,000 men.

Total 425,886 men,
excluding what Turkish reinforcements were sent, which brought their numbers to over 8 battalions at a late period of the siege.

The French losses, from all causes, amounted to.....	69,229 men.
Those of the English to.....	32,290 men.
Total	<u>101,519 men.</u>

It will be observed that losses sustained by the allies by sickness at Varna or at Gallipoli do not enter into the above table. The entire forces sent by the allies to the east amounted to a greater figure than the above; for example, the British sent to the east 107,040 men, of whom 70,910 returned with their regiments, the balance being made up of killed, invalided, prisoners, and some deserters.

However, the table above is restricted to an accurate exposition of the power of the expedition, which had for its object the capture of Sevastopol; by its strength, the distance from home at which it operated, the rapidity and certainty of its movements, and by the entire success with which it was crowned, after encountering the utmost rigors of winter, and a defence almost unparalleled for bravery and obstinacy, and unequalled in point of engineering skill; by every criterion, in fact, this expedition far surpasses any previous one in the history of the world.

1854. While the expedition to Sevastopol was assembling at Varna another grand descent was being made upon the Russian establishments in the Aland islands, in the Baltic. This latter expedition consisted of a combined French and English fleet, (which must have been of great power,) though I have been unable to find the exact number of vessels and guns, carrying a land army of 10,000 French and a small force of British troops. The French army was in two brigades, with 200 artillerymen and 150 sappers. The embarkation of the latter took place at Calais, and the fleets rendezvoused first at Faroe sound, then at the anchorage of Ledsund, and finally appeared before Bomarsund on the 7th of August, 1854. They anchored just beyond the range of the guns of the fortress; on the 8th the debarkation was effected by placing the troops in launches, which were towed by row-boats manned by sailors; the main landing was at a point 6 miles southwest of the works, while a body of 3,000 landed 9 miles to the north, to facilitate the investment.

The siege was conducted by land exclusively, except that some vessels (on the 15th) cannonaded the place from a distance of $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile, a range at which many of their shells, even, fell short of the walls; and on the 16th the place surrendered.

The result of this success was the capture of 2,400 troops, of 200 guns, and considerable supplies of powder, balls, and provisions. The Russians likewise lost the costly works that had been built to insure possession of the Aland isles; for, previous to leaving, the allies reduced the main fortress and the towers of Bomarsund to a heap of ruins.

This expedition, in itself, was a great exhibition of power; but when we consider that it was conducted at the same time with the gigantic and unprecedented one to the Crimea, a vivid idea will be formed of the military and naval resources of France and England.

AMERICAN EXPEDITIONS.

In 1739, England having declared war against Spain, a combined expedition, under Admirals Anson and Vernon, sailed from England and Jamaica to acquire possession of the richest portions of Spanish America. The fleet of the latter took Portobello in November, and afterwards Fort Chagre, on the isthmus; but Anson's squadron, that was to have co-operated on the opposite side, at Panama, had been scattered by storms off the Horn, and Vernon returned without result.

In 1740, (October,) Lord Cathcart's expedition left England and assembled at Jamaica, where it was joined by a body of colonial troops. It then numbered 29 ships of the line, 80 smaller vessels, and 15,000 sailors, besides 12,000 land forces, equipped with all sorts of warlike instruments and every kind of convenience. This expedition attacked Carthagena, the strongest town in Spanish America, and demolished its fortifications. The excessive mortality in the expedition caused it to return to Jamaica without further effect, in November, 1741, after losing about 20,000 men.

In 1742 the Spaniards collected a large fleet and numerous land forces in Cuba, and made a descent in July, with 36 vessels, upon Forts William and Frederica, on the St. Mary's. They were repulsed by Governor Oglethorpe.

In 1745 the Louisburg expedition took place. It consisted of 100 vessels, which rendezvoused at Canseau, where they were joined by the squadron of Admiral Warren, from Antigua. After besieging the place by land and sea for six weeks, during which several men-of-war joined the blockading fleet from England, the place capitulated.

In 1746 a large fleet left France under d'Anville, but it effected nothing, having been wasted by storms and shipwrecks.

In 1747 a French fleet sailed with troops for Canada and Nova Scotia, but was encountered by the British fleet under Anson and Warren, and what ships were not taken were forced to retreat.

In 1755 the French sent reinforcements to Canada in 12 ships-of-war, under Dieskau; two of which were intercepted and taken by Admiral Boscawen. Braddock's expedition arrived in America, from England, the same year.

In May, 1758, Amherst's expedition sailed from England, and rendezvoused at Halifax. The fleet was composed of 22 ships of the line and 15 frigates. The army numbered at least 10,000 effective men. It sailed against Louisburg, the French naval station, and arrived in Chapeau Rouge bay, where it waited for six days, whilst a storm rendered a landing impracticable. During this time the French strengthened and extended their lines of field-works and abattis.

On the 8th June the surf was still dashing heavily, when the debarkation took place under the cover of the fire of the frigates. Notwithstanding the French batteries and the capsizing and destruction of several of the boats by the surf, the landing was effected, the French lines taken, and Louisburg invested the same day. In less than two months the place was reduced to ruins, and capitulated;

5,600 troops and sailors became prisoners, and five ships of the line and four frigates were captured. The rest of the French fleet (five vessels) had been burnt or taken previously.

In January, 1759, Admiral Pococke attacked Martinico with 10 line-of-battle ships and 6,000 effective troops. Being repulsed from that island, he sailed for Guadalupe, which island he took after a struggle of three months.

In June, 1759, the expedition destined to take Quebec rendezvoused at Louisburg. General Wolf commanded the land forces, amounting to about 8,000 men, carried in numerous transports. The fleet, under Admiral Sanders, numbered 20 ships of the line and as many frigates and armed vessels.

On the 26th June the landing took place on the Isle of Orleans. On the 29th batteries were erected on the main land opposite Quebec; but though the town was injured by their fire the citadel was beyond their range.

In July, Wolfe attempted to gain a footing on the opposite shore of the St. Lawrence, above the Montmorenci, but was repulsed, with the loss of 400 killed alone.

On the 13th September, having deceived the French as to his intentions, Wolfe crossed to the north shore, above the town, and gained the battle of the Plains of Abraham, which Montcalm preferred to deliver rather than throw his army into Quebec.

The French second in command was obliged, on September 17, from the want of provisions, to surrender the city.

In January, 1762, General Monkton and Admiral Rodney appeared off Martinique, the richest of the French colonies, with a fleet of 16 ships of the line and 13 frigates, and transports containing 12,000 troops; this island was naturally strong and was well fortified, but was taken in about five weeks. The same expedition took Grenada, St. Lucia, and St. Vincente.

In May the same expedition, having received reinforcements of troops and supplies from the North American colonies and from England, received orders to attack Havana. The land forces now amounted to 11,000 effective English troops, besides the quotas from New York and New England; 2,500 negroes from Jamaica and the Leeward islands were also enrolled, and subsequently used in the labors of the trenches. After twenty-nine days of open trenches the Moro Castle was taken by storm, and on the 11th of August the city capitulated.

The fruits of this expedition were the most important naval and military station of the West Indies, 9 ships of the line, and 4 frigates, besides an immense booty, of which the property of the Spanish king alone amounted to \$10,000,000.

It succeeded in spite of all the difficulties of a tropical summer, the yellow fever, and a difficult position, improved by strong and well defended fortresses.

In 1769 an expedition set out from Cuba, and arrived before New Orleans with 3,000 chosen troops on board; the commander took

possession, in the name of the Spanish government, of the whole valley of the Mississippi.

(In the preceding year the French inhabitants had rebelled and declared their intentions of joining the colony to France as a dependency, or otherwise of forming an independent republic.)

On the 25th of June, 1776, Sir William Howe arrived off Sandy Hook; Admiral Howe arrived on the 12th of July; General Clinton arrived soon after, as did also Admiral Hotham, with troops from Charleston and England.

The army thus united amounted to 24,000 men—English, Hessians, and Waldeckers. They were ready to open the campaign in August.

The battle of Flatbush followed, and resulted in the retreat of the Americans on the night of the 29th.

February 11, 1780, Sir Henry Clinton arrived at John's island, thirty miles from Charleston, having sailed from New York the 26th of December. Charleston was defended by General Lincoln, who built a chain of redoubts, lines, and batteries from the Ashley to the Cooper river. These mounted eighty pieces of artillery. And on all sides of the town where a landing was practicable batteries were erected and covered with cannon.

On the 21st the British fleet crossed the bar, and in a few days the city was invested by sea and by land.

In April Clinton received a reinforcement of 3,000 men from New York, and took Fort Moultrie.

On the 12th of May the city surrendered.

In July, 1780, the French fleet, under the Chevalier De Ternay, arrived at Rhode Island. It had two ships of 80 guns, one of 74, two frigates of 40, a cutter of 20, an armed hospital ship, and 32 transports with 6,000 men, under Rochambeau.

In August, 1781, De Grasse's fleet of twenty-eight sail of the line appeared in the Chesapeake, from the West Indies, and landed 3,200 troops, under Marquis de St. Simon, to assist in the siege of Yorktown. Eight more ships of the line arrived soon after, under De Barras, from Rhode Island.

In February, 1794, Admiral Jervis landed at Martinique with 6,000 troops, and took possession of the island, with the exception of the forts, which were occupied by Rochambeau with 800 men. The British were subsequently driven off, a reinforcement having arrived of 1,500 French, from Brest, and the blacks having been enrolled by the latter.

In 1795-'96 Abercrombie retook from the French the islands of St. Lucia and Demerara.

In 1802 Leclerc's expedition sailed from France to St. Domingo. It consisted of 29,000 men, who were afterwards reinforced by 15,000 additional troops, making a total of 35,000 soldiers. The fleet numbered thirty ships of the line and twenty frigates. The failure of this expedition was due partly to the vicious plan of operation, but chiefly to the yellow fever, which committed dreadful ravages both in the land and naval forces. The army of Toussaint did not exceed 20,000

men, but was exempt from the sickness which carried off almost the whole of the invading troops.

1814. The English expedition in 1814 against Washington was composed of Admiral Cockburn's fleet in the Chesapeake, reinforced by a squadron with General Ross' army, which embarked at the Garonne river, in France.

The latter fleet comprised thirteen armed vessels and three transports, and carried 2,500 troops. Arriving at Bermuda it was joined by three men-of-war, which had on board 1,600 troops. Continuing the voyage, the combined fleet joined that of the Chesapeake, which consisted of three line-of-battle ships, several frigates, and some sloops-of-war and gun-brigs. There were in this fleet 700 marines and a division of marine artillery, bringing up the land forces to about 5,000 men.

On the 19th and 29th of August the latter were disembarked at Benedict, about fifty miles southeast of Washington. On the evening of the 20th a flotilla was sent, under Cockburn, up the river to attack that of Commodore Barney, which was, however, blown up by the Americans. General Ross, in command of the army, proceeded to Upper Marlborough, where he arrived on the 22d, having marched forty miles in three days. Here he was joined by Cockburn; and the united forces of the expedition marched, the night of the 23d, five miles nearer to Washington.

On the 24th the advances to Bladensburg took place, and our army was beaten. The capture of Washington, and the atrocious treatment our capital received at the hands of the British, are still fresh in the recollection of our citizens.

The attack upon Baltimore, during the ensuing month after the above occurrences, was made by the same expedition, which, having received on board the army, again disembarked it at North Point, on the Patapsco, thirteen miles from the city.

The repulse of the combined attack of the enemy on this occasion, and their retreat to the ships, are well known; and I will take advantage of the circumstance to conclude my reference to this expedition, the main facts relating to which I have already given, viz: the numbers of the vessels and land forces, and the distance from which they came.

1815. The expedition which had performed the exploit of burning the American Capitol proceeded from the Chesapeake to Jamaica, (two ships only excepted, which were sent to England with wounded and prisoners.) Here they were joined by a fleet of men-of-war and transports, carrying 2,500 infantry, six companies of rifles, two squadrons of dismounted dragoons, detachments of engineers, artillery and rockets, and also recruits for the regiments that had served in the Chesapeake. Major General Keane arrived in this fleet and took command of the whole.

Having set sail from Jamaica, on the 20th of November the expedition reached the mouth of the Mississippi—or rather they anchored opposite the Chandeleur islands, near the entrance of Lake Borgne. Here the plan of attack was concerted.

Considering it impracticable to reduce the forts which commanded the navigation of the river, and as the ships could not pass up unless this were effected, it was decided to land on the banks of the lake, and make a push for the city before any strong defences could be prepared by the Americans.

The troops being got on board, the lighter vessels entered the lake on the 13th of December. They were opposed by the American gunboats, which were, however, captured by a flotilla of fifty launches and barges.

The vessels now penetrated as far as their draught allowed, and on the 16th began to debark their detachments upon a sandy strip called Isle au Poix, at the mouth of Pearl river. The vessels had to send their boats for this purpose nearly thirty miles, and the soldiers underwent great hardships from the total want of tents or fuel.

The entire force was not debarked until six days had elapsed, and the whole week was consumed in the operation, in organizing the troops into divisions, and assembling boats, packing ammunition, stores, &c.; and it must be recollected that the British were as yet only in possession of a barren island.

The debouches of Bayou Catalan or Bienvenu into the lake, about thirty miles, or a day's sail from the island, was selected as the point of landing, and the advance guard of 1,600 men and two guns was sent there to seize on a favorable spot. These surprised the guard, and then pushed up the river to Villeré's canal, where, having encamped, they sustained a severe attack from our troops under Jackson and General Coffee, who were aided by the fire of the schooner *Caroline*, under Commodore Patterson.

The whole British army hastened at the sound of the cannonade to effect its landing, and by the 24th it was all in the position first occupied by the advance guard.

General Jackson, finding that his attack on the advanced guard had rendered the enemy cautious, and would prevent an immediate march upon the city, decided to improve the time by intrenching himself, and selected the position which lay in rear of the Rodriguez canal. This position was 1,620 yards in extent, resting its right and left on the river and on a swamp, respectively, and was protected in front by the canal.

The intrenchments consisted simply of a parapet of earth, running in a right line from the river to the swamp, where it took a square turn to the rear; an unfinished redan was just beyond the ditch, at the junction of the line with the river.

The canal formed a wet ditch for the intrenchment. It had five feet of water in some parts, but in others was very shallow, its banks were, however, very slippery and soft, from the effect of rain and the opening of the levees. The defenders of the position amounted at this time to about 2,000 men, and this force repelled (as will be mentioned) the first attack of the British. In the grand attack, the army under Jackson amounted to 3,500 or 3,700 men, as he was joined on the 4th by 2,500 Kentuckians, of whom about 1,500 were detached to garrison the battery on the right bank.

The British army now landed had, on entering the ships, amounted to about 8,000 soldiers, and it seems probable that, with Lambert's reinforcement and with the marines, the number that took part in the battle of the 8th of January was about 10,000.

While the Americans were fortifying their position, and the main army of the enemy was concentrating in advance of it, the British had thrown up batteries, which firing hot shot at the *Caroline* and *Louisiana*, had burnt the one and dislodged the other from her position, which had prohibited an advance along the levee.

The way being now clear, the British advanced on the 28th and, on approaching the American line, opened a fire of cannon, bombs, and rockets, which they followed up by a violent attack, which lasted seven hours, resulting in the repulse of the enemy.

At this juncture the British were reinforced by 1,600 infantry under General Lambert, who thus arrived in time to assist in the decisive battle of the 8th.

General Pakenham, who had also arrived from England and taken command just previous to the advance, now concluded to abandon the idea of storming the American lines, and to commence his attack by a heavy cannonade, which should breach the works and silence their artillery. Accordingly thirty heavy guns were brought up from the ships, and were mounted, on the 31st, in six batteries, which opened fire next day.

The delay caused by bringing up the guns was improved by Jackson, and the American batteries were so strong by this time that they silenced the British fire and drove the artillerists from their pieces. This success was greatly contributed to by the flotilla and by the battery which Jackson had thrown up on the opposite side of the river, both of which took the enemy's line in flank. An attempt to turn the American left, by an attack from the swamp, was also defeated.

The success of a future attack seemed, therefore, to depend on silencing the battery across the river, and there was no way of doing so but to take it. To this end General Pakenham, who displayed certainly much energy, ordered Villeré's canal to be deepened so as to admit of passing the boats upon the Mississippi from the bayou, which should carry a detachment to the opposite shore. The canal being finished on January 6th, Pakenham ordered Colonel Thornton to cross the river on the night of the 7th and take the important battery.

The capture was to be announced by a signal rocket, when the main body was to commence its attack on Jackson's line. This programme of attack was very simple, and its failure in execution was not due to any ill conduct of the British troops.

The battery on the opposite bank was carried by 500 British, and was held during the main attack by Colonel Thornton, while the army of Pakenham performed prodigies of valor in the attempt to storm the works, but, as it is universally known, the courage of the troops sufficed only to increase their losses.

My object has been chiefly to exhibit clearly the difficulties of the landing, and to bring the enemy from his ships to the point where

the result of the expedition depends upon the fate of a battle on land; the chances, at this crisis, of the success or failure of the expedition may be calculated on general principles, seeing that all the marine probabilities which are especially under consideration, and at the outset of the expedition counted against it, are by this time eliminated.

It is sufficient, therefore, to state that in this short campaign the British lost near 5,000 men. In the battle of the 8th January General Lambert reported a loss of 2,070, and Colonel Haynes of 2,600.

The result of this tremendous defeat was the retreat of the whole force and their re-embarkation, an operation which was conducted with great energy and without serious loss. It was rendered tedious by the necessity that now existed of constructing a brush road over the swamp to the place where the troops must re-enter the boats. This road took nine days to construct, and it was not till the night of the 18th that the beaten army was ready to evacuate its position.

It regained the point of embarkation by a stolen night march, and finally found itself once more aboard the fleet, though the operation of transferring the troops to the vessels lasted several days, owing to the prevalence of foul weather, and the distance of the vessels, which were about a day's pull, in boats, from the shore.

While the points of this history remain unconfused by the accounts of more powerful expeditions, it will be well to deduce some conclusions from it that it will be useful to refer to in the sequel.

In the first place, it appears that a force of about 10,000 men succeeded in overcoming all the difficulties of concentration at one point, although starting in detached corps from the Mediterranean, France, England, and the West Indies. Next, they accomplished their debarkation at a place perhaps the worst adapted in the world for such operations, owing to the shallowness of the water and its muddy shores, and the contracted avenues to the objective point. Third, their advanced guard had actually reached the highway to New Orleans, and had but to disperse or defeat an army of about its own numerical force, and composed of irregular troops alone, in order to complete the success of the expedition.

That it did not do so must be imputed, *cæteris paribus*, to a want of military tact in the commander-in-chief, or his neglect of his duty; for had he informed himself of the number of his enemy's forces, it is plain that every rule of warfare would counsel him to attack at once, without giving time for intrenchments to be built and reinforcements to arrive.

That the expedition was not successful appears, therefore, to have been due first to the bad generalship of Packenham, and secondly to the genius and heroism of Jackson, who used to the uttermost the time, the locality, the resources at his disposal, and the militia under his command.

I repeat that the expedition was successful in so far that the result of it depended on military operations entirely disconnected with the fact of its being a maritime expedition, and that even in these operations the probabilities, as they would be estimated if the numbers

and tactical positions of the armies were alone considered, and the genius of Jackson left out of consideration, were greatly in favor of the invaders up to *the very moment when the retreat of the British began*. Even after the blunder of not marching at once on New Orleans; after the dilatory and undecided conduct of the British general between the 24th December and the 8th January, which gave Jackson time to consolidate his lines and batteries, and to double his army; and after the terrible slaughter of the British in the battle of the 8th, there was still an even chance, at least, for the commander-in-chief to reckon upon, provided only he had judgment and decision enough to appreciate and make use of it. I allude to the success of the enemy on the right bank, which would have been enough in the hands of a general like Jackson, had the British such a one, to insure the forcing of the American lines;* after that, the British would have been superior in numbers, artillery, and discipline; and if they were beaten in the open field, it would have been for want of a leader equal to the illustrious warrior whom Providence assigned to the command of our army.

This speculation upon the abstract probabilities which related to the battle of the 8th of January is offered merely as an exercise, as I may say, to assist the reader in understanding the general discussion in hand; it no more reflects on the imperishable glory of our arms to say that Jackson was outflanked at New Orleans, than to say that General Taylor was surrounded at Buena Vista. In both cases the disadvantages under which the generals labored enhance their reputation.

1847. The expedition which under Scott subjugated Mexico is still so fresh in the minds of Americans that I shall not refer to any other pages of its history than those which relate the manner in which the landing was effected.

As a military operation the landing will always be a model for imitation, both as to the arrangement of the plan and the details of its execution; the enemy were to the last moment in doubt as to the place selected for the debarkation, but even if they had divined it, or been secretly advised on the subject, the nature of the locality and the measures adopted by the general to cover the operation would have insured its success, though opposed by the whole disposable Mexican force.

The expedition, as is well known, rendezvoused at Lobos, where the army was organized; the troops detached from General Taylor's command had assembled by the end of January at Brazos St. Jago and Tampico, and were sent from thence to Lobos, a distance of about sixty miles; the rest of the troops arrived at the rendezvous from New Orleans.

On the second of March the transports all sailed for Anton Lizardo, and preparations were made for the landing, which General Scott

*In support of this view, see Jackson's despatch to the War Department, in which he says that "The enemy now occupied a position from which they might annoy us without hazard, and by means of which they might have been able to defeat, in a great measure, the effects of our success on this side the river."

decided to effect on the sandy beach, at a point west of Sacrificios island, and about three miles south of the city and castle of Vera Cruz.

One hundred and forty-four surf boats had been ordered for the landing, but sixty-five only had arrived; these were to be towed behind the ships from Anton Lizardo to the landing place, when the troops were to enter them, and make the shore under cover of the guns of the smaller vessels, which would be so disposed as to sweep the beach by their fire.

On the 9th Worth's division was put on board of the men-of-war and steamers, and those of Patterson and Twiggs, after filling up such vessels of the squadron as were not occupied by Worth's, were put into transports, which were towed by the steam vessels of the fleet.

The expedition, advancing in the above order, arrived about noon at the selected spot; the surf boats were immediately filled by the troops of Worth's division, which, upon gaining the beach, formed and marched forward to the sand hills, where they took up a position to protect the operation from any attack of the Mexicans.

The surf boats continued their trips with alacrity, and before next morning the entire army was established on the shore.

The landing of materiel and baggage continued without interruption until the 12th, when a heavy norther sprung up, causing such a surf that the operation had to cease entirely; this norther blew constantly (except a lull of a few hours on the 13th) until the 17th, when it abated, and the landing of stores and artillery was recommenced; the whole of the army materiel was not, from this cause, got on shore till the 24th, having been interrupted the third time on the 23d.

The army, in the mean time, had advanced on the city and completed the investment of it; a parallel and several batteries had been constructed, and on the 22d the bombardment commenced; the city was overwhelmed with shot and shell for four days, when its governor offered to capitulate.

Thus, in eighteen days from the time the expedition anchored off the beach, it had accomplished the preliminary and all-important measure of the campaign.

The Mexicans were deprived of the strategical advantages which were offered by the fortress, both in its character of a retreat for troops and harbor of refuge for privateers; the army also gained a secure base of operations, and was enabled to march on the capital by the paved road which leads to it from Vera Cruz.

In this descent an army of about 12,000 men was landed on an open beach, exposed to the most violent winds, and only three miles from a fortress and castle of the enemy. The landing of the provisions, artillery, and baggage was repeatedly interrupted by severe storms, but in spite of all these difficulties the expedition achieved, in a little over two weeks, a success which had been pronounced an impossibility by foreign military critics.

CHAPTER IV.

CONCLUSIONS.

A few important general conclusions may be drawn from the facts of Chapter III, and from the accounts in history of the descents made prior to 1400.

It appears that the seas have never proved a sufficient barrier to the aggressive spirit of powerful maritime States, even when the art of ship-building was comparatively in its infancy, and almost before the science of navigation came into existence; and that, when the compass was still uninvented, not to speak of the epochs when oars were the only propelling force employed, formidable expeditions, both as to numbers and equipments, have crossed seas and oceans, and have landed successfully on hostile shores.

In proportion as successive improvements in the construction of vessels have diminished the dangers which such invasions must hazard, before the debarkation has reduced the chances against them to the usual ones of land warfare, there appears a constant tendency in maritime nations towards exerting more of the national integral strength in this sort of warfare, and also a more frequent resort to it, both in schemes of conquest and as a means of distracting the enemy from the land warfare in which he may be simultaneously engaged.

The constant communication of an invading army with its ships, and by means of them with its own country, appears to be essential to the prosperous issue of these expeditions; and the chances for fulfilling this condition of success are directly influenced, like the probabilities in favor of a satisfactory landing, by the nature of the vessels at command—their seaworthiness, speed, and size, as well as number. Accordingly there can distinctly be traced, in the History of Maritime Expeditions, an increased probability of the success of the latter in proportion to the improvements in ships and navigation.

If these views are strongly sustained by the events of trans-oceanic warfare previous to the invention of steam, they are proved to be correct beyond dispute by the almost incredible impulse which that motive power has given to the aggressive spirit and military preparations of France, England, and Russia. Steam has done as much towards aggrandizing the aggressive strength of France and England, and the distances at which they can exert it, as the invention of the mariner's compass did towards enlarging the area of navigation.

Without much exaggeration it may be said that steam has so contracted and bridged the Atlantic that we are ten days' march from England and two from Halifax; but if this expression conveys a fair idea of the speed and certainty of the voyages of steam fleets, it is inadequate to represent the ease with which the journey is performed by the troops, and the facility with which the baggage and artillery are transported.

The Atlantic telegraph, also, whenever it is made serviceable, will be of immense advantage to the British. The intended movements

of our squadrons can be indicated in England simultaneously with their departure from our ports, and the operations of their fleets or expeditions, directed against them or our seaboard cities, can be guided from home with a double advantage as to time.

It may be said that the arguments I adduce only prove that our navy should be increased; but we must view the case as it is. Our navy is not only insignificant in size compared to those of France and England, but is likely to continue so.

Even, however, if it were equal in size to those of our rivals there would be enough for it to do in distressing our enemy's commerce and fighting his squadrons on the high seas, without leaving any force to spare for the passive defence of our coasts.

Besides, is not England, with her immense navy and powerful channel fleet, in constant apprehension of a descent by the French? Did not Wellington repeatedly caution the government against the dangers of invasion.

It seems certain that the chief difficulty to be provided for by the French, in their plans for invading England, is the uncertainty of keeping up the communications of the army landed with home. This is, as before remarked, very necessary, both for supplying reinforcements and against a contingency of a retreat.

The isolation of the invading army, and the impossibility of its making a retreat in case of failure, and therefore staked on the issue of a naval battle; and it is fair to presume that it is this risk which delays the order for the execution of a design which must be cherished by every French soldier and sailor.

In our case, however, this dissuading reflection is wanting to preserve our coast from insult; but the reader will need no assistance in making up his mind on the point immediately in question if he will glance over the subjoined condensed account of the British and American navies,

Indeed, there seems to be no necessity for insisting any further, even upon the main case which I have endeavored to make appear.

The conclusions that an unprejudiced reader of the account in question will arrive at, with regard to the military attitude of this country, cannot fail to be identical with those which I have, to the best of my ability, advanced and supported.

On the one hand there is given, in a late number of the Washington Union, the following statement of the United States naval force on active service.

Active service.

Line-of-battle ships	10	None serviceable.
Frigates	10	3 serviceable.
Sloops	21	All fit for active service.
Brigs	3	All in service.
Schooners	1	Useless.
Screw steamers, 1st class	6	5 ready for service.
Screw steamers, 1st class	2	Building.

Screw steamers, 2d class	6	1 serviceable, 5 building.
Screw steamers, 3d class	4	Inferior.
Screw steamers, 4th class	1	Inferior.
Side-wheel steamers	7	Effective.

Actual available force.

Frigates	3	150 guns.
Brigs	3	16 guns.
Sloops, screw	1	13 guns.
Paddle steamers	7	39 guns.
Sloops	21	388 guns.
Frigates, screw	5	172 guns.
Light screw	2	11 guns.
	42	789

Thus it will be seen that the government is prepared to send to sea at once, in case of war, only 42 vessels, sail and steam, of all classes, carrying 789 guns. In addition to these, it has at disposal 5 or 6 small steam vessels in the revenue and coast survey service, none of which, however, are fit for war purposes, except the Harriet Lane, a new paddle cutter of 650 tons.

On the other hand, the British navy is described as follows:

Great Britain has some 90 vessels of the line, carrying from 72 to 190 guns, the majority of them screw steamers. Her sailing vessels of the line are most of them in disuse, being used for receiving, store, and transport ships. Her screw propellers of this class carry long 32's and 8-inch guns, and one 10-inch pivot gun. She has some 30 large screw frigates, carrying heavy guns, most of them 8-inch. She is also building a class of steamers, several of which are in the water, designed to cope with our own new vessels of the first class.

Her present class of screw sloops are large vessels, of from one thousand two hundred to two thousand tons, carrying from twelve to twenty-four heavy 8-inch guns, with one pivot gun. She has about two hundred and fifty light steam vessels, all screw, divided as follows: Despatch vessels of six hundred and fifty tons and three hundred horse power each, carrying two or four 32-pounders and two pivot 8-inch guns; a class of vessels of about four hundred tons and one hundred horse power, carrying two howitzers and one 8-inch pivot.

Her third and most effective class of vessels are small screw gunboats, ranging from two hundred to three hundred tons burden, with from twenty to sixty horse power, carrying a light 8-inch gun or long 32-pounder and one or two 24 or 32-pound howitzers. Besides these she has between forty and fifty paddle steamers of various sizes: from the Terrible, of one thousand eight hundred tons and twenty guns, to the Pigmy, of fifty tons and one gun.

From this statement it will be seen that if she has men to man them, Britain can place thirty screw steamers of the line, twenty

screw frigates, forty screw sloops, and one hundred and fifty lighter steam vessels on the Atlantic coast, without decreasing the strength of any one of the fleets on other stations, and still have a large force to hold in reserve. In this enormous navy we find combined, to an almost incredible extent, the main requisites which I have shown to be essential to the success of naval military expeditions, viz: rapidity and precision of manœuvres and of combinations, as well as of voyages; speed and certainty of communications, and capacity and concentrated power in the vessels.

CHAPTER V.

On reviewing hastily the four chapters just concluded the following points will be found to have been incontestably established:

1. That the United States being, above all the powers in the world, in a condition to defy any other sorts of attack, will be, in any future war, subjected to a series of naval military expeditions, which shall have for object the destruction of the government naval establishments and the ruin of our commercial cities.

2. That these expeditions will be on a most immense scale, and formidable, as well from the late scientific and military improvements in warfare as from the numbers of the troops and the rapidity and certainty of the descent.

3. That these expeditions will follow immediately upon the declaration of war, be simultaneous with it, or even be themselves the only announcement of hostilities, may be inferred from the usage of nations, and of Great Britain especially, during the last fifty years.

4. And, lastly, it will certainly happen that those of our seaboard cities will be first attacked which offer the richest prizes, and which it would affect the country most to ruin, (commercially or materially,) and which possess the least capacity of resistance.

5. These expeditions may be of an entirely naval character* or they may be descents in which the fleet would co-operate with the land forces, either offensively or merely as forming and protecting the communications and retreat† of an army of debarkation; or it may serve in both of these capacities. ‡

It is against attacks of our seaports by fleets alone that the seacoast fortifications of the United States are intended; this appears from the nature of the works themselves, which are mostly stone castles looking upon entrances§ to harbors, or on roadsteads, where they merely prevent an enemy's fleet from effecting a rendezvous or taking shelter or making their station|| for blockading purposes. This, also, is the

* Such as Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt; French attack on San Juan de Ulloa; attack on Copenhagen in 1801 by Nelson and Parker; projected attack on Cronstadt; bombardments of Odessa and Kimburn.

† Pakenham's and Washington expeditions.

‡ Sevastopol, Bomarsund, and Kertch.

§ Fort Warren, Fort Sumter, Fort Delaware, Fort Richmond, Fort Schuyler.

|| Castle Calhoun, fort at Sandy Hook, Fort Taylor, and fort at Ship Island, Fort Jefferson.

theory which is stated expressly in the written reports of the Chief Engineer of the army, and it is especially laid down in the assemblage of letters by several of the highest officers of the Engineer Corps, which is to be found in General Totten's report on the national defences of 1851.

6. I therefore propose, as a supplement to the official system of American fortifications, a plan for defending the seacoast cities from naval descents, of which the essential features are—1st, the use of fortifications of a cheap description and adapted to the range of the Minie rifle or its equivalent, the new regulation United States rifle musket; and 2d, that the main reliance, in the defence of these works, is the militia and volunteer regiments belonging to the city which may be attacked.

The city of New York—with its great material wealth in private and public buildings and stores, its navy and ship yards, its factories, machine shops, and foundries, and its other workshops of all kinds—is, in itself, a worthy object for a grand expedition; but the incentives to an enemy to attempt such an enterprise would include, besides, the hope of paralyzing, to a certain extent, the trade of those great districts of country of which New York is the commercial centre.

But although the loss to the country in general which would spring from the bombardment and conflagration of New York would be severe, (the manner in which that event would be felt it is unnecessary to explain to practical business men,) I need not dilate on it here; for the readers to whom I address myself are especially New Yorkers, who ought not to need any additional stimulus to interest them in the matter than the possibility of lasting injury to the city which their boldness, enterprise, and perseverance have placed first among all competitors on the western continent.

I say lasting injury, for it is certain that the country at large would recover from the shock of a blow struck upon New York much sooner than could the latter, individually, which must remain for a long time a maimed member of the general system; while, to carry out the analogy, the vital streams of trade which now circulate through it, being directed into other channels for the time, would so aggrandize the neighboring ports, that their rivalry might be of material hindrance to the restoration of the city in its former pre-eminent position.

The citizens of New York have always shown themselves solicitous for the safety of their port, and in every case where the necessity of fortifications has been pointed out by engineer officers they have been prodigal of their efforts to secure appropriations for the building of them.

They have done their share towards the work of making the city perfectly secure from all foreign aggression, and it must be with great difficulty that they will listen to the unwelcome assertion that the defences which they have been assured are all sufficient for the purpose are far from being so; that their powerful protection from attacks, in one quarter at least, is an illusion; that, supposing an enemy's army landed on Long Island, the immunity from a bombardment is to follow from certain scientific and strategical influences (which the fortifica-

tions are to exert) which shall deter him from approaching the city by roads which are entirely unprotected.

It will be enough for a man of common sense to be informed that the barriers to an enemy's advance are not *material and visible* for him to despise them; and certainly if an enemy does not see any ahead of him, he will not be as apt as a less interested party to listen to an argument showing that it is highly dangerous for him to advance and prosecute his enterprise.

Here is a prize worth more than Sevastopol, Copenhagen, Bomarsund, Kimburn, or Kertch, as booty to an enemy; and which would be double the loss to this country than it would profit its destroyers; and it lies as open to attack, from several quarters, as if not a cent had been spent on its defences. A chain is no stronger than its weakest link; and any one opening by which the city can be approached is as good as two, or three, or as a free entrance in all directions. I will not, at present, discuss the question whether or no the castles which are set on the banks of the water avenues to the city will altogether bar the passage of any foreign fleets and flotillas; but, taking it for granted that heavy guns and mortars cannot be brought *afloat* against the city, will proceed to demonstrate that they can be, and very readily, by an enemy which should rendezvous at Halifax, voyage for forty-eight hours in steam vessels and in transports towed by steam if necessary, and, arriving in Long Island Sound, disembark in one of the numerous harbors of that quiet lake, and march upon Brooklyn with a force of say 70,000 or 100,000 men, and with a train of light mortars and howitzers, by which the entire city would be reduced to ashes by firing across the East river. As an alternative, the city might be required to give up as prizes of war the naval stores and ships-of-war in the harbor, the American merchant ships in port, and furnish, in addition, a contribution of as many millions of dollars as the pressing necessity might make the loss preferable to the other threatened evils.

CHAPTER VI.

DEFENCE OF NEW YORK AGAINST A NAVAL MILITARY EXPEDITION.

The Official Theory and Practice analyzed and criticised.

In the report, to the Secretary of War, of General Totten, Chief Engineer, of 1840, which is substantially repeated, in essential respects, in his "Report on the National Defences," of 1851, we find that the theory of the defence of New York, according to which all its fortifications have been and are to be made, is as follows:

1. To prevent a fleet from appearing before the city and bombarding it; to this end there are a certain number of castles built on the shores of the bay and East river.

At the Narrows are Forts Lafayette, Hamilton, and Richmond, and batteries Hudson and Morton. Across the channel, at this point, is to be stretched a strong boom, which shall stop an enemy's fleet, or delay it long enough to give the forts time to cripple or destroy it. A work on the site of Fort Tompkins, and a battery to rake the beach, are in construction. The former is to remedy the ill location of Fort Richmond and the dislocated arrangement of the whole system on Staten Island.

In the second line behind these, on this approach, and close to the city, are Fort Columbus and Castle William and South Battery on Governor's Island, and a trifling work on Ellis' Island. These were originally built to effect all the purposes of the works below, but are now chiefly of value as tending to discourage an enemy from running the gauntlet of the lower works, with the idea of receiving their fire without reply, and revenging himself on the city.

To close the avenue presented by the East river, there are two forts, opposite each other, on Throg's Neck and Willet's Point. (One of these is not yet begun.)

2. To prevent a hostile fleet from taking position in the lower bay, (Sandy Hook bay,) and thence blockading this entrance of the port, a castle is to be built on Sandy Hook.

3. To prevent an enemy from disembarking on Long Island, or on the main land, and marching on the city, with a train of mortars and howitzers, to bombard it, we have nothing but the same works, which are said to effect this purpose, totally distinct from the other, by the following *theory*: To prevent a hostile fleet from landing an army at Gravesend bay, below the Narrows, the (unbuilt) fort on Sandy Hook is supposed to suffice, because it bears on the main ship channel within cannon range. This power of being capable of firing on the enemy's ships while they are traversing the distance of two miles within $1\frac{1}{4}$ mile of the fort is supposed, as it appears from General Totten's report of 1856, sufficiently formidable to hinder the conception of the enterprise. Other engineer officers yield the point that Sandy Hook might be passed, if not by day, at least by night, by such an expedition, or that the fleet, instead of passing by Sandy Hook, might, as urged by Major Chase, take the East, or the 14-foot channel, and arrive at Gravesend bay without coming within range of the fort; but they say that, even if arrived here, the enemy could not land his troops, owing to the fire of the forts at the Narrows.

On the East river General Totten supposes that the landing would be stopped, or its object frustrated, by the works at Throg's and Willet's Points, owing to the following causes: The enemy would not land on the main land below Fort Schuyler, because he would have more than twenty miles to march on New York, and would have to cross the Harlem river. He would, it is pretended, be prevented from landing on Long Island by the fort on Willet's Point, which has a *strategetical bearing* on his advance on Brooklyn. This is a fair statement; for in General Totten's report of 1840 we find—

“But should he land on the Long Island side, he might, by leaving parties in suitable positions with a view to prevent our crossing the

river and falling on his rear, make a dash at the navy yard, having no obstacle in his front.

“To prevent this effectually, and also to accomplish other objects, a work should be erected at Willet’s Point, opposite Throg’s Point.

“This work * * would involve a march against the navy yard from this quarter in great danger, since all the forces that could be collected on the New York side might, under cover of this work, be crossed over to Long Island and fall on the rear of the enemy, *cutting off his communication with the fleet.*”

In short, we have the works of New York built on the following theory :

1st. To stop fleets from sailing up to the city, forts, castles, and batteries, which oppose the passage by their fire, and which are to be aided by the material obstacle of booms stretched across the water.

2d. A work to prevent a fleet from making a resort of Sandy Hook bay.

3d. To prevent an expedition from marching on the city, after landing on the main land below Throg’s Neck, the natural barrier of the Harlem river is to be defended by troops in the field.

4th. To prevent an expedition from marching on the city, after landing on Long Island, below the work on Willet’s Point, reliance is placed *entirely on his fear of attacks on his rear* by troops issuing from that work.

5th. To prevent a landing in Gravesend bay, within ten miles of Brooklyn, it is supposed that the fleet must pass within range of a projected, but yet uncommenced, work at Sandy Hook, and that it would be deterred from doing so by fear of the damage it would sustain. And I will here add the opinion of individual officers, that, even if it did pass, the anchoring and landing in Gravesend bay would be so cannonaded that the operation would be impossible.

The above is a fair and accurate exposition of the entire system of the fortifications of New York.

It has always, however, been considered by some eminent officers of the corps that the system is faulty in theory, and it is so, in my opinion, both in theory and execution.

Avoiding discussion for the present of the first three points, let us consider the fourth and fifth, to which this memoir relates.

It has always been asserted by Major Chase, and by the late Major Sanders, of the Engineer Corps, that a landing in Gravesend bay is perfectly practicable; the sailing past Sandy Hook at night by the large ships is easy enough, and the losses would be far from checking the progress of a powerful fleet of vessels, capable, as ships-of-the-line and frigates are, of receiving a great number of shots, and sustaining the fire of forts for hours. Smaller vessels can enter New York bay by the East channel, which does not lie within range of Sandy Hook, and gun-boats can pass within a stone’s throw of the point of Coney Island. But this main ship channel might, as Major Chase insists, be avoided altogether; for, provided the expedition were altogether conveyed in light draught vessels, it might take the 14-foot channel, which leads to Gravesend bay, without passing under the

fire of Sandy Hook; there is, indeed, no doubt of the practicability of either of these passages.

As to the anchorage and beach of Gravesend bay being within and under the fire of the works at the Narrows, that would appear, if so, to be an accidental circumstance, from the following considerations: Fort Hamilton, the nearest one, is built in a hollow, and is prevented by a ridge of land, which lies between it and Gravesend bay, from seeing the latter, except from the upper or barbette battery of the side which bears upon it; now, this side, like the side fronting on the Narrows, is casemated, and its scarp wall is pierced with embrasures for guns, so that if the fort, identically as it stands, had been built on top of the said ridge, a hundred yards to the southward of its present site, instead of behind it, there would have been, in addition to the nine or ten barbette guns that can now be directed on Gravesend bay, a complete tier of guns in casemate, which latter have always been valued by the Engineer Department at a much higher rate than guns in barbette. As, however, this advantage, which, at a time when bomb-proof floating batteries were unknown, was really of great importance, was neglected, for no sufficient reason, and for no cause, as far as the shape, construction, or cost of construction of the work was concerned, we must conclude that the action of Fort Hamilton upon Gravesend bay, as prohibiting or interfering with debarkations, was not an element of the design of the fort.

This view is strengthened by considering that when the fort was built our largest guns were 32 and 42-pounders, with an extreme range of about 1,900 yards, obtained with the maximum charge and elevation; now, if the work were furnished only with an armament of these, the further beach of Gravesend bay would be a mile beyond the range of its guns, even if it were seated on the ridge above mentioned.

Another argument in support of the opinion that the works at the Narrows were not originally intended to prevent debarkations on Gravesend beach is to be found by examining Fort Lafayette, which stands just in advance of Fort Hamilton, on a shoal in the Narrows.

This fort is square, and one face has a view down and one up the Narrows; an angle is thus left bearing across the Narrows, so that its guns cannot be directed square across; this is probably because of the works in that quarter on the opposite side, which might otherwise be in danger from chance shots from this work; but another angle bears nearly towards Gravesend bay, and thus no guns could be mounted, except the two in the angle itself, having a bearing in the necessary direction to interfere with a debarkation on its beach; and what renders this view still more evident is, that the face which bears most directly on the said beach is not provided with embrasures for cannon, but is merely *loop-holed for the use of musketry*.

As to the redoubt behind Fort Hamilton, one face of it sees the bay, but it has no more guns on the side which bears in this direction than on either of the other three, viz: three guns, one at each end of the face, and one in the middle, the redoubt mounting in all eight guns.

If, to get General Totten's opinion on this subject, we consult his

“Reports” of 1840 and 1851 to the Secretary of War, we find the following recommendations, which relate directly to it. In the first place, he recommends the construction of works, one on the east bank, a shoal to the eastward of the channel, and one on another called the *middle ground*, as “an outer barrier at the very mouth of the harbor:” to prevent access to the inner harbor, and thus to render a close blockade of the harbor impossible, and obliging an enemy, disposed to debark an army, to land at or near Rockaway, on the beach exposed to the ocean and storms.

He says expressly, that, without some “outer barrier” of this sort, a squadron would land a force on the beach of Gravesend bay, within seven miles of the city of Brooklyn, of its commanding heights, and of the navy yard, with no intervening obstacle of any sort.

“This danger is imminent, and it would not fail, in the event of war, to be as fully realized as it was during the last war, when, on the rumor of an expedition being in preparation in England, 27,000 militia were assembled to cover the city from an attack of this sort. It is apparent that the defences near the city and those at the Narrows, indispensable as they are for other purpose, cannot be made to prevent this enterprise.”

General Totten subsequently admits that there is great doubt whether the shoals mentioned are stable enough to warrant building upon, and says that, “all other means failing, works may be erected on Sandy Hook, which will have a *good action* on the channel, and under cover of which bomb-ketches, or steam batteries, or both, may lie.

“With such an arrangement, there would be little probability of the lower bay being occupied as a blockading station.”

To sum up, General Totten substantially admits, 1st, that the works at the Narrows will not prevent a landing at Gravesend bay;

2d. That it requires works that shall close the exterior mouth of the harbor, to prevent such a landing;

3d. He proposes to do *what he can* towards this by a work at Sandy Hook.

Now, the East channel runs in a convex line with regard to Sandy Hook, and its nearest edge at the closest point is 6,000 yards from it, or a mile beyond any possible range of our heaviest ordnance. This channel is deep except where it crosses the bar, where there is, at low water, always 19 feet.

By this channel, transports could enter freely, even supposing the fort at Sandy Hook built, while their protecting fleet of liners and frigates could either enter at night, or hastily by day, by the main ship channel.

According to General Totten’s own showing, therefore, the landing at Gravesend bay is a thing to be expected in our next war.

It is worth while, however, at this point, to endeavor to ascertain for ourselves how the case really is: whether the forts at the Narrows can prevent a debarkation in Gravesend bay or not; and this will not give us much trouble, since we have only to consider the distance of

the forts from the anchorage and beach, and compare this with the distance that the heaviest guns in our service will carry.

Forts Hamilton and Lafayette are the nearest works to Gravesend beach, lying on the same side of the Narrows; the distance from these to the point of Coney Island, which is the nearest part of the further half of the beach, is $2\frac{3}{8}$ miles, while it is $2\frac{7}{8}$ miles to the furthest part of the same half, which is the edge of Coney Island itself; so that there is a quiet landing place of some two miles in extent, none of which lies closer to Fort Hamilton than $2\frac{3}{8}$ miles, and the greatest part of which is nearly 3 miles from the same point. As to the works on Staten Island, Battery Hudson, on the side of the high bank which forms a point into the bay, and which is the nearest point of Staten Island to Gravesend bay, is $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the further edge of the channel, where it passes Coney Island and the entrance to Gravesend bay, and is $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the beach of the latter on the near or inner side of Coney Island.

The 10-inch columbiad, with a charge of 18 lbs., and firing a shell of 100 lbs., will carry, at the angle of greatest range, 35° , (see Thiroux, page 351,) as far as 4,828 yards, according to the Ordnance Manual.

But, lately, it has been found that this charge is too heavy for the piece, which is very apt to burst with it; and by a recommendation of the Ordnance Board, approved by the Secretary of War, the charge for 10-inch columbiads is restricted to 14 lbs. at the utmost, with the additional restriction of not firing solid shot from them.

Likewise, the 8-inch columbiads are restricted, by this regulation, to charges not exceeding 8 lbs. Their maximum charge was formerly 15 lbs., which, with a shell, and at the elevation of $27\frac{1}{2}^\circ$, gave a range of 4,468 yards.

What is the diminution of range that follows from a reduction of the charges of 10-inch and 8-inch columbiads, respectively $\frac{1}{4}$ and $\frac{1}{2}$, (nearly,) I am not able to say; but we may suppose that it will not be less than $\frac{1}{8}$ and $\frac{1}{4}$ of the ranges of the respective pieces.

This will fix the maximum range of our 10 and 8-inch columbiads at 4,225 and 3,351 yards, or, in other words, they will not carry as far as $2\frac{1}{2}$ or 2 miles, respectively.

It must be recollected that there is, with these ranges, owing to the elevation, *no ricochet*; and, also, that there is no sort of accuracy of fire at high elevations. On this point, Sir H. Douglas says that "elevation is, inversely, the exponent of accuracy."

At $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from the battery, therefore, an enemy's vessel cannot be reached at all; and for, say, a half mile inside of this distance, she runs very little risk of being struck.*

Now, the distance from Staten Island to the further side of the main ship channel, where it passes in front of the anchorage of Gravesend bay, behind Coney Island, being $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles, and it being $3\frac{1}{2}$ miles to the shores of the bay, it is a matter of certainty that the largest men-of-war can come to an anchor, in a line parallel to the shore in ques-

* While on this subject, it may be noted that these facts show that the 10-inch seacoast mortar is equally effective in range and accuracy with the columbiads.

tion, and protect the landing of an army by their heavy guns, being themselves out of the reach of any annoyance from the batteries on Staten Island, and in perfect safety also from storms; the shallower waters of the bay would admit all sorts of gun-boats and light draught vessels, and the launches, &c., of the men-of-war.

The large vessels lying, as supposed, opposite Coney Island, would also be $2\frac{1}{2}$ miles from Forts Lafayette and Hamilton, and consequently out of the range of their guns, while the gun-boats, flatboats, or launches used in the debarkation, could land the troops, all along the inside sheltered beach of the island, without running more than a trifling risk. This would occur in passing by the point, which lies just inside of the extreme range. Immediately beyond this, however, the beach retreats so as to be altogether out of reach. In short, the debarkation of a foreign army at Gravesend bay is at this moment entirely feasible.

After the pains to which I have put the reader that he may convince himself of the fact that a debarkation on Gravesend beach is easy, and not to be greatly incommoded, much less prohibited, by the fire of any existing or projected fortifications, he will be surprised to learn that, even if the beach in question were under the fire of some of our works, or if from any other reason there should be objections, on the part of the supposed expedition, to the landing of the army upon it, there are *equal facilities for the latter, out of sight, as well as out of range, of all our forts upon the outer or seabeach of Coney Island.*

To explain this, I must briefly describe the lower bay of New York, which is not to be judged of (except by persons used to the sea) by looking at the charts.

This lower bay is an immense sheet of water, which has the shape on the map of an equilateral triangle, with sides of 15 miles each, the points being at Amboy, the Narrows, and the Highlands. Two sides are bounded by Staten Island and Jersey; while the third side, which lies due north and south, is partly limited by Coney Island and by Sandy Hook, opposite each other, while the intervening space of 7 miles is open, APPARENTLY, to the ocean.

I say apparently, because "THE BAR," which is at two places dry at low water, stretches entirely across the space, which, lying between Coney Island and the Hook, seems to admit freely the waves of the Atlantic.

There are several channels across the bar, by which vessels find an exit, more or less round about, according to their draught of water; the heaviest class being obliged to follow down along the inside of it, in a due southerly course, till they come nearly opposite the Hook, when they turn suddenly square to the east, and so stand out to sea.

The track thus followed by the heaviest vessels is called the main ship channel, and it is, and is constantly being used, as a harbor; vessels of all sizes anchor in it, and it is considerably smoother in easterly weather than the regular quarantine anchorage off Seguin's Point, because the latter, which has the same shield from the waves, namely, the bar, is more remote from it.

In an east or southeast gale there is, on the east bank, (which is that part of the bar which stretches three miles from Coney Island

without any channel, and which is, at one point, bare at low water,) a continuous line of breakers, which are so violent that they can be seen dashing and throwing up foam from Fort Hamilton; and the force of the sea is thus altogether spent, so that on the inside or west of the bank there is no more than a regular swell, in which vessels of all tonnage can safely ride at anchor, especially as there is good holding ground of mud and sand.*

The only difference that would be felt by this harbor, if Coney Island, instead of the east bank, sheltered it on the east, would be, that it would be protected from the force of the wind as well as waves; but, with good holding tackle, the wind can do no harm, and a vessel properly provided with it can lie behind the east bank as safely, if not as comfortably, as in the North river.

The landing would be, of course, effected in fine weather, (and there are, indeed, few days in summer when the weather is heavy enough from the eastward to prevent,) and might take place with perfect safety on the outer beach of Coney Island. Along this beach there are no breakers in moderate weather, and the swell is mostly stopped at the outside of the east bank, so that flatboats and launches could make short and easy trips between the ships and the shore.

The whole operation would be entirely out of the reach of the guns of any of the forts, and the beach itself is hidden altogether from the latter by the row of sand hills which form the high part of the island.

There is, therefore, a certainty that a foreign army can be debarked on the outer beach of Coney Island, and that it may maintain communication with its fleet, (the latter having a safe anchorage,) and with Halifax, Bermuda, or England, by means of the 14-foot and the East channels, without possible molestation from any works that are now built, or that have been projected or named by the Engineer Bureau.

But the peril from another quarter is still more evident, and there is, if possible, still less to say for the official theory of the defence.

Long Island sound is practically an immense roadstead, and on the Long Island side there are smaller bays and harbors which offer every facility for landing troops and stores.

Such are Smithtown bay, Huntington bay, Oyster bay, Hempstead harbor, and Manhasset bay, at 40, 30, 20, and 15 miles from New York, respectively.

It cannot be denied, and in fact it is essentially taken for granted by General Totten himself in the report (of 1840) that a landing may be expected in one of these bays.

What, then, is to prevent the enemy from marching on Brooklyn? Nothing, according to General Totten's plan, unless the commander-in-chief of the expedition has his head so filled with obsolete military science that he will not "leave a fortress in his rear."

* This reference to storms must not lead to the impression that they are to be expected in summer weather, which is the time when an expedition would probably appear off our coasts; on the contrary, the whole season may pass without a single violent gale; but I have said enough to show that even the worst weather would not damage a hostile fleet which should station itself just below Coney Island, to land an army, and to keep communications with it and the sea.

It is entirely to the chance of the hostile expedition being commanded by a man who has notions exploded sixty years ago by Napoleon, that New York depends for safety.

Should nothing more be done than I have been able to find recommended officially to check such an expedition, we will have, as a consolation for the plundering and destruction of the cities of New York and Brooklyn and the navy yard, the honest but fruitless justification of the Austrian, Melas: "This Bonaparte violates all the rules of scientific warfare."

CHAPTER VII.

CONSIDERATIONS BEARING UPON A NEW DEFENSIVE PLAN.

Something more effectual than is yet proposed by our Chief Engineer is requisite to stop the approach upon New York of a great military naval expedition, with all the appliances of modern war, and counting its 50,000 or 70,000 men.

That we must be prepared for such a contingency cannot be denied in the face of the facts and numbers of Chapter III; and it follows that it is proper to decide at once what is the plan which shall offer us the most chances of success in the short but severe campaign which we may soon, perhaps, be engaged in, in the protection of the soil, of our commerce, our public works, and our dwellings, from the fate of Washington and Copenhagen.

In arranging such a plan of action we must consider—

1. The nature of the army that is to be resisted ;
2. That of our own troops ;
3. The topography of Long Island, including the probable landing points ; the line of march of an invading army, the positions to receive the attack in ;
4. The choice of positions for the defence, and the manner in which localities may be taken advantage of to increase the chances in our favor ;
5. Finally, the best manner of combining artificial, permanent, and field works with the natural advantages of ground, so as to attain enough strength without excessive expense.

An attempt to depreciate the citizen soldiery of America, her best safeguard, would be as incompatible with my feelings as it is remote from my intentions.

I need not be reminded of the victories that our militia and volunteers gained in the late war over veteran troops, recently draughted from the splendored peninsular army of Wellington ; nor of their successes in Mexico, which rival in daring and romantic brilliancy the exploits of the soldiers of Cortez, and which they did not decline to purchase with losses almost unparalleled in warfare.*

*I refer of course to the proportion of the killed and wounded to the number of troops engaged.

What our citizen troops have done, they can perform again. Such armies as were victorious under Jackson, Scott, and Taylor, are undoubtedly competent to meet in the field any foreign ones of equal force.

But our history offers no precedent of engagements between armies of European proportions ; and the experience of other nations proves that, in proportion to the numbers engaged, discipline and unity of action become more and more indispensable to success. When bodies of 50,000 or 100,000 on a side meet in the open field, individual bravery, even when stimulated by patriotism, is less to be prized than perfect mutual and reciprocal confidence between the troops, their officers, and their commander ; and this cannot be infused at once into an army, but requires for its development years of active service, which perfect each man in the knowledge of his duties, give him the habit of implicit obedience, and confirm his respect for his superiors.

It is, no doubt, by this principle that Wellington would have justified his boast that, "with 70,000 such troops," as he commanded in the peninsula, "he could go anywhere and do anything."

History offers examples where armies, not wanting in courage, have found their very numbers a disadvantage in battle, and the occasion of immense losses in retreat.*

The British and French troops of the present day are not inferior to any that have been heretofore opposed to our arms. Their campaigns in India, Algeria, and the Crimea, have tempered them to the highest pitch of efficiency.

As to numbers, it is reasonable to count upon a hundred thousand such being thrown at once upon our coast ; while in point of arms and equipments, we may expect that an invading expedition would be amply provided ; for their recent experience has shown our rivals exactly what is needed, and in what quantity, in undertakings of this sort.

If we fancy such a force, fresh from the ships, with their arms, clothes, and shoes in good order, and with only a day or two days' march to perform in order to behold their point of destination, stimulated, too, by the promise of plunder and prize money, we have surely a picture calculated to excite uneasiness, and give us cause to cast about for the most certain means of safety in such an emergency.

In calculating beforehand the chances of a battle, there must be considered not only the probabilities of victory, but the result to be derived from it, and the consequences of defeat.

*Take the battle of Narva, for instance, in which 80,000 Russians, behind intrenchments, were beaten by the advanced guard of the army of Charles XII, composed of 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 infantry, or 8,000 men in all. The Russians lost in this battle 18,000 men in killed, besides a great number who were drowned in attempting to retreat over the bridge of the Narva ; their left wing, also, which had not been engaged, laid down its arms the next day when the Swedes prepared to attack it in turn. Charles thus made 30,000 prisoners, but he contented himself with ordering them home.

Charles had landed with 20,000 men ; but was so impatient to raise the siege of Narva, that he pushed on with his best troops, routed three Russian corps on the way, and on the third day appeared before the Russian lines. His artillery immediately played upon and breached the earth-works on the right, when he led his fatigued troops, after a short test, to the assault. Voltaire gives the Russians of that time the same character for bravery that the Eastern war has since rendered indisputable, and attributes this defeat to their want of discipline and the habit of warfare.

If in the battle which will perhaps decide the possession, for example, of Long Island, our arms should be successful, the fruits of victory, beyond the glory acquired, would be of a negative kind, being limited to the keeping of what we have already got ; for the losses would be about equal, and the enemy's ships would receive his beaten troops, and protect by their broadsides their embarkation. If, on the contrary, our troops should be beaten, there would be no possibility of preventing the enemy from advancing without delay to Brooklyn heights and the shore of the East river, and there erecting a few mortar and howitzer batteries, with which to either burn down New York, or compel the alternative of a ransom that would impoverish the city ; as to the navy yard, it would be a fair object for destruction.

In a word, an American defeat on Long Island would involve the greaest misfortunes that could occur to New York and Brooklyn ; while, on the other hand, a victory would be rewarded with no substantial and material gains.

In this game, where the stakes are so disproportioned, we should at least endeavor to have great odds in our favor.

If, therefore, we could even calculate on opposing to a foreign army, landed on Long Island, a force equal in numbers and discipline, or which should make up in numbers for any inferiority in discipline, it would still be desirable to favor our troops with every advantage that can be derived from fortification ; and if the aids of the engineer are not to be disdained in this hypothesis, how much ought they to be prized in the actual case ; for it is certain that we shall never see a disciplined American army of 80,000 or 100,000 men on Long Island ; and it is equally true that no number of raw troops that could be collected on the island would be a match, *in the field*, for 80,000 or 100,000 veteran troops.

Considering that the maintaining of large regular armies is prohibited by the nature of our institutions, it happens fortunately that imperfectly disciplined troops are so well adapted as they are to the defence of intrenchments and fortifications ; indeed, in this sort of warfare, they have, in many instances, surpassed regular troops in obstinacy and devotedness.

Irregular or undisciplined troops in large masses fail in the field because such is the natural course of events ; but place the same men behind intrenchments, or otherwise, in such a manner that the duty of each consists in defending his post, and you eliminate from the adverse chances all those which follow from the impossibility of using the army on the battlefield like a tremendous machine ; concentrating at one point, perhaps, and feigning retreat at another—extending or contracting the order of battle, surrounding, outflanking, or surprising the enemy—in short, if irregular troops, composed of brave and good marksmen, do not defend intrenchments against odds, even of the best soldiers, it is the fault of the intrenchments, or of the manner in which they are disposed in them, or of their commander.

It has, therefore, been the custom of generals in command of raw levies to accustom them to war by engaging them constantly in small affairs, or, if compelled to accept battle, to select a strong position

that cannot be attacked except in front, and intrench it as much as possible. In arranging the troops care is taken to obviate the necessity of changing materially their posts during the engagement.

The general who is charged with the defence of Brooklyn will, therefore, look about him for a favorable position, which shall, besides offering facilities for fortification, be situated directly in the path of an enemy landed on any probable part of Long Island, and which cannot be outflanked.

This selection involves, of course, a thorough personal examination of the general features of the coast, its harbors and beaches, and with the topography of the island, its hills, plains, and roads, its towns and villages, from one end to the other.

PART II.

CHAPTER I.

DESCRIPTION OF LONG ISLAND.

Long Island is about 100 miles long; its outer or southern shore is a sandy beach, protected from the direct effect of easterly storms by keys, or sandy strips, which enclose between themselves and the main land extensive bays; these last, though shallow, have some deep channels, which permit small coasting vessels to navigate them. The largest of these bays are Jamaica bay, Great South bay, and Great West bay.

On the north shore we see, instead of level sandy plains, bounded by bays of the south side, high bluffs or grassy hills, with clean gravelly beaches at their base; the general line of shore is indented by several safe and extensive harbors, which admit ships of the largest class. The principal of these are Huntington and Oyster bays.

The whole sound may in fact be regarded, as far as large vessels are concerned, as one harbor, for there is good anchorage and plenty of water throughout it, and it hardly ever happens that there is in summer such a storm on it as to oblige vessels to seek shelter; besides, when such is the case, shelter can always be obtained by running across the sound to the windward side of it, and anchoring under the lee of the land.

The eastern end of the island is forked, and the broad expanse between the two points, Montauk and Oyster Pond, is so protected by these and by some islands that there are numerous safe bays and harbors.

Gardiner's and Peconic bays, with Sag and Fort Pond harbors, are the principal of these.

To describe Long Island with regard to the facilities it offers for a landing by a foreign army, it may be said that in the summer months a landing is practicable everywhere round its shore. In case of

severe easterly weather, which may be looked for in winter, and occasionally in the spring and fall, the outer beach is covered by breakers, and the inlets into the bays on this side are dangerous to enter; but in all weather, except north, northwest, and northeast storms, which need not be expected except in the fall or winter gales, a landing can be effected on the north side; and during these gales, when we will suppose a fleet separated for a couple of days from its land force, it can find shelter, within a short distance, under the north shores of the sound, whence it can return and resume its communications with the force debarked the same day that the storm ceases.

As to the east end of the island, the facilities are perfect for landing and keeping up communications with the force landed, except in extraordinary weather.

At the west end, Gravesend bay and Coney Island offer every facility for debarkations; but of this a practical proof was given us in 1776 by the British, and I have before discussed their capacities.

The topography of Long Island needs but a short description.

A chain or ridge of hills runs from Gravesend bay to Oyster Pond Point. These hills are perhaps from 130 to 170 feet high, with well wooded or grassy slopes. The hills are of gravel, with some clay.

On the north side the slopes of the hills descend, covered with green, to the waters of the sound; at their foot is a narrow beach of sand and gravel, which goes off suddenly into deep water.

At a few points the hills have been undermined by the waves, and present steep gravel banks with boulders at their base.

On the south side the hills terminate in a fine undulating plain, which becomes flat and sandy as it approaches the ocean.

The only exception to this rule is at Great West bay, where a range of low hills commences, and continues so as to form the eastern fork of the island, which terminates at Montauk Point.

The farms on Long Island are, on the average, of a fair productiveness, and these would no doubt be taxed to the utmost to aid in the support of a foreign force occupying the island.

The topography of Long Island is, therefore, such as to lend itself easily to all sorts of military operations and manœuvres, and the roads which traverse the country, especially the longitudinal ones, favor the latter to a considerable degree.

Thus we have the Long Island railroad, which joins Brooklyn to Greenport; and there are numerous plank roads and macadamized and shell roads, all terminating in Brooklyn, and favoring combined concentric marches of several columns upon that city.

The essential facts of a military nature that relate to Long Island may be summed up in a few words: that it is perfectly easy for a foreign army to debark on its shores at any time and march upon Brooklyn, keeping up constant communication with its ships, and supplying itself, to a certain extent, with provisions from the country. The great extent of coast open to attack and the nature of the shores, which are, unfortunately, exposed everywhere to the broadsides of men-of-war, render it extremely improbable that an American army

could anticipate and repel the attempt of a grand expedition to debark a land force.

The overwhelming batteries of a fleet, the uncertainty as to the time or place of the attempt, and the harassing nature of the movements of a defensive army which should endeavor to show front to a fleet in all its manœuvres; all these considerations render it extremely impolitic to trust to the repelling of an attempt to land an army on Long Island. The other alternative is, that of fighting the enemy after he has landed; and a defensive battle is indicated as offering the most chances of success by the nature of our troops and the necessities of the occasion.

If a defensive battle is decided on, it is of the highest importance to select, in advance, the position on which it is to be fought, and this leads us at once to inquire whether there is any one position which will interdict the approach of an enemy upon Brooklyn, no matter what point of the island he has landed at?

I believe I can indicate a position which not only satisfies the above condition rigorously, but also combines unusual military advantages with the property, of capacity of being rendered almost impregnable by a few permanent works.

CHAPTER II.

DESCRIPTION OF THE DEFENSIVE POSITION WHICH I PROPOSE TO STRENGTHEN BY FORTIFICATIONS.

In order to form a correct idea of this position, I recommend the reader to take a "county map of Kings and part of Queens county," and look over it, at the same time following my description of the topography; that is, unless he can look at the place itself, which of course a military man would do, if possible, before forming an opinion, or unless he knows it already, as is the case with many New Yorkers, who are in the habit of driving for pleasure over the fine roads which traverse the beautiful district lying between Brooklyn and the sea-side.

The large Coast Survey map, in four sheets, of New York harbor and the vicinity, embraces, indeed, this extent of ground; but since this map was made the city of Brooklyn has been built out a great distance. The villages near it have become towns; paved and graded streets are to be found where hills and valleys are indicated in the map; hills have been cut down and low spots filled in; several cemeteries and the Brooklyn reservoir occupy parts of the chain of hills which the map indicates as wooded, &c. In a word, this map is altogether behind the times.

As to the county maps, they omit the delineation of hills, and consequently require to be assisted by the description which follows.

The west end of Long Island, is nearly detached from the rest of it by the waters of Jamaica bay on the south, and of Flushing bay on

the north sides; these penetrate towards each other so much as to leave only five miles of land between them.

The tract of country which is thus partly detached contains nearly eighty square miles. It is divided into two nearly equal parts by the chain of hills before referred to, which commence at the Narrows and run northeast to about the middle of the space between Flushing and Jamaica bays, where they branch, the highest branch keeping on, and the lower one turning square to the northwest, and following Flushing creek to its outlet in Flushing bay.

To the north of these hills lies the city of Brooklyn, with the towns of Williamsburg, Astoria, Newtown, and Bedford.

Having now sketched the outlines of the picture, it remains to fill in the details of that part of it with which we are particularly concerned.

The range of hills forms an important feature in a military respect, and besides offers an excellent panoramic view of the district lying between itself and the sea, which is the part of the country to which I particularly invite attention.

This range begins with a high hill overlooking the Narrows and Fort Hamilton.

Standing on the summit of this and facing to the right, we look down upon the regular lines of grassy embankment, and the rows of casemate chimneys, which indicate Fort Hamilton; and upon the red streak, which a little closer, but still three-fourths of a mile off, marks the masonry parapet of the redoubt. The purple hills of Staten Island and the intervening glistening strait of the Narrows, form the back grounds of the picture.

Looking directly forward, that is, in a southerly direction, we see a gently undulating cultivated plain, which, with the exception of a slight wooded rise at the village of Bath, on the water side, sinks insensibly to the level of the sea. The belt of blue water beyond, fringed at its shallow edges with brown, which, limiting the plain on the right, extends itself diagonally to the front and left, is Gravesend bay, where the British landed in 1776. The thin strip of white sand hills beyond the bay, and separating it from the sea, is Coney Island. Beyond this again lies a broad strip of blue ocean; the faint line on its surface, which looks like a low beach or island, is Sandy Hook, and the indistinct hills, which bound the view and appear to overhang the Hook, are the highlands of Neversink.

Turning gradually towards the left, or eastward, we observe that Coney Island, after it ceases to form a breakwater, protecting Gravesend bay from the breakers of the Atlantic, extends itself far to the east, being separated from the mainland by meadows and marshes, and by a narrow creek.

The view which presents itself, if we turn still further to the left, can be seen to better advantage from our next stand-point, which is more elevated than the present one, and which faces more to the east.

This point is Ocean hill, in Greenwood cemetery, the highest or next to the highest point of land on Long Island; to reach it we will follow the ridge, observing that the latter subsides almost to the level

of the plain before we arrive at the limits of Greenwood, and that this cemetery is seated upon the opposite declivity, and is sufficiently extensive to cover the whole side of the hill which culminates at the spot already referred to.

From Ocean hill we can see, in a southerly direction, the Highlands, Sandy Hook, and the ocean, in nearly the same relative positions as they appeared to take when seen from our first elevation; but the view of Gravesend bay and Coney Island is intercepted by a slight rise of land, on which is the village of New Utrecht. Looking easterly, a slight rolling plain is spread before us, reaching so far that we can hardly make out in the distance the houses and spires of Flatlands, and beyond that village the broad expanse of Jamaica bay, flattened into a thin belt; while the sandy key, which separates it from the blue ocean horizon, is almost indistinguishable.

This key, which is called Rockaway beach, stretches almost as far to the eastward as we can see from this point, for there is a high spot on our left which limits the landscape in this direction; we notice, however, that the bay does terminate within the segment of the horizon, which is open to our view, since our attention is attracted by the white hotels at Rockaway, which, reflecting the sun strongly, look nearer than they really are, and mark where the beach joins the land.

Looking more downwards, we see, close by, the village of Flatbush, which gave the name to the defeat of our troops in 1776; and examining the country in the vicinity more carefully, we distinguish several plank roads leading to Canarsie, Bath, Gravesend, and Coney Island, as well as some country roads.

Quitting Ocean hill, and proceeding still further eastward on the ridge, we shortly arrive at Mount Prospect, where we see the same picture as that just described, from a slightly different point of view; in front, and close by, lies the town of Flatbush; and the passes forced by the British in 1776 are also in sight before us.

As we follow the ridge eastward from Mount Prospect it subsides considerably, and, at the point where it is crossed by the railroad, it is almost lost; immediately to the east of this low place, however, is a high hill, which is occupied by the cemetery of the Evergreens.

A short distance beyond the Evergreens cemetery, and on the summit of the ridge, is the new Brooklyn reservoir, and immediately next to it is a cluster of cemeteries, of which the principal one is that on Cypress hill.

On the highest point of this hill is an observatory, which affords a magnificent view of the entire horizon; ascending it and turning our backs on the North prospect, which embraces the cities of New York and Brooklyn, the North and East rivers, and the noble bay, we see in front a handsome undulating plain, dotted with houses, spreading out till it loses itself in meadows and marshes, which are limited by the waters of Jamaica bay. The village of East New York and the plank road to the town of Jamaica are seen in the foreground.

Jamaica bay, which is rather a network of creeks and islands, is also fully overlooked from this hill; the sand strip which protects it

from the ocean, and Rockaway inlet, through which the creeks all issue out, are likewise in full sight, as well as a broad strip of the sea, which alone bounds the view.

Proceeding from Cypress hill still eastward, we find the ridge continuous, and maintaining a considerable altitude; at the distance of three miles, and after crossing the Myrtle avenue and Williamsburg plank roads to Jamaica, we arrive at a summit which deserves especial mention—I refer to the one overlooking the source of Flushing creek, which is a meadow called the “Head of the Fly.”

Looking southward from this hill we see the plain limited by Jamaica bay, as in the view from Cypress hill; turning eastward we see the ridge prolonged as far as the eye can reach, but at our feet is a hollow or depression in it, which in a manner divides the range at this point. (This hollow is traversed by the road from Newtown to Jamaica, which last lies three miles off in an easterly direction.)

Turning to the north we see the flat, reedy meadows and swamps in which Flushing creek rises; below them, occasionally, the windings of the creek itself; beyond, the waters of Flushing bay, into which it empties, and finally the East river.

The valley down which we have just looked, and which, with Jamaica bay, more than half cuts the island in two, is limited on either hand by high sloping banks.

The western bank, which is the most important to this description, is admirably adapted for the posting of troops or the locating of fortifications, for the purpose of interdicting the passage of the meadows or creek to an invading army.

For a mile in advance of these heights there is nothing to obstruct a clear view of the creek and its marshy borders; and following the bank down towards the bay, we arrive shortly at a hill which lies on this side of a small creek, which may be considered the limit, in this direction, of the position which needs to be occupied to cut off the eastern part of the island from Brooklyn. I propose it for the limit, because here the natural obstacle to an enemy's march, formed by the creek, becomes so considerable, that a position behind it would be strong enough without fortifications, provided it were properly watched and guarded.

If the reader has now gained a good idea of the topography of the west end of Long Island, he will be able to follow the route I will now indicate as traversing the line which I propose to fortify.

Commencing at the abovementioned hill, on the west side of Flushing creek, to proceed up the creek, along the heights which border it and the meadows in which it rises, to the hill above the “Head of the Fly;” here the line goes obliquely down the last named hill, preserving its southerly course, and gaining the plain; it then passes the Union and Centreville race grounds, and joins the marshes of Jamaica bay at a certain creek, near Torbell's landing.

This part of the line I shall call its eastern division. The line now turns an obtuse angle, and runs southwest, along the meadows, till it reaches Flatlands, near Bergen Island; this part of the line is the centre division.

From Flatlands the line turns at another obtuse angle, nearly equal to the first, and runs east to Fort Hamilton, ascending obliquely the lofty hill which is mentioned in the first part of this description.

The whole length of this line is $14\frac{1}{4}$ miles, counting between the extreme points that need to be fortified; and I propose to locate upon the line seventeen permanent redoubts, to be built immediately; the spaces between these to be closed, when the occasion arises, by earthwork intrenchments.

CHAPTER III.

GENERAL DISCUSSION OF THE VARIOUS KINDS OF FORTIFICATION THAT ARE APPLICABLE TO THE DEFENCE OF BROOKLYN.

I have two reasons for incorporating into this memoir the synoptical and analytical description of certain celebrated lines of fortification, which will be found in the following chapter.

In the first place, I wish to prevent unprofessional readers from forming the opinion that my proposition for the defence of Brooklyn is visionary and impracticable, owing to the extent of the line of works of which it involves the construction.

This extent of fourteen miles will appear reasonable in every point of view, when, after a perusal of this chapter, the reader shall compare the projected line with the others described; he will find that the former is not only shorter, but vastly more susceptible of an obstinate defence, in proportion to its development, than several famous lines, which have, in both recent and more remote wars, been of the greatest service to generals in embarrassing and perilous circumstances.

The proposition that a given extent of position can be more strongly fortified by the system of works here advocated than by any other which has ever been adopted, except, indeed, the Russian lines at Sevastopol, which are models for study and imitation, (and, to a certain degree, the French lines at the same place,) may be demonstrated by an argument which, in brief, amounts to this:

The two most essential requisites in lines have always been, as they are at present, the presenting everywhere, to obstruct the advance of the enemy, difficult material obstacles, which shall be rendered as near impassable as possible by the fire of its defenders; (this involves, evidently, the disposing of the troops in such a manner that their musketry shall reach every portion of the space directly in front of the lines.) And secondly, that the troops must not be so scattered along the intrenchments, in order to fulfil strictly the first condition, as to render any point of the line weak, and powerless to resist a violent attack by a large column which should attempt to surprise or storm the works.

These two conditions are now, and have hitherto been, universally recognized, but have been, *owing to the limited range of the musket,*

difficult to combine in the same line. Thus we find in history examples where each has been altogether conceded to the other, according to circumstances; among which the most prominent in influencing the general's decision have been the nature of the country, whether inaccessible or level, and that of the troops at his command, whether regular soldiers or undisciplined.

There are also instances of a general's having been enabled, by making good use of the advantages of a position, and profiting by the excellence of his troops, to satisfy both conditions in his defensive arrangements; for when the works can be assailed but from one direction at a time, and, if the troops are accustomed to manœuvres, a suitable force can be amassed on that portion which is indicated by the enemy's movements as the point of attack.

But this inherent difficulty, which, in former times, has thus hampered all sorts of schemes for the defence of extended positions, has been dissipated by the invention of the Minié rifle, which, by expanding the range at which infantry fire is effective, in an immense degree, gives the engineer the fullest latitude of conception, and renders easy, both of design and execution, plans which may combine in themselves every desirable defensive property, and which are adapted as well for undisciplined troops as for regular soldiers.

I must here enlarge a little upon the several points of the foregoing argument, more especially for the purpose of making it evident that the range of the infantry musket is the guiding element of all projects of fortification, and so explain the possibility of so great an improvement, in the construction of lines, being consequent upon the invention of Captain Minié.

The lines that have been actually constructed may be divided into three varieties, which correspond with the three cases mentioned above; being respectively adapted to the fulfillment of either of the two essential conditions of defence, independently of the other, and to the combination of the two in the same project.

The first variety includes all lines which consist of uninterrupted intrenchments, which present no gaps except where roads lead through them. The second comprises those composed of redoubts, or detached independent works of any kind, which are expected to prohibit the enemy's crossing the position they occupy by their musketry and artillery fire; and, finally, there are lines which combine the two sorts of intrenchments just mentioned.

Continuous lines are weakest from the fact that, if the enemy succeeds in forcing his way through them at any point, even should no more than a single battalion effect an entrance at first, a way is cleared for the main columns. The entire system of intrenchments is taken in the rear, and the defenders find themselves in one of the most perilous situations that can occur, namely, with their line of battle pierced, and either of the two parts of the army, or both, liable to an irresistible flank attack.

It is noticeable that the very pains which may be taken to guard against minor attacks or false attacks, by garrisoning equally every point of the line, render this catastrophe more imminent; for the evil

is thereby incurred of presenting everywhere only a feeble rank of troops to meet the attack of the overwhelming columns of a concentrated attack; so that an army posted behind such intrenchments, even though superior in numbers to its assailants, would probably be disastrously beaten if the latter should attack in heavy masses at different points at once; preventing the defenders from concentrating on these points by false attacks, as well as by such celerity of action as should leave them no time to effect the requisite manœuvres. A striking exemplification of this remark is to be found in the forcing of the French lines at Turin in 1706, where Marshals Feuillade and Marsin awaited the attack of the Austrians under Prince Eugene and the Duke of Savoy, who, although with an inferior army, carried the intrenchments and totally defeated the former; the immediate fruit of which victory was the capture of the French artillery and baggage, and the raising of the seige. In the attack Eugene divided his army into eight columns, and directed them against the weakest part of the French lines.

The second variety comprises all arrangements of detached works, whether enclosed or open at the gorge, and in a single line or in quincunx order, which aim at preventing the passage of the enemy by their fire alone, or by the additional resistance of troops in the field.

Detached works are better adapted than continuous intrenchments to the strengthening of a tolerably extensive position, particularly if regular troops are to be had for its defence; for in this case the works may be regarded merely as auxiliaries, and as sheltering, to a certain extent, manœuvres effected in their rear; or they may defend particular important points, and so advantageously take the place of large bodies of troops which might be better employed elsewhere.

I can think of no example better calculated to illustrate my remarks on this head than is afforded by the battle of Pultawa, where Peter the Great gained his first but inestimable victory over the Swedes; a victory which resulted in a considerable degree from his judicious location of detached redoubts, and from his exact appreciation of their intrinsic merits, and of their precise sphere of usefulness in a defensive battle.

The Czar not only originated on this occasion this modification of defensive works, but brought to perfection the theory and practice of them, as combined with field operations.

He established his cavalry on the right of his line, placing it in the intervals between seven redoubts, which were well supplied with artillery. His infantry were behind slighter intrenchments of, I believe, the continuous order.

Charles XII had decided on attacking the Russian right with his cavalry, (and had, to favor this manœuvre, despatched General Creutz, with 5,000 cavalry, the night before, with orders to make a detour and fall upon the flank of the same wing simultaneously with the general advance; this body had, however, lost its way, and failed to co-operate.) The assault of the Swedish horsemen was completely successful, and the Russians were driven from their redoubts in confusion. However, the latter now opened their fire of artillery, and from

this cause (and the non-appearance of Creutz's division) Charles' troops were checked, and the Czar found means to rally his cavalry, which, charging in turn, forced their former assailants to retreat, after experiencing great losses.

This seems to have been the decisive action of the day. The Russian infantry immediately issued from their lines and attacked the Swedes, while their cavalry, dashing to the rear, cut off their communication with Pultawa, and cut to pieces the reserve of 3,000 men.

This may be called the first period of the battle, the result of which is well known. Charles' irremediable defeat was owing in part to the enemy's superiority in numbers and artillery, for he had but 21,000 troops in the field, and 4 guns, against the 70,000 men and 72 pieces of the Russians; and the failure of Creutz was also against him. But the serious check which his cavalry received and which spoiled the plan of attack, and gave the Czar an opportunity for his subsequent brilliant manœuvres, was independent of the disparity of numbers, and was due altogether to the redoubts on the right flank.

It must here be recollected that the redoubts in question were in the first place strictly *auxiliaries*, and that Peter's disciplined troops gained the victory by a counter attack, and also that the position defended was of *small extent*.

It is a different affair when a position of many miles in extent depends principally upon lines of works for its strength, and especially in case the defenders are other than veteran troops.

The battle of Fontenoy (1745) furnishes another instance in point. On this occasion the French line was strengthened on the right by the village of Antoin, next by that of Fontenoy, and on the left by the wood of Barri, which had been fortified, in order to render it equally defensible with the villages, by *three redoubts*.

The Duke of Cumberland, after the Hanoverian had been twice repulsed before Antoin, and the English three times before Fontenoy, decided to attack the left wing, and ordered General Ingoldsby to carry the redoubt which lay nearest to Fontenoy.

The general, however, on approaching it, declined to assault it before he should receive a battery of cannon; and as much time was thus lost, the duke ordered the advance to be made in column between the redoubt and the village, and under the fire of both.

The indomitable bravery of the British enabled them thus to penetrate the French lines, but it was with immense losses, which, though insufficient to stop the advance, still must have had a great effect on the troops, and prepared their commander for giving the order to retreat, which followed the counter attack executed by the "*Maison-du-Roi*," or household troops of France.

That Marshal Saxe himself attributed a considerable share of his glory to the redoubts mentioned appears from his speech to the king after the victory. He said: "Sire, I have to reproach myself with not having placed another redoubt between the wood and Fontenoy; but I did not believe any general would risk passing through the interval."

I adduce the above example merely to give force to my remarks concerning the proper sphere and adaptation of detached works.

In discussing the merits of *lines composed of these latter*, as they have been employed, or could have been employed, previous to the introduction of the long range infantry rifle, the following considerations occur:

To impede sufficiently the advance of the enemy through the gaps between them the redoubts should not be further apart than double the range of musketry. On this account, and because of the limited distance at which the musket is effective, the number of redoubts must be great to enable them to support a long line properly. The consequence follows that each one must be small and have a weak garrison, and hence there is little reliance to be placed on the individual resistance of these redoubts, and but a slight effect can be expected from their fire.

The above consideration leads us to an estimate of the minimum number of enclosed works that can form a defensive system, for they must be within 500 or 600 yards of each other, at the furthest, if the ordinary infantry musket is the arm of the troops; but whenever the fortifications have been regarded as the main reliance of the defence—and this is the case we are investigating—the redoubts, or lunettes, have been placed within 250 or 300 yards of each other, so that the difficulty thus touched upon becomes very doubly serious and has this consequence: that to derive the greatest benefit from enclosed works alone in the defence of extended positions they must be few in number, and the intention must be abandoned of forcing the enemy to pass under their fire and experience great loss in order to cross the lines.

As there is no material obstacle between the works to retard the columns of attack, this conclusion amounts to placing the aid derived from the fortifications, when they are of this sort, in a subordinate estimation, compared to the active defence which is expected from the troops in the field.

It is plain, therefore, that the system of defence for *long lines*, which involves the use of *detached works only*, (unless, indeed, the country is of a very rugged and mountainous or otherwise broken and inaccessible nature,) is worse fitted than continuous systems for a defence by *irregular* troops.

Here the reader will please to recollect the abstract of the argument in hand, and note that the above reflections, which are suggested by, and refer to, only those lines that have been constructed (in actual warfare) before the eastern war, do not apply in such a degree to similar works that may hereafter be thrown up, because of the improvements which have within a few years been made in the habitual firearm of the infantry soldier, an element in warfare which forms the very foundation of all plans of fortification, whether temporary or permanent.

The smooth-bore musket (which had not, indeed, received much improvement, in regard to range, since Peter the Great and Turenne defended with it the entrenchments of Pultawa and Dunkirk) was

considered by military writers of the date of Wellington, and up to the time when the Minié rifle was invented, to be *effective*—that is, be tolerably accurate of aim, and to cause mortal wounds, at ranges inside of two hundred yards, and three hundred yards was the furthest limit at which deadly effects were expected from it.

It is by a comparative estimate that the prodigious effects of the Minié rifle may be judged of by those who have not had the advantage of witnessing its performances; and such of my readers may, by referring to the tables in my first “Memoir on Fortification,” assure themselves of the correctness of the following statement: that the Minié rifle, or the new United States regulation rifle-musket, is four times as accurate at six hundred yards as the musket (smooth-bore) is at three hundred yards. As to the force of the elongated projectile of the new piece, it is sufficient to say that at 1,000 yards it will pierce through and through a pine plank of three inches thick.

At Bomarsund a French battery was “exceedingly annoyed” (in the language of the official account) by the fire of some Finnish riflemen, who were stationed in high points of the Keep, although the range was 900 yards. During the siege of Sevastopol the allied batteries were repeatedly silenced by the Russian riflemen in the “rifle pits,” which were between six hundred and seven hundred yards distant, and the effects of this fire were so severe that the pits were ordered to be taken at any hazard. The great losses sustained in the execution of this order is a proof that the necessity for it must have been great.

It may, therefore, be considered perfectly demonstrated by experimental practice and by actual warfare that the detached works, which may be thought necessary to strengthen future defensive positions, may be placed more than twice as far apart as in former times, and still fulfill the desirable condition of perfectly sweeping by their fire all the ground over which they are distributed. It follows from this that, to protect a given extent of country and form a defensive system, half as many redoubts as were formerly requisite will now suffice; and hence the number of troops disposable for their garrison remaining the same, each one may be made larger, more capable of defence individually, and constituting more of an impediment to the enemy; and, in fine, such a system may be made to combine every desirable requisite as constituting a highly defensive artificial military position, with the sole exception of not presenting a continuous material obstacle to the enemy.

If, therefore, we combine a continuous line with a system of large detached works at 1,200 or 1,400 yards intervals, we shall have as perfect a system of fortification as is possible or can be desired.

The preceding discussion on continuous and on detached lines has been longer and more elaborated than I intended; but as it has developed fully all the military elements of the problem of defending with undisciplined troops, or with inferior numbers, an extensive position, we can, in considering the third class of lines, spare ourselves the pains of theoretical analysis, and form a correct judgment upon the lines which I propose for the protection of Brooklyn and

New York, by simply submitting the scheme to the test of the general principles already elucidated, having the data of a knowledge of the topography and extent of the position, and a description of the system of fortification which is to be adopted.

But, though a theoretical consideration of the third class of lines is here superfluous, an example will be of use as serving to fix definitely the notions which the preceding reflections give rise to; and I will, therefore, briefly refer to the wonderful lines by which Todleben enabled the garrison of Sevastopol to resist so long the most tremendous maritime expedition that the world ever saw.

These works, which are described by many authors, should be studied by every officer who professes to reflect upon the principles of his art. Nothing can surpass them in boldness of design; and never will there be seen a more masterly adaptation of detached works and continuous intrenchments to the topography of a position. In this instance it was the location of the works alone which gave the line any strength, for the different fragments of it were, from the short time allowed for their construction, of no more than a minimum strength, and formed, intrinsically, insignificant obstacles. Nothing, also, can more prominently display the military genius and originality of the modern Vauban than his having seized the opportunity offered by the arming of the Russian infantry by the Liege rifle, to expand the scale of fortification at once to four times the dimensions which it had been restricted to by the contracted range of the smooth-bore infantry musket.

[The report of Captain G. B. McClellan, accompanied by a map, gives the best description of the lines in question that I have seen; and I am indebted to it for the following abridged special account:]

I will refer my readers to this, for definite information relating to the topography of the ground occupied by the lines; for my present purpose it is sufficient to state that they formed a semi-circle resting on the harbor at both extremities, and having an extent of over four miles; their site is varied by hills and valleys, running on the west side parallel and on the east perpendicular to the general direction of the works.

The line fortified may be divided into seven fronts—that is, units—each one being composed of a continuous intrenchment, resting at each end on strong detached works; the first is from the left of the line to the Little Redan, its length being nine hundred yards; the second from the latter point to the Malakhoff, seven hundred yards; the third lies between the Malakhoff and Great Redan, and is one thousand one hundred and sixty yards long; the fourth reaches from the Great Redan to the Flag-staff bastion, and is one thousand six hundred and seventy yards long, or almost a mile; the fifth is from the latter point to the Central bastion, five hundred and fifty yards; the sixth extends to the Quarantine bastion, one thousand four hundred yards; the last front is one thousand yards long.

The familiar names of the Malakhoff, Redan, &c., refer to the works which were first constructed by Todleben when he undertook to fortify Sevastopol, on the land side, in the shortest possible time.

He commenced by occupying the IMPORTANT POINTS BY DETACHED WORKS GENERALLY CLOSED AT THE GORGE. The first efforts of the garrison were directed toward giving these sufficient strength to resist assault; afterwards, they were CONNECTED BY RE-ENTERING LINES of a weaker profile, which served to enfilade the ravines and flank the main works. These lines were generally, though not always, CONTINUOUS.

As to the theory of the defence, the Russian engineers appear to have relied upon the *collateral* works for flanking defences, and arranged so as to obtain a sweeping fire from these over the ground lying in front of either of the independent detached works, preferring to take their chance of stopping the enemy, by heavy losses, before he arrived at the ditches, rather than devote their means to the immediate flanking, at short range, of these ditches.*

CHAPTER IV.

SYNOPTICAL ACCOUNT OF SOME CELEBRATED LINES.

It is unnecessary to go very far back into history to get enough examples of extensive lines to serve to deduce general principles from. It is, however, certain that the most celebrated generals of all ages have relied upon them to extricate themselves from positions of great danger.

It was by means of strong lines that *Cæsar* resisted a much superior army of Gauls at Alexia. *Turenne* made use of double lines at the siege of Dunkirk. *Prince Eugene* covered his army, while besieging Lille in 1704, from the attacks of the Duke of Burgundy by lines. The French lines at Turin, in 1706, have an unfortunate celebrity, from the facility with which they were stormed by Prince Eugene; the ill arrangement of the works, and their weakness, combined with the bad generalship exhibited by Marshal Feuillade in attempting to defend entrenchments that were intended, like most lines of circumvallation, only to resist surprises by small parties, to cause the defeat of the French and the raising of the siege.

In 1709 the French lines at Malplaquet were forced by the allies under Marlborough and Eugene; but so terrible were the losses of the latter that they experienced all of a defeat but the name.

* The most interesting details connected with these lines are the rifle-pits and the bomb-proofs.

The latter were ample in number. They were sometimes under the rampart, sometimes under the second line of defence, often under special traverses, and occasionally entirely under ground, and even hollowed in the solid rock. The underground ones are considered by Captain McClellan the best, as in that position they would afford no cover or other advantages to an assailant who might gain a temporary footing in the salient of the work.

The rifle-pits consisted sometimes of a little pile of stones, or baskets of earth, enough to shelter one man; while the largest were semi-circular excavations that would hold forty men. These were arranged in front of the Volhynian redoubt, in two lines, forming a salient angle 250 yards in advance of the work.

As it was, the lines were incomplete, and the position itself was objectionable on account of its separating the French army into portions which must each depend on its own resources, as it could not be succored if driven back.

There were some hollow ways, also, by which the position could be approached, and certain passes through the forest in front which had not been well defended. In addition, the French had not outposts in this wood beyond the abattis, so that their general was ignorant of the movements of the enemy till the latter had approached near the position.

With regard to the nature of the intrenchments themselves, much fault is to be found with them for being open in the rear, and also presenting intervals by which the enemy could penetrate; this weak disposition was not strengthened, as it should have been, to make it consistent with the intention of a "line with intervals," by strong enclosed works; on the contrary, none of the latter were used.

Above all, the position was susceptible of being turned, and in the battle (which was conducted by Eugene with great skill) it was turned; this circumstance alone would have decided the French to retreat, but they did not do so till after night, and the allies were not aware of their having left the field till next morning.

The latter were, however, too much weakened and disordered by their losses to pursue.

In 1710, the French armies having been reduced to a strictly defensive policy, Marshal Villars fortified and occupied, as a frontier defence, the line extending from the sea, at the mouth of the Canche river, to the Meuse; first following the Canche, then across a divide to a river flowing into the Scarpe, at Arras, and down the Scarpe to the Scheldt, at Valenciennes; from this across a divide to the Sambre, and down this to the Meuse, at Namur.

The enemy was in advance of the left of the centre, besieging the fortified town of Betteune.

The object of the greater portion of the line was to prevent marauding expeditions of the enemy, and for this purpose the rivers, where they existed, formed a sufficient obstacle, if defended simply by patrols; and between Valenciennes and Landrecy a continuous line of field works served equally well; the patrols, or "flying camps," were furnished and supported by the fortified towns along the line.

The portion extending from the Canche river to Arras was unprotected by any natural obstacle, and was directed in front of the enemy; it was here the French army encamped, and the line was of, say, sixteen or twenty miles in length, formed by a series of redans, located with regard to the configuration of the ground, and strengthened by redoubts and by marshes formed by backing up the streams.

This part of the line was chiefly intended to protect the French army in its manœuvres to the right or left, for the purpose of opposing the allies in their attempts upon either of the fortified places of the frontier.

The "lines of the Queich" were first fortified in 1743, when they

consisted of detached works, in the location of which but little attention was paid to reciprocal support.

During the seven years' war, in 1760, the line was re-established, and the general arrangement and ensemble of the works were very much improved.

During the war of the French revolution, in 1797, the line was again put in a defensive state, but on a plan not exactly the same as in 1760.

The following is a description of the lines as they existed in 1760:

To comprehend their object, it is necessary to state that they were situated so as to close the passage into France which lies between the Vosges mountains and the Rhine; being thus a complete barrier to an invading army coming from Mayence, or the Palatinate, above that city.

The extent of the line was about fifteen miles; its left was the town of Anweiler, which was surrounded by a loopholed wall, and which closed the débouché through the mountains, by which, otherwise, the line might be turned on this flank.

The right rested on the Rhine, was protected in front by a large marsh, and was strengthened by a village, which was fortified with care. The centre was protected by the fortified city of Landau.

From Anweiler through the mountain valley of the Quiech were fortified posts, strengthened by inundations effected by dams thrown across the small tributaries of the river.

At the point where the mountains subside into the plain was a village, which was fortified and surrounded by seven redoubts; between this and Landau the line was protected by the Quiech, which could be raised by mill-dams so as to inundate its banks, and received additional support from a canal in rear of the latter; hence no entrenchments were thought necessary on this portion, especially as they were, for some distance, under the fire of the artillery of Landau.

Below, or to the right of Landau, the first mile and a half was formed of a continuous redan line, which was so disposed as to retain the waters of the river and create a wide marsh in front; a lunette and a redoubt were stationed in advance, and a mill and an intrenched village strengthened the position.

For a third of the distance from this to the Rhine, the line was formed of slight intrenchments preceded by small inundations, on the further side of which two intrenched villages and two enclosed works were situated.

From the last point indicated, to the right, the position was protected by field works of the nature of a cremaillère line, adapted carefully to the ground, and laid out with great skill, so as to supply the want of a natural strength equal to that of the other positions; the continuous line was strengthened by advanced detached works. The extreme right was upon high ground, with a steep ravine in front, which was occupied by redoubts and strengthened by abattis. The marsh in front has already been mentioned.

There was every facility throughout the line for communication from one end to the other, by good roads running the whole length

of it, in its rear; and on the left half of it there were several parallel roads, so that communications would not be interrupted by the enemy even if he should gain a footing inside of the line.

This line is a highly instructive instance of a frontier barrier, adapted not only to resist the invasion of a large army, but also calculated to secure the country in the rear from marauding parties, which might otherwise enter for purposes of plunder.

The continuous nature of the line was intended to effect the latter object, and it was expected that the fortified villages and redoubts, and especially the Place of Landau, would (like the enclosed works I recommend in my project for the fortification of Brooklyn) enable an army of defence, by occupying them strongly, and calculating on meeting the enemy, at any point of the line that might be forced by him, with a reserve, to repel a much superior army. * * *

In 1761 Frederick the Great found himself reduced to the greatest extremities; he was hard pushed by the Austrian and Russian armies; the great disparity of forces forbade his receiving battle, and to retreat would be to lose Schweidnitz, and otherwise greatly imperil the campaign, which was a critical one for Prussia.

From this danger, the greatest he had ever encountered, Frederick saved himself by a stroke as daring as it was well combined. He occupied and intrenched the position of Buntzelwitz, near Schweidnitz, where his army could receive an attack with every chance of success; at the same time he prevented the investment and siege of Schweidnitz, covered Breslau, and kept within reach of his magazines.

These famous lines formed a sort of oblong, with six salient angles; these last were located on projecting and commanding hills or spurs; the whole position was formed by a chain of hills of different declivities, varying from steep to gentle, and separated from each other by several brooks; the two principal of these covered the front. The perimeter of the camp measured from twelve to seventeen miles, according to an estimation, around the most salient and detached works, or round the more continuous line in the rear. The ground enclosed was a fine plain, adapted to manœuvres, and a wood, which stood in front, had the effect of hiding the latter in a great degree from the enemy's view. All the hills were strongly intrenched by works which held a numerous artillery, and slighter lines connected these points. The whole perimeter of the position was also surrounded by abattis, trous-de-loup, and fougasses; and though put in a respectable attitude of defence by ten days and nights' incessant labor, directed and supervised by the King himself, the Prussians did not cease to improve their lines during the whole time they were menaced by the enemy.

On arriving in front of these lines, the Austrian general, Laudon, was for attacking them, but would not do so without the co-operation of the Russian army. Failing to persuade the commander of the latter to approve his plan, both armies decamped after spending twenty days before the lines, which had by that time attained an almost impregnable strength. * * * * *

The Spanish lines of Boulou, in April, 1794, are an instance of a

strong and extensive position, strongly intrenched, but which fell easily, in consequence of an oversight or blunder on the part of the designer of the works. These lines were occupied by a Spanish army, to prevent the French revolutionary army of 35,000 men from entering Spain by way of Bellegarde. The camp was traversed by the Tech, and separated from the plain of Vallespir by a chain of hills, and was fortified with exceeding care. The line was in the form of a right angle, the point of which was towards the front and right. The right side commenced at a hill, strongly intrenched, on the far side of the river, and, crossing the narrow valley, ran up the mountain on the hither side, resting finally on the castle of Montesquiou, near the summit, and around which it was not supposed the enemy could pass. The left half of the angle, or the front of the position, ran on the far side of the river, and finally, turning short, crossed it, resting on the height of La Guardia, which commanded the bridge of Ceret. The arc thus fortified had an extent of 11 or 12 miles. The weak point of this position was the extreme right, which could be turned, owing to the omission to fortify the highest peak of the mountain which lay to the right and in rear of the castle of Montesquiou. The French general accordingly attacked the camp by sending 10,000 infantry and 800 cavalry to seize the height in question, which they did without opposition, while the main body made demonstrations in front. The result was that the Spaniards considered themselves lucky in being able to retreat by an improvised road over the mountains, (leaving all their guns, 150 in number,) their line of retreat by Bellegarde being overlooked by the same height which enabled the French to gain the rear of their works. * * * *

During 1794 and 1795 the French had been constructing on the left bank of the Rhine strong lines for the purpose of blockading Mayence, which city they expected to besiege. Mayence, being built on both sides of the river, formed a *tête-de-pont* for the Austrians, and the latter unexpectedly issued from it, (Oct. 29, 1795,) broke through the lines, and thus took up an extremely advantageous position between Jourdan's and Pichegru's armies, the latter of which was especially threatened, and might have been disastrously beaten if this successful attack on its left wing had been vigorously followed up. Owing to the attack being unforeseen, the garrison of the lines consisted at the time of but 3,000 men; and of these a certain portion had just arrived, having been detached from the army of the Sambre and Meuse, and were not, from their little acquaintance with the localities, or with their duties, much better than spectators of the combat.

The lines were composed altogether of open works, the main defence being a continuous line of curtains, flanked by redans and bastions, and located on the edge of the heights looking towards Mayence. In advance, and in some parts in rear also, were *flèches* and *lunettes*, but nowhere redoubts, so that the whole line could be turned by the forcing of any weak point of it. In addition to this defect, the works were nowhere strong enough to resist the attack of large bodies of men, and also presented a weak point at their right extremity; which, instead of being connected with the river, left a wide meadow, which might

be used to turn the flank of the whole position. This oversight was the more fatal as the line of retreat of the centre and left wing would be menaced in case of the successful attack of, or turning of, the right.

The Austrian General Clerfayt, having a perfect acquaintance with the French lines, attacked them in three columns, putting his greatest strength into the attack on the French right. In this he was assisted by a flotilla, which landed two battalions in the rear of this end of the line. The attack on the right and centre being successful, the French left had to retreat, though its defence had been successful, and the whole army retired in disorder on the Pfrim river, in order to get nearer to the main body. In this battle the Austrian soldiers scaled the works, musket in hand. The immediate results were the capture of all the French heavy artillery, and great stores of siege materials and provisions. * * * * *

Wellington's lines of Torres Vedras (1810) are justly celebrated for their vast extent, their natural strength, and the admirable manner in which every resource of the engineer was called into action in adapting the defence to the site, the means disposable, and the necessities of the case.

Not less wonderful are these lines for the complete manner in which the labor of their construction was repaid by the invaluable results obtained by their means.

No less a stake than the possession of Portugal depended on their strength; and, indeed, if they had been forced, the consequences might, like those of the capitulation of Baylen, have been propagated in a manner to be felt throughout Europe.

But for these lines there can be little doubt that the victorious Massena, with his 110,000 veteran soldiers, who had pursued the British to this contracted cul-de-sac, would have driven them into the sea, or at least forced them, like Sir John Moore's army, to end a disastrous retreat by seeking safety in their ships.

This supposition is corroborated by all the circumstances of the campaign, but especially by the excessive solicitude exhibited by Wellington in hastening the construction of the works, and incessantly laboring to augment their strength during the entire year that seemed likely to witness an attack upon them.

The lines were two in number, concentric, and extending from the sea to the Tagus; and, as the British fleet and gun-boat flotilla had the entire possession of both these barriers, the position could not be turned.

Thus shutting off Lisbon from the rest of Portugal, they afforded an unequalled position for a defensive battle, with every chance of success; and even if beaten, which must be with great loss to the attacking army, the defenders could still retreat into their fleet, an operation which was assured by the intrenched camp, or tête-de-pont, which, isolating the extremity of the peninsula, would effectually protect an embarkation.

The total force under Wellington's command amounted at the least to 130,000 men, British and Portuguese together. Of these 60,000 were detailed for permanent garrisons for the forts and redoubts; the

remaining 70,000 were the best troops, and were designed for manœuvres.

The first line was originally intended to serve as a check to an attacking enemy, and the second was to be the main reliance; if this, too, was forced, the army was to take refuge in the intrenched camp, and enter the ships under its shelter.

The first line, however, became so strong, by dint of constant labor upon it, that Wellesley finally made his calculations to take a decisive position behind it.

The first line was 29 miles in extent, and beginning at Alhandra, upon the Tagus, crossed the peninsula, following, on its western slope, the Zizandre, and finally terminating where that river empties into the ocean. Beginning on the right, (at Alhandra,) the first five miles of works were upon a ridge which had naturally been steep, but was now scarped for a height of 15 or 20 feet, so as to be almost inaccessible. The next five miles were laid out upon two mountains which were defended by redoubts. The centre of the line was occupied by field works, (strengthened by an immense redoubt mounting 25 guns,) all seated upon the lofty Mount Agraça, which, besides the strength afforded by its height, presented a view of the whole line of works on either hand, and of the approaches to them.

Of the 10 or 12 miles on the left, the first seven were lines well seated behind obstructed ground, and with the river Zizandre flowing in front of them; the remainder of the line was protected by inundations, and the field works were strengthened by many redoubts and forts, one of which was of enormous size, and mounted 40 cannon. A paved road ran behind this part of the ground, and contributed to strengthen it by facilitating manœuvres from one wing to the other.

A feature of the ground that was very advantageous to the British was this: that in front of the line, opposite Mount Agraça, rose the towering Monte Junta, which could only be crossed at some miles distant from the front, and which, therefore, would prevent the French from attacking both wings of the British line at once; also, the former must be very cautious in attacking the left, even singly, as the latter might sally from their lines, during the passage of the mountain, and attack the front or rear of the column en route, thus taking it at a great disadvantage.

The second line was laid out at from 6 to 10 miles behind the first, and extended from Quintella to St. Lorenzo, a distance of 24 miles. Without giving a description of it, let it suffice that it was stronger than the first, and that in it, still more than in the other, redoubts, forts, water-cuts, scarps, abattis, and intrenchments of all sorts, were constructed without regard to labor or expense.

To give a proper idea of the pains bestowed on the works of Torres Vedras, the following description of the defences of the outpost line of Arunda is given:

Across the ravine on the left of Arunda, a wall of dry stone was built, 30 feet high and 16 feet thick. Across the valley of Arunda an abattis was constructed of full grown oaks and chestnuts, which had to be dragged several hundred yards, and were so reset and crossed

as to be perfectly impenetrable, while a breastwork in the rear afforded cover for troops. Along the ridges for three miles ran a stone wall six feet high and fourteen feet thick. Altogether it was considered that the single division that guarded this post could defend it against 20,000 men.

The entrenched camp, or tête-de-point, had an extent of 3,000 yards, and was seated near by the permanent fort of St. Julians, at a distance from the second line varying from 24 miles to two days' march in its rear.

Before Massena arrived in front of the lines he was altogether ignorant of their strength. A reconnaissance of them induced him to change his first intention of storming them immediately, and, upon a closer examination, he despaired of doing so until he should receive reinforcements. It then became a question of time, whether he could remain long enough to give the latter time to join him; for the country in his rear was not fruitful enough to afford subsistence for a great length of time to his numerous army. On the other hand the Anglo-Portuguese forces, and the inhabitants of the enclosed district, were in equal straits for food; the latter much the most, for in the struggle of endurance which ensued, and which lasted through the winter, 40,000 persons died of want within the lines.

During the blockade, however, the lines continued to increase in strength; and the storming of them, which had appeared hazardous at first, became at last an impossibility; the reinforcements did not arrive, and the French had exhausted the country of every sort of subsistence that would support life.

Finally, after displaying in the highest degree the obstinacy which characterized him, Massena was obliged to retreat, baffled, not by the army, but the *lines* of Wellington. * * * *

Soult's lines on the Nivelle form an instance of a strong position of great extent, but badly fortified and ill defended.

In the latter part of 1813 Soult found himself stationed on the Spanish frontier of France, with about 66,000 soldiers; his task was to prohibit the passage of the combined army of 90,000 men under Wellington. He decided to take his stand in the triangular district which is bounded by the sea, by the Nivelle river, and the mountains on its left bank, and by the Nive, from its source to the Mondarin mountain, which last commanded the bridge over it, and which could not be turned.

Both flanks were thus secure, and the front was strongly seated on mountains and strengthened by a river; in its centre, and on a commanding height, was a large redoubt, called the signal redoubt; in front of it, on the slopes, were numerous field works, and in advance of these, trenches and abattis. Three large redoubts lay towards the left, and on the extreme right inundations had been effected, which formed a great obstacle to an approach on that side.

The whole extent of front to be defended was 16 miles. Soult spent three months in intrenching this position, but the works were ill-planned, being mostly open works, and easily turned by the gorge. Many of the redoubts that were commenced were incomplete when

attacked, and some were so placed that the garrisons could not depress their pieces enough to bear upon the attacking columns. Their revetments, of dry stone, were readily climbed by the British, but most of the works taken were entered by the gorge. The troops were deprived, by the broken nature of the ground, and the want of roads in rear of the works, of the power of mutual support; so that however strong an attack might be experienced by either wing, it could not be reinforced from the centre.

In the attack of these lines, which took place in November, Wellington profited by all the defects of his opponent's arrangements.

His main attack was against the left of the centre, the key of the position, and he threw 44,000 men upon the 15,000 French who guarded the works near this point, holding in check a division of 12,000 men in another quarter by 6,000 British. The works were not found a serious impediment by the attacking columns owing to the defects above mentioned; one fort especially was so ill situated that the defenders were driven out of it by a battery of horse artillery which galloped up an unfortified hill in its rear and opened a plunging fire into it.

With all the disadvantages of bad communication it seems probable that the defeat of the French, and their retreat from the position, would have been obviated by the use of redoubts instead of open works; by giving them a strong profile, and by a judicious location of them among the hills and between the lines of field works.

This view is borne out by the stubborn resistance which the signal redoubt offered; it held out after the whole line had retreated, and withstood three attacks with a loss of but one man killed, while the British lost 200 in killed and wounded; the redoubt finally capitulated, as further resistance could be of no service to the defence of the position. * * * * *

As the two remaining examples of lines that I have examined have not had the merit of being tested by actual attacks, I will dispose of them briefly:

The first is the intrenched camp (as it was called) of Drissa, constructed by the Russians in 1812, on the occasion of the grand invasion of their country by Napoleon. Without going into detail, it is worth mentioning that the works were laid out on an arc of five miles, which correspond to a chord of $3\frac{1}{4}$ miles.

On the front, and distributed over an extent of 7,000 yards, were ten redoubts; at the two extremities this line rested upon the river. Between the redoubts open batteries of artillery were established, Each redoubt was covered in front by low field works, of 220 yards development, and laid out at 130 yards in advance,

Before the left of the line there was a wooded marsh; and to prevent the enemy from profiting by this, some of the trees were cut down, and used in forming an abattis, which was of about 2,000 yards extent, and over 420 yards in advance of the line of redoubts.

Between the seventh and eighth redoubts there was built a large bastion-shaped work, with a gorge of about 320 yards, which communicated with the redoubts by a sort of curtain of 140 yards in length.

Behind the centre of this bastion, and about 200 yards in the rear of it, was located another redoubt.

A second line of works lay at a distance of 360 yards behind the front of the first—it was composed of five redoubts; and finally, at 900 yards in rear of the centre of this second line, was another redoubt, making seventeen in all.

The bastion and nearly all the redoubts had their ditches palisaded, and were surrounded by a triple row of *trous-de-loup*.

This defensive camp, or lines rather, is worthy of much study, and I shall offer it as a strong support to my argument. At present it is only necessary to remark, that the general disposition, in this case, is evidently formed on a wish to have the defence accumulated in a few enclosed works of great strength, which, being situated at an average of 750 yards apart, from centre to centre, will each have a flanking fire over the nearer half of the intermediate intrenchments.

It is also probable that the latter were arranged to facilitate counter attacks by the garrison, in case the enemy should be repulsed. * *

The lines of circumvallation of the allies at Sevastopol were constructed with the single view of shielding the army from a Russian attack. The usual object of lines of circumvallation is chiefly to prohibit the entrance into the besieged place of reinforcements of troops, ammunition, or provisions, which might otherwise elude or break through the investing force, and make a dash for the gates of the place. But here the investment was only half complete, which is the same thing as entirely neglected.

The Russians could enter the fortifications on the south side in any force, large or small, by crossing the bay, or by marching along the shore. Consequently the lines from Inkerman to Balaklava were purely defensive. It is to be remarked, also, that these extensive works were not judged necessary at first, but that the allies were induced to adopt them, and afterwards to continually strengthen them by receiving severe admonitions and demonstrations of their value, especially in the battles of Balaklava, Inkerman, and the Tchernaya.

The lines were double; the first one extended from Inkerman to Balaklava, along the northern and eastern boundaries of the plateau of Chersonese, and along the Tchernaya, and behind the canal, (which forms a second obstacle to an attacking army,) and so along to the hilly ground of Balaklava. The total extent of this first line was over six miles. Its object, as stated before, was to protect the right of the besieging army and its depots at Balaklava, and its line of communication with the latter point.

That the advanced line fully effected this purpose is proved by the resistance which it enabled the French and Sardinian troops, who defended the position attacked, to offer to the Russian attempt of August 16, 1855.

On this occasion the enemy's forces, consisting of six divisions of infantry, three of cavalry, and 150 guns, and estimated in all at from 40,000 to 50,000 men, made an obstinate attack on that part of the lines which lay in the vicinity of the Tractir bridge over the Tchernaya.

They were repulsed with the loss of 3,329 killed alone. The number of wounded is not stated, but the French took care of 1,600 of them, besides those who were carried off by their comrades.

This signal repulse was effected by 12,000 French and 10,000 Sardinian troops; and the result is to be explained only by admitting the great defensive value of the lines as an adjunct to the naturally strong position.

This conclusion is made positive by the fact that, after the battle of the Tchernaya, the French took greater pains than ever to add to their works, which they rendered almost superfluously strong.

The *second line* ran across the peninsula, from Streletzka bay to the sea, in a southerly direction, following the elevated ground; the extent of it was about 8,000 yards, the works were continuous, and strengthened at various intervals by eight redoubts, in the shape of bastions closed at the gorge. These bastions were of great size, and probably quite strong.

The object of this line was, like the third line of Torres Vedras, to provide against a ruinous defeat of the allied armies, which should necessitate a retreat into some secure position, where they could await reinforcements, or from which they could, if fortune should continue against them, re-embark into their fleets and leave the Crimea entirely.

The second line was therefore laid out so as to be defensible by a small part of the army, while the main body might be transferred to the ships.

In my propositions for the defence of New York I shall have occasion to refer to this last line, which is, in several points, analogous to the one I suggest. The chief features of resemblance are, its extent, the closing of the gorges of the bastions, the connecting them by continuous lines, and the variable distances at which they are placed, together with the great average distance which is flanked by each.

CHAPTER V.

PRINCIPLES RELATING TO LINES DISCUSSED AND APPLIED TO THE PARTICULAR CASE IN POINT.

First. Each extremity of a fortified line should rest upon an obstacle which may be considered impassable by an enemy, and which the latter should be unable to outflank or march around. Large rivers, the sea, rugged mountain ranges, such are the indispensable supports to the flanks of an extensive intrenched position.

Thus the lines of the Queich rested upon the Rhine and the Vosges; the French lines of the Nivelle upon the sea and upon the inaccessible Mondarin mountain, upon which were works that commanded the bridge over the Nive river, passable only at that point for the enemy.

The lines of Torres Vedras extended from the Tagus to the sea.

The French lines of circumvallation at Sevastopol rested at each flank on the sea, and the English, or advanced ones, upon the sea and on the strong position of Inkerman.

The lines at Mayence might have been made to rest at both ends on the Rhine, but the right flank was not joined to the river, and the neglect of this precaution was the cause of the Austrians forcing the position.

At the lines of Boulou a similar neglect, in not securing the mountain summit which formed the extreme right of the position, caused the loss of it to the Spanish. * * * *

Second. The lines should present a continuous uninterrupted barrier of a profile not easily to be clambered over. Gaps in the line are as good for the enemy as breaches ready made by his artillery or sappers, because the moment the artillery of the defences is silenced, and the troops are driven temporarily from the parapets of the flanks, the assaulting column can enter at a run, without any impediment to give the defenders time to resume their fire.

It must here be understood that, though uninterrupted, the intrenchments should not be simply of the kinds commonly called continuous; that is, of a series of curtains, flanked by any or all of the elementary field works which are open at the gorge. It was such a line as this which caused the defeat of the French at Turin, and such will always involve the ruin of their defenders, owing to the following reasons:

The army which guards an extensive, continuous line, must find its safety in completely prohibiting the enemy from crossing it at any point; should they succeed in passing the line at the centre for example, they could concentrate their forces, and, marching to the right or left, attack in flank the defenders, who must receive their reinforcements from the wings by piecemeal; and as is always the case when the flank is surprised, the latter arrive too late to be of service, and in time only to be beaten in detail.

But if, to guard against the lines being forced at every point, the general posts his troops so as to render the entire length of the works equally strong throughout, he renders his defeat a matter almost of certainty; for the dissemination of his forces, which is thus produced, renders it impossible, with the largest army, to have enough troops everywhere to resist the onset of a column which perhaps is made up of the main body of the enemy.

Manœuvres of the troops for the purpose of accumulating them at the point attacked are not practicable, for the forcing of a fieldwork insufficiently garrisoned is the affair of a few minutes; and, besides, the attention of the defenders will be distracted, by several false attacks, from the decisive one. * * * *

Third. For these reasons, the [technically called] continuous lines have seldom been resorted to without being strengthened by strong redoubts, or star forts, situated at intervals either in front or in rear of, or forming a portion of the line.

At the same time it is apparent that the same reasoning that has just been given will apply in a certain degree even when the lines are

supported by redoubts. I should say that it has been susceptible of application until the recent improvements in the soldier's musket, which, by vastly increasing its range and accuracy, afford an opportunity for reconciling those clashing conditions which, as I have just shown, are not to be harmonized at all in continuous lines, and which it hitherto required great skill to reconcile even with the assistance of enclosed works. To make clear the point in question, it must be stated that writers on the subject of field fortification generally fix the limit of effective range of the musket, in actions of this nature, at less than 200 yards—it will carry further, but with no exactness; and at 300 yards the force of the ball is spent. The exceptions to this rule are few. The greatest variation is found in the practice of Vauban, who calculated the lines of defence of his field works (in which he exhibited as much genius as in his permanent fortresses) so as to count upon the extreme range of the musket—that is, he fixes the distance from the flanking parts to the salients at 300 yards; but (as St. Paul justly observes) the musket ball cannot be relied on at this distance, either for penetrating power or accuracy; and, in addition, the fire of the flanks ought to reach to some distance in front of and beyond the salient defended by them, so as to give a cross fire on the enemy before he arrives at the ditch. This basis fixes the length of the single front of continuous lines of different kinds as follows:

Redan lines, at the maximum	240 yards.
Tenaille lines, with large salients	320 “
Tenaille lines, with small salients	240 “
Bastioned lines, (maximum)	240 “

The disadvantages of the tenaille lines when made of the maximum dimensions, the chief of which is the exposure of the lines to ricochet fire, cause the length of 240 yards to be made the rule.

Now, basing the calculation on the same range of the musket, if the continuous line is to be strengthened by redoubts, either these will not be close enough to support the whole line or there will be a great number of them. For example: a line of redoubts, to protect, by their fire, each other and the intermediate spaces, must be double, and arranged in quincunx order. Dr. Sellon estimates the distances in each line at 440 yards from centre to centre, which will amount to one redoubt for each 220 yards.

A line formed of detached lunettes, with a second line of redans in the rear, (all rendered enclosed works by stockades,) has spaces of 250 yards at the furthest. In case, therefore, that the latter alternative is chosen, the redoubts will require for their garrison a great part of the reserve which ought to act independently of the works; and also the garrison of each one must be small, and the work itself must be small, and consequently weak. The consequence would be that, so far from improving the defence of the continuous line, they would aggravate the disadvantages of the defenders. For this reason redoubts supporting lines have generally been placed at wide intervals and made of large size, strong, and capable of holding a large number of troops. Frequently star forts have taken the place of

redoubts, as being intrinsically stronger. This arrangement has been the best one possible, in consideration of all the circumstances; the deficiencies of it have been inevitable results of the short range of the smooth-bore musket.

These deficiencies, to recapitulate them briefly, have been:

1st. That the enclosed works have not protected by their fire the whole length of the open intrenchments which closed the interval between them, thus leaving weak points in the line.

2d. That, for a still stronger reason, they have had no power of mutual support by reciprocal flank fire.

It will be seen that the limited range of the musket has been so great a restriction upon the defensive combinations for the defence of extended positions that no possible arrangement could be contrived to render lines, even theoretically, strong. Fine natural advantages of topography and the genius of a great general have been the main strength of such dispositions.

At the present time, however, this restriction is entirely removed by the invention and introduction into all services, as the habitual arm of the soldier, of the rifle-musket with the Minié (or its equivalent) projectile.

Lines may now be constructed of great extent and defensible by a not extraordinary force, and in localities which it would formerly have been considered impossible to defend.

The demonstration of this assertion, which has not before been made, follows naturally at this point of the argument. It can be shown that lines can now be combined so as to fulfil all the requisites of a continuous line and still permit of the defending force being chiefly concentrated at a few points, leaving, besides, a large enough proportion of troops to form a powerful reserve; in other words, all the advantages of any lines that were ever constructed may be preserved, while the former inherent and inevitable deficiencies are eliminated. * * * * *

Fourth. Of the proper location and nature of enclosed works in lines.

The enclosed works of a modern system of lines should be—

1st. Located as far apart as possible, to conform to the other essential conditions; because the fewer they are the more pains can be taken with each one to strengthen it, and also, the more troops can be stationed in each, out of the total number that can be spared for the garrisons.

Hence, each work could be stronger in itself to resist a separate assault, and also would give a more formidable flanking fire upon the approaches to and ditches of the intervening intrenchments.

2d. The works should not, however, be so distant as to prevent their sweeping, by their musketry as well as their artillery fire, all the ground between them, including the immediate vicinity of the curtains which join them, and the enfilading of the ditches of the latter.

As I propose to confide the flanking of the entire system to the enclosed works specified, and as the necessity of a thorough flanking,

both of the approaches and ditches, of all intrenchments, is an universally admitted military principle, no more need be said on this point.

It is evident that the basis, according to which must be determined the intervals in question, is the effective range of the regulation musket in the hands of the private soldier; this element for the rifle-musket, with which all the United States infantry is to be armed, is 600 yards.

As the distance specified is not obtained from any published or official authorities it will be as well to state my reasons for adopting it.

In the first place, it will be recollected, as was quoted from St. Paul, that the smooth-bore musket was expected to kill at 300 yards; the *Aide Mémoire du Génie* says that at 300 yards musket bullets begin to give fatal wounds. The *line of defence* has accordingly been fixed at from 160 to 200 yards, so as to give, upon the approaches to the flanked angles, a cross fire, for, say, a hundred yards in advance. For about this distance the assaulting columns would therefore be under a more or less effective fire, which would continually increase in accuracy as they approached the ditch, and would produce about its maximum destructive effect upon the troops while they should be accumulated in the latter and occupied in climbing the scarp.

Let us therefore find the range at which the Minié ball will produce a mortal wound, and see whether it can be assumed as the correlative of the 300 yards for the smooth-bore.

At 300 yards the musket bullet will penetrate $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches into white pine wood; this is an ample estimate, as it is from the French "*Aide Mémoire du Génie*," which, if I am not mistaken, refers to heavier bullets and a larger charge than our percussion muskets carried. With regard to the latter, it appears* that at 300 yards none of their shots penetrated into oak, and only $\frac{1}{10}$ th part stuck where they hit. Now, the range at which the rifle-musket will give an equal penetration is *at least* 1,000 yards.†

As to accuracy, all the published tables go to prove that the new piece is more exact at 1,000 yards than the musket at 300. For example, one series‡ of trials has found the mean deviation of round musket balls at 300 yards, to be $3\frac{1}{2}$ feet vertically by 6 feet horizontally. Of the whole number of balls fired in this trial 12 per cent. missed the target, of 5 by 10 yards.

A similar trial§ showed that the mean deviation of the elongated projectile from the rifle-musket at 900 yards, was 2 feet 10 inches vertically and 1 foot 9 inches horizontally, while only 2 per cent. of the shots failed to hit the target, which was 5 by 6 yards.

It must be considered, however, that for firing at early dawn, or on a dark day, or at a company dressed in grey or blue, there is not as good a chance to aim as is always the case at trials, which are conducted in fine weather, and where the mark is a white, conspicuous

* Ord. Manual.

† Tables of experiments in "Report on small arms," or table 12 of my *Memoir on Fortification*, 1858

‡ Table 3 of same memoir.

§ Table 9, *idem*.

object; and these drawbacks would be much more important at 1,000 yards than at 600. It must also be taken into account that the undulations of the ground, in any position likely to be advantageous for intrenchments, would probably prevent an uninterrupted view of 1,000 yards in extent; and, in addition, the flanking work must be of an excessive size to be formidable enough to check, by its fire, the body of men which could advance through the interval of 2,000 yards, which would separate the supporting enclosed works, if each were expected to defend a length of 1,000 yards. In order, therefore, to be on the safe side, I have adopted the figure of 600 yards as the *effective range of the new piece*, considered as the arm of the private soldier.

The deadly fire of the Russian rifle pits at Sevastopol, at from 600 to 700 yards distance, and the sharp shooting at 900 yards during the siege of Bomarsund, are confirmations, which I regret not having space to enlarge upon, of the correctness of my conclusion.

The range of grape shot is 600 yards also; a circumstance which had an influence with me in fixing the line of defence at that distance.

The two requisites, with regard to *relative* location of the enclosed works in a line, will then be satisfied by placing them at intervals of 1,200 yards apart, counting between their flanks, or 1,400 yards from centre to centre. Of course, if the nature of the ground should require it, they might be placed closer; the system would thereby gain more rapidly perhaps in strength than would be counterbalanced by the expense, for the redoubts need hardly ever be so close as to incur the defects (of numerous works) mentioned on page 564, which are not important, until they get within 700 yards of each other. * * *

Fifth. To place the enclosed works in conformity with the locality and topography, the following principle should be kept in view.

They should be seated upon commanding spots, which lie also rather in front of the line of continuous works; thus situated, they will be difficult of access themselves, and will, moreover, gain a plunging and reverse fire upon the lower ground, in front of the intermediate curtains, and upon the ditches of the latter.

The range of both artillery and musketry will be greater from these high points, and also there will a greater number of shots tell in an enemy's column, which must appear larger than if viewed from a level.

The moral effect is, besides, worth noting, as soldiers invariably dislike to pass under the fire of commanding works.

This condition is, after all, one that needed only to be stated, and I have discussed it more for the sake of uniformity than anything else, as it has always been followed in actual lines. * * *

Sixth. The size of the enclosed works.

They should be large enough to deliver a very heavy flanking fire on the approaches, &c., of the intrenchments.

This fire should be of both artillery and musketry; in fact all the artillery disposable for the defence of the lines, except the flying batteries, should find room in the redoubts.

In the redoubts, if placed as above recommended, will be the most

advantageous position for the action of artillery upon the enemy's columns, and in them, also, the guns will be most secure from capture.

It must be recollected, however, that not only does artillery require much space on the terrepleins, but that it will not do to crowd the latter with pieces to the exclusion of a proper number of troops; for in that case the work would be very liable to be taken by assault; hence, the more pieces the work carries, the greater should be the garrison of it.

Let us suppose that each work carries two six-gun batteries of artillery, one on each flank, the space required for these and three traverses will be 45 yards.

Probably 200 yards of banquette for infantry will suffice, as it is about 80 yards greater than the whole length of a bastion face in the modern system of fortification. This will altogether give the flank a length of 250 yards.

The flanks are the lines which, according to my system, must fix the size of the work, since the latter must positively give a great column of fire in both directions to fulfil the part imposed on it by the theory of the defence.

The flanks being fixed in length and direction, it remains to decide on the manner of joining their ends. The front of the work should give its fire towards the approaches by which an enemy could march to assault it; hence its best disposition will be in two lines or faces, making equal angles with each other and with the flanks.

This arrangement will, in view of the obtuseness of the angles so obtained, permit of all the guns of the two faces, or of a face and flank, being directed along either capital of the work; so that an approach must be under at least the full direct fire of one face.

The lengths of the faces should vary according to the position and importance of the work, say from 60 yards each to 100.

As to the gorge, I propose to construct it in the shape of a bastion front.

The gorge will in most of the redoubts, that is, in all that are laid out on a part of the line which has but little curvature, have a length of about 160 yards, which gives ample room for the tracé proposed. The object of closing the gorge is purely to make the work equally strong in rear as on the other sides, to resist an escalade. It has no view of the collateral works, nor of the curtains; and, consequently, we have only to consider how it can be arranged to defend itself in the strongest manner and at the least expense.

That the entrance gate of the work is in the gorge is another reason for desiring to arrange the latter in a manner to make it as defensible as possible.

The bastioned tracé is undoubtedly the one best calculated to answer the single purpose of the gorge, from its strength and simplicity.

The garrison of the redoubts just described should be, on an average, 2,000 men. * * * * *

Seventh. In deciding upon the shape and size of the enclosed works of a line, we must, besides the action of each *upon the ground around it*,

consider the necessity of providing for its separate and independent defence against attempts at escalade, or even a short siege.

It is impossible to separate perfectly these two essential points in *any other sort of work than a redoubt*; but in this the lines of rampart may have precisely the lengths and directions that will enable them fully to sweep the country around, and their approaches, by their fire, and to perfectly enfilade the ditches of the curtains, and flank the ground in front of them; this is possible without the slightest interference with the dispositions for the independent defence of the work, in front or rear; and if this second condition has guided me in planning the gorge of my proposed works, it is because in this quarter the other one goes altogether out of the question.

The second condition, relating to the individual defence of each enclosed work depends upon:

1st. The arrangements for flanking its ditches;

2d. On the profile.

It is because of the peculiar property of a redoubt, of satisfying the above condition separately from the other, that I have chosen it in preference to the star fort, or bastion fort, which have generally been constructed to defend the more important points of lines.

The reason has probably been that there have not been the means of providing for the individual defence of the work that become necessary for a redoubt; from the same cause, in the field redoubts that have been used in actual warfare, there has generally been a neglect of flanking arrangements.

The latter, when introduced, have consisted of—

1. Galleries of timber, loopholed, along the reverse of the ditches, at the salient angles, so as to enfilade, each, the ditch of one face.

2. Similar galleries running across the ditches at their middle points, for firing both ways each, thus enfilading one ditch.

The timber and plank necessary for these constructions, and the time requisite to build them, have often been wanting, and so have decided engineers not to adopt the redoubt, but to prefer some tracé that would enable the garrison of each work to defend it from the parapets without any supplementary arrangements. It must be remembered also, that, from the causes I discussed at the outset of this section, depending on the range of the musket, the second condition in question has always been the one most important in an enclosed work, from the impossibility of satisfying the other more than very imperfectly.

The star fort of 8 points certainly satisfies the second condition as well as a redoubt, arranged with the timber-flanking galleries in question. The former gives a strong fire upon the approaches along either capital, from two lines, which are each a third of the width of the work in length. There are dead spaces in the inner ends of the ditches, it is true; but the salient ends are well flanked, and the defence from open ramparts is preferable to the firing from the detached and inconvenient galleries of redoubts.

These star forts, however, are not adapted to the purpose of my proposed line, from the important reason that one-third of each of

the two sides, which would face towards the curtains to be flanked, is prevented (by its being broken forwards to flank the ditches of the remainder) from giving its fire in the direction of the curtain. Besides, star forts are, not so easily as redoubts, adapted to irregular ground; and after passing a certain size, (say of 8 points, with faces of 60 yards, and with a garrison of 600 troops,) a better form will be found in the bastioned fort, in which the flanking lines do not bear so large a proportion to the main lines of the work as one-half—the ratio in the former. Even in the bastioned fort, however, there is too much indentation of the rampart, and too much sacrifice of the most essential condition that enclosed works ought to satisfy in lines.

In view, therefore, of all the arguments for the different sorts of enclosed works for the purpose in question, I should be inclined to choose redoubts, even if made on the plan of flanking by timber galleries. But when we consider that, in the case in question, these timber galleries may be dropped, and a much more convenient, consolidated, and infinitely stronger flanking arrangement substituted for them, there can no longer be any hesitation in the choice. * *

Eighth. In the Brooklyn lines proposed, there is no reason for not making the 15 or 17 redoubts that will be necessary of a permanent nature.

A revetted, partly detached scarp would render each one impregnable; and then a judicious location of them would render the whole line impregnable. I use the word impregnable in consideration of the probable length of the attack, and of the supplementary means of defence, which I will point out beyond, to resort to, in case of a more obstinate attempt.

The redoubts, if revetted, should have three bastionnets, or reciprocally flanking masonry caponnières. These should be put at the salient and two shoulder angles. There should be two half bastions at the inner ends of the flanks, and joining to these would be the two half bastions of the gorge front.

The use of masonry at the three outer angles is here unobjectionable, comparatively, with the requirements of the general theory of the defence. They cannot be attained and breached, or counterbattered, by any sort of artillery firing, except from batteries placed on the edge of the ditch; for, being close to the counterscarp, (which is only the width of the ditch from them in the direction towards any other location of the enemy's batteries,) they cannot be reached by the most curved of ricochet fire; and as to the breach batteries referred to, they cannot be placed until after a siege, and I believe not then, if the supplementary defence I will mention is adopted.

To describe briefly the bastionnets specified, it will be sufficient to state that they are casemated caponnières, which are placed something like the tours bastionnés of Vauban's second and third systems. They are armed with howitzers for firing cannister and small grape, and completely enfilade the ditches by a grazing fire. Their shape is bastioned, so as to prevent any dead angles being occasioned at any part of the scarp. They do not extend above the coping of the scarp,

and are consequently hidden from all exterior views by the crest of the glacis.

The half bastions, which flank the outer half of the flanks of the redoubts, are preferable to bastionnets, because the ditches they enfilade, lead towards the front, and thereby offer a chance to the enemy to open a curved fire along them which would breach casemates or any detached scarp of flanks at their inner ends.

With regard to the profile, the redoubts in question ought to have their ramparts and parapets of the usual dimensions, though the last perhaps had better be twenty-five feet thick on the flanks and faces.

The scarp for its entire circuit should be twenty feet high, but of this the upper eight feet should be a thin detached wall, arranged with a banquette three and a half feet high. This detached wall should follow round the coping of the bastionnets.

On the gorge side the scarp might be detached in the same manner on the faces and flanks of the half bastions; the curtain would most likely be formed of a range of bomb-proofs, for shelter, and to hold powder and stores.

It is certain, from the experience at Sevastopol in 1854 and 1855, that mortars will form a preponderating element in future siege trains; their shells will demolish and level thin parapets, and will render uninhabitable any works not profusely supplied with bomb-proofs.

There should be, consequently, enough of the latter in each redoubt to suffice for holding all its stores of powder and a fair supply of provisions, with a surplus depending on the money disposable for the purpose. The three bastionnets, it will be noted, are bomb-proof.

If the enemy should make his preparations before any part of the line for shelling it, the redoubts of that portion should immediately be filled with laborers, and a great number of temporary bomb-proofs of beams and earth be constructed at the foot of its terreplein slopes,* or under the rampart, or entirely under ground.

The parapets are made thick enough to prevent their being blown away by the bursting in them of large shells, which would otherwise open a view into the interior for the enemy's artillery.

Several reasons concur to recommend the partial detaching of the scarp, so as to form a *chemin-des-rondes* and breast-height wall.

In the first place, there will be a considerable saving of expense effected by the diminution of masonry, which amounts to about a cubic yard for every lineal yard of wall.

2d. The work is rendered thereby much more secure against attacks by storm, because the banquette in rear of the thin wall may be lined, during the assault, by two ranks of troops, who can open a direct and plunging fire on the assailants, crowded together in the ditch below. The short range at which this fire will be delivered will cause it to be exceedingly effective. These troops can also take hold of the ends of the scaling ladders which the enemy may rear against the scarp and

* The experience of Sevastopol shows that the army defending lines or an intrenched camp can, by the assistance of a few works to prevent immediate attack, so fortify any one menaced point as to put it in a condition not to be taken without a siege.

cast them off and dash them to the ground before any stormers had time to mount them.

3d. In order to give the space necessary for the banquette, and for a free communication behind it, between the thin wall and the exterior slope of the parapet, the mass of earth forming the latter must be set back a certain distance from the edge of the scarp.

There is thus a little room subtracted from the interior area of the work, and the parapet is a trifle shortened; but, in redoubts of the size I recommend, neither of these consequences are at all objectionable. It is only in the diminutive two and three story forts of our seacoast, that every foot of space has to be studiously economized, and want of room is an insuperable obstacle to the use of the *chemin-des-rondes*.

There is, however, a great and solid advantage which is consequent upon thus setting back the weight of the parapet from the sustaining wall.

The latter may be breached and tumble in ruins into the ditch, without the earth of the parapet even tending to slide down after it; while the parapet, in case it does rest close to the scarp, is entirely undermined when the latter falls, and caves in, together with some of the rampart on which it rests, so that not only is there an easy ascent provided for the enemy by the earth assuming over the ruins of the wall its natural slope, but the interior of the work is opened to the enemy's marksmen and artillery, which will render it difficult to make a hand to hand defence of the breach.

Take the case, however, of the partly detached scarp, and suppose it to be breached; there is less wall to fall in and the earth which follows it in its fall is a small triangular prism, which slides off on a plane which is nearly the prolongation of the exterior slope of the parapet; the latter is, therefore, not even reduced appreciably in thickness, and, as a covering mass and as a breast-work, remains as good as ever.

All the enemy gains, therefore, in this case, by breaching the scarp, is creating a steep slope to ascend by, without diminishing the offensive powers of the work or preventing the adoption of all sorts of arrangements for the close defence of the breach.

These are the main advantages secured to the defence by the adoption of the *chemin-des-rondes* and its covering wall. It will be seen that it is especially suitable for the isolated redoubts proposed for the Brooklyn lines, and that the simplicity of the latter, and their considerable area, render the introduction of this arrangement uncommonly free from any counterbalancing objections.

There are one or two of the latter which it may be well to mention, though they are of much less weight in the case of these redoubts than as applied to extensive fortresses; and even in recent examples of these in Europe we find many instances of the use of the *chemin-des-rondes*.

The *chemin-des-rondes* is said to give a facility to the enemy, after he has gained the top of the wall at any point, to extend his troops to the right and left so as to mount at the same time a wide extent of

the parapet. However, the garrison has also a better opportunity of preventing the first lodgment, and of reinforcing more promptly the troops defending the point where the enemy succeeds in gaining a footing.

Another defect attributed to the thin covering wall is, that it may be knocked down very soon by the enemy's artillery. This is not, however, so much the case if it is hidden from exterior view by the glacis, as it can then be reached only by curved fires, which are uncertain.

Another consideration is, that probably only a short extent of the wall, on the faces, will be demolished, while that on the flanks and gorge will remain intact. This will also be the case only for the one or two redoubts that may be bombarded, while the eighteen or nineteen others enjoy all the advantages of the arrangement, without being subjected at all to this drawback.

Now, even supposing that a considerable length of the wall, on the faces of one or two redoubts, should be ruined, the *chemin-des-rondes* would still have effected, for these redoubts, all it was intended to perform.

If the enemy had tried to storm them before deciding to take the time and pains to plant his heavy guns and wait their effect, he will have been repulsed with severe loss—a result, in a good measure, attributable to the detached scarp; and it is certain that the knowledge of this construction would tend to prevent the experiment being tried, and thus occasion the delay necessary to construct batteries and arm them.

There would thus be gained by the defenders several days, which they could turn to profit by putting the redoubts attacked into a perfect state of defence by the construction of fougasses, mines, palisades, and all sorts of obstacles, and by crowding them with men, and sheltering the garrison with a great number of bomb-proofs.

In the rear and on each flank new field works and batteries could be thrown up and armed; while the interior preparations were in progress, the former should bear upon the approaches to the redoubt, and strengthen it by their fire.

It will be recollected that the flanks and gorge remain intact, and that 12 feet of scarp, at least, remains on the faces throughout, and there is, consequently, if the work has a large garrison, no probability of the work being *surprised*, a contingency that scarps are intended especially to prevent; hence an assault ought to be frustrated with certainty, considering the time and means that have been disposable in preparing for it.

As the redoubts I propose are the main feature of the line, I have discussed them at much length; the strength of the system, however, depends, not so much on the individual strength of these works, but on their acting in concert and harmony with the earthworks which form the continuous barrier.

With regard to the efficacy of enclosed forts in strengthening a line of field works, we have any amount of testimony from history. The employment of strong redoubts and forts on the summits of all the

hills which formed salient portions of the lines of Buntzelwitz is an example. The number and magnitude of the redoubts in the lines of Torres Vedras, and their heavy armaments of cannon, show that Wellington placed great confidence in them. The vigorous defence of the signal redoubts in the lines of the Nivelles, which did not surrender till the open works had been forced, goes to show that with all the disadvantages of a false position and incomplete communications, these lines might have held out if they had been more frequently garnished with similar works.

At the intrenched camp of Drissa, the main reliance was upon redoubts, which were palisaded with care, and so placed that the enemy could not force the general line by merely overrunning the intermediate intrenchments; he was obliged to take two or three redoubts; a certainty which warranted the Russians in fortifying these points as they did.

The efficacy of enclosed works was strongly exemplified at the battle of Borodino, where the single redoubt of Chewardino, situated 2,000 yards in front of the line, on a hill, after being assaulted and taken three times, was not securely possessed by the French till 10 o'clock at night, after a sanguinary struggle of sixteen hours. To gain this point was of the highest importance in the eyes of Napoleon, who designed to refuse his left, pushing his right forward. This single redoubt, therefore, (says M. de Sellow,) permitted the Russians to dispute the decisive point for a whole day. In the same battle the Russian left was protected by some works in advance of the heights of Semenofskoi, and it is due to these that this part of the line held out as it did, for six hours, against the enormous masses which Ney and Davoust had accumulated upon this point of attack, which was subjected also to the fire of near four hundred pieces of artillery.

The great redoubt of Borodino was not taken till toward 3 o'clock in the afternoon, after having cost the lives of several thousand soldiers; it was the resistance of this redoubt to the assaults of the viceroy, that prevented the latter from effecting (as Napoleon intended) a break between the centre and left wing of the Russian army.

The small redoubt on the British left, at Inkerman, had a great share in influencing the result of that battle, enabling the guards to hold out till reinforcements arrived to their support, and these, likewise, resisted long enough to give the French an opportunity to discover that the demonstration in the right was a feint, and to repulse the enemy by their rapid movement, which attacked the Russians in flank.

The French lines (the 2d line) before Sevastopol, exhibits almost the identical arrangement of pentagonal redoubts and curtains that I propose to adopt; the location of the redoubts upon the advanced and elevated portions of the site, and the junction of them by nearly straight lines of intrenchments, are features worthy of imitation.

In the advanced line of the allies, reaching from Balaklava to Inkerman, we also find redoubts occupying some of the most important points of the topography.

The consequences of relying upon open field works, that is, either

of continuous lines or lines with intervals, made up of elementary works which are open behind, and which can consequently be turned and rendered useless by an army who can gain a foothold in any quarter of the line, are exemplified in the fate of the French lines at Mayence, at Turin and at Malplaquet.

The same causes led in each of these cases to the loss of the position; they each exhibit a dissemination of the troops, rendered necessary by the nature of the works, which require that every yard of parapet shall be manned from one end to the other; the consequent weakness of the whole line at every point, and the inevitable yielding of the thin rank of troops, guarding the points assailed by overwhelming columns of the enemy, are seen in each instance; this succession of events is rapidly followed by the advance of the consolidated forces, who have penetrated the line, upon the defending troops who have not had time to form, in order to meet an attack in the rear, which completely spoils all previous plans for a successful resistance. * * *

Ninth. The intrenchments connecting the redoubts should be defended by a line of skirmishers only, to accord with the general theory of the system; they should not therefore be revetted lines, but earthworks, thrown up on the anticipation of a descent on the island, and strengthened by abattis and *trous-de-loup* on the slopes in front.

The ditch and parapet should run *in a direct line*, or a re-entering angle, from one redoubt to the other, and in such a manner that the reverse or inside of the latter could be enfiladed from the redoubts.

The position this curtain must occupy being known in advance, there is a very cheap obstacle which might make the approach to the line quite difficult. I allude to thorn hedges, which should be planted as thickly as possible, where circumstances admit.

The curtains thus laid out and strengthened, would offer sufficient impediment and sufficient cover for a line of skirmishers to oblige an enemy, who might endeavor to pass them in preference to assaulting the redoubts, to make his attack in heavy columns; for any other disposition of his troops would be too weak to force the skirmishers to retire.

But the numbers and compactness of a column render it a mark that is difficult to miss, and the columns of attack in question must advance under a double or triple fire, both from the redoubts, which open with artillery, (the nearest one with an effective musketry also,) and from the skirmishers in front, sustained by the reserve.

Under these circumstances, the probable losses would be excessive, and would appear sufficient to frustrate the attempt to pass between the redoubts; so that even the temporary field works recommended would probably necessitate the siege of one or more of the latter; should that be found to be the case, the entire duty of the intermediate intrenchments, in the general scheme of defence, would be fully accomplished, and I think there would no longer be any doubt of the complete efficacy of the system; for I have already shown that the redoubts are proof against surprises or escalades, or attack by storm preceded by bombardments, and that consequently a siege is necessary to gain possession of them.

But while the batteries, parallels, and approaches of an attack in form are being constructed, there can be at least as many hands employed on this side of the lines in strengthening them, and throwing up additional redoubts and batteries in rear of them, so that it may safely be assumed that the new works will render the first line as impregnable to a siege as it was at first to a precipitate attack. * *

Tenth. An easy and rapid communication from one wing to the other is an essential requisite of a good system of lines; the advantages of it appear in many of the examples I have adduced, and the results of a neglect of arrangements for this purpose, or of localities which prevented such arrangements, are evident in others.

For instance, the lines of Buntzelwitz were thought to owe much of their strength to the free communication, from one point to another afforded by a fine plain, which was adapted to the manœuvres of all arms of the service; and the existence of a wood which concealed the movements of the troops, in part from the enemy, was considered to be an additional advantage.

The left of the lines of Torres Vedras was much strengthened by being posted in advance of a good road, which ran for about ten miles parallel to the fortifications.

According to Napier, Soult owed his defeat, at the lines of the Nivelle, in a certain measure, to the want of roads or communications of any kind along his position.

In the case of the Brooklyn lines, there should be a hard wide road leading the whole length of them in their rear, and in addition to the already existing plank and other roads, two or three roads might on occasion, be improvised, leading from some central position in the rear, where the reserve would be posted; for besides parallel manœuvres, there should be every facility for the latter to march directly upon either quarter of the line that might be menaced by the enemy, and it can be shown beyond doubt, that it is the judicious management of the reserve which will constitute the safety of the system.

Some of the roads specified would have the great advantage of being completely hidden from any views of the enemy, who must therefore remain partly in ignorance of the movements of the reserve: while on the contrary, every manœuvre of the latter would be discovered, from the parts of the lines situated on the summits of the hills which overlook the country all the way to the sea shore. * *

Eleventh. Transmission of intelligence and orders: There is in a fixed position, which is occupied long beforehand in expectation of attack, every facility for making perfect arrangements for conveying, instantly, information to the headquarters and to the posts interested, of every movement of the enemy; and the rapidity and certainty which a proper organization will impart to combined movements of different divisions, are so valuable, that no pains should be spared to insure them.

The means usually resorted to have been the semaphore, and for night use, rockets; but in foggy weather both are rendered useless, and the rockets are apt to be confounded with shells thrown by the

enemy, or the similar signals of the latter ; besides, rockets can only be a very meagre reliance.

On these accounts it will be found worth while to establish an electric telegraph along the line as a check on the former methods, and even as a main reliance, for its scope is much greater than the semaphore, which is limited to a set of preconcerted signals ; it is also less liable to great errors.

Besides some semaphores there should therefore be telegraph wires laid along the line, having stations in the redoubts ; and similar lines should run along the radial roads to the general headquarters at the central position. They need not, of course, be established till the necessity occurs. * * * * *

Twelfth. Convenient débouchés should be arranged to permit the reserve to attack the enemy in turn, in case he should be repulsed so as to warrant the attempt. * * * * *

Thirteenth, and lastly : Not only the construction of the lines should be correctly planned, but the manner of defending them must be in harmony with the nature of them.

The redoubts are proof against assaults, and consequently against the most violent siege ; for the trenches and batteries of the enemy can be responded to by superior works thrown up by the garrison during the siege ; there is however a remote possibility of an assault giving the enemy a temporary footing on the curtains, which are, from economy, of earthwork. Instead, therefore, of posting all the troops, not required for the garrisons of the enclosed works, along the curtains, the greatest solicitude should be to maintain a strong reserve, which, being in constant communication with the line, by means of signals, should continually manœuvre so as to be opposite the main point of attack.

Should the enemy break through the line between two redoubts, he will have suffered greatly from the fire of the troops in the intrenchment, and likewise from the redoubts on each side while advancing to it, removing or breaking down the abattis and other obstacles, and climbing the ditch and parapet. On attaining the rear side of the breastwork, he will find that its defenders have taken shelter behind the redoubts on either side, and that they are firing upon his flanks from their new position, which is reinforced, perhaps, by the garrisons of the adjoining lines of curtains. All the time the artillery and musketry fire of the redoubts will continue, and the enemy must experience considerable losses while amassing his troops to march against the reserve, which will now be at hand, to take part, either offensively or defensively, in the combat.

It might happen that the general in command might see an opportunity of sallying out beyond the line during the attack, and throwing his whole force on the flank of the enemy.

I have said enough, however, to make clear the general method which alone would be suitable to the defence of such a line as I propose for the defence of New York.

With this fundamental idea, the rest must depend, as in all battles, on the time, place, and opportunity. No perfectly elaborated arrange-

ment can be followed out strictly, and as many battles have been won by the inspiration of the moment as by preconcerted plans. * * *

This appears to be a proper place to allude to a plan for the defence of Brooklyn, which resulted (some fifteen years ago, I believe,) from the conferences of a board of engineers. This plan, however, has never been made public, nor has it, to the best of my information and research, ever been offered, officially, even to the Chief Engineer, much less to the Secretary of War, or to Congress: hence the fact of such a plan having been discussed does not conflict with my assertion in the preface, that the government has never been warned of the danger to New York from descents upon Long Island, and still less been presented with any plans for their prevention.

This plan I have not been able to find in any printed or written documents, and have heard it stated differently by the officers who have mentioned it. One account is, that Brooklyn was to be isolated from the rest of Long Island by a "chain of permanent redoubts," extending from Willet's Point, along the hills, to Fort Hamilton, (a distance of twenty-one miles,) to be connected, in time of war, by a line of field works. Another account states that permanent redoubts are to be used, but that they are not to constitute a line, but merely to occupy the important points along the ridge in question.

Applying the principles elucidated in the foregoing general discussion on lines to these plans, the defects of the latter become manifest.

In the first place, however, let us inquire what sort of redoubts would be used, and the answer may be guessed, if we observe the nature of that one which lies at present at the right flank of the proposed line. I refer, of course, to the redoubt of Fort Hamilton.

This redoubt is insignificant in size, being thirty-two yards square *on the outside*. It has eight guns in barbette, which take up about half the room on its contracted terreplein, leaving space for perhaps thirty or forty men, in two ranks, to fire in either direction. Its parapets are but four feet thick, and are of masonry, which a short cannonade would knock down, leaving the terreplein open to a rifle fire, which would soon clear it of its defenders.

If these redoubts are to be used merely as auxiliary defences, that is, as strengthening particular important points, and are intended to hold out only against an attempt at storming, they will be less objectionable than in any other point of view; but they are too small to hold a garrison whose fire shall be of any hindrance to the passage of a strong column in their vicinity—an inconvenience which might also be avoided by the enemy, as they would be very far apart; and if subjected to a cannonade they must certainly fall.

Besides, this hypothesis involves necessarily that of an active defence of the position by an *army in the field*, and I have already shown that all defensive plans which rest on the basis of an army of militia must calculate to place the latter behind intrenchments of some kind, so as to neutralize the immense advantage which veteran troops have over them, if they have a chance to manœuvre against them in the field.

If, on the other hand, the redoubts were intended to strengthen a continuous line of field works, the plan of the board appears in a still

worse light; for how can a line of twenty-one miles in extent, open to attack at all points, be defended by any number of works of this weak description?

It must be recollected that the plan under discussion was proposed before the invention of the Minié rifle, or rifle musket, and hence the redoubts must have been calculated to occupy intervals of 600 yards at the maximum; this involves the construction of over sixty redoubts, (a number that will appear great when compared with the fifteen or seventeen redoubts of my plan;) now, if made strong, each of these redoubts would want a large garrison, and an entire army of 50,000 or 60,000 men would be required to hold them all, without counting the 100,000 men or more that would be needed to garrison the line of field works and furnish a reserve; if the redoubts were, on the contrary, intended to be of the same size, and to have an equal garrison with the one at Fort Hamilton, then the line would certainly be broken through by a determined assault, or by several simultaneous assaults, which, on so long a line, would prevent any relief being sent from one wing to the other.

I hardly think, however, that any officer will be found to advocate the plan just criticized; for, if any should satisfy himself that a line twenty-one miles long could be defended by either system of redoubts and intrenchments that could have been meant by the board, he must at least concede that a line fourteen miles long is much easier guarded; and that when the latter is so located that only six miles of it can be attacked at a time, and arranged to correspond with a defence by the new rifle musket, it may be regarded as impassable, and a hundred-fold superior to that of the board.

Finally, the west half of the site that was proposed for this line by the board is now laid out in streets, built up, occupied by cemeteries and reservoirs, or otherwise appropriated for other purposes than military ones.

CHAPTER VI.

SUMMARY OF THE MEMOIR.

It is the intrinsic military advantages, as a defensive position, of the line I propose to fortify, that render the defence of Brooklyn feasible, and these advantages are independent, in a great measure, of the *system* according to which the works are projected.

I therefore invite particular attention to the following comprehensive tableau of the line, in which its grand properties, extent, and merits are set forth, disembarrassed of minutiae of topography, and not confused by reference to the means or mode of its defence.

1. The line extends from the head of Flushing bay to Fort Hamilton. It thus isolates Brooklyn from any point of Long Island where an expedition can land; for no fleet can pass the forts on the East

river, and these are below Flushing bay; nor can a fleet pass the batteries on the Narrows, where Fort Hamilton is situated.

2. The line is 15 miles in extent, involving the fortification of a length of $14\frac{1}{4}$ miles, and comprises three grand divisions of nearly equal length.

The first division is of 6 miles, and runs from Fort Hamilton, east, to Jamaica bay. This division fronts towards Gravesend bay and Cony Island.

The second division borders the marshes of Jamaica bay, running northeast for 4 miles, and opposes any landing on this shore.

The third division is 5 miles long; it runs north from the shores of Jamaica bay to the head of Flushing bay, and stands in the way of any approach from any point on the sound or Atlantic shores of Long Island.

3. The principal merit of this line, which renders its defence a matter of certainty, and which follows from the fact that each of these three divisions rests both flanks upon the water, is, that whatever part of Long Island an expedition might land at, the latter would be checked in its advance by a single division of the line, and would be restricted to the attack of this one.

In other words, the three divisions are isolated from each other, and it is impossible to march around the exterior of the line from one division to another.

This extraordinary natural property of the line has this inestimable consequence: that, although the line is 15 miles long, only 5 miles of it, or 6 miles at most, will ever need to be defended at a time. The entire force behind the lines can therefore be concentrated upon either division the moment that the news of the debarkation of a foreign force upon the island is telegraphed to Brooklyn. * * * * *

A similar condensed description of my plan for fortifying this line, and a brief exposition of its advantages, are as follows:

1. The two divisions facing the south and east to be made the strongest, because they are the longest, and liable to regular land attacks, aided by artillery.

The division fronting on Jamaica bay to be calculated to resist gun-boat attacks, and a debarkation within effective cannon range.

2. The fortifications on each division to be an uninterrupted line of earthwork intrenchments, but with arrangements for sorties, and flanked and otherwise supported, at distances of 1,400 yards, by detached redoubts with masonry scarps, which shall be impregnable against any assaults or attempts at storming.

3. The heavy artillery to be placed in the forts, where it shall sweep all the country in front, and take in flank an enemy marching to the assault of the lines of earthwork between the forts.

The light artillery to be placed, on the day of battle, wherever it may seem that it is most wanted, behind the earthworks.

The defending army to be stationed so as to form two ranks for the entire length of the earthworks, and to furnish the forts with garrisons of 2,000 men each; the remainder of the troops to form a reserve to march to the assistance of the point most violently attacked.

4. *Estimates.*—Thus posted, an army of 50,000 men would defend Brooklyn against any army that could be brought against it; 20,000 men would guard the earthworks, and 15,000 would hold the forts, while there would be left a reserve of 15,000 to aid in the defence at the decisive point of attack.

It will be seen that the above calculation provides for the defence of only 6 miles in length, or of only a single division, though the largest of the line; but it will be recollected that only one division can be attacked at a time. No general would split an army, however large, to land half of it to the east and half of it to the west of the lines; to divide an army into isolated corps, without concert or communications of any sort, in order to attack a consolidated enemy, would be a gross military blunder.

It is true that a gun-boat attack upon the centre division might take place simultaneously with the assault on the division on the right or left, and in view of that, the estimate for the garrison of the lines may be increased by 5,000 men; and to guard against all possible attempts on the remaining division which might take place as diversions to distract the defence, we will allow for the remaining division a garrison of one-third the full quota, say 10,000 men, which may be regarded as constituting a second reserve. The total number of troops that can ever be required to man the lines, allowing for a reserve of 25,000 men, is, therefore, 65,000. This number of troops can be furnished at a few days' notice, and fully armed and equipped, from the city and State of New York alone; and I believe that they are equally well suited to defend the above projected works as the works themselves are to the defensive position which I indicate.

To utilize the valour and marksmanship of our militia, their general should place them so that each man's duty will be simply to defend his post; in this way the advantage that foreign armies would otherwise enjoy, that of outmanœuvring our troops in the field, would be neutralized.

This has been my leading principle in selecting the defensive position, and in deciding on the nature of the works which should render it impregnable.

It is this principle also which renders absurd the lines of detached redoubts proposed by some engineers, to extend from Fort Hamilton to Willet's Point; and doubly absurd the scientific "rule and compass" arguments of others, who prove that no attack will ever take place on Brooklyn, because, they say, the enemy's rear, flank, or communications, might be cut off should he attempt one.

I regard it as an important advantage of the proposed lines that, being convenient of access to the city, the redoubts can be made the rendezvous of militia and volunteer regiments and companies for the purposes of drilling and target-firing.

Let each regiment have its station assigned to it in the line permanently, so that in practicing and marching in and to that vicinity it may become acquainted with the face of the country, the roads, and the ranges at which artillery and musketry will begin to be effective from the particular redoubt to which it belongs.

The redoubts would, I believe, be accepted by the New York regiments with pleasure, if offered to them to use as armories, and storehouses, and places of rendezvous; and the government would, by such an arrangement, have the works taken care of free of charge.

The lines would in this manner be, very probably, made a popular resort for pleasure excursions, and as a pleasant drive, and so form an additional attraction in the vicinity of the city.

It would be premature, in this memoir, to present any estimate of the cost of such a line of fortification as I propose; but I must, at any rate, anticipate the possible objection that its expense would be out of proportion to its value to New York.

The line can, in fact, be constructed with extraordinary economy. The land which must be bought for the sites of the redoubts will not cost much, for no part of the line is located in built districts, or within the corporate limits of Brooklyn, or even upon valuable farm land; on the contrary, the plats of ground which the government will require lie either on bare and stony or woody hill tops, or on sandy and cheap cultivated ground, or on meadows and marshes.

As to the building of the redoubts, I respectfully propose that the city of New York should take the contract for the entire work, and that it shall use in the execution of it the forced labor of all the convicts in its city prisons.

If this arrangement were adopted, the city would be benefited by having the expenses of its convicts paid by the federal government, while the latter would get its work done at an absolute minimum of expense, seeing that the cost of it would amount to no more than the bare wholesale value of the materials and the actual expense of boarding and lodging the masons and laborers; the profits of the workmen being in this case lost by them, and paid by neither party of the contract.

XIII.

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE EXPLORATIONS AND SURVEYS,

Washington, November 20, 1858.

SIR: I submit the following annual report upon the operations of the department carried on under this office.

I.—THE EXPERIMENT OF SINKING ARTESIAN WELLS UPON THE PUBLIC LANDS.

In my last annual report to the department (November 30, 1857,) it was stated that the expedition to continue the experiment of sinking artesian wells upon the public lands, assigned by the department to Captain John Pope, Topographical Engineers, under instructions of May 5, arrived at the former camp on the Pecos on the 2d of September, 1857, and resumed work upon the well which had been bored to the depth of eight hundred and sixty-one feet the previous year.

The operations at this point were carried on for a year, when they were terminated by authority of the department, it having been considered that they had demonstrated that, with any reasonable amount of expenditure, artesian wells on the Llano Estacado, and plains of similar formation and position, are impracticable. The depth attained was one thousand and fifty feet.

The work was continued during the winter, which, from its unusual severity, increased the labors and hardships of the party, exposed, as it was, in tents on the bleak plain. The difficulties encountered were far greater than had been anticipated by Captain Pope, but were constantly met with skill, zeal, and perseverance.

The impracticability of carrying the boring to a greater depth with the means provided, is attributable to the incoherent nature of the soft sandstones, marls, and clays, which, throughout the whole depth of the well, fell in and packed so firmly around the tubing, that, in forcing it down, the threads of the connecting screws were stripped off, and the tubes themselves split and crushed. From the same cause, when it became necessary to withdraw the tubes upon the accidental loss in the well of the heavy iron rod connected with the cutting tools, and subsequently of the slips holding the cutters, long delays occurred; and in one of these cases the well could only be cleared by boring and spearing up a part of the tubing. Near the bottom of the well thin seams of hard limestone were met, the jagged edges of which cut the wooden rods in two, and bent the iron rods so that they speedily became worthless.

The water used in the boiler of the engine contained material in suspension that formed in six days a hard incrustation half an inch thick, which could only be removed by chiseling. The fine sand in suspension cut away the valves, and the acids in solution rapidly destroyed the boiler and other iron work. Much time was thus lost, and new machinery could not be obtained nearer than New Orleans.

Such, in brief, were the obstacles encountered in sinking the well

to the depth of one thousand and fifty feet; beyond that depth it could not be carried.

Captain Pope expresses the belief that wells might be bored to a much greater depth on the Llano by using heavy cast iron tubes of large diameter, and suitable driving apparatus, but that the cost of transporting this heavy material would preclude its use. Upon this I can express no opinion, as the dimensions, weight, &c., of this tubing are not stated.

The reports received from Captain Pope do not specify how many new supplies of water were met during the last operations. One new supply, described as a strong stream pouring into the well, is marked on the diagram as entering it two hundred feet below the lowest water previously encountered (in 1856,) which, coming from a source six hundred and seventy-six feet below, rose to within one hundred and ten feet of the surface. As it is not stated that the water from this new supply rose higher in the well than during the previous year, it is presumed that it did not. In Captain Pope's letter of the 4th of June, 1858, mention is made of powerful streams of water pouring into the well without rising to the surface. This would indicate that they find vent at lower levels than that of the surface of the Llano at the well, and would lead us to apprehend the same result for streams that might be encountered at greater depths, and to doubt whether the water would flow out at the surface even if the boring were carried to the depth originally intended. Captain Pope does not appear to entertain any such doubt, but, on the contrary, explicitly states in his report of the 22d of August last, that his opinions about the certainty of getting water to overflow at the surface are unchanged.

The suggestions of Captain Pope, in his report of the 4th of June, that the work upon the well near the Pecos should be discontinued, and the next experiment be made upon or near the route between Anton Chico and Albuquerque, were approved by the department, and instructions to that effect were sent him on the 10th of July. At the date of his last communication (September 28) the party had arrived at Galisteo, and commenced the experiment on the plain between Anton Chico and Albuquerque, at the intersection of the road between those two places with the road from Santa Fe to Fort Stanton.

In order to exhibit the nature and extent of the operations of Captain Pope, I submit herewith copies of his instructions and reports of progress. It is only by their perusal that his labors can be properly appreciated.

II.—EXPLORATION OF THE RIO COLORADO OF THE WEST.

The expedition for the exploration of the Rio Colorado of the West, commanded by First Lieutenant J. C. Ives, Topographical Engineers, has completed its field operations. Lieutenant Ives returned to Washington in August, and is now employed in preparing the report and maps. I submit herewith a communication from him, showing briefly a portion of the results of the expedition.

In the last annual report it was stated that the expedition was at

San Francisco, *en route* for the field. The supplies and property of the party, and also the materials for constructing a small iron steamboat, were sent from San Francisco to the mouth of the Colorado in one of the government vessels. They arrived there on the 2d of December. Under serious disadvantages the steamboat was put together, and on the 31st of December the ascent of the river was commenced. On the 11th of March a point was reached nearly five hundred miles from the mouth, (in lat. $36^{\circ} 06'$,) beyond which it was impracticable to proceed in boats. It was intended that the examination of the river should be made in the season of low water, and during the progress of the party the river proved to be lower than had ever been known. In this worst stage the navigation was found to be difficult, but is pronounced entirely practicable, for the distance stated, for steamboats of suitable construction and of but two feet draught. The trip from the mouth to the head of navigation will require from ten to twenty days, and the round trip from three to six weeks. There is an abundance of wood for fuel on the river.

From the head of navigation to the nearest point on the Spanish trail, or Mormon road to Utah, the distance is forty miles; about one hundred miles to the point where that road crosses the Muddy river, a tributary of the Virgen; two hundred and twenty miles to the first Mormon settlement in the Great Salt Lake basin, and five hundred miles to the Great Salt Lake.

The head of navigation is about seventy miles above the Mojave valley.

Examinations should be made for a better route between the head of navigation and the Virgen, since, for the space of sixty miles before reaching the Muddy river, no water is found on the Mormon road.

By using the Colorado as a channel for forwarding supplies, there would be a saving in land transportation to Salt Lake of seven hundred miles; to Fort Defiance of six hundred miles, and to Fort Buchanan of eleven hundred miles.

The chains of mountains that cross the navigable portion of the Colorado were found, like those of California and Sonora, to possess great mineral wealth. Rich deposits of silver, copper, and lead were observed, and a great abundance of iron; but gold and mercury only in small quantities.

After the completion of the reconnaissance of the river, explorations were conducted by land along the 36th parallel, on the plateau region through which the upper Colorado and its tributaries cañon, the greater part of which was entirely unknown. Extending over a space of four degrees of longitude, these plateaus were found cut into immense chasms, thousands of feet deep, forming intricate systems of abysses many miles in width, and utterly impassable. Through these chasms the streams just mentioned ran, and, wherever seen, foamed and surged with the rapidity of their descent.

Near the eastern border of the table lands, which extend from the Colorado to the mountains of the Sierra Madre, the Moquis towns are found. They were visited by the expedition, which arrived at Albuquerque about the 1st of June, and was there broken up.

The region explored is pronounced to be of little agricultural value. Cretaceous coal was found near the Moquis towns.

The examinations of Lieutenant Ives confirm the opinion of Captain Whipple as to the railroad practicability of the line from the Big Sandy to the Colorado river, which is shorter than the line down Bill Williams' Fork by ninety miles, and less costly by six million dollars. The changes effected by the adoption of this line, in the length and cost of the whole route, will be found on pages 36 and 37 of the conclusion of the official review, volume VII of the Pacific Railroad Report. This is the only modification of the railroad route of the 35th parallel introduced by the explorations of Lieutenant Ives and the examinations made by Mr. Beale when opening the wagon road from Fort Defiance to the Colorado river.

The explorations conducted by Lieutenant Ives were attended by circumstances of more than ordinary difficulty, and the successful execution of the duties assigned to him is highly creditable to himself and party.

III.—EXPLORATIONS IN NEBRASKA.

The return, in November last, of the expedition commanded by Lieutenant G. K. Warren, Topographical Engineers, after the successful execution of the duties intrusted to him of reconnaissance and exploration in Nebraska, has been already reported. The maps have been completed, all the necessary calculations of the astronomical and barometrical observations made, and the reports in relation to the different objects of the expedition are in an advanced state.

The principal objects of the expedition were to ascertain the best route by which to continue to the South Pass the military road now constructing from the Mississippi river to Sioux City, on the Missouri, and to examine in this connexion the valley of the Loup Fork of the Platte, and that of the Niobrara, and to make such reconnaissance of the Black Hills about the sources of the Big Shyenne as circumstances would permit, to determine their character, especially with reference to the future military operations that may be carried on in this Territory. In accomplishing these objects, the expedition would obtain information of the character and resources of the country, its adaptability to settlement and cultivation, and would develop its geography and geology along the routes pursued, nearly all of which were previously unexplored by white men.

The preliminary report of Lieutenant Warren is herewith presented. The routes reconnoitred and mapped in 1857 are from Sioux City to the mouth of Loup Fork; thence up this stream to its source in the Sand Hills; and thence by the Niobrara to Fort Laramie. From this point the party proceeded north and carefully examined the Black Hills, and, returning to the Niobrara, explored this stream to its junction with the Missouri; and also a route from the mouth of Turtle Hill river to Fort Randall. Finally, the road from Fort Randall to Sioux City was surveyed.

With the report on these routes Lieutenant Warren combines that

of the routes examined by him in 1856, under orders from General Harney, of which examinations no report has heretofore been presented.

In that year he made a careful reconnaissance of the Missouri river from the southern boundary of Nebraska to a point sixty miles above the mouth of the Yellowstone, and of this latter stream to Powder river.

The routes explored, including those of 1858, (of which a report has been rendered and printed,) all lie east of the 106th meridian. They lead once through the Sand Hills north and south, and twice east and west, almost around the Black Hills, and through the valleys of the following rivers, viz: the Platte, Loup Fork, Niobrara, White Earth, Big Shyenne, Missouri, Yellowstone, and James rivers.

The accompanying report of Lieutenant Warren is divided as follows:

Part 1 is a statement of the routes pursued and main incidents which affected their direction and extent, and in connexion with this are given the objections urged by the Dakotas against the passage of the expedition through the Territory. This may prove valuable to any white men that may travel there.

Part 2 contains a general description of the surface of Nebraska; an account of the general structure of the country; its principal geological formations and the character of the soil; and its adaptability in different parts to settlement.

It confirms the statements heretofore made by explorers in other portions of the western prairies of the generally sterile character of the lands west of the 99th meridian, attributable to the absence of fertile elements in the soil in large tracts, like the Sand Hill region, and to the want of timely rains.

The section in the mountains bordering these plains on the west is described as containing small fertile valleys, with streams of water and an abundance of building material, both of stone and wood, and an ample supply of the latter for fuel. The opinion is expressed that this section will be overspread by considerable settlements.

Part 3 contains a general description of the rivers and routes through the Territory, with a discussion of the question as to the best route by which to supply Fort Laramie and the interior. The conclusions arrived at in regard to this last question are, that the route up the Loup Fork is impracticable, and, besides, is less direct than the Platte route; that the route along the Niobrara is barely practicable for wagons, and that the difficulties to be met with on the road, together with the increased river transportation of the route, render it less favorable than that up the Platte, whether the starting point be Omaha City or Nebraska City; that a road from Sioux City to Fort Laramie, along the Niobrara, would only be about forty miles shorter than a road proceeding from the same point direct to the Platte, at the mouth of Loup Fork, and thence along the Platte route to Fort Laramie; that the shorter length of the Niobrara route is more than counterbalanced by the great difficulties on that route, and therefore the route along the Platte is the better of the two;

that the route from the mouth of White river west to Fort Laramie is probably practicable, and superior to that along the Niobrara; that the route from Fort Pierre to Fort Laramie is likewise superior to the Niobrara route, but that the increased river transportation and absence of settlements along this part of the Missouri river render these routes at present inferior to those of the Platte valley; that above Fort Pierre, on the navigable part of the Missouri river, there are no routes leading from it to Fort Laramie or the South Pass that are as advantageous as those enumerated. It is further concluded that of all the routes explored the Platte valley is the best adapted for locating a railroad to connect the settlements to be formed in the mountains with those along the Missouri river; and that, as a national route for a Pacific railroad, leading to the South Pass or to Bridger's Pass, it is superior to any other in this latitude. These conclusions appear to be fully sustained by the facts advanced in their support.

The 4th part of the report treats of the Indian tribes, their number, location, &c. An approximate estimate of their strength is made, and routes by which to operate against them, in the event of hostilities, are discussed. Almost every part of the country examined is practicable for the operations of cavalry; and routes practicable for the wagons of a military expedition can generally be found, even in the Black Hills, to such points as would be used as depots from which supplies for brief periods could be furnished for military movements.

The 5th part of Lieutenant Warren's report is a brief statement of the meteorological phenomena of the country, as observed during the explorations; the most prominent facts respecting which are the extreme variableness of the phenomena of moisture and temperature—facts which confirm previous statements in regard to them.

The report contains a catalogue of the fossils collected, with the localities of the specimens, and similar lists of the plants and the collections in the different departments of zoology. All these collections were made without interfering with the more immediate, practical objects of the explorations, and reflect credit on the labors of Lieutenant Warren and his assistants. These collections are esteemed to be of high scientific value; and among the discoveries due to the labors of the expedition are the discovery of the Potsdam sandstone, the oldest of the fossiliferous rocks, in the Black Hills, the first positive proof of the existence in America of the formation corresponding to the Jurassic of Europe, and the discovery on the Niobrara of a new formation of the pliocene tertiary, containing the remains of an extinct fauna resembling that now inhabiting Asia, from which at least thirty-two distinct species of vertebrates have been described by Professor Leidy. The principal of these results have been published, by permission of the department, in the proceedings of the Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia. Accompanying one of these papers, prepared by Dr. Hayden, is a small geological map of Nebraska.

A military map of Nebraska and Dakota, on a scale of $\frac{1}{1200000}$ prepared by Lieutenant Warren, and ordered to be engraved by the Senate at its last session, is now ready for publication.

The completion of the exploration of the interior of Nebraska, about the sources of the Yellowstone, Lieutenant Warren thinks could be most advantageously and economically made by an expedition organized to remain at least two years in the field, and the cost of this he estimates at \$60,000. This exploration has been a favorite object with him, and his previous experience, and his knowledge of the Indians and character of the country, would enable him to accomplish the work with economy.

The highly creditable manner in which the explorations heretofore intrusted to him have been conducted, under many embarrassments, difficulties, and dangers, prove him to be peculiarly well qualified for the task.

A detailed plan for the execution of the work will be found in the report.

IV.—THE MILITARY ROAD FROM FORT BENTON TO FORT WALLA-WALLA.

The opening of the military road from Fort Benton, on the Missouri river, to Fort Walla-Walla, on the Columbia river, for which there was an appropriation of \$30,000, was assigned to Lieutenant John Mullan, 2d artillery, on the 12th of last March. On the 25th of May Lieutenant Mullan had organized his working party and left Fort Dalles, on the Columbia river, for Fort Walla-Walla, when intelligence was received by him of the commencement of hostilities by the Indian tribes occupying the regions through which the route he was about to open passes. The party was accordingly disbanded, and Lieutenant Mullan joined Colonel Wright's command, as topographical officer, and in that capacity, and in command of a party of friendly Indians, participated in the campaign upon the Spokane plains. The appropriation was entirely inadequate to the object for which it was designed, and to open a road of similar permanency of character with the military roads in the United States Territories would require a very much larger sum. No estimate of this has been made, but it may be assumed that it will not be less than the amounts expended on equal lengths of route on the wagon roads to the Pacific in other latitudes, for which appropriations have been made.

V.—OFFICE WORK.

In addition to supplying the general map of the United States Territories for military purposes, special maps of the theatres of operations have been furnished to the troops engaged in the field. Maps of each of the military departments are being prepared. Upon the general map of the United States Territories west of the Mississippi, Lieutenant Warren has laid down the approximate boundaries of the various Indian tribes that occupy the country. Copies of this, printed in colors, so as to exhibit the location of each tribe, showing also the limits of the military departments, and positions of the military posts, will, it is believed, be found useful to the War Department and the army, and will materially aid those not familiar with

this region, in comprehending the nature and extent of the military operations necessary to control the Indian tribes

In preparing this map, besides the information possessed in this office, much that was valuable was obtained from the Indian Bureau and United States Land Office, particularly in regard to the location of the Indian reserves. The attempt to define the boundaries of these Indian tribes is a difficult task, as they are not well established among themselves; and those that are friendly to each other, though using different languages, often mingle to such an extent as to have a common country; as for instance the Crees, Chippewas, and Assiniboins. It is for this reason, probably, that no map of this kind has ever before been produced.

Upon returning to Washington, in December last, Lieutenant Warren resumed charge of the preparation of the maps, &c., compiling in this office, in addition to the duties connected with his own explorations. He has completed his report upon the general map, which forms a part of the Pacific Railroad Report, and will be published with it.

Lieutenant Abbot, in addition to conducting certain surveys and investigations upon the delta of the Mississippi, under my general direction, and preparing the results, has likewise aided in the duties of this office, and both these officers have, in turn, taken charge of it during my absence.

The appropriation for marking the southern boundary of Kansas directed that copies of the plats of the line should be furnished to the Secretary of the Interior and the Secretary of the Territory of Kansas.

Copies of four of the seven sheets of the map of the boundary, as marked by Lieutenant Colonel Johnston, 1st cavalry, have been prepared for this purpose, and those of the remaining three will probably be finished by the 1st of January. They have been copied by Mr. A. Schimmelfennig, who in this instance has, for the first time in this country, successfully applied the photographic process to copying maps on so large a scale.

VI.—EXPLORATIONS PROPOSED.

The fields of exploration proposed for the next season are, those in Nebraska, before mentioned; the region along the San Juan to its junction with the Rio Colorado of the West, and along the Spanish trail from that river to Abiqui; the route across the Sierra Nevada to Carson's river, to ascertain its railroad practicability; and the upper Columbia river, to ascertain its navigability. These, with the topographical examinations made by officers with the various military commands, will usefully expend the amount appropriated for military surveys and reconnaissances and geographical explorations.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Captain Topographical Engineers, in charge.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,

Secretary of War.

ARTESIAN WELL EXPERIMENT.

Reports of Captain John Pope, Topographical Engineers, to Captain A. A. Humphreys, Topographical Engineers, in charge of Office of Exploration and Survey, War Department.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, May 5, 1857.

SIR: In the execution of the duties hereby assigned to you, of continuing the experiment of sinking artesian wells upon the public lands, for which an appropriation of \$100,000 was made, you will be guided by the following instructions:

Proceeding to St. Louis, *via* New York, you will have prepared, as soon as practicable, the tools, machinery, apparatus, and material requisite for the work, employ such mechanics and other persons as may be necessary for the service, and with them repair to San Antonio, Texas, and assume the command of the expedition.

The organization and outfit having been completed, you will move to the Pecos river, near the 32d parallel of latitude, establish your camp at a convenient position, resume the boring of the well left unfinished during the past summer, and continue the work until the water flows out continuously upon the surface. This having been done, and the well left in good condition, you will proceed to the Rio Grande, occupy a position suitable for continuing the experiment begun near that river, and complete the well in like manner with that near the Pecos.

Upon the successful termination of each work, you will report in detail upon it, transmitting at the same time a geological section exhibiting the source whence the supply of water is probably derived.

These two works having been finished and left in serviceable order, you will continue the experiment of sinking artesian wells on the plains or basins east of the Rio Grande, the number of experiments being limited by the amount of the appropriation, which your expenditures for field and office work must not exceed. These wells should be established upon or near lines of military and emigrant roads, if sites can be found at such positions, in every way favorable for the experiments, and two of them should be located upon that portion of the route from Independence to New Mexico, lying east of the Canadian river.

As soon as you have selected the position for a well, you will report the facts that have governed you in the selection, transmitting at the same time detailed descriptions of the locality, with such sketches of the country and geological sections as will exhibit the probable source of the supply of water, the depth to which the boring must be carried, the nature of the formations to be passed through, and all other information necessary to a thorough understanding of the subject, and a demonstration of the practicability, extent, and cost of the work.

These wells will be finished in the same manner as the first two.

Such reconnaissances and geological examinations as may be neces-

sary for the selection of the sites of the wells will be made, as also the usual surveys over the routes pursued by the expedition; and so far as it can be done without interfering with or adding to the expense of the accomplishment of the special object for which the appropriation was made, every opportunity will be availed of to gain information respecting the region over which your movements will extend.

You will obtain from the assistant quartermaster at Fort Fillmore the boring apparatus, materiel, instruments, &c., turned over to him by you at the termination of the work on the Pecos during the last season. Upon the completion of the experiments of sinking artesian wells, you will return by such route as the condition of your party may render necessary or desirable, discharge your employés, dispose of your outfit at some convenient and favorable point, and repair to Washington with such assistants as may be required to complete your report.

The commanding officer of the department of Texas will be directed to detail seventy-five enlisted men of the infantry, with two subalterns, and twenty-five enlisted men of the cavalry, with one subaltern, and order them to report to you for duty, without delay, at San Antonio, Texas.

The officers of the quartermaster's, subsistence, ordnance, and medical departments, serving in Texas and New Mexico, will be instructed to furnish the expedition, upon your requisition, transportation, quartermaster's stores, provisions, arms, ammunition, medicine, medical stores, &c., the articles for the use of the civil employés being paid for out of the appropriation for the well.

So far as it can be done consistently with the proper protection of the work, you will cause working parties to be detailed from the enlisted men of your command to aid in the construction of the wells, who will receive the extra pay allowed by paragraph 883, Army Regulations.

Immediately upon the receipt of these instructions, you will report the kind and amount of boring apparatus, machinery, tubing, tools, and materials, that should be provided for completing the experiments, with their probable cost; the number of assistants and others whom you propose to employ, with their rates of compensation; the train and camp equipage necessary for the operation, with their estimated cost; and the expense of organizing and maintaining the expedition during one year, and also for continuing it a second year.

You will communicate with the department through the Office of Explorations and Surveys, in charge of Captain A. A. Humphreys, Corps of Topographical Engineers; and to this office you will make the reports and returns required by "Regulations of an officer of engineers in charge of a work or operation," and such other reports, transmitted as often as the means of communication will allow, as will keep the department apprised of all your movements and the progress of the work in your charge.

Before taking the field, you will turn over to the same office the

note books, maps, reports, and results, so far as obtained, of your previous expedition.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.

Captain JOHN POPE,
Corps Topographical Engineers.

ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI,
May 5, 1857.

SIR: I have the honor to report that I have completed the arrangements and secured the tools and machinery necessary for the duties assigned to me, and only await my final instructions, and the transfer of the funds for which I submitted an estimate.

Everything is in complete and perfect order, and to the manufacture of machinery and the procurement of everything necessary for a thorough discharge of the duty the experience of the past two years has been successfully applied. I doubt not that the expedition will prove as successful as its most sanguine friends could anticipate.

May I respectfully request that Mr. Howard and the other young gentlemen to accompany the expedition be ordered to report to me in New Orleans.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,
Captain Topographical Engineers.

Hon. JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.

[Extract.]

INDIANOLA, TEXAS,
July 9, 1857.

SIR: I have the honor to report that my party and train marched from this place to-day fully equipped for the plains, and unless some unforeseen delay occurs in providing transportation and supplies at San Antonio for the enlisted men of the expedition, requisitions for which were transmitted some time since to the quartermaster at that place, no halt will be made until I reach my camp on the Pecos.

(Signed by Captain John Pope.)

CAMP ON THE PECOS RIVER, NEAR THE 32D PARALLEL,
September 7, 1857.

SIR: I have the honor to report my arrival at this camp on the 2d instant, and the resumption of the work near this place.

I am now sinking a five-inch hole to the first water (240 feet) into which I shall fit a copper pump for the supply of engine and men. This will occupy us about twelve days, by which time the engine will be fitted up and ready to resume the boring of the well at the depth attained last year, (861 feet.)

I anticipate with confidence, a successful result within two months.

Our march from San Antonio has been rapid and altogether fortunate.

I am, sir respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Captain Top'l Eng'rs, com'g.

Capt. A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Top'l Eng'rs, in charge of Office Expl's and Surveys.

An unofficial letter from Captain Pope, dated Camp on Pecos river, October 1, 1857, states: "We are getting along here as well as could be expected, and I hope six weeks will enable us to complete all our operations near this place. The pump has been sunk to the first water, (240 feet,) and is now pumping for the use of the engine. Within the first two weeks we cut and hauled mesquite roots sufficient to run the engine for three months, and everything goes on smoothly and expeditiously. We are now pumping from the well the mud and sand which have accumulated since we left it, and will resume the boring in a few days."

CAMP ON PECOS RIVER, *January 5, 1858.*

SIR: I have the honor to report for the information of the War Department, that we are still engaged upon the "Llano Estacado" in the prosecution of the first experiment of sinking an artesian well.

The time consumed has already been far greater than was anticipated, from the repeated accidents and breakages of machinery, which required much time in each case to repair. The boring has only reached at this date a depth of nine hundred and fifty feet, though I trust that hereafter the work will be more rapidly executed.

Several streams of water have been already intersected since the work was resumed, and the borings now are in the sulphurous shale from which issue the sulphur springs at the head of Delaware creek. I am in daily expectation of striking water which will overflow the surface.

The winter has been unusually severe for this region, and we are in the midst of a norther, accompanied by snow. I have been obliged to send into Fort Davis to be foraged all the animals not absolutely necessary for the work here, and to haul from that place sufficient corn to give the animals here half the ration of forage.

We shall, however, do well enough during the winter, and shall doubtless pass that portion of it which yet remains for us on this plain without suffering any hardship.

I am, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Captain Top. Eng's, commanding expedition.

Captain A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Top. Eng's,*

In charge Office Explorations and Surveys, Washington, D. C.

CAMP ON THE PECOS RIVER, *February 26, 1858.*

SIR: I have the honor to report for the information of the War Department, that the work near this place is still unfinished.

The difficulty in the first instance of sinking tubing to a depth of one thousand feet through strata so slightly coherent as to fall in at almost every point of the entire depth, and which bound the tube so as to render it almost impossible to force it down, consumed much time and labor. The breaking of the boring apparatus near the lower extremity (the middle of an iron sinker thirty feet in length) occasioned further delay, very much prolonged by the caving in of the well above the top of the broken sinker, so as to render a great deal of labor necessary to get hold of it and withdraw it. When all things had been finally set to rights, we had the misfortune, after boring to a depth of 1,047 feet, to burst the cast-iron pump of the engine, and I have been obliged to send as far as Galveston to procure another, as there is no possibility of repairing or procuring such a casting here. The work still goes on, however, as the broken pump can still be made to work, and I have abundant force to push the work by hand if it becomes necessary.

We are boring in hard limestone, very black, and easily recognizable in its outcrop at the head of Delaware creek, about forty feet above the surface of the springs forming the sources of that stream.

I entertain the hope daily of completing the work, which would, no doubt, have been finished long since but for the many and wholly unusual and unanticipated accidents I have referred to.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Captain Topographical Engineers.

Captain A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Top. Eng's, in charge of office.

CAMP ON PECOS RIVER, *April 1, 1858.*

SIR: I regret to report that the accidents and difficulties we have met with in the prosecution of the work near this place have prevented as yet any advancement of the boring since my last report. The water of the Pecos river, which we are obliged to use in the

boiler of the steam-engine, forms a hard, solid coating around the flues in the course of a very few days, and occasions leakage in the boiler sufficient to prevent the raising of steam. I have been obliged in consequence to reflue the boiler throughout, and to make man-heads enough to enable a man to clean it thoroughly at least once every six days. This has occupied several weeks.

The peculiarity of the formations is another source of great difficulty, which much time and labor are necessary to overcome. For a hundred feet above the bottom of the well there are consecutive strata of soft slate and of hard flinty limestone in thin layers. The slate is washed away by the agitation of the water, leaving the sharp edges of the limestone exposed so as to cut in two in a very few moments the wooden poles, and to bend iron substitutes so that they are rendered useless.

There is great difficulty in sinking the tube arising from the soft, crumbling character of the whole formation from the surface down.

Although the bottom of the tube is perfectly free and loose, the friction along the sides is so great that the driving necessary to move it is sufficient to crush the upper end of it and to tear out the screw threads below.

The tube we are using is the iron (wrought) which you sent from Philadelphia last year.

We are now endeavoring to sink the tube to the bottom with fair prospect of success, though it will be a work requiring time.

I have little doubt we are in close vicinity to the water, as the formations are peculiar and readily identified with their out-crop, about forty feet above the head springs, Delaware creek.

I have reduced my party to the smallest possible limits, and shall be able to maintain it in the field at least to July 1, 1859.

I send herewith topographical and geological sketches and sections exhibiting in detail all possible information concerning the vicinity of the well. The geological section from the Guadalupe mountains, exhibits as you will observe some different features from those heretofore sent. I have satisfied myself for sufficient reasons that the Pecos flows through a valley occasioned by upheavals along lines both east and west, and is not a valley of denudation. The dip of the strata from the Guadalupe mountains is not continuous across the "Llano Estacado" with a constant descent, but rises east of the Pecos in a gentle undulation without fracture to the summit of the plain, at an altitude of six hundred feet above the river, and a distance of about thirty-five miles from it.

The geological section will exhibit plainly what I have stated.

I will of course prosecute this work with all vigor and perseverance, and I by no means despair of completing the work here in time to accomplish a large portion of what was proposed when the expedition took the field.

Extract from a letter of Captain A. A. Humphreys, Topographical Engineers, in charge of Office of Explorations and Surveys, dated April 14, 1858.

"SIR: Your reports from the camp on the Pecos river of the 26th and 28th of February were duly received, and submitted to the Secretary of War.

"In consideration of the unexpected difficulties and consequent, unavoidable delays that have occurred in your work upon the artesian well near the Pecos, the Secretary of War directs that, upon the completion of that well, instead of proceeding to complete the artesian well west of the Rio Grande, you will omit that work and continue the experiment of sinking artesian wells on the plains or basins east of the Rio Grande, as indicated in the fifth paragraph of your instructions of the 5th of May last."

CAMP ON PECOS RIVER, *May 1, 1858.*

SIR: I submit the following report of operations in the prosecution of the experiment of sinking an artesian well on the "Llano Estacado."

The boring is done by means of oak poles, $1\frac{3}{4}$ inches in diameter, in 16 feet sections joined in twos by heavy iron straps. Each boring rod is therefore 32 feet long with a male screw at one end and a female screw at the other, both having very strong and heavy threads. The drill has a straight edge of $3\frac{1}{2}$ inches, and is attached to an iron rod 30 feet long and $1\frac{1}{4}$ inch in diameter. To the upper end of this rod (or sinker) is attached a pair of iron slips, having a play of 16 inches (the fall of the drill) and to these are screwed on the wooden poles, up to the surface. The upper end of the poles is attached by a moveable chain to a spring beam worked by steam, and (boring at the usual speed) the drill falls fifty-five times in a minute. The borings are pumped out by a sand pump of copper, 9 feet long, which works with a rope passing round a drum attached to the steam engine. The hole is pumped out on an average once in $2\frac{1}{2}$ hours of boring.

The difficulties we have encountered have resulted from the peculiar soft and crumbling strata of variegated marls and clays, which are of an uncommon thickness, not, I believe, to be found elsewhere within the range of geological examination. It has been necessary in this case to line the well with tubing from the surface, and as combining strength and lightness wrought iron tubing $\frac{3}{16}$ of an inch thick was brought out with the expedition.

The first difficulty met with was in sinking the tubing to a depth of 81 feet lower than it was left last year (810 ft.). Although with the under cutting drills it was easy to enlarge the bore below the tube so as to admit the latter to pass down freely, yet the friction along the sides resulting from the crumbling and falling in of loose slightly coherent strata around it, was so great that it required driving as heavily as it would bear to force it down. Next the iron sinker broke off in the middle and before anything could be put down to withdraw it the

well caved in for sixty feet above it and completely covered it. Six weeks were passed in clearing the well and getting out the broken sinker. Next the water used in the engine, in consequence of large quantities of lime and sand held in suspension soon coated the flues of the boiler with a very hard scale and caused them to leak badly. It was therefore necessary to take down the engine and reflow it entirely, inserting manheads for cleaning. Very shortly after we again resumed boring we passed into alternating thin strata of blue slate and flint limestone, the most difficult strata we have yet encountered. Water pours in at several places in the well in considerable streams, and very soon washes away the slate, which is soft, but leaves the sharp jagged edges of the hard limestone fully exposed; in a very little while the wooden rods working through these strata would be cut in two; iron rods were substituted, but they were soon bent so badly, by coming into violent contact with the sharp limestone, as to be useless; I therefore was obliged either to diminish the bore by inserting smaller tubing, or sink the large tubing to the bottom. The exceeding difficulty of the last plan induced me to prefer the former, and the hole was lined with three-inch copper tubing from the lower to the upper thin layer of limestone. Unfortunately, very soon after effecting this, the iron slips broke immediately beneath the bottom of the copper tube, and so spread apart that they could not be withdrawn through the tube; it was therefore necessary first to take out the tube—a work of difficulty. It was all gotten out except nine feet of the lower part, which pulled off, and had to be bored and speared up. The boring up and pumping out of the copper tube was completed yesterday, and the head of the broken slips is now exposed so that they can be withdrawn.

Since our arrival at this camp we have been thus embarrassed by difficulties and breakages, altogether due to a most peculiar, difficult, and uncommon formation of great and hitherto unknown thickness. The strata are so distinctively marked that they can be easily recognised in their outcrop between the Pecos river and the Guadalupe mountains; and we have reached the stratum of slate exposed plainly at the head of Delaware creek, about forty feet above the issue of the powerful fresh and mineral springs which form the sources of that stream.

The winter here has also greatly incommoded us from inadequate protection of the men from unusually inclement weather for this region, and there were many days during the severe northers, incident to this country, in which it was impossible to work. The spring is now fairly open, and I trust we shall soon be able to finish this work, as I am altogether certain that the water is but a little way below us.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Captain Top'l Engineers.

Capt. A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Corps Top'l Engineers,*

Washington, D. C., in charge of Office Expl's and Surveys.

CAMP ON PECOS RIVER,
June 4, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that abundant springs of living water have been discovered on the summit of the Llano Estacado, fifty miles due east from this camp, and about half way between the Pecos and the Mustang springs. An exploring party which I sent out some days since returned to-day, after having carefully explored the country eastward from this place, and have found a hard firm road over the entire distance to these springs. From this camp in a due easterly course to the Mustang springs, is a distance of ninety-five miles, with a hard gravelly road over the entire distance, and all trouble about crossing this plain is not only entirely obviated by this discovery, but a saving of distance amounting to at least eighty-five miles has been effected.

Two hundred of these springs, some of them thirty yards in circumference, have been found extending in a direction north and south over a space of nine miles. Everywhere in the neighborhood of the water we found groves of willow trees thirty feet high, and from four to six inches in diameter. They will furnish abundantly the material necessary for constructing the stations which may be required.

The existence and character of these springs are exceedingly peculiar and difficult to be accounted for.

Commencing about three miles north of the 32d parallel of latitude, and fifty miles east of the Pecos at this camp, is a range of abrupt white sand hills, seventy or eighty feet higher than the surface of the plain, which extends in a direction a little east of south for about fifty miles. To the east, west, and north, the country descends rapidly from the summit or back-bone of these sand hills, which is the highest line for ten or fifteen miles in any direction. Along the very summit of this ridge issue the springs I have mentioned, bubbling up through beds of loose white sand of indefinite, or rather undetermined depth. They are not at all affected by surface rains, as there is not the slightest evidence on the banks of their ever rising or falling, and the surface drainage is from them in all directions.

As I have stated the line of these springs or pools has been traced for nine miles towards the south, exhibiting in this distance two hundred considerable pools of water. In most cases the pools are from three to four feet in depth, but in some of the larger ones the depth is six feet. The water is perfectly transparent, and free from impurities. There seems to have been originally a considerable stream of running water, resembling Delaware creek in character, that is, a succession of deep pools connected by a swift running stream some two feet wide, and with perpendicular banks about three feet high. The sand seems to have drifted before the violent winds along the course of the stream until it has entirely covered the small narrow streams connecting the ponds. This could readily have been done, as the flags, bullrushes, and cane grow so thick and matted along these narrow threads of water as completely to overlap each other from both sides, so that even along Delaware creek the narrow

stream connecting the large pools is altogether hid from the summit of the bank.

This seems the only way to account for the peculiar character of these springs, and I am still further confirmed in this opinion from the fact that holes were dry in several places between the springs, into which water rose from a depth of several feet, and overflowing the surface immediately ran off in a small stream into the spring to the south.

The existence of this water and of a hard firm road across the plain, will be of prodigious service to travel, and is particularly fortunate in being discovered at this time, as it is precisely on the most direct route of the semi-weekly mail to California. Its discovery also will greatly diminish the importance of the artesian well boring experiment in this plain.

I transmit herewith a topographical sketch exhibiting the situation of these springs with respect to known points both east and west. You will perceive that the lines of survey heretofore made across the Llano Estacado pass only a few miles to the north and south of this line of springs, and certainly there is no evidence of the existence of water in the midst of these bare sand hills until you are directly in the midst of them.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Captain Topographical Engineers.

Captain A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Corps Topographical Engineers,

In charge Office Explorations and Surveys, Washington, D. C.

The water of these springs is undoubtedly not surface water, and must come from a depth greater than any of the streams intersected by the boring, as the surface of the springs is at least three hundred feet above the surface of the ground at the artesian well camp.

The geological formation in the immediate vicinity of both places is the same, the gypsum and the loose pulverulent limestone appearing on the surface.

J. POPE,

Captain Topographical Engineers.

CAMP ON PECOS RIVER, *June 4, 1858.*

SIR: I have the honor to report that after incredible difficulty and labor we have at last succeeded in withdrawing from the well the broken sinker and bit, and are now commencing again the boring operations.

The peculiarity of the geological structure of this plain for so many feet below the surface, in conjunction with the action of powerful streams of water which pour into the well without rising to the surface, occasion difficulties in the work which no previous experience in artesian well boring has yet exhibited. In less than one week

after the boring has passed below the tubing, the rush of water so causes the sides of the well to cave and fall in as to leave large caverns in some places, and in others sharp jagged edges of hard sandstone and limestone, which almost destroy the boring rods, whether wood or iron. At a distance of forty feet below the bottom of the $3\frac{1}{2}$ inch tube there is a strong stream of water pouring in, which has made a cave so large that broken iron rods five feet long completely disappear in it, though entering it perpendicular to the bore. It is so exceedingly dangerous, in consequence of the numerous breakages and accidents incident to such work, to insert smaller tubing, that I am very reluctant to do so if I can possibly avoid it.

In a tube so small as $2\frac{3}{4}$ inches in diameter it is next to impossible to put down any socket or hook to get hold of broken poles, slips, &c., and the last long delay we have just terminated was due to this very difficulty. When once a tube is put down through such a crumbling formation as characterizes this plain, it is next to impossible to withdraw it again, as the falling in against it of the soft strata for its whole length binds it fast in the hole.

In the present case we were obliged to bore up a part of the small tube, and pump it out before we could get hold of the broken slips and sinker. The large tube hangs free at the bottom, and nothing prevents its going down except the friction along the sides, resulting from continuous falling in of earth from top to bottom; but so great is this friction that, in order to move the tube down, it is necessary to drive it with such violence as to strip off the screw-threads and split the tube. I have been putting down the large tube, however, for several days past, with much success, by inserting a mandrill and driving, so that the strain is near the bottom.

Even should the screw-threads strip off in this process, one piece, at least, will go down, and they can be thus driven down in succession, and the contact made sufficiently perfect to answer our purposes. I have no expectation that much more depth of boring will be necessary, but our difficulty has been in boring *at all*. We are now fairly under way again, and I hope will meet with no further trouble. Much, if not all, our trouble since we last commenced this work could have been obviated by bringing out heavy cast iron tubes and the necessary driving apparatus; but the weight of the tubes and apparatus would have been so exceedingly great as to have rendered it a work of large expense to haul them five hundred miles across the plains. The tubing we have (wrought iron and copper) is admirably adapted to work of this kind at any place not so peculiar as this, and I anticipate no serious delay or difficulty after I once leave this place.

In this connexion I beg to present some suggestions for the consideration of the department:

1. The boring operations are fairly progressing again, after long delay and severe labor, and if no further difficulties occur, the work bids fair to be completed any day. On the other hand, it is possible we may be again arrested by the recurrence of continued difficulties, so as to be little advanced at the expiration of several months.

2. It will be difficult, if not impossible, to keep laborers and me-

chanics another winter, exposed as they must be to the severity of the weather on this exposed plain. The severe cold is also peculiarly destructive to animals, for which we can make no shelter whatever, as there is no timber nearer than seventy miles, and we cannot spare either men or wagons to send for it. It has been as much as we have been able to do to discharge the absolutely necessary duties of this work, and keep ourselves supplied with rations and the animals with half forage, both of which must be hauled one hundred and twenty miles.

3. If there be any well-founded hope that we can finish this work within any reasonable period, we can surely do it in four months, during which time, without the unusual accidents which have heretofore delayed us, we can carry the boring to a depth of 2,200 feet. I would suggest, therefore, to the honorable Secretary of War whether it would be judicious to expend the whole of this appropriation upon the Llano Estacado, where this experiment may prove unsuccessful from the difficulties of the work; or whether, at the end of three or four months longer, it would not be advisable to test the question at some of the other points had in view when this expedition took the field, and which are not inferior in importance. One point in especial, where it has been long my design with the approval of the department to make one of the experiments, is on the 35th parallel route, between Anton Chico and Albuquerque, where there is now a distance of nearly eighty miles without water. The great military road from Independence and Fort Leavenworth to New Mexico passes over this plain, and all supplies and munitions for the department of New Mexico are hauled over it to the depot at Albuquerque.

The great valley thus destitute of water is immediately south of Santa Fé, and extends without interruption the whole length of territory south of that place. The soil is excellent; there are abundant forests of cedar in the valley and pine in the mountains, and on the west side of the valley are the gold placers of New Mexico. It is a point of much importance both to the government and to the people of New Mexico, and it would indeed be unfortunate should this expedition be so long delayed here as to render it impracticable, with the appropriation, to make the experiment at that place.

I make these suggestions to the department thus early, first, because I cannot expect a reply in less than three months, by which time, without renewed difficulties, this work will be finished; and second, because my instructions require me to remain here "until water overflows the surface."

The experiment at Doña Ana is the most doubtful of success, as the department has been informed hitherto.

I have to request that communications for me be addressed to Fort Davis, *via* San Antonio.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Captain Topographical Engineers.

Captain A. A. HUMPHREYS, *Topographical Engineers,*

In charge of Office of Explorations and Surveys.

WAR DEPARTMENT, OFFICE EXPLORATIONS AND SURVEYS,
Washington, D. C., July 10, 1858.

SIR: Your report of the 4th of June has been received and submitted to the Secretary of War, who approves your suggestion that the work upon the well near the Pecos be discontinued about the end of September, if it should not be completed in the manner required by your instructions at that time. In the event of its abandonment before such completion, your operations must be considered as establishing the impracticability of sinking artesian wells upon the Llano Estacado and other plains in that region of similar formation and position.

On the 14th of April last you were directed to omit the work upon the well west of the Rio Grande, and upon the completion of the well near the Pecos, to continue the experiment on the plains or basins east of the Rio Grande, as indicated in the 5th paragraph of your instructions of the 5th of May, 1857.

Your suggestion that the next experiment after leaving the Pecos be made upon or near the route between Anton Chico and Albuquerque is also approved, and you will begin the operations for boring as soon as you have found what appears in your judgment a suitable point for obtaining water, and where supplies of it are needed on or near that route.

Your letter of the 4th of June states that the distance over which water is not to be had between Anton Chico and Albuquerque is about 80 miles. Lieutenant Whipple, in his report on the route for a Pacific railroad near the 35th parallel, represents the route from Anton Chico to Albuquerque to be well supplied with water except for two months in the year, during which time there is no water on a portion of the route though that portion is much less than that mentioned by you.

Having ascertained a suitable point for boring a well on this route, and commenced operations, you will report to this office the exact distance at which permanent supplies of water already exist, and also the practicability of supplying the intervening spaces with water by means of tanks, ponds or dams, in the event of the boring proving unsuccessful.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Captain Topographical Engineers, in charge.

Captain JOHN POPE,

Topographical Engineers, Fort Davis, Texas, via San Antonio.

CAMP ON THE PECOS RIVER,
June 30, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report for the information of the War Department, that the boring operations at this place have not been carried to any greater depth than was attained at the date of my last report.

Two weeks from June 1 were spent in efforts nearly ineffectual to force down the $3\frac{1}{2}$ inch iron tubing. For this purpose, the spring (or undercutting) drills were employed and the bore of the well enlarged to $4\frac{1}{4}$ inches in diameter for seventy-eight feet below the bottom of the tube. As I have before stated the friction on the sides of the tube is so great that severe driving is necessary in order to move it, and after driving down about twelve feet, three screw threads were stripped off, and the lower portions of the tube below the fractures so much crushed as to render impracticable any further efforts to sink it. It cannot, of course, be withdrawn for the same reasons. As the well was kept constantly filled up to very near the bottom of the iron tubing, it was then necessary to insert again the copper tube of smaller diameter. This has been done, and we are now engaged in pumping out from the inside of the latter in order that it may sink down as far as practicable. Independently of the danger and inconvenience of working inside of a tube so small, I have little expectation that more than a temporary advantage will be gained by the insertion of the copper tube.

The strata continue to crumble and fall in below where it can possibly be driven. I am constrained to say after ten months of very severe and unremitted labor that, I fear that, without greater facilities and more extensive preparations than could have been secured under the appropriation for this service, or could have been transported without enormous cost, it will be impracticable to overcome the mechanical and physical difficulties of this work.

I have the most experienced and capable superintendent of boring to be found in the west and a full complement of mechanics and borers, who have been for their whole lives employed in such business, and who, under charge of the superintendent now with me, last bored the deep and difficult well of Belcher & Co., in St. Louis.

They are all eminently competent, but the difficulties of the work here are foreign to the experience of any artesian well borer in the United States. In my own opinion there are but two ways by which to accomplish this work, and both involve expenditure beyond the reach of this appropriation; the first by bringing out very heavy cast iron tubes and the necessary driving apparatus, and the second by bringing tubing of all sizes from three inches to twelve inches in diameter.

In either case the cost would be beyond the reach of any appropriation likely to be made.

The certainty of getting water in this plain to overflow the surface, is as well settled in my judgment as it ever was, but the mechanical and physical difficulties of executing the work, arising from a most peculiar, extensive, and uncommon succession of crumbling strata which at a depth of one thousand and forty-seven feet still remain of unknown thickness, are beyond measure greater than could have been anticipated.

The point reached by the boring, and the debris pumped out, are easily identified with the strata outcropping about forty feet above the head spring of Delaware creek and in their immediate vicinity,

but what thickness the same strata have attained at the point of boring it is impossible to say.

I have the honor again to invite the attention of the department to the suggestions for the further prosecution of this work contained in my letter of June 4, 1858.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Captain Topographical Engineers.

Captain A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Corps of Top'l Eng'rs in charge

Office Expl's and Surveys, Washington, D. C.

CAMP ON PECOS RIVER,

July 27, 1858.

SIR: I regret to be obliged to report that the operations at this place have not advanced in the least since the date of my last report, and that in my judgment and in conformity also with the opinion of Mr. Brown, the superintendent and principal mechanic of the artesian well boring, it will be impracticable without largely increased facilities and consequent expenditures to prosecute the work further. The difficulties resulting from extreme singularity and extent of geological structure, together with the extremely injurious action of the Pecos river water upon iron machinery I have already explained to the department.

The boiler of the steam engine has been completely devoured by the acids of the water so that iron nuts half an inch thick crumble in the hands like clay. The plungers of the supply pump and steam chest are completely honeycombed, and every part of the engine accessible to the water has been more or less injured by it. It has been necessary to procure a new boiler in view of any future work, and I have, therefore, sent three wagons to Indianola to bring one up. I endeavored after the complete destruction of the boiler to carry on the work by hand, but after a depth of nine hundred feet, boring by hand even under favorable circumstances is nearly impracticable, in the present case it is wholly so.

The utmost that I am able to do to complete this work has been done, and but for the specific orders of the Secretary of War, I should move at once from this place to a point east of the Rio Grande and west of the Pecos, where the structure is more favorable, and where the work could be carried on with some prospect of success.

I hardly consider it possible under any circumstances to keep this party another winter in this plain. The past winter was severe, and the men suffered much. It was entirely unexpected by every one familiar with this bleak and exposed plain, that this command would attempt to winter upon it exposed as they must be with very insufficient shelter, and I have no idea that any of the civil employés who are absolutely necessary for the work could be induced to remain thus exposed another winter. The military, of course, could be coerced

into another campaign equally severe, but they would be useless alone.

I lay all these facts, and my own opinions upon them, before the department with great regret. I have long been interested both personally and officially in this experiment, and have spent three years in laborious efforts to accomplish it. The disappointment I feel in being again obliged to relinquish it uncompleted is very great, but I am assured that the department will do justice to the zeal and industry with which it has been prosecuted.

I have the strong belief that the success of the experiment in other places will yet justify the expenditures the government has made, to determine a question of so much consequence.

I shall await the decision of the War Department as to my future operations at this camp. I regret to report also that scurvy is beginning to break out in the command, and that no supplies of anti-scorbutics can be procured except the fresh vegetables on the Rio Grande one hundred and seventy miles distant, and which completely spoil before they can be hauled out to this camp. The command has now been nearly a year without supplies except the bare ration.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Captain Topographical Engineers.

Captain A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Corps of Top'l Eng'rs in charge

Office Expl's and Surveys, Washington, D. C.

CAMP ON PECOS RIVER,
August 22, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that since the date of my last report, the work of boring has been completely arrested, as with men it is impossible to handle an auger of 1050 feet. I am waiting the return of the wagons sent to Indianola, Texas, for a new boiler, but I have to say that I do not consider it practicable to carry these borings to greater depth with any means within reach of the appropriation. It will in my judgment be a waste of time and money further to prosecute the work under present circumstances. I therefore recommend that the party be moved to some other of the points designated in my instructions, where the chance of success will be far better.

The geological structure of this plain is so very peculiar, its extent so much greater than is known to the experience of any geologist, and in consequence the mechanical and physical difficulties of carrying borings to a greater depth, have been so constant and so unusual in the history of such operations, that after a whole year of unremitted and laborious work, the boring has been scarcely at all advanced.

Facilities and conveniences impossible to secure at a point so remote will be essential to a successful completion of any such experiment on the Llano Estacado, and until the government is willing to go to ex-

pense beyond reasonable hope, I fear this great plain must be left to its pristine solitude and desolation.

As the department is doubtless familiar with such operations, I will explain briefly the peculiar obstacles we have encountered, the more remarkable from the great depth to which they have pursued us.

The upper geological formations of this plain consist of what are known to geologists as *cretaceous strata*, which here are nothing more than alternations of strata of soft sandstones and variegated marls and clays. In every other part of the world, where these strata have been developed, they are comparatively of small extent, particularly in depth, and with a short departure from the surface of the ground, the sandstones become much harder, and the variegated marls and clays become gradually converted into shales and slates. Almost the precise reverse seems to be the case here, and at a depth of one thousand and fifty feet the strata are softer and crumble more easily than at the surface. We have encountered occasional thin seams of flinty limestone, but of too little extent to modify the very peculiar physical character of this formation.

The first effect of such a geological structure is the necessity of tubing any well to be bored from the very surface, and forcing or trying to force the tube to follow the auger closely. This I found is easy enough to do, as I had come prepared for such obstacles, and had plenty of wrought iron tubing and spring or undercutting drills. With the latter we were able, without the least difficulty, to enlarge the bore, below the tube, to any size necessary; but we had not progressed more than six hundred feet with the work, until the friction along the sides of the tube, from top to bottom, resulting from the falling in around of the loose, crumbling strata, absolutely prevented it from moving down, although the bore below was a full inch and a half greater in diameter than the outside of the tubing. I then commenced to drive, and succeeded, by using great care, in getting it down two hundred feet further. Beyond that depth, the friction became so great, that the force necessary to overcome it crushed the wrought iron tube, and stripped off the screw threads at the joints.

It was impossible to carry the boring below the tube, as the crumbling strata of marls and soft sandstones commenced at once to fall in, when unsupported, and filled up the well faster than it could be pumped out. I had, however, anticipated this difficulty, and had brought out tubing of different diameters; and as soon as I found that the large tube could be drawn no further, a smaller one was pressed down inside, and the diameter of the well reduced.

For a while this obviated the difficulty, but after one hundred and fifty feet the small tube could no longer be forced down, and the strata still continued soft, and fell in constantly.

By these means, and with the severest labor I ever saw, both night and day, exposed on this bleak plain with little protection to an inclement winter, we succeeded in reaching a depth of one thousand and fifty feet; no change whatever has occurred in the strata; they are as soft and crumbling at the bottom of the well as at the top, and it is impossible to say how much longer they will continue so.

These constitute our physical difficulties, and they are, so far as I know, foreign to the experience of any well borer in the United States. Certainly no difficulties of the kind are recorded in the history of such operations elsewhere. The mechanical difficulties of the work have also been peculiar and almost irreparable.

The water used in the boiler of the steam engine was hauled in wagons from the Pecos river, a distance of eight miles. It carries an enormous quantity of angular sand and finely comminuted gypsum in suspension, and causes by these means the utmost trouble in getting the boiler free from the solid and rapid incrustation accumulated on the flues.

The gypsum and sand combined form a crust as hard as flint, and so firmly attached to the iron that it was necessary to take down the boiler and chip it off with chisels. If left more than six days it became at least half an inch thick. The sand also completely cut to pieces and honeycombed the valves and plungers of the supply pump until it became altogether useless, and I was obliged to send to Galveston for another.

The water of the Pecos also contains a large quantity of free acids, which absolutely devoured the iron, until the boiler a few days ago became completely useless, and I have again been compelled to send to Galveston. At least two-thirds of the thickness of the boiler iron was eaten up by the acids, and iron nuts half an inch thick crumbled in the hands like dried clay. The plunger of the steam chest is also completely honeycombed; and wherever iron has been exposed to the action of this water, especially in a boiling state, it has been greatly injured.

Such in brief are the difficulties, mechanical and physical, which have so long embarrassed the work, and which I fear it will be impossible to surmount at a place so remote from every convenience, and where it is so nearly impracticable to replace any part of the necessary machinery.

With very heavy cast iron tubes and driving apparatus it might be practicable to complete these borings; but the transportation alone of such heavy articles, in quantities sufficient for the object, would involve an expense beyond the reach of any appropriation Congress will ever make for such a purpose.

This, however, is but one of many points had in view for these experiments when I left Washington, and I do not doubt I shall have much better success elsewhere, as this plain stands alone in its peculiar character.

In the boring, so far as we have carried it, abundant springs of water have been passed through, (four or five in number,) but they do not rise to the surface, and their existence is rather a disadvantage to the work, as they greatly increase the rapidity of the falling in of soft strata.

My opinions about the certainty of getting water to overflow the surface are by no means changed; but the boring operations are difficult far beyond my anticipations, and lead to the conclusion that,

under the present condition of this country, the expense of successfully completing the well would not be justified by its necessity.

The man in charge of the work bored the deep well of Belcher & Brother in St. Louis, and has with him the same mechanics and borers employed on that work. He is eminently competent, and indefatigable; and his conduct here has fully justified the high recommendation with which he joined me.

It is of course a disappointment to me, under the circumstances, again to leave this work unfinished, but the best that was possible has been done, and there is nothing more to be said.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Captain Topographical Engineers.

Capt. A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Corps Top'l Eng's, Washington, D. C.

CAMP NEAR FORT FILLMORE, N. M.,

September 6, 1858.

SIR: I have the honor to report that, in accordance with the approval of the War Department contained in your letter of July 10, I broke up my camp on the Pecos, and am now en route for the route between Albuquerque and Anton Chico.

My communication of August 22 will inform you fully of the condition of the work near the Pecos, and the grounds upon which I broke up my camp immediately upon receipt of your letter of July 10. Nothing had been done for several weeks previous, for the reasons stated, and both time and means were being lost by further delay at that place.

I shall march for Galisteo to-morrow, and shall probably reach there by the 21st instant. A full report and sketches will be transmitted to the department immediately upon my arrival at that place.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN POPE,

Captain Topographical Engineers.

Captain A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Corps Topographical Engineers, Washington, D. C.

COLORADO EXPLORING EXPEDITION.

Preliminary Report of 1st Lieutenant J. C. Ives, Topographical Engineers, to Captain A. A. Humphreys, Topographical Engineers, in charge of Office of Explorations and Surveys, War Department, November, 1858.

WASHINGTON, November 1, 1858.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit, for the information of the department, the following brief synopsis of a portion of the results

of the expedition organized under my command for the exploration of the Rio Colorado of the west.

I sailed from San Francisco for the mouth of the Colorado river on the 1st of November, 1857, in the quartermaster's schooner used in transporting stores to the head of the Gulf of California. On board were the property and supplies belonging to the expedition, and also the materials for constructing a small iron steamer, to be employed in ascending the river. I was accompanied by a steamboat engineer and a party of seven men. The other assistants and employés took the steamer for San Diego, and crossed by land to Fort Yuma, which is on the Colorado, 160 miles above its mouth.

EXTENT OF EXPLORATIONS.

The schooner arrived at the mouth of the river on the 2d of December, having been much delayed by calms and head winds. The steamboat was finished and launched on the 30th of the same month, and the ascent of the river was commenced on the day following. I continued up the river for 500 miles, reaching, on the 11th of March, in latitude $36^{\circ} 06'$, the mouth of a stream supposed to be the Rio Virgen, beyond which it was impracticable to proceed in boats. I therefore sent back the steamboat and the hydrographic party to Fort Yuma, and, taking advantage of the permission granted in the instructions from the department, left the river on the 23d of March, with a pack train, to examine as far as possible the country through which the upper Colorado and its tributaries flow.

Keeping as near as possible to the river, I traversed the region along the 36th parallel, the greater portion of which had been previously unexplored. Most of the line of the 35th parallel was also visited. Following various lines of examination gradually conducting towards the east, I arrived, about the 1st of June, at Albuquerque, on the Rio Grande, the distance accomplished during the land explorations amounting to nearly 900 miles. At Albuquerque the expedition was broken up, a few members of the party still retained returning home by the overland route to Fort Leavenworth.

NAVIGABILITY OF THE COLORADO.

During the progress of my work upon the navigable portion of the Colorado the water happened to be, according to the evidence of those who had lived in that vicinity for many years, unprecedentedly low. An opportunity was therefore afforded of trying the experiment of steam navigation at the worst stage of the river, and at a time when the difficulties ordinarily to be encountered would be considerably magnified.

The region at the mouth of the Colorado is a flat expanse of mud. The lines of the shore and the channels that afford entrance to vessels from the Gulf are shifting and changeable, and bars, shoals, and islands, composed of a semi-fluid mass, are in constant progress of formation and removal. The navigation for thirty miles above is

rendered periodically dangerous by the strength and magnitude of the spring tides. These have a rise and fall of from twenty-five to thirty feet, and a flow of extraordinary velocity. The flood is preceded by a "bore," or huge tide wave, from four to seven feet high. In certain narrow bends it is very powerful and violent, but gradually loses its force as it ascends, and at a distance of thirty miles is scarcely perceptible. Along wider portions of the river there are curves of the shore in which its force is not felt, and here boats may be safely moored till this dangerous wave has rolled by. Upon the shoals are formed what are called "tide rips," where the sudden check given to the rushing volume of water causes it to bound along in high successive waves. Steamboats that come to the mouth of the river during the spring tides must descend from above tide water during the ebb, and start to return two or three hours after the commencement of the flood.

The neap tides have a rise and fall of only ten feet, and a moderate velocity.

Between tide water and Fort Yuma the principal obstructions to navigation are the sand bars. These become more frequent and difficult as the river is ascended. The channel is exceedingly circuitous and constantly changing. The average depth is about eight feet. Shoals were frequently encountered, however, where there were scarcely two feet of water. Experience alone can afford the capability of navigating this portion of the river successfully. A knowledge of the locality of the channel cannot be imparted, as it has been known to shift from one bank to the opposite one in a single night. From the formation of the banks, from the appearance of the water, of the eddies, of pieces of drift wood and other floating substances, and of the islands and bars visible above the surface, a practiced eye can do much towards selecting the proper course, though boats rarely make a trip between tide water and Fort Yuma, at the low stage of the river, without grounding many times a day. The bars, however, are composed of soft and loose material, and may always be passed with more or less labor, depending in a great measure upon the skill shown in the employment of the different methods of extrication resorted to.

Below Fort Yuma there are no rocks. The snags are numerous, but seldom dangerous.

During the months of April, May, and June, while the river is rising, and before new bars have had time to form, the navigation is most easy. The average velocity of the current at low water is two and a half miles an hour, during the July freshet from five to six. The river at this season is about ten feet higher than during the winter months.

For three or four years an enterprising company has been engaged in transporting government stores in steamboats from the mouth of the Colorado to Fort Yuma, and their persevering energy has so far succeeded in overcoming the natural difficulties of the navigation as to enable them now to perform the trips with entire regularity and certainty.

For one hundred and eighty miles above Fort Yuma the navigation

has a character similar to that already described. The river passes through several chains of hills and mountains, forming gorges or cañons, sometimes of a considerable size, and in these there is generally a better channel than in the valleys.

During the next hundred miles gravelly bars are of frequent occurrence, and at some of them the stream presents almost the appearance of a rapid. In the intervals between, in both valleys and cañons, are stretches of good river, and although the bad places are worse, the channel generally is better than it is below.

For the succeeding fifty miles the river bed is composed in a great measure of coarse gravel and stones, and many swift rapids were encountered. Upon several were found not over two feet of water. In this portion of the river there are a few sunken rocks, that would be dangerous till their position became known.

The "Black Cañon," which is twenty-five miles in extent, is now reached, and in it the rapids are numerous and difficult.

Above the cañon the river is wide and shallow, and assumes the character of a rapid for so long a distance as to render any attempts to carry boats to a higher point almost valueless, and, considering the difficulty, hazard, and expense that would be incurred at the low stage of water in taking steamboats through the cañon, I am of the opinion that its mouth should be considered the practical head of navigation. Up to this point the Colorado, notwithstanding the difficulties to be encountered, may be pronounced navigable. The experiment was attempted, as has been stated, at a time when the river had experienced an unprecedented fall. At most seasons of the year the navigation would be much easier and better, and a boat of suitable model and dimensions, and drawing, when loaded, but two feet, would be able to ascend the Colorado to the mouth of the Black Cañon with as much regularity and certainty as the steamboats now upon the river ply between the head of the Gulf and Fort Yuma. Although during high water the river experiences a great rise, the whole channel is not proportionally deepened. New bars commence at once to form, and at all seasons shoals are liable to be encountered. An iron stern-wheel steamer, one hundred feet long, of twenty-two feet beam, built full, and with a perfectly flat bottom, having a large boiler and powerful high-pressure engine, and drawing, when light, but twelve inches, would be the description of boat best adapted for the service.

Wood of excellent quality for the purpose of fuel can be obtained in abundance on the bank at short intervals between the mouth of the river and a point fifteen miles below the Black Cañon. It is principally mezquite, willow, and cottonwood.

CONNEXION OF THE HEAD OF NAVIGATION WITH UTAH.

A reconnaissance made from the foot of the Black Cañon towards the nearest point on the emigrant trail to Utah showed that a wagon road might be opened between the trail and the head of navigation. For sixteen miles, while passing through the gravel hills and ravines that cover the eastern slope of the intervening range of mountains,

the country is somewhat rough, and a little work would be required to make a good roadway, but after reaching the summit there would be no further difficulty. The distance from the river to the emigrant road is about forty miles.

TOPOGRAPHICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE REGION TRAVERSED.

The navigable portion of the Colorado runs nearly north and south. Near the Gulf the surface on either side is perfectly unbroken, the view being limited towards the west by distant spurs from the mountains of Lower California, and towards the east by the great Sonora desert. Further north broad valleys alternate with wild and rugged ranges of mountains, of volcanic origin, that cross the river in almost parallel northwest and southeast lines. The cañons formed by the passage of the river through some of these mountain chains are probably unequalled in beauty and grandeur by any similar formations. In the Black Cañon the deep and narrow current flows between massive walls of rock that rise sheer from the water for over a thousand feet, seeming almost to meet in the dizzy height above. The tortuous course of the river, as it winds through these sombre depths, where the rays of the sun rarely penetrate, gives infinite variety to the majestic outlines of the overhanging masses, forming combinations whose colossal proportions and fantastic sublimity it would be impossible to figure or describe.

Above the cañon, in the vicinity of the mouth of the Virgen, is the most rugged and sterile region that I have ever beheld. Barren piles of rock, heaped together in chaotic disorder, and exhibiting on their broad surfaces no trace of vegetation, extend for miles in almost every direction. The volcanic upheavals, which have here their northern limit, appear to have experienced also their most violent action. Beyond, towards the north and east, the country is undisturbed, and a region is entered upon that presents totally new features and peculiarities. This is a vast table land, hundreds of miles in breadth, extending eastward to the mountains of the Sierra Madre, and stretching far north into Utah. To the extreme limit of vision immense plateaus rise, one above the other, in successive steps, the floors of the most elevated being from seven to eight thousand feet above the level of the sea. The Colorado and its tributaries, seeking the level of the low region to the southwest, have, by ages of wear and abrasion, cut their way through this huge formation, making cañons that are in some places more than a mile in depth. The mighty avenues of the main water-courses are the thoroughfares into which smaller but still giant chasms debouch, and these in turn have their own subordinate tributaries, forming a maze of yawning abysses, generally inaccessible, and whose intricacies it would be a hopeless task to attempt to unravel. Twice only, after long and difficult clambering down the sides of precipices and through walled approaches that seemed to be leading into the bowels of the earth, were the banks of the streams below finally attained. One place was on the Colorado itself, and the other near the mouth of one of its larger

tributaries. Except at the place of descent the cañon of the river, as far as it could be seen, showed no point of practicable ingress or outlet, and the appearance of the torrent, foaming and surging along its confined bed, left little room for doubt as to what would be the result of any attempt, such as has been sometimes suggested, to explore the river in boats from its sources above.

So numerous and so closely interlaced are the cañons in some portion of this singular region that they have displaced all but scattered remnants of the original plateau, leaving narrow walls, isolated ridges, and spires so slender that they seem to totter upon their bases, shooting up to an enormous height from the vaults below.

The natural surface of the country opposes insurmountable barriers to travelling in any fixed direction, and the aridity of the accessible portions of the table lands rendered the explorations difficult. Though the season of the year was the most favorable for finding water, much inconvenience was experienced from its scarcity, and it is doubtful whether during the dry months the examinations could have been prosecuted at all.

West of the Little Colorado belts of cedar and pine forests somewhat relieve the general aspect of barrenness, but travelling eastward, between that river and the towns of the Moquis Indians, the country becomes almost entirely a desert. The immense stretches of sandy soil are broken only by ridges of brilliant red and yellow marls, that intensify the heat and glare of the sun. The mirage ordinarily existing in such localities assumes generally the appearance of water, and is rendered peculiarly unpleasant from the known absence of that element over the whole region in question. Still further east the table lands begin to mingle with spurs from the Sierra Madre, the country becomes more broken and diversified, and the desert gives place to the habitable Navajo territory that borders the mountains west of the Rio Grande.

INDIAN TRIBES ENCOUNTERED.

The Indians living along the lower portions of the Colorado, comprising the Cocopa, Yuma, Chemehuevis, and Mojave tribes, have become tolerably well known from the narratives of persons who have within the last few years passed through their territory. Their numbers have been, I think, over estimated. Idle and inquisitive, they assemble *en masse* from far and near at the approach of strangers, and give an impression of a much larger population than really exists. The crowds that collected each day at the prominent points of the banks to watch the steamboat pass by appeared at first to present continual new sets of individuals, but it was found, after time had made familiar the portions of the faces that the paint and mud permitted to be visible, that the composition of the successive throngs was in a great measure the same. The Mojave tribe, which has been least exposed to intercourse with whites, appeared to be considerably the most numerous. Their symmetrical proportions and stalwart frames have obtained for them the reputation among all that have

been among them of being the finest race physically upon the continent.

The region east of the Colorado, along both the 36th and 35th parallels, is almost uninhabited. Inconsiderable bands of Tonto Apaches wander at some seasons over portions of it, and are occasionally encountered. Two small tribes were found living in the plateau cañons of the Colorado, corresponding in appearance to descriptions given of stragglers that had been met by parties crossing the country further south. There are but a few hundreds of them in all, and they are a diminutive wretched race. Their rude huts of boughs and stones are perched, like birds' nests, in crevices on the sides of the cliffs. Fish from the river, a scanty store of corn, wrung from some comparatively sunny spot in the dismal ravine, and what little game they can secure, constitute the resources which enable them to keep life in their bodies. Buried in the almost subterranean caverns, where alone they can obtain a permanent supply of water, most of them live and die entirely isolated from the world above. Their lonely and monotonous life seems to have deadened every faculty and emotion. It might have been supposed that the appearance of the first party of whites that had ever penetrated their retreats would have occasioned some sensation; but though the train of men and animals must have come down amongst them entirely unexpectedly, the novel spectacle excited no more apparent interest in the individuals encountered than in the toads that were hopping about among the rocks at their feet.

The Moquis Indians, whose residences border upon the country of the Navajoes, were the first large tribe seen after leaving the Colorado. There are seven towns, dignified by the early Spanish explorers with the titles of cities, and ruins of others that are now deserted. The tribe is much smaller than has been sometimes stated. The number of the population has been supposed to be about 7,000, but I should consider one-half of this an extravagant estimate. The towns are situated within a few miles of each other, and on the tops of isolated and precipitous hills. They are enclosed by walls of stone, and tolerably well constructed. The houses are built around an open court, and the only mode of entrance is by ladders that conduct to a small platform on the top of the exterior wall, upon which the doors and windows of the habitations open. Springs near the summits of the hills furnish a supply of water, and to provide against seasons of drought there are large stone reservoirs, exceedingly well made, placed in the hollows along the faces of the bluffs. Some of the towns are approached by flights of stone steps, and the steep ascent is laid out in neatly arranged terraced gardens; the masonry of the revetments being kept in excellent order and preservation. Orchards of peach trees, bearing an indifferent quality of fruit, grow on the hill sides. In the broad valley below are fields of cotton, corn, pumpkins and melons, whose cultivation, under great disadvantages of soil, climate and agricultural outfit, exhibits a degree of industry that in an Indian is truly remarkable. Both men and women labor in the field. They possess a considerable number of sheep,

nearly all of a jet black color, and some poultry. The women wear a long black gown of their own weaving, and the men variegated blankets, also of home manufacture. They are a shambling, ill-made race, with pleasant though homely faces, and are perfectly peaceful and inoffensive. They seem to suffer little molestation from more warlike tribes, which is due less to their own prowess than to the natural defences of their towns, whose commanding position and difficult approach afford security against both surprise and assault. The progress they have made in agriculture and manufactures helps to maintain their peaceful relations, Indians from all parts of New Mexico and from Utah having recourse to them for blankets, and in time of scarcity for provisions. Their unruly and powerful neighbors, the Navajoes, sometimes commit depredations upon them, but even with these an appearance of friendly intercourse is preserved. A curious fact was noticed, and illustrative of certain peculiarities of the Indian race, that the whole tribe do not speak the same language; the individuals in some of the towns absolutely professing to be unable to understand what is said by the residents of others.

A large portion of the Navajo territory was traversed, but its inhabitants have become so well known since the establishment of a military post in their midst as to require no particular description.

AGRICULTURAL VALUE OF THE COUNTRY EXPLORED.

A discussion of the agricultural value of the region explored, or its capability of sustaining a population would involve many considerations—some of an intricate character, a fair exposition of which would require a degree of detail much beyond the limits of the present communication. A few general facts and conclusions only can be stated.

During the explorations all of the lands upon the Colorado, from its mouth to the 36th parallel, and the greater portion of the region along both the 35th and 36th parallels, between the Colorado and the Rio Grande, was traversed. Much of the country had been previously explored, and a considerable portion of it—particularly some of the open valleys of the Great and Little Colorado rivers, and the Navajo country, pronounced by excellent authorities a good agricultural region—capable of a high degree of cultivation. Many facts were noticed during the examinations that tended to confirm this view, but certain unfavorable features were also apparent. Of the valleys upon the Colorado that of the Mojave Indians, which borders the 35th parallel, is by far the finest, and is perhaps the most promising looking region in the portion of New Mexico west of the Rio Grande. It was visited in the season of spring, which in that climate is during the month of February. The atmosphere was indescribably balmy and delicious. A pale transparent haze, of a peculiar delicate blue, which all must have noticed who have been in this valley, enveloped it with a softened glow. In brilliant contrast to the dark and frowning mountains on either side were groves of trees, with fresh and beautiful foliage, dotting the whole expanse of the

foreground. Fields of wheat, corn, beans, pumpkins, and melons, promising a luxuriant crop, met the eye in every direction. Comfortable houses and well built granaries, overflowing with the last year's stores, testified to the provident affluence of the inhabitants; and the robust appearance of the people themselves, with their well developed frames and solid glossy limbs, betokened a high degree of health, comfort and good living. That, for the number of Indians who now inhabit it, with their habits and mode of living, the country is an excellent one there can be no doubt. Whether it could ever be of much value to whites admits of a great deal.

The shifting of the bed of the Colorado would be a cause of great trouble in so narrow a valley. The changes occur with a rapidity and to an extent that can be scarcely appreciated by one who has not witnessed them. Having passed through the country in the spring of 1854, while accompanying the expedition of Lieutenant Whipple for the location of a railroad route along the 35th parallel, I had an opportunity of observing the effects of this action, which were so great as to justify the inference that every portion of the cultivable bottom lands is liable to be in turn overrun by the river. To the Indians, who have a certain community of property and interest and no valuable improvements to lose, this is a matter of no vital moment, but the white settler would be much discouraged from putting up buildings and fences, and digging the ditches necessary for purposes of irrigation, by the knowledge that at any day the river might direct its course through his premises.

Freshets occur at periodical intervals which subject large portions of the valleys to inundation. For four or five months of the year the rays of the sun are so intense and burning that no vegetation can withstand their influence, and during the very early spring, sometimes, when at midday there is an ordinary summer temperature, ice will be found at night. The growing season is thus rendered exceedingly short, and a single accident to a crop would, for that year, be without remedy. Seasons have occurred within a few years when the Mojaves have been subjected from this cause to great privations, and lost considerable numbers from actual starvation.

The composition of different portions of the soil was carefully examined by Dr. Newberry, the geologist of the expedition, and I am informed by him that, though much of it is so constituted as to be fertile, very large tracts in the higher parts of the valleys are so impaired by an excess of alkaline substances as to be comparatively valueless.

In forming an opinion of the value of the region some weight, too, should be attached to the fact that the races upon the river do not multiply. The records of the early Spanish explorers show a diminution rather than an increase of population since that period, and for this there is no assignable cause, unless it may be the incapacity of the country to sustain a large number of inhabitants. The Mojaves have had no communication with the whites, excepting when a wandering trapper or some exploring party has passed by their territory. A peaceful, yet a powerful people, and guarded on every side by

difficult mountains, they have suffered little from wars with other tribes. Their mode of life has conduced to the highest state of physical development. The marriage relation, as has been noticed by all who have been among them, is respected in more than an ordinary degree among Indians, and there seems to be no reason, except that above stated, why they should not have become a numerous nation.

The remarks made respecting this locality will apply, and perhaps in a stronger manner, to the rest of the country on the river, and also to the valley of the Little Colorado. The latter region abounds in ruins and vestiges of a former population, but is now uninhabited.

The remainder of the great area of territory examined presents, also, its discouraging features. The northern portion is much the worse. Besides the deserts that have been alluded to, in the timbered region itself are found broad tracts where the vegetation has become extinct, and the white and withered trunks are scattered like monuments over a vast cemetery of departed life. No indication of fire exists. The destruction has been gradual, and an impression is conveyed of some deadly rot slowly creeping over the surface of the country. Want of rain is undoubtedly the great cause of the evil. Near the abandoned ruins of several of the Moquis towns no water can now be found. This people, though exposed to no contact with whites, have partially dwindled away, and their ultimate fate, if the same meteorological condition continues, can be a question of little doubt.

Along the 35th parallel, within the limit of the volcanic disturbances, much of the country is better, and at some seasons of the year very attractive. After the melting snows of spring, and during the autumnal rains, a more smiling picture of green forest glades, sparkling streams, verdant hills, and wild flowers, the eye could not desire to dwell upon; and, excepting that the surface of the soil is in most places closely packed with lava rocks, there would seem to be a promising field for the agriculturist. Evidence, however, has been collected of seasons of drought so excessive as to render it doubtful whether more than a small portion of the country could ever be inhabited.

Over the whole of this region and that first alluded to remains of buildings and fragments of pottery are found, and this fact has been adduced as an argument to establish the present capability of the country to sustain a population; but there is an analogy between these mouldering ruins and the dead forest near by suggestive of a different conclusion, giving rise to a doubt whether the decay of one race of inhabitants might not have been induced by influences that would be effectual to prevent the introduction of another.

MINERAL RESOURCES OF THE COUNTRY.

The mineral resources of some parts of the country explored are considerable. The ranges of mountains that cross the navigable portion of the Colorado, which belong to the same system as those of

California and Sonora, are, like them, the repositories of a large amount of mineral wealth. They were examined by Dr. Newberry with as great thoroughness and care as the character of the expedition would permit, and found to be traversed by veins of such magnitude and richness as to give promise of a field of extensive mining operations. The metals, as far as observed, were gold and mercury in small quantity, silver, copper, and lead in rich and valuable deposits, and iron in the greatest abundance.

The close proximity of the treasures of these mountains to water transportation greatly enhances their value. A copper mine that promises to be highly successful is now being worked forty miles above Fort Yuma.

In the country of the upper Colorado the useful minerals found were iron, coal, rock salt, and marble. From their geographical position they have little pecuniary value, though their existence in that region is a fact of great scientific interest. On the sides of the cañons were splendid exposures of the stratified rocks which compose the great table lands of New Mexico, exhibiting all of the formations from the base of the sines to the tertiary.

TRANSPORTATION FACILITIES OF THE COLORADO.

An estimate has been already presented to the department of the probable cost of transportation of stores to different points upon the Colorado. Fort Yuma is the only military post at present supplied in this way. The undertaking, while in its infancy, has been more expensive than it would be were the amount of business greater and the system fairly organized, but has proved in every respect superior to the slow, difficult, and expensive overland transportation. The increased amount of emigrant travel along the 35th and 32d parallels, the overland mail routes, the military post which must soon be required in the Mojave valley, and the mining operations, both upon the Colorado and in Arizona, will add largely to the business upon the river. Many distant points might profit by the facilities of approach it affords. Without entering into all of the details, which will be presented elsewhere, it may be stated that the amount of land transportation saved by sending supplies by this channel would be, to Salt Lake 700 miles; to Fort Defiance 600 miles; and to Fort Buchanan, near Tucson, 1,100 miles. A steamboat of the character previously described in ascending from the mouth of the river to the head of navigation would probably occupy from ten to twenty days, depending upon the season of the year and the stage of the water. There may be both delay and trouble in organizing a large transportation establishment in so new and in some respects so difficult a region, but I can see no reason why the Colorado should not at some day be used as the medium of communication with the greater portion of New Mexico, Eastern California, and Utah.

SUMMARY OF FIELD OPERATIONS.

The examination of the natural history of the region explored was zealously conducted by Dr. Newberry, whose name is well known in

connexion with such labors. Many new and interesting species of fossils, minerals, plants, and animals were collected. The geological results are of the highest interest. In making the collections Dr. Newberry was much assisted by Mr. H. B. Mollhausen, who also prepared a valuable series of illustrations of the more remarkable localities along the route.

Of the navigable portion of the river a careful and detailed survey was made, the labor being principally performed by Mr. C. Bielawski, of San Francisco. A set of meteorological and tidal observations and a topographical reconnaissance from Fort Tejon to Fort Yuma were faithfully conducted by Mr. P. H. Taylor, assisted by Mr. C. K. Booker.

The steamboat was taken to the mouth of the river, and there put together by the engineer, Mr. A. J. Carroll, of Philadelphia. The work was executed under peculiarly unfavorable circumstances, with surprising expedition, and with an ingenuity and zeal that I cannot too highly commend. During the trip up the river the post of pilot was filled by Captain D. C. Robinson, who had for many years lived upon the Colorado, and the successful ascent and descent of the river may be attributed to the energy, coolness, and thorough capacity with which he accomplished his duties.

A small party accompanied the land explorations, consisting of seven assistants and employés and a few Mexican packers, with an escort of twenty men, under the command of Lieutenant John Tipton, 3d artillery. To this officer I am indebted for valuable assistance in the astronomical and meteorological departments of the survey, and for the excellent order and discipline maintained safely throughout the trip among the individuals of his command.

The train while following the bank of the river and crossing the country was in charge of Mr. G. H. Peacock, of California, whose good care and experienced management brought it safely through a country of no ordinary difficulty.

The work of computing the astronomical positions and barometric altitudes is now in progress. Maps of the region explored are being constructed by Mr. F. W. Egloffstein, who accompanied the expedition as topographer, and who neglected no opportunity of obtaining, though often at the cost of great privation and exposure, an accurate knowledge of every portion of the region traversed.

During the explorations the health of all of the members of the party was good, and no accident of any kind occurred.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,

J. C. IVES,

*1st Lieutenant Topographical Engineers,
Commanding Colorado Exploring Expedition.*

A. A. HUMPHREYS,

*Captain Topographical Engineers, in charge of Bureau
of Explorations and Surveys, War Department.*

EXPLORATIONS IN NEBRASKA.

Preliminary report of Lieut G. K. Warren, Topographical Engineers, to Captain A. A. Humphreys, Topographical Engineers, in charge of Office of Explorations and Surveys, War Department.

WASHINGTON, D. C., November 24, 1858.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to submit the following preliminary report on the results of the explorations conducted by me in Nebraska in the years 1855,—'56,—'57. This report is divided as follows:

1st. Routes explored, and main incidents affecting their direction and extent.

2d. Physical geography of Nebraska, character of the soil, and resources of the country.

3d. Remarks upon the climate and meteorology.

4th. A description of the principal rivers, and discussion of the merits of different routes. And

5th. An enumeration of the Indian tribes, military posts, and routes for military operations.

To the report is annexed a small map of Nebraska on a scale of 1 to 6,000,000, showing the main physical features of the country and the routes requiring further examination, as well as those already explored. The report is accompanied by catalogues of the paleontological, mineralogical, botanical, and zoological specimens collected on our explorations, prepared by Dr. F. V. Hayden, so as to show the localities where they were found. Much useful instruction as to the manner of making meteorological observations and collecting specimens in natural history was given to us by the officers of the Smithsonian Institution, and the secretary, Professor Henry, furnished us with rooms in which to store the collections and elaborate the results. A brief report, by Dr. Samuel Moffett, of the health of the party during the expedition in 1857, is also appended.

We have found it necessary to defer to a subsequent report the narrative and itinerary of the routes, the complete maps, profiles, and other illustrations, the tables of meteorological observations, and the results of our collections and observations in geology, botany, &c.

Some of the geological results have already been published by permission of the War Department in papers read by Dr. Hayden, Mr. F. B. Meek, and Dr. Joseph Leidy, before the Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia. A letter prepared by me for the Hon. G. W. Jones, senator from Iowa, has also been published, accompanied by a small map of Nebraska, on a scale of 1 to 6,000,000. This map has also been colored so as to indicate approximately the geological formations, and in this shape is published with one of the papers prepared by Dr. Hayden in the proceedings of the Academy of Natural Sciences of Philadelphia.

A map of my explorations in Nebraska was ordered to be engraved by the United States Senate during the last session, and is now nearly ready for publication. In preparing this map I availed myself of all other explorations and surveys within the limits comprised by it, (in-

cluding thus some late unpublished maps kindly furnished from the Interior Department,) an acknowledgment of all of which is made thereon. It was necessary to indicate on this map a considerable portion of the country not examined by me in order to give it the greatest practical value, and to show the relation of the parts I have explored to those surrounding them. My design was to make the map a complete representation of all the region occupied by the Dakotas, and the best routes by which to approach and traverse it, and along which to conduct military operations to the best advantage; in other words, to make it a "military map of Nebraska and Dakota," which is the title I have given it. It is on a scale of 1 to 1,200,000, and embraces all the country from the 94th to the 106th meridian, between the 38th and 50th parallels. In its northeast corner is the Lake of the Woods, in the southeast Fort Leavenworth, in the southwest Pike's Peak, and in the northwest the junction of Milk river with the Missouri. A number of rivers are put down on this map which have never yet been explored, except at their mouths; these are the Knife river, Heart river, Cannon Ball river, and Moreau river. As the expeditions under my command have gone almost around the section through which they flow, and determined with a great degree of certainty that it is an open prairie, and have gained some knowledge of their lengths and directions from the Indians, they are probably represented with a considerable degree of exactness.

On the small map accompanying this report the southern branches of the Yellowstone river have also been represented with an approximation to correctness, by using information furnished by the expeditions of Captains Lewis and Clark, and Captain Bonneville, and also from sketches, &c., obtained by me from traders and trappers. This section of country, however, has much practical importance in relation to routes through it by which to reach Utah from the navigable parts of the Missouri and Yellowstone, and deserves a thorough exploration. This examination I have always had a great desire to make, and in my previous expeditions have taken much pains to ascertain the best means of conducting it. In this I have been fortunate in meeting with Mr. James Bridger, Mr. Alexander Culbertson, Mr. Robert Campbell, and others well acquainted with the character of the country from personal experience, and have the assurance of the services of Mr. Bridger if the exploration should be ordered.

On account of the great distance of the region to be examined from the settlements it is necessary to provide the expedition with the means for remaining two summers, the intervening winter to be passed at some suitable point on the Yellowstone or Big Horn rivers. It would be difficult for an expedition to do more than go and return in the same season, so that then little or no time would be allowed to explore. The country is principally occupied by the Crow Indians, and, as I know them to be friendly, I think a military escort can be dispensed with, which is a material consideration under the present excessive requirements of the military service. The method I propose instead is, to go well provided with goods and presents by which to purchase of the Indians permission to pass through the country and to employ them as guides. In this way much expense can be prevented,

and, with prudent management, danger to the expedition can be avoided ; besides, valuable information will be gained from the Indians which would be withheld if we entered their country in a hostile attitude.

The expedition should be completely organized and equipped for the field by the 1st of May, 1859, and remain in the field until the 1st of December, 1860, nineteen months.

There should be thirty men, at \$30 per month, and eight assistants as topographers, collectors, guides &c., at \$125 per month. This would require \$38,000. Their provisions would cost about \$7,000. Animals and outfit \$10,000. Indian goods \$4,000. Contingencies \$3,000. Total \$60,000. Of this amount about \$35,000 would be required the first year. The bulk of the stores and goods required should be contracted for, to be delivered at Fort Laramie or the Platte Bridge.

The expedition itself should proceed by the Missouri river to Fort Pierre, where the necessary animals for a pack train should be assembled. At this point we should meet with some of the principal men of the Dakotas, and overtures should be made to secure their assent to our proceeding westward up the Shyenne and its North Fork, and thence to the source of Powder river, thus exploring a new route. Should this consent be withheld, and it should not be considered safe to proceed without it, the party could take the route by way of White river to Fort Laramie and thence to the source of Powder river. The exploration should then be conducted along Powder river to its mouth, thence up the Yellowstone to the mouth of Tongue river, up which stream a detachment should be sent to its source. The remainder of the party should ascend the Yellowstone to the mouth of Big Horn river, and up this latter stream to the point where it leaves the mountains, where it should be joined by the detachment which explored Tongue river.

The approach of winter might require the party to pass that season in this neighborhood, or, if time sufficed, the expedition might ascend the Big Horn river to Wind river, where a very favorable wintering place could be found. Either of these places would be sufficiently convenient to the supplies on the Platte. Under circumstances not foreseen it might be best for the expedition to winter near Fort Laramie.

The next season should be spent in examining the mountain region about the sources of the Yellowstone and Missouri, to ascertain the character of the routes leading south and west from the navigable parts of these rivers. On returning, one portion should descend the Missouri, the other the Yellowstone, to their junction, where a Macinac boat should be in readiness, by which all could proceed to the settlements.

These explorations would determine the practicability of all the routes marked on the accompanying map as deserving examination, and would require much activity on the part of those conducting them. Pack trains should alone be used, as wagons greatly retard the operations of a party and vastly increase the difficulty of defending it against attack. The abundance of game in much of this region would render

unnecessary to provide the usual quantity of bread and bacon, which always make the bulk of the provisions required.

The party must be well prepared for defence against war parties, and it would be desirable to arm each man with a revolver, and about three-fourths of them, in addition, should have a double-barrelled gun, one rifled, the other smooth. This is a most effective gun either for hunting or fighting.

Copies of my instructions from the Hon. John B. Floyd, Secretary of War, dated May 6, 1857, and from Brevet Brigadier General W. S. Harney, dated June 3, 1856, are transmitted herewith.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

G. K. WARREN,

Lieutenant Topographical Engineers.

Captain A. A. HUMPHREYS,

Corps of Topographical Engineers,

In charge Office Explorations and Surveys.

WAR DEPARTMENT,

Washington, May 6, 1857.

SIR: Under the appropriation "for surveys for military defences, geographical explorations, and reconnaissances for military purposes," you will organize an expedition to ascertain the best route for continuing the military road between Fort Snelling and the mouth of the Big Sioux to Fort Laramie and the South Pass, by way of the Loup Fork of the Platte; to make also such explorations in the Black Hills, about the sources of the Sheyenne and Little Missouri rivers, as the time and means will permit; and to examine the Niobrara or l'Eau qui Court river, upon your return route, for the purpose of ascertaining its character and resources and the practicability of locating a road along it, leading from the Missouri river to the South Pass, or from Fort Randall to Fort Laramie.

The sum of twenty-five thousand dollars is set apart from the appropriation to defray the expenses of the expedition, which amount your expenditures must not exceed.

The commanding general of the Department of the West will be directed to detail an escort of thirty enlisted men of the infantry, under the command of a second lieutenant, who will report to you for duty.

Transportation for the provision and equipage of the escort, their subsistence, and their necessary ammunition, will be furnished, respectively, by the Quartermaster's, Commissary, and Ordnance Departments.

Upon the proper requisitions, officers of the Quartermaster's and Commissary Departments at the military posts near the routes pursued by the expedition will furnish, as far as practicable, all necessary supplies for it, which, when required for the civil employés, shall be paid for at cost prices at the places of delivery, from the appropriation for the survey.

Twenty Colt's revolvers, of the navy pattern, with belts, holsters, and the necessary ammunition, will be furnished by the Ordnance Department; those lost or damaged being paid for out of the appropriation for the survey.

All other arms and ammunition for the civil employés (guides, hunters, herders, &c.) of the expedition will be paid for from this same appropriation.

You are authorized to employ as assistants—

A topographer, at a salary not to exceed	\$130	per month.
One assistant topographer, at a salary not to exceed	100	"
An assistant astronomer, at a salary not to exceed...	125	"
A physician and geologist, at a salary not to exceed	125	"
An assistant physician and geologist, at a salary not to exceed.....	100	"
A meteorologist, at a salary not to exceed	60	"

And to pay their actual travelling expenses to and from the field of operations.

You will procure your employé's equipment, supplies, &c., at those points which appear to insure the most economical and effective organization for your party, and prepare to take the field at the earliest possible moment. While in the field attention will be given to ascertaining everything relating to the agricultural and mineralogical resources of the country, its climatology, its topographical features, and the facilities or obstacles which these latter offer to the construction of rail or common roads.

You will communicate with the department through the office of Explorations and Surveys, in charge of Capt. A. A. Humphreys, Corps Topographical Engineers; and to this office you will make the reports and returns required by regulations of an officer of engineers in charge of a work or operation, and such other reports, transmitted as often as the means of communication will allow, as will keep the department apprised of all your movements, and the progress of the expedition under your charge.

On the completion of the field duty, you will return, with your assistants, to Washington, and there prepare the maps and reports necessary to a full exposition of the results of the expedition.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN B. FLOYD,
Secretary of War.

Lieut. G. K. WARREN,
Corps Topographical Engineers.

SPECIAL ORDERS No 26.

HEADQUARTERS SIOUX EXPEDITION,
Camp near old Fort Lookout, Missouri River, June 3, 1856.

I. As it is important to obtain reliable information of the Missouri river, from Fort Pierre to some point above the mouth of the Yellowstone, near which Governor Stevens' route strikes it, Second Lieu-

tenant Gouverneur K. Warren, Topographical Engineers, is assigned to this duty, and will proceed with his party by the steamer St. Mary's to the point above indicated.

On his return, Lieutenant Warren will procure a sufficient number of Mackinac boats, for the transportation of his party, stores, &c., to enable him to effect a thorough examination of this part of the river.

II. The commanding officer of the 2d infantry will select an efficient party from his regiment, consisting of two non-commissioned officers and fifteen men, to report to Lieutenant Warren as his escort. They will be furnished with three months' provisions, equipage, &c.

III. The assistant quartermaster at Fort Pierre will furnish the necessary transportation, and such supplies as Lieutenant Warren may be entitled to from his department, for the proper execution of these instructions.

By order of Brevet Brigadier General Harney.

A. PLEASANTON,

Captain 2d Dragoons, Acting Assistant Adjutant General.

CHAPTER I.

Routes explored, and main incidents affecting their extent and duration.

In presenting the following report of explorations in Nebraska, made by me in the year 1857, I shall include also my previous reconnaissances in that Territory in the years 1855-56, while attached to the staff of Brevet Brigadier General W. S. Harney, commanding the Sioux expedition. As, at this time, a complete narrative of these cannot be made, I shall only mention the routes pursued and the nature of the examination, and then give what I consider the most prominent results.

A report of the explorations made in 1855, and map of the routes pursued by the Sioux expedition, have already been published by the United States Senate in a small document called "Reconnaissances in the Dacotah Country." During that year routes were examined from Fort Pierre to Fort Kearney; from Fort Kearney to Fort Laramie, along the Platte river; from Fort Laramie to Fort Pierre; and from Fort Pierre to the mouth of the Big Sioux river.

In 1856 I started from St. Louis for Fort Pierre, in the middle of April, accompanied by my assistants, Messrs. A. H. Hutton, J. H. Snowden, and F. V. Hayden, on board Captain Throckmorton's steamboat Genoa. During our passage up the Missouri we made a careful sketch of the river above the southern boundary of Nebraska by means of compass courses, and distances estimated from the rate of travel of the steamboat, and by astronomical observations for latitude. The elevated position of the pilot-house of the steamboat, which the politeness of the captain allowed us to occupy, afforded advantages for gaining a knowledge of the river, the extent of the sand bars, and the size and quantity of timber on the banks, the nature of the bottom

lands as regards marshes, &c., not equalled by those of any other means of reconnaissance, and the topographer at the same time could avail himself of the extensive and accurate knowledge of the pilot. Our observations, by means of forward and back sights, showed us that the effects of local attraction on the compass by the iron on the boat were not important, and the checks on the estimated distances, afforded by the results of observations for latitude, proved that these estimates were very accurately made by Messrs. Hutton and Snowden, who, by turns, prepared the sketch of the river.

As far up as the mouth of James river our advance had been quite rapid, the river being at a good stage; but a short distance above that point we encountered a sudden and heavy freshet in the river, (produced by rains,) with a current so rapid that our boat was unable to advance against it. From this cause we remained tied up to the bank a whole day. As soon as the river began to fall, the velocity abated, and we proceeded on the voyage. So sudden, however, was the subsidence of the flood that, in five days after we had escaped the embargo of too much water, we found ourselves aground and drawing several inches more water than there was anywhere on the bar, which stretched across the river. This occurred to us near the first Cedar island.

Under these circumstances, being anxious to reach Fort Pierre as soon as possible, as was also Captain Frost, (who was sutler at the fort, and whose goods were the principal freight of the boat,) we determined to leave the boat and proceed on foot to the dragoon camp, at the mouth of American Crow river, about 80 miles distant. Our means of transportation were two horses, the property of Colonel Lee, 2d infantry, and Lieutenant Colonel Andrews, of the 6th infantry, which carried our blankets and provisions, and we were accompanied by a Mr. Moore and two men. On arriving opposite to the dragoon camp on the evening of the third day's travel, we were informed that there was no boat to bring us across. We stayed on the bank of the river that night, and the next morning renewed our signals to communicate with the camp. These, however, failed to attract attention to us, and our provisions being short we were obliged, though much wearied by our journey on foot, (there having been a cold rain one day and night,) to attempt to reach Fort Pierre, 80 miles distant. This we accomplished in three days, and arrived there on the 20th of May, completely exhausted, having subsisted mainly on the birds killed with our shot guns. The journey gave me an opportunity of viewing the country and its appearances a few miles back from the Missouri.

The steamboat having landed a portion of her freight at the place where we left her, reached Fort Pierre three days after us. On my arrival all the tribes of the Dakotas west of the Missouri, except the Siehangus and Ogalalas, were assembled in council, and a treaty of peace was made with them by General Harney, which terminated the Sioux war.

Instructions were now given me by General Harney to proceed with my party in the American Fur Company's boat to the mouth of the Yellowstone, and as far above as she should ascend, and to return by

means of a Mackinac boat, and carefully examine all points on the river to determine their suitability as sites for military posts, and to obtain such other information as we should be able with regard to the country. An escort of fifteen men and two non-commissioned officers of the 2d infantry were placed under my command. We left Fort Pierre in the American Fur Company's boat "St. Mary," Captain Labarge, on the 28th of June, and reached Fort Union on the 10th of July. The boat landed most of her stores, and then proceeded to a point about 60 miles above the mouth of the Yellowstone and discharged the balance.

While ascending the river, the sketch of it was taken above Fort Pierre, as it had been below, by Messrs. Hutton and Snowden, and observations were made by me for latitude. At Fort Union a 16-inch transit was set up, and observations taken during a whole lunation; but owing to the cloudy condition of the nights during the time, and the shortness of the nights themselves, only two sets of observations were obtained on the moon and stars. The result of these gave the longitude of that post $104^{\circ} 02'$, with a limit of error of about $10'$.

While at Fort Union we saw the Assinniboin Indians.

Having ascertained that a Mackinac boat could not be prepared for me before the 1st of September, I determined to make an examination of the Yellowstone during the month of August; and in carrying this out I was fortunate in being able to purchase the means of land transportation from Sir St. George Gore, who was returning from an extensive hunting excursion on the waters of the Yellowstone and its branches. We left the mouth of the Yellowstone July 25, and, travelling leisurely up the left bank, reached a point one hundred miles from its mouth, beyond which it was impossible to advance with wagons along the valley of the Yellowstone without crossing to the opposite banks. Here we made a camp with the main body, and with a party of seven I proceeded, with pack animals, over a very difficult country (known as the Bad Lands of the Yellowstone) to the mouth of Powder river, thirty miles further.

This was the furthest point up the Yellowstone that I intended to proceed, and I was anxious to reach it and to fix its position, as being a good and certain point with which any future reconnaissance could connect. From the appearance of Powder river at the mouth, no one would suppose the stream to be of the length it really is, and I was not surprised at Captain Clarke not having done so on his voyage down the Yellowstone in 1806. On returning to our wagon camp, we all travelled a short distance down the Yellowstone to a convenient point, where we made a boat eighteen feet long and five feet wide, by stretching the skins of three buffalo bulls over a frame made of small cotton-wood and willow trees. With this vessel a small party navigated the Yellowstone to its mouth, carefully mapping the islands and bends of the river. The wagons and land party returned to the Missouri by travelling over nearly the route by which they ascended.

We enjoyed the greatest abundance of large game of all kinds while on the Yellowstone river.

On reaching Fort Union again we found our boat nearly ready,

and, all our arrangements being completed, we left that place on the 1st of September. A small party conducted the animals along the shore on our journey down the Missouri, generally camping each night with the boat party. Halts of two or three days were made at all interesting localities, and map sketches were made several miles up all the streams flowing into the Missouri; and the map of the Missouri was also verified. These sketches, on a scale of one and a half inch to a mile, are on file and convenient for reference in this office.

Thermometer and barometer observations were made throughout the period of the examinations of the year 1856. Dr. Hayden was indefatigable in his efforts to develop the geology of the region traversed, and some of the results have already been published, by permission of the War Department, in the Proceedings of the Academy of Natural Sciences in Philadelphia. A very extensive collection was also made in zoology.

We reached Fort Pierre on our return on the 2d of October, at which place our animals were sold, and most of the soldiers returned to their respective companies. A few accompanied us as far as the mouth of the James river. We reached Sioux City on November 15, and fortunately found a steamboat there, by means of which we proceeded with our effects to St. Louis, and thence by railroad to Washington. The cost of this expedition to the United States was about \$10,000.

No special report has yet been made by me on the results of this year's exploration. The maps were about completed, and the material in the process of elaboration, when I was assigned to the command of another exploration by the War Department, a brief account of which I shall now proceed to give.

I received my instructions from the Hon. John B. Floyd, Secretary of War, May 7, 1857, the general terms of which were to make the necessary examinations to determine the best route for continuing the military road between Mendota and the Big Sioux westward to Fort Laramie and the South Pass. Thence to proceed northward and make such examinations on the Black Hills as my time and means would permit, and to return by the valley of the Niobrara, and make a careful examination thereof. I was assisted in the examination by Messrs. J. H. Snowden and P. M. Engel, as topographers; Dr. F. V. Hayden, as geologist; W. P. C. Carrington, as meteorologist; Dr. S. Moffett, as surgeon; and Lieut. Jas. McMillan, commanding the escort.

The escort, numbering twenty-seven men and three non-commissioned officers, under Lieut. McMillan, all of the 2d infantry, was directed to meet me at Sioux City, transportation for it being furnished by the quartermaster's department. Transportation for the remainder of the party was assembled at Omaha City as soon as possible; and on the 27th of June, under the charge of Mr. Snowden, set out for the rendezvous at the mouth of Loup Fork.

Accompanied by Mr. Engel, I then proceeded to Sioux City, where we found the escort had been awaiting us several days on the Big Sioux river. Through some misunderstanding there were no teamsters furnished for the wagons of the escort; and the mules, from a

disease of the hoof, and the wagons, and especially the harness, from long use, were of very inferior quality. It occupied me six days in getting the train in travelling condition, which was only done by abandoning one wagon and a large supply of stores for the escort. During this time a rumor* reached there of a fight having taken place between the soldiers and the Shyennes at Ash Hollow, in which a hundred of the former were killed. Twelve of the soldiers of the escort, tempted by the high prices of labor in this vicinity, and tired of the toils and privations of campaigning, deserted as we were about to set out, and some white thieves who infested the neighborhood of Sioux City carried off two of my best horses. These losses occurring in a civilized community, where we supposed ourselves among friends, were quite annoying, and gave rather unpleasant forebodings of what might occur to us when we should come among our enemies, the Indians.

We set out from Sioux City July 6, and, taking a direct course, joined the other party on the Loup Fork, being 11 days in going 110 miles. The route was heavy from frequent rains, all the ravines being filled with water, and the most insignificant rivulet requiring preparation, on account of the soft nature of the soil, before a wagon could cross it. We had to make one bridge (over Middle creek) about 30 feet long, and construct a raft with which to cross the Elk Horn.

The united party now set out on their journey westward on the Loup Fork, meeting with no serious difficulties on the route (except the quicksands in crossing the main north branch) till we came to within 50 miles of the source of the stream. Here the river became shut up in a gorge impassable for wagons, and we were forced out among the difficult sand hills which border the bluffs and which extend north to the Niobrara and south nearly to the Platte. They also extend much further east, but they occasioned us no difficulties till we were forced to leave the bank of the stream.

We finally came to the source of the Loup Fork, and from this point endeavored to proceed as directly as possible north to the Niobrara, for we were somewhat apprehensive of losing everything, for want of water, by endeavoring to push our way westward through the Sand Hills. These hills, however, were so impracticable for wagons that we were forced much more to the west than we desired, and one day we were unable to find water to camp by. There are numerous lakes in this Sand Hill country, but many of them are too much impregnated with salts to be wholesome. Some of these latter our animals drank out of without injury. On reaching the longitude of $102^{\circ} 30'$ we had the good fortune to find an open stretch of country with a large well marked lodge trail leading between the Platte and Niobrara, which, in one day's travel northward, brought us to the Niobrara. We now proceeded rapidly over an easy route to Fort Laramie.

During the journey there had been considerable sickness in the camp from fevers, and one of the men was so near the point of death that a halt of several days was made for his benefit. Dr. Moffett also became so ill as to require a delay of one or two days. These neces-

* This rumor was without foundation, as it afterwards appeared.

sary stoppages, the difficulties of the route, rainy weather, together with my being obliged to leave so much of our provisions behind at Sioux City, reduced our supplies to a small amount, and for nearly two weeks we were without sugar or coffee. We had also been very much disappointed in the amount of gam; and though the country gave evidence of having recently been occupied by large herds of buffalo, only a few bulls were seen. During the early part of the journey mosquitoes were abundant, and allowed our animals no rest at night, and immense numbers of flies attacked them by day. These insects, combined, exhausted and worried the animals more than the labor they performed, and the lives of one or two were saved only by covering them with grease and tar to keep the flies and mosquitoes away.

At Fort Laramie we entirely refitted the party, which took us an unusual long time, on account of everything being required for the Utah expedition. It gives me great pleasure to state that the commanding officer, Colonel Hoffman, and the acting quartermaster, Lieutenant Higgins, gave me all the facilities at their command. Owing to the great number of animals that graze in the neighborhood the grass was nearly eaten off, and our animals recruited very little during our stay there. While there I succeeded in getting several sets of observations for moon culminations, which determined the longitude to be $104^{\circ} 30'$ with a limit of error of about $4'$. Dr. Hayden and Mr. Engel also made an excursion to Laramie peak, which they ascended.

The party, on leaving Fort Laramie, was divided into two parts, as, owing to the lateness of the season, it was impossible to accomplish all the objects of the expedition by keeping together. Though in doing this I subjected each portion to the possibility of being defeated by the Indians, I deemed the case to justify the risk. The wagons were, half of them, turned in to the quartermaster, and the remainder, with the escort under Lieutenant McMillan, were to proceed down the Niobrara, and await me in longitude $101^{\circ} 30'$. Mr. J. H. Snowden went with this party to make the topographical reconnaissances; Dr. Moffett also accompanied it. My own party consisted of Dr. Hayden, Mr. Carrington, and Mr. Engel, and we had with us 17 men as packers, &c., and Mr. Morin as a guide and interpreter. Our supplies were packed on mules.

Setting out from Fort Laramie on the 4th of September, we proceeded direct for the Black Hills, *via* Raw Hide butte, Old Woman creek, the south fork of the Shyenne, and Beaver creek; up a branch of this last we entered the Black Hills. We continued north to the vicinity of the Inyan Kara, (or the peak which makes the mountain,) a remarkable high basaltic peak, one of the highest of these mountains, and so far to the north that we had a full view of the prairie beyond.

Here we were met by a very large force of the Dakotas, who made such earnest remonstrances and threats against our proceeding into their country that I did not think it prudent for us, as a scientific expedition, to venture further in this direction. Some of them were for attacking us immediately, as their numbers would have insured success; but the lesson taught them by General Harney, in 1855,

made them fear they would meet with retribution, and this I endeavored to impress upon them. We were at the time almost in sight of the place where these Indians had plundered Sir George Gore in 1855, for endeavoring to proceed through their country, and one of them was actually mounted on one of his best horses taken at that time. Sir George Gore's party was only about half as numerous as mine; but there were a number of my party which I had picked up at Fort Laramie on whom we placed very little reliance.

The grounds of their objections to our traversing this region were very sensible, and of sufficient weight, I think, to have justified them in their own minds in resisting; and as these are still in force for the prevention of the passage of any other party of whites not large enough to resist successfully, they are of sufficient importance to be repeated here. In the first place, they were encamped near large herds of buffalo, whose hair not being sufficiently grown to make robes, the Indians were, it may be said, actually herding the animals. No one was permitted to kill any in the large bands for fear of stampeding the others, and only such were killed as straggled away from the main herds. Thus the whole range of the buffalo was stopped so that they could not proceed south, which was the point to which they were travelling. The intention of the Indians was to retain the buffalo in their neighborhood till their skins would answer for robes, then to kill the animals by surrounding one band at a time and completely destroying each member of it. In this way no alarm is communicated to the neighboring bands, which often remain quiet almost in sight of the scene of slaughter.

For us to have continued on then would have been an act for which certain death would have been inflicted on a like number of their own tribe had they done it; for we might have deflected the whole range of the buffalo fifty or one hundred miles to the west, and prevented the Indians from laying in their winter stock of provisions and skins, on which their comfort if not even their lives depended. Their feelings towards us, under the circumstances, were not unlike what we should feel towards a person who should insist upon setting fire to our barns. The most violent of them were for immediate resistance, when I told them of my intentions; and those who were most friendly, and in greatest fear of the power of the United States, begged that I would "take pity" on them and not proceed. I felt that, aside from its being an unnecessary risk to subject my party and the interests of the expedition to, it was almost cruelty to the Indians to drive them to commit any desperate act which would call for chastisement from the government.

But this was not the only reason they urged against our proceeding. They said that the treaty made with General Harney gave to the whites the privilege of travelling on the Platte and along White river, between Fort Pierre and Laramie, and to make roads there, and to travel up and down the Missouri in boats; but that it guaranteed to them that no white people should travel elsewhere in their country, and thus frighten away the buffalo by their careless manner of hunting them. And finally, that my party was there examining the country to ascertain if it was of value to the whites, and to dis-

cover roads through it, and places for military posts; and that having already given up all the country to the whites that they could spare, these Black Hills must be left wholly to themselves. Moreover, if none of these things should occur, our passing through their country would give us a knowledge of its character and the proper way to traverse it in the event of another war between themselves and the troops. I was necessarily compelled to admit to myself the truth and force of these objections.

The Indians whom I first met were the Minikanyes, to the number of forty lodges, near whom, as they were very friendly, we encamped.* They were soon joined by the warriors of a large camp of Unkpapas and Sihasapas, and our position, which was sufficiently unpleasant in the presence of such a numerous party of half-avowed enemies, was rendered doubly so by a storm of sleet and snow, which lasted two days and nights, and against which we had but little protection.

A young Indian, who had accompanied us from Fort Laramie, considered the danger to us so imminent that he forsook our camp and joined his friends, the Minikanyes.

Under these embarrassing circumstances my associates evinced the most resolute bravery and determination to abide the result like true men.

I consented to wait three days without advancing, in order to meet their great warrior, Bear's Rib, appointed first chief by General Harney's treaty, merely changing our position to one offering greater facilities for defence. At the expiration of the time, Bear's Rib not making his appearance, we broke up camp, and, travelling back on our route about forty miles, struck off to the eastward, through the southern part of these mountains. The point where we turned back is well marked by the Inyan Kara peak, whose position was fixed by us.

After we had proceeded two days on our journey eastward, we were overtaken by Bear's Rib and one other Indian who accompanied him. He reiterated all that had been said by the other chiefs, and added that he could do nothing to prevent our being destroyed if we attempted to proceed further. I then told him that I believed he was our friend, but that if he could do nothing for us, he had better return to his people, and leave us to take care of ourselves, as I was determined to proceed as far as Bear butte. After a whole day spent in deliberation, he concluded to accompany us a part of the way, and he said he would then return to his people and use his influence to have us unmolested. In return for this, he wished me to say to the President and to the white people that they could not be allowed to come into that country. That if the presents sent were to purchase such a right, they did not want them. All they asked of the white people was, to be left to themselves and let alone. That if the presents were sent to induce them not to go to war with the Crows and their other enemies, they did not wish them. War with them was not only a necessity but a pastime. He said General Harney had told them

* I am much indebted to the influence of Major Twiss, the Indian agent near Fort Laramie, for his efforts to give the Dakotas a favorable opinion of my expedition, and to secure us a friendly reception.

not to go to war, and yet he was all the time going to war himself. (Bear's Rib knew that when General Harney left the Sioux country he had gone to the war in Florida, and was at the time in command of the army sent against the Mormons.) He said, moreover, that the annuities scarcely paid for going after them; and that if they were not distributed to them while they were on their visit to the trading posts, on the Missouri, to dispose of their robes, they did not want them.

(It is a fact, that for several years, owing to this cause, these Indians have not come in for their goods at all.)

He said that he heard that the Ihanktonwans were going to sell their lands to the whites. If they did so, he wished them informed that they could not come on his people's lands. They must stay with the whites. Every day the Ihanktonwans were coming there, but were always turned back.

Whatever may have been Bear's Rib's actions after leaving us, it is certain we saw no more Indians in the Black Hills. We completed our reconnaissance along the eastern portion of these mountains as far as Bear peak, which forms another convenient and accurate point with which any future reconnaissance may connect with our own. We also visited the north fork of the Shyenne, in this vicinity. On our return we took a southeast direction, striking the south fork of the Shyenne at the mouth of Sage creek. We then proceeded up the south fork to French creek; thence southeast, through the Bad Lands, to White river; thence along the sources of White Clay creek and Porcupine creek; and thence to the Niobrara, striking it in longitude $102^{\circ} 03'$.

We found the party under Lieutenant McMillan about forty miles below where we struck the river, and eighty miles below where we had first reached it on our journey westward in August. This intervening distance had been carefully mapped by Mr. Snowden, and he had made several excursions at different places to examine the country, as I had directed. Lieutenant McMillan's march down the river thus far had not been made without much wordy opposition from the Brule Dakotas, much of the same kind as that I have related as having been said to me in the Black Hills. On finding that he was determined to proceed, the chief, Little Thunder, sent four of his principal men to accompany them, which they did for some days. At a subsequent time, twenty-two warriors charged into the camp, thinking the party was a trading expedition. Their insolence was checked by Lieutenant McMillan's threatening to fire on them; whereupon they entered their usual protest against the party's proceeding further, and the next day all withdrew. The last twenty miles of Lieutenant McMillan's route was through difficult sand hills bordering the river, the stream itself being so shut in by high precipitous ridges that he was unable to travel along it.

We now found the route exceedingly laborious for wagons on account of the sand hills, which continue to the mouth of Rapid creek. The character of the immediate valley of the Niobrara precluded the wagons from travelling along it; so, while Mr. Snowden mapped the route of the train, Mr. Engel travelled along the river, sometimes on one side and sometimes on the other, and made a map of it. Even he,

though riding a mule, found it difficult to keep up in the way with the wagons, which slowly wound their way through and over the sand hills. Our camps at night were here always on the main river. After passing the Rapid creek the sand hills gave us no longer any trouble, (except for about twenty miles on the point between the Niobrara and Keya Paha,) but the ravines and precipices still prevented the wagons from travelling within from five to eight miles of the Niobrara, and here Mr. Engel continued the sketch as before. Dr. Hayden also travelled along the immediate banks of the river, examining the character of the rocks and collecting fossils.

On reaching the mouth of the Keya Paha, the main party, with the wagons, proceeded direct to Fort Randall, and a separate party, under Mr. Engel, travelled down the Niobrara to its mouth, completing the examination of that stream. It was my intention for Dr. Hayden to accompany him, but on arriving at the place of separation we found the same geological formation and characteristics as we knew to exist at the mouth; and as the intervening distance was only sixty miles, he did not deem it necessary to go over it.

Fort Randall was reached on the 1st of November, and the escort was returned to the regiment. We were most hospitably received by Major Day, commanding the post, and the other officers of the 2d infantry, and I take this occasion to acknowledge my indebtedness to this regiment for the aid and protection they have afforded me in all my explorations.

Two sets of observations for moon culminations were obtained, but cloudy weather prevented more. The longitude, as calculated from there, is $98^{\circ} 34'$, with a probable limit of error of about $8'$.

The party set out from Fort Randall on the 7th of November, and surveyed the route to Sioux City, which was reached on the 16th. The season being far advanced, no steamboat was expected, and the river was full of floating ice. The weather, as we travelled on towards Fort Leavenworth, became very severe, and the river became frozen over as far down as St. Joseph's. During this time we made rapid progress, but a mild spell of weather coming on made the road so heavy that with the greatest exertion we scarce made ten miles a day. During this time the health of the party suffered severely from influenza. We reached Fort Leavenworth on the 4th of December, and were fortunate enough to meet there with a steamboat, by which we proceeded to St. Louis, and thence by railroad to Washington.

CHAPTER II.

Physical geography of Nebraska; character of the soil and resources of the country.

Though my personal examinations have nowhere extended west of the 106th meridian, there are certain points west of it to which I would direct attention. The positions of the Missouri and Yellowstone west

of this meridian and north of the 46th degree of north latitude have been well examined by Lewis and Clark and under Governor Stevens, and the valuable information they obtained is widely known. The section, however, between the 46th parallel in the north and the 43d in the south, the 106th meridian in the east, and the dividing line between the waters of the Pacific and the Atlantic in the west, is comparatively unknown, except from the accounts afforded by trapping parties. The information given of it on the map of Lewis and Clark is derived from this latter source; as is also that on Colonel Bonneville's map, published with "Irving's" work on "Adventures in the Rocky Mountains," &c.; and these are our most authentic sources of information. These maps have been generally disregarded by subsequent map-makers; and previous to the map I compiled for the Pacific Railroad Office, there have been no mountains represented about the source of the Yellowstone. From inquiries I made of trappers in 1855, I became convinced of the existence of these mountains, and represented them accordingly, endeavoring to combine the information on Lewis and Clark's map and Bonneville's map with that which I had procured from traders and trappers. In doing this, I represented the Big Horn mountains perhaps too far to the west, as they are perfectly visible from the summit of the Inyan Kara peak, in the Black Hills.

Leaving out of consideration for the present the smaller detached mountain masses, and beginning with the main range of the Rocky mountains on the 49th parallel, we find their eastern base to have a direction nearly northwest and southeast, and the range crossing the Missouri at "The Gate of the Mountains." Continuing southeast, it crosses the Yellowstone near where Captain Clark reached that river in 1806, (latitude 46,) just south of which it forms high, snow-covered peaks. This line of mountains is broken through again by the Big Horn river, and the mountains receive the name of Big Horn mountains. The southeast terminus of the Big Horn mountains sinks into the elevated table land prairie, and perhaps reappears again as the Laramie mountains. (South of the latitude of Fort Laramie the line of the eastern front of the mountains is nearly north and south.)

The Black Hills, whose geographical position we have determined, are the most eastern portion of what has heretofore been considered a part of the great mountain region west of the Mississippi; and it is worthy of note that, if a line be drawn from them to the Little Rocky mountains, on the 48th parallel, which are the most eastern portion in that latitude, this line will be parallel to the line of the main front of the mountains which I have already traced. What is still more significant is, that if a straight line be drawn from the mouth of the Yellowstone to the mouth of the Kansas river, it will also be parallel to the lines before mentioned, and will have about an equal portion of the Missouri on each side of it.

The line of the east base of the main mountain mass is the highest, of course, of any portion of the plains, and at Raw Hide peak, near Fort Laramie, is about 5,500 feet elevation, as determined by the horizontally stratified tertiary deposits, though owing to great, denudation the average height then of this line of the plains will not be so great

and Professor Joseph Leidy, whose papers, published in the Proceedings of the Academy of Natural Sciences, have already made known some of the principal discoveries and results due to their labors. Dr. Hayden was the only one of those mentioned who accompanied me in the field.

In the paper by Dr. Hayden, accompanying the geological map, published in June, 1858, Dr. H. observes that "A much larger surface might have been colored on the map with a good degree of confidence, but I have preferred to confine myself, for the most part, to the results of my own observations in the field." The northeast portion of the boundary of the tertiary formation between the White and Niobrara rivers is then placed too far west, according to my own observations in 1855 and 1857. The line between this and the cretaceous is not west of a straight line between the mouth of the south fork of the White river and the mouth of the Keya Paha. A small portion of tertiary should also be shown on the north side of the south fork of the Shyenne. The great lignite tertiary formation most probably extends almost to the base of the Big Horn mountains.

It is of course impossible to give correctly the relative extent of certain of the formations on a map of this scale. The width of the upheaved sedimentary formations which encircle the igneous rocks of the Black Hills are much more developed on the western than on the eastern slopes, owing to their difference in dip—on the western being quite gentle, but steep on the other, causing them soon to disappear under the cretaceous rocks; and this is one of the most important features in the configuration of these mountains.

From what has been said it will be seen that the surface of Nebraska presents two great sections—that of the plains, and that of the mountains.

The plains in this latitude are composed of nearly horizontal strata of the tertiary and cretaceous formations, except in a small portion of the southeast corner, where the carboniferous is developed. Though the plains are much diversified by the effects of denuding agencies, and present in different portions striking characteristics, yet they are, as a whole, a great uniform surface gradually rising towards the mountains, at the base of which they attain an elevation varying between 3,000 and 5,500 feet above the level of the sea. The plains have three distinct portions as determined by their geological formation: 1st, the pliocene and miocene tertiary; 2d, the cretaceous; and 3d, the lignite tertiary.

The *first section* extends from the southern boundary north, nearly continuous to the 44th parallel, and contains a large portion of the valleys of the Platte, Loup Fork, Niobrara, and White rivers. Here, except in the immediate valleys of the streams, which are composed of good soil, naturally irrigated by springs from the bluffs, or susceptible of irrigation, much of the country is sandy and unfit for cultivation. No valuable mineral or good building stone have been discovered in it. Here are to be found the Sand Hills, which occupy an area north of the Platte of not less than 20,000 square miles. These hills on the north begin between the White and Niobrara rivers, and extend south probably beyond the Arkansas. Where we have visited

them, they vary in height from 10 to 200 feet, and in the western portion are ranged in ridges running east and west; but in travelling you are frequently obliged to cross them, as the intermediate valleys, which are also sand, are not continuous. About the sources of Loup Fork many of the lakes of water found in them are impregnated with salts and unfit to drink, and our sufferings in exploring them will always hold a prominent place in our memories. The present form of these hills is mainly if not wholly due to the wind. Where the grass protects the surface the sand does not drift; but if this is removed, the wind whirls the sand in the air, and often excavates deep holes. I therefore look upon them as utterly impracticable for any line of railroad; for should any attempt be made to grade the surface, which would be necessary, the wind would fill up the cuts with sand as with drifting snow.

In this section is also to be found the Bad Lands, or Mauvaises-Terres, of White river, so celebrated for their vertebrate remains. The locality to which this name (Bad Lands) has been applied is in extent about one hundred and fifty miles long, in a direction northeast and southwest, and about sixty miles wide. The term Bad Lands was given to this section by the traders, on account of the difficulty of getting a road through a portion of it. The extent of the geological formation to which these Bad Lands belong is very great, and, as the name is an improper one to be applied to the whole of it, I shall not use the term except in speaking of the portion occupied by it along the middle course of the White river. In this part of White river some as beautiful valleys are to be found as anywhere in the far west, though, like other parts, the majority of the country is barren. These Bad Lands of the White river country have frequently been spoken of as a vast grave or sepulchre, from the amount of bones found in it; and this figure of speech has somewhat tended to give a gloomy idea of the place which it does not especially deserve, as it abounds in the most beautiful and varied forms, in endless variety, giving the most striking and pleasing effects of light and shade. It has also been described as having sunk away from the surrounding world, with the country rising like steps to the Black Hills, which is not the case, many portions of these Bad Lands being higher than all the intervening country between them and the Black Hills, from which the portions on White river are distant about thirty miles. The formation to which this portion belongs extends almost uninterruptedly east to the mouth of the Keya Paha, and south beyond the Platte; and an instance of the striking appearance which it sometimes makes is exhibited in Court-house rock and Scott's bluffs. The word "Bad Lands" is generally applied by the traders to any section of the prairie country where roads are difficult, and in this way to parts of many distinct geological formations; and as it is generally calculated to mislead, should not be used. When I shall use it occasionally, I use only the name of the country, as it was originally given to mean bad land to travel through.

The *second section* is the cretaceous formation, forming the level country at the base of the Black Hills, the valley of the Shyenne river, and the immediate valley of the Missouri river, from Heart river to

the Big Sioux. In this section the soil is clayey; and wherever there is a sufficiency of rain, or streams can be found to irrigate the land, it will be productive. The great drawback to its fertility is a want of timely rains. A portion of this formation, from the Big Bend to the Shyenne, is composed of black shale, and contains much saline matter, which renders the water in places unhealthy, and adds to the sterility of the soil along the bluffs of the streams, where saline springs are common. In this section, too, there are no valuable minerals or good building stone, except that furnished by the boulders.

The third section, or lignite tertiary, extends north and west to the British line. The want of rain, which is felt in this area even more than in the one to the south of it, renders it nearly barren. Everywhere, through this formation, beds of lignite are to be found, sometimes of a thickness of six and seven feet. The burnt appearance of earth, along the banks of the streams, shows that in former times these beds have been on fire over large areas, and in places are entirely burned out, and those on Powder river are said to be on fire at this time. There is every reason to believe that in places this lignite will be found of quality good enough for fuel. In this section the boulders furnish the only good building stone.

In nearly all parts of Nebraska good clay for making brick can be found.

The carboniferous formation is developed in a small part of the southeastern portion of the prairie of Nebraska, and I will quote from the report of Dr. Hayden in relation to the coal of this section: "The town of De Soto is the highest point known on the Missouri where these limestones are exposed. Ascending the valley of the Platte river we find them quite well developed as far as the mouth of the Elk Horn, where they pass beneath the bed of the river, and the sandstone No. 1 occupies the country.

"Several small seams of coal have been found in these limestones at Bellevue and other localities, and in the valley of the Platte. About ten miles above its mouth I noticed a bed of very dark carbonaceous shale, two feet in thickness, cropping out near the water's edge. This was considered by the inhabitants as a sufficient proof of the existence of a workable bed of coal in the vicinity. The evidence now points to the conclusion that though these limestones belong to the true coal measures, they hold a position above the workable beds of coal, and that it is not probable a valuable seam of coal will be found north of the southern line of Nebraska. A bed of coal, of inferior quality, has been wrought near Leavenworth City, Kansas Territory, but it holds a lower geological position than the limestones of the southern portion of Nebraska, the dip of the strata being toward the northeast." As our examinations were always somewhat hurried, there is room to expect that workable beds of coal may yet be found here, but at present we know of no facts against the opinion given by Dr. Hayden.

The seam of very inferior lignite found in the neighborhood of Sioux City in the cretaceous rocks may possibly, in some places, furnish fuel of value, but where seen by us as exposed it gives but little promise. In this case, as well as the coal seams in the Platte, mentioned above,

it may be that on penetrating to the interior portions of those beds they will improve in quality.

The section of Nebraska which is now being occupied by settlers has fertile soil, not surpassed by any portion of the prairies of the Mississippi valley. In this eastern section will be found the fertile and wooded valley of the Elk Horn river, and all the wooded parts of the valley of the River Platte. In the southern portion of it good building stone is furnished by the carboniferous rocks.

After passing to the west of the 97th meridian we begin to meet with sandy tracts, especially near the 42d parallel, in which latitude the sand hills extend the furthest east. In my former report I said that but a small portion of Nebraska which I had visited is susceptible of cultivation west of the 97th meridian. I did not mean to imply that good land on these prairies would not be found west of it, for there are fertile tracts as far west as the 99th meridian, in the neighborhood of streams that are valuable, and contain wood enough to support settlements. In stating that the Territory is overspread by powerful tribes of roving savages, and is only adapted to a life such as theirs, I did not mean to imply that white men could not occupy it, but that if they ever did they would have to lead a life similar to that of the Indians, depending mainly for subsistence not upon the buffalo, but their own herds and flocks for support; and this is most emphatically true of the region between the 99th meridian and the base of the mountains.

There is one thing concerning the longitudes of places west of the Missouri river which causes many persons to deceive themselves, and is worthy of mention here. A common idea is that the course of the Missouri is nearly south from Sioux City to Leavenworth City, and that settlers may go as far west of the one place as the other and find fertile lands. But the course of the Missouri between these points is so much to the east that Sioux City is only fifteen miles east of the meridian of Fort Riley, and Fort Randall is as far west as the western limit of the Cross Timbers on the 35th parallel.

Though the western portion of the prairies of Nebraska is not much inferior to that of corresponding meridians in Kansas and northern Texas, there is no disguising the fact that a great portion of it is irreclaimable desert, with only a little wood and cultivable land along the streams.

The reasons for this are, 1st, an insufficiency of timely rains; 2d, over large areas the soil does not possess the proper constituents; 3d, the severity of the long cold winters and short summers; and a 4th might be included in the clouds of grasshoppers that occasionally destroy the useful vegetation. They are nearly the same as the locusts of Egypt, and no one who has not travelled on the prairie and seen for himself can appreciate the magnitude of these insect swarms. Often they fill the air for many miles of extent so that an experienced eye can scarce distinguish their appearance from that of a shower of rain or the smoke of a prairie fire. The height of their flight may be somewhat appreciated, as Mr. E. James saw them above his head as far as their size would render them visible while standing on the top of a peak of the Rocky Mountains, 8,500 feet above the level of the

plains, and an elevation of 14,500 above that of the sea, in the region where the snow lies all the year. To a person standing in one of these swarms as they pass over and around him, the air becomes sensibly darkened, and the sound produced by their wings resembles that of the passage of a train of cars on a railroad when standing two or three hundred yards from the track. The Mormon settlements have suffered more from the ravages of these insects than probably all other causes combined. They destroyed nearly all the vegetables cultivated last year at Fort Randall, and extended their ravages east as far as Iowa.

It must be observed, however, that good grass will generally be found all over these plains, varying in quantity and kind with different localities, and that the desert character of the country is not like that found in the deserts on Green river and Snake river, west of the South Pass, where even a sufficiency for animals cannot be found.

A very different condition of soil, water, and building material of stone and wood, exists when we reach the mountain region.

The Black Hills, or more properly mountains, lying between the forks of the Shyenne, on the 44th parallel, between the 103d and 105th meridians, cover an area of 6,000 square miles. Their bases are elevated from 2,500 feet to 3,500 feet, and the highest peaks are about 6,700 feet above the ocean level.

The different rocks which compose these mountains, as determined by our exploration, are—

- I. Metamorphosed azoic rock, including granite.
- II. Lower silurian, (Potsdam sandstone)
- III. Devonian?
- IV. Carboniferous.
- V. Permian.
- VI. Jurassic.
- VII. Cretaceous.

All the rocks below the silurian are igneous and metamorphic, and the stratification which they exhibit stands everywhere nearly vertical, with a strike varying between northeast and northwest. So constant is this vertical dip, that it may not in reality indicate primary stratification, but some mechanical arrangement due to the molecular forces brought into its existence during its cooling from the heated state. All the rocks, from the silurian to the close of the cretaceous, apparently lie conformable to each other. The shape of the mass is elliptical. The duration of the longest line of this or major axis being about north 20° west. On the west the rocks dip, as a whole, very gently, and at a distance of five miles from the foot of the hills the cretaceous is apparently undisturbed, though at the base these rocks in some places stand at an angle of 45° . The manner in which this rock lies suggests the idea that the cretaceous probably forms a considerable portion of the elevated plateau between the Black Hills and Big Horn mountains. The dip of the upheaved rocks on the west side is as a whole very gentle, not amounting to more than from 5° to 15° , and consequently they are considerably developed, and form more than one-half the mountain mass composing some very high ridges. These rocks have a much greater inclination on the east side of the moun-

tains, and soon disappear under the cretaceous, forming a comparatively narrow belt. The east base of the mountains is from 2,000 to 3,000 feet below the western.

The rocks seem also to dip much more suddenly down on the south than on the north side. The strike of these upheaved strata is in almost every direction corresponding on the exterior nearly with that of the tangent to the outline of the mass, and on the interior being more nearly coincident with the direction of the major axis.

A result of this formation is that the upturned rocks break off abruptly on the side towards the interior of the mass, and leave an open valley in many places between this steep slope and the gentle one which succeeds it as we approach the interior. In these valleys the best roads are found, and one, which nearly encircles the Black Hills, is known among the Indians and traders as the Race Course or Runny road.

The Inyan Kara Peak is basaltic, and the appearance through a powerful spy-glass of those to the north, known as the "Bear's Lodge" and "Little Missouri Buttes," indicates that they are also of this formation. More recent volcanic action is visible at Bears' Peak, and two circular spaces to the west of this peak, now occupied by muddy lakes, indicate the existence here in former times of volcanic.

The highest mountain masses, such as Harney's Peak, on the east side, are all granite, the rocks, as seen at a distance, appearing in the same unmistakable form as those on the Paw Hide and Laramie Peaks, namely, coarse granite or gneiss, standing in layers and slabs, indicating a vertical stratification. A full description of these mountains must be left for the final report. They derive their name from being covered with pine, whose dark green gives them a black appearance.

In reference to the carboniferous rocks in these mountains, Dr. Hayden says: "The exact positions in the carboniferous system to which the limestones around Fort Laramie and in the Black Hills belong, is not sufficiently clear from the evidence yet obtained. They do not seem to be the equivalents of the beds above described along the Missouri, though they may be. The texture of the rock is quite unlike any of the limestones of the coal measure with which we are acquainted, and there seems to be an absence of the fossils characteristic of the coal measure limestones on the Missouri, and in north-eastern Kansas. The latest opinion, however, of my associate, Mr. Meek, is that they belong to the true coal measures.

In these mountain formations, which border the great plains on the west, are to be found beautiful flowing streams, and small rich valleys covered over with fine grass for hay, and susceptible of cultivation by means of irrigation. Fine timber for fuel and lumber, limestone and good stone for building purposes are here abundant. Gold has been found in places in valuable quantities, and without doubt the more common and useful minerals will be discovered when more minute examinations are made.

I think it exceedingly desirable that something should be done to encourage settlements in the neighborhood of Fort Laramie. The wealth of that country is not properly valued, and the Indian title not being extinguished there is no opportunity to settle it. Those who

live there now support themselves by trade with the Indians, which being already overdone, it is to their interest to keep others away. If the Indian title were extinguished, and the protection of the territorial government extended there, so as to be effectual, there would soon spring up a settlement that would rival that of Great Salt Lake. The Laramie river is a beautiful stream, with a fine fertile valley, and there are such everywhere along the base of the mountains. Pine timber, of the finest quality, in abundance grows there, easy of access, from which the finest lumber can be made; building stone of good quality abounds. The establishment of the military post, and the constant passing of emigrants, have driven away the game, so that the Indians do not set a high value on the land, and it could easily be procured from them.

The people now on the extreme frontiers of Nebraska are near the western limit of the fertile portions of the prairie lands, and a desert space separates them from the fertile and desirable region in the western mountains. They are, as it were, on the shore of a sea, up to which population and agriculture may advance, and no further. But this gives them much of the value of places along the Atlantic frontier, in view of the future settlements to be formed in the mountains, between which and the present frontier a most valuable trade would exist. The western frontier has always been looking to the east for a market, but as soon as the wave of emigration has passed over the desert portion of the plains, to which the discoveries of gold have already given an impetus that will propel it to the fertile valleys of the Rocky mountains, then will the present frontier of Kansas and Nebraska become the starting point for all the products of the Mississippi valley which the population of the mountains will require. We see the effects of it in the benefits which the western frontier of Missouri has received from the Santa Fé trade, and still more plainly in the impetus given to Leavenworth by the operations of the army of Utah in the interior region. This flow of products has, in the last instance, been only in one direction, but when those mountains become settled, as they eventually must, then there will be a reciprocal trade materially beneficial to both.

These settlements in the mountains cannot be agricultural to the same extent as those on the Mississippi valley, but must depend greatly upon the raising of stock. The country furnishes the means of raising sufficient quantities of grain and vegetables for the use of the inhabitants, and beautiful, healthy, and desirable locations for their homes. The remarkable freedom here from sickness is one of the attractive features of the region, and will, in this respect, go far to recompense the settler from the Mississippi valley for his loss in the smaller amount of products that can be taken from the soil. The great want of suitable building material which now so seriously retards the growth of the west will not be felt there.

How far the fine timbers in the interior of Nebraska can be relied upon to supply settlements on the Missouri is a question upon which I am not qualified to give a very positive opinion. Upon the Niobrara the pine extends along the Niobrara and its side ravines for about 120 miles, and there is nearly an equal extent of it on White river; but on

both streams it is of inferior quality and difficult of access. That at the Black Hills is much better timber, and covers an area of about 15,000 square miles; but this is also in situations where there would be much labor in getting it out, and an Indian war would probably attend the first attempts to do so. I think the Niobrara, White, and Shyenne rivers could be used to bring the logs to the Missouri, down which they could be rafted.

The great want of timber which is felt along the settlements on the Missouri, and the high price which this material commands, may probably overcome all the difficulties I have stated to exist; and, having done this as faithfully as I can, I must leave each one to form his own opinion on the subject.

CHAPTER III.

Remarks on the climate—meteorology.

The seasons I have spent in Nebraska have, as I am informed by those who have resided there a long time, been favored with an unusual supply of rain. With this caution as to the inferences which may be drawn from our observations, I will give a short account of some of the meteorological phenomena observed by us.

In the year 1855 we left Fort Leavenworth on the 15th of June, and reached Fort Pierre on the 16th of July. During the passage up the river we had 13 days of nearly calm weather; 10 days of south or southeast wind, sometimes very strong; seven thunder-storms, some of them of great violence, with much rain, the amount diminishing as we ascended the river, (there being no heavy rain after the 29th of June, all of which time we were above the mouth of the Niobrara.) The highest temperature observed was on July 15, at 2 p. m., at which time the dry thermometer gave 102° in the shade, and the wet bulb thermometer 69° . When we reached Fort Pierre we were informed that there had been no rain or snow there for more than a year. The appearance of the vegetation confirmed this statement, as scarcely a green spot was anywhere to be seen.

Hourly observations on the wet and dry bulb thermometers and barometers were made at Fort Pierre from July 17 to 25, and at the hours of 7 a. m., 9 and 2 p. m., till August 7. The mean height of the barometric column at this place is (reduced to 32°) 28.435; the altitude above the sea, 1,500 feet. The highest temperature observed during this time was, at 3 p. m., July 22, dry thermometer, 86° ; wet bulb thermometer, 64° ; the barometer, reduced to 32° , reading 28.310. On the same evening we had a heavy fall of rain, with thunder and lightning, about 5 miles south of the fort; this was the first rain experienced in the neighborhood. From July 22 to August 7 there were three violent thunder-storms from the west, one of which was attended with a heavy fall of rain. An abundance of rain continued to fall here during the summer.

While on the journey from Fort Pierre to Fort Kearney, between

August 7 and August 22, we had much overcast and misty weather nearly all the time, and on seven of the days rain fell in small quantities.

From August 25 to September 12 we were on the road along the Platte river to Fort Kearney; during this time we had two heavy thunder storms, attended with a large fall of rain. While at Fort Laramie, we had heavy frost about the 25th of September. Fort Laramie has an elevation of 4,200 feet.

From September 29 to October 19 we were on the road to Fort Pierre. The weather at times was very cold, and snow fell to the depth of four inches on the night of the 3d of October; for several days in the first part of this month the thermometer stood, at day-break, at 29° . On the 20th and 21st of October we had a violent storm of rain, sleet, and snow, with high winds, which covered everything with ice. We were quite surprised, on reaching the neighborhood of Fort Pierre, to find the grass green and abundant, for it was such a contrast to its appearance in August, when everything seemed to have perished for want of rain. Much snow fell here during the winter, and in the spring there were heavy showers of rain, so that a more beautiful prairie country could not be found than this, as it appeared in May and June, 1856. At the same time the previous year the grasses scarce gave an indication of life.

We left Fort Pierre on the 28th of June, 1856, and reached Fort Union on the 10th of July; on the passage the weather was comparatively clear, with light winds. Up to this time no rain had fallen there, and in many places there was a great scarcity of grass. On the 15th a heavy storm of rain and wind commenced at 9 p. m., and continued till 10 p. m. on the 17th. The wind for several days previous had been light, and came from the north. On the 15th, at 2 p. m., the thermometer was at 90° , the barometer (reduced to 32°) reading 27.827. At 9 a. m., on the 16th, the barometer read 27.735; thermometer 58° . The wind blew with great violence from the north all day on the 16th, so that it was with great difficulty we kept our tents standing; and a portion of the enclosure of the American Fur Company's fort was blown down. This storm was not accompanied by thunder and lightning. On the 17th the weather was again clear; wind light from the northeast; thermometer, at 2 p. m., 67° ; barometer, 28.179. Fort Union has an elevation of 1,900 feet above the sea.

While at Fort Union and in the neighborhood we had after this abundance of rain, so that the whole landscape in August and September wore a beautiful green, and grass was plenty in places where, in July, there was not a blade of it. The highest temperature we experienced here was on the 20th of July, the thermometer, at 2 p. m., reading 93° . The earliest frost ever recorded to have occurred here was in the month of August of 1855.

We left Fort Union the first of September and reached Fort Pierre on the fifth of October. We were again struck with the variable nature of the climate on finding that but little rain had fallen here during our absence and the grass had all dried up, though at this place the same period of the previous year it was everywhere green.

In the year of 1857 we started from Omaha the 28th of June, in the midst of the rainy season, and reached Fort Laramie August 20. During this journey we had fifteen rainy days, or about one in four, and on many other days there were showers with thunder and lightning near us that are not included. The highest temperature was 100° , 2 p. m., August 11.

Prior to our arrival at Fort Laramie not much rain had fallen there; but on the 22d it commenced, at 11 a. m., to rain hard and continued, with but little intermission, till the 24th. This storm was not accompanied by violent wind, and the barometer gave very little indication of its approach, preserving about a reading of 25.980. No one there remembered to have ever seen so much rain fall at one time at that place.

I left Fort Laramie on the 4th of September; we had one heavy rain on the 10th, at the base of the Black Hills. While in the Black Hills we had a storm that lasted from 6 a. m. on the 16th till 9 p. m. on the 17th. As we were travelling and changed our altitude during this storm, and while it was coming on, the indications of the barometer are not of any value. Our elevation was about 5,500 feet. The storm began with a cold rain, thermometer 54° . The temperature gradually fell till the rain changed to snow during the night of the 16th, and the thermometer went down to 32° . There was a strong wind a portion of the time from the north. During the latter part of this storm we were enveloped in the clouds, and as it cleared up these gradually rose, as we could see by the line they made along the sides of the high peaks and ridges.

We experienced a very violent storm, of about twenty-four hours' duration, on the 8th of October, while on White river, and had a fall of about six inches of snow on the Niobrara on the 18th of October. From the 18th of October to the 31st we had four storms of rain and sleet.

I have not attempted here to give the direction of the wind during the period, as it could only be done satisfactorily by copying the daily register. The prevailing wind through the year is from the north, as is fully established by the sand hills along the Niobrara. The wind had blown these up to the brink of the precipices along the north bank, and on the south has removed them to the distance of about half a mile. October is generally a very windy month. In 1856, fifteen days of this month, while we were travelling down the Missouri in a Mackinac boat, from Fort Pierre to Sioux City, it blowed so we could not proceed. The prevailing wind at this time was from the south, and we had one violent rain storm, with a south wind.

A true indication of the nature of the climate of Nebraska is to be found in the character of the plants which grow there. Certain kinds, unable to live through the long periods of drought which occur, are rarely to be seen, and those which flourish best are such as require but little moisture, or whose roots, penetrating deep into the soil, enable them to draw a sufficiency of moisture from below. In the high prairies, where there is a good soil, we find the bunch grass growing in tufts, but in many places interspersed with patches of cacti. The bottom lands of many of the streams support no trees but

the cottonwood and willow, and some of them produce rank growths of the wild sage.

The absence of trees on all the prairie regions is another evidence of the dryness of the climate, and even in places where they can grow, as in the ravines, the excessive cold of the winter winds prevent them from reaching their full development, as is proved by the dead tops of nearly all the trees which extend their branches above the level of the prairie. The prairie fires have done much towards preventing the growth of trees in places adapted to them, but it is not a sufficient cause to account for the general absence of forests.

An interesting instance of the effect of climate on the growth of trees is to be seen in the cedar as you ascend the Missouri. At the first Cedar island, in latitude 43, these trees grow in the bottom lands of the river, and are large and straight, those growing on the bluffs being of an inferior quality.

The cedars diminish as you ascend, and the last of these in any number together is to be seen in the bluffs opposite the mouth of the Little Shyenne, in about latitude 45, and here they are exceedingly crooked and twisted. Along the Missouri and Yellowstones in the lignite tertiary formation, we find the cedar unable to support itself above the ground, and, spreading itself over the surface, presents the appearance on the hill sides of grass or moss.

During the time I have been in Nebraska I have found everywhere an abundance of grass, except in places near the posts and others, where it had been eaten off by the buffalo.

A considerable quantity of a small variety of corn is raised by the Mandans, Rees, and Gros Ventres, near the 47th parallel, on the Missouri, and it is probable that this corn can be raised along the base of mountains as far north as the 46th parallel. The entire mountain section of Nebraska will produce good wheat, where the land can be irrigated, and the abundance of grass for pasturage will permit of the raising of immense herds of stock.

This western portion of Nebraska may, therefore, in the future be valuable for occupation for a people partly engaged in agriculture, but relying mainly upon the raising of stock.

Many valuable inferences in regard to the climate may be drawn from an examination of the catalogue of plants growing in Nebraska, prepared by Dr. Hayden, and appended to this report.

It is my intention to give tables of the meteorological observations in a subsequent report. These, besides the indication they afford of the climate of Nebraska, will be useful in aiding the determinations of the progress and limits of storms over large areas in connexion with extensive investigations on this subject carried on by the Smithsonian Institution, under the direction of Professor Henry.

The thunder storms, so far as we have observed them, have a great uniformity. The day after one has passed over is generally cold, with a light north wind and high state of the barometer. This condition lasts from one to three days, when the wind changes to the south and gradually increases in force during the day, and sometimes falling almost to a calm at night. The barometer falls during the time, and cumulus clouds begin to form. After the south wind has blown three

or four days, a thunder storm comes from the west, generally in the night; the south wind often blowing a hurricane all the time the storm is approaching from the west. This storm is again succeeded by cool weather and a high state of the barometer, and in general we found a sure indication of the approach or termination of a storm in the falling or rising of the barometer column. These storms as seen on the prairie have a number of independent centres, so that they often pass across the landscape to the north and south without your receiving any of the rain. They are frequently accompanied by a fall of hail and violent gusts of wind.

CHAPTER IV.

Description of principal rivers and discussion of the merits of different routes.

In giving a description of the character and importance of the rivers examined, it will perhaps be best to discuss at the same time the subject of routes, as they are intimately connected.

The Missouri, therefore, claims our first attention, and though it has been so repeatedly described by others, a few of its general features may be enumerated here. A detailed account of the various points we examined as locations for military posts must be reserved for the final report. This great stream has generally a uniform width from the junction with the Yellowstone to its mouth, varying from $\frac{1}{3}$ to $\frac{1}{2}$ a mile when the banks are full. In low water the width is much less and dry bars of sand occupy portions of the bed, from which the water has withdrawn. In the upper part of the river where the trees do not destroy the force of the wind, the sand is blown about in the most astonishing manner, and the clouds of sand can be seen for many miles. Sand banks are thus formed, generally at the edges of the trees on the islands and points, and which are often many feet above the level of the highest floods.

The force of these winds may be inferred from this, and their constancy during certain months, especially in October, are of themselves one of the greatest obstacles to the navigation of the river.

The plans which these sand banks exhibit are those of the perimeters of the islands and points on which they were formed, and not unlike those of the Indian mounds in the Mississippi valley, which are supposed to be the remains of ancient fortifications. These banks along the Missouri have, therefore, been considered as the works of the aborigines, such, for instance, as those described and figured by Lewis and Clark, as existing at Bon Homme island. I have conclusive evidence, from personal examination, that these were formed by the wind, and are not the work of the ancient Tolters as some writers have supposed.

The river has generally, in the same stages of the floods, about as good navigation on account of the depth above James river as it has

at that point, but an improvement takes place below this point, in the depth of the water on the sand bars in low stages, as you descend to its mouth.

Along the banks of the Missouri the bluffs are generally clothed with various species of trees as far up as the mouth of the Platte; above this point the timber is generally confined to the ravines and bottom lands. These bottom lands attain a width of from ten to fifteen miles after we get above Council Bluffs, which is almost continuous to the mouth of James river. Throughout this section the edges of the banks are lined with heavy cottonwood and other trees, and fuel for steamboats can now generally be found cut up and prepared for their use.

At James river the bluffs close in so that the general width of the space between is only from one to two miles all the way to the Upper Big Bend, near the 48th parallel. Here again the bottom lands become wider, and continue at a width of from three to six miles to a point about fifty miles above the Yellowstone. In this last section there is also an abundance of large cottonwood timber, and the appearance of the river is quite similar to what it is at Sioux City. After passing the Niobrara the steamboat's crew will have to cut the wood required for generating steam, and the only scarcity will be in finding dead trees at such points as the boat can land at. Abundance of fuel exists everywhere, if the wood was cut beforehand and hauled to suitable landings. The portion of the river most deficient in wood is between the mouth of the Little Shyenne and Cannon Ball rivers, but even here there is an abundance for the purposes of navigation for years to come.

One of the greatest obstructions to the navigation of the Missouri consists in the great number of snags or trees, whose roots, imbedded in the channel by the caving of the banks, stand at various inclinations pointing down the stream. These obstructions are, comparatively, quite rare above the mouth of James river, but from this point down to the Mississippi it is a wonder often how a steamboat can be navigated through them. As it is they cause the boats to lie by during the night, and thus occasion a loss of nearly half of their running time. But this is not the only delay, for often on account of the wind the bends filled with snags cannot be passed, and the vessel is frequently detained for days on this account. This effect of the wind is much more seriously felt as you ascend above Council Bluffs, for the protection afforded by the trees on the banks is constantly diminishing.

Our examinations extended but sixty miles above the mouth of the Yellowstone, but the portion between this was examined carefully by the parties under Governor Stevens in 1853, and the results are given in his report on the Pacific railroad explorations. It is the almost universal opinion of those who have examined this portion of the river that it would be navigable in its best stages for light draught boats. From our reconnaissance in 1856, I feel convinced that, notwithstanding the difficulties to navigation which exist, the Missouri is a superior river to any in this country, except that portion of the Mississippi which is below their junction. The navigation is generally closed by ice at Sioux City by the 10th of November, and at Fort Leavenworth

by the 1st of December. The rainy season of the spring and summer commences in different years between the 15th of May and the 30th of June (in the latitude of Kansas, Missouri, Iowa, and southern Nebraska) and lasts about two months. During this period the tributaries of the Missouri in these latitudes maintain this river in good boating stage. The floods produced by the melting snows in the mountains come from the Platte, the Big Shyenne, the Yellowstone, and the Missouri above the Yellowstone, and reach the lower river about the first part of July, and it is mainly to these that the navigator of the Missouri above the Niobrara depends. The length of time the flood lasts is in proportion to the quantity of snow in the mountains, which varies greatly in different years. On the average it may be said to last a month, but a steamer starting from St. Louis on the first indication there of such rise would not generally reach the Yellowstone before it was nearly past this latter point. Rivers like this, whose navigation depends upon the temporary floods, are greatly inferior for ascending than descending boats. The rise at the Yellowstone would be about ten days reaching St. Louis, and any good system of telegraphing along the stream, which would apprise those below, would more than double the advantages to the upward navigation. If a miscalculation is made by taking a temporary rise for the main one, the boat has to lay by in the middle part of the river till the main rise comes. From this cause I, starting on the 16th of April, was thirty-seven days in getting to Fort Pierre, 1,250 miles from St. Louis. Again, if the boat starts too late the main rise may all pass the upper river before she reaches it, and her progress will then be slow and tedious. By starting June 6, 1855, (which was too late, it being an early season,) we were forty-one days going to Fort Pierre.

The American Fur Company's boats are of the largest class of freight boats now navigating the Missouri. They are ably managed, and the company possesses information by expresses sent from its trading posts near the mountains as to the amount of snow that has fallen and the probable extent and time of the rise produced by its melting. The boats are loaded and time of starting fixed accordingly. Their boats carry from one hundred and fifty to two hundred tons to the Yellowstone, a distance of 1,900 miles, drawing from three to three and a half feet of water, and make the passage up in from twenty-two to thirty-five days. Considerable freight is taken out for the post of Fort Union, and they generally ascend with that for Fort Benton to about sixty miles above the mouth of the Yellowstone, and have on one occasion gone to Milk river, one hundred miles further.

The quantity of water is, on the average, about equal from the Yellowstone and Missouri at their junction, and above this point steamboats venture with caution. The great risk in proceeding further of having the boat caught in the upper river during the winter more than counterbalances the prospective gain. The freight is then taken on board of Mackinac boats, and cordeled by hand, aided generally by sails. These boats are from sixty to seventy feet long, drawing fifteen to eighteen inches, (regulated somewhat by the cordeling force,) though twenty to twenty-four inches draught could

be used. The time from Fort Union to Fort Benton varies from forty to eighty days, depending on various causes, of which wind is the most important. The river distance from Milk river to Fort Benton is about five hundred miles.

The interests of the general government would be much advanced by making appropriations to remove the snags which obstruct the river below James river.

The Yellowstone.—For the first one hundred miles above the mouth the bottom lands are nearly all on the left bank; and the first forty miles are from four to five miles broad, with beautiful, soft, rounded bluffs to the west; the banks of the river are clothed with large cottonwood trees, and the country presents one of the finest locations for a military post and Indian reservation anywhere to be found. After you advance about forty miles up the left bank, the bluffs begin to come on this side almost to the river, and the bottom lands narrow and the timber diminishes. A good route for wagons, however, exists on this side for one hundred miles above the mouth. Having gone thus far you meet with very impracticable bluffs, barely permitting of the passage of pack mules, to get around which with wagons, without crossing the Yellowstone, you must travel out into the prairie one or two days' journey, so as to head the difficult ravines. Bluffs similar to these exist on the right bank all the way from the mouth to this place, but here the river suddenly changes its position in the valley, so as to leave the open valley on the right bank, and causes the difficulty which exists on the other.

This point is also the highest point navigable for steamboats, and those even of very light draught cannot, except at high water, go further than about fifty miles from the mouth, as, in the next space of fifty miles, the channel is so very much divided up by wooded islands and obstructed by gravel bars. But at the point before mentioned as the head of steamboat navigation, ledges of rock begin in the bed of the stream, and about one-half mile below Powder river we encounter a dangerous rapid, called by Captain Clarke "Wolf rapid." Two miles above Powder river Captain Clarke describes another serious rapid, which he calls "Bear rapid;" and twenty miles above this another, which he calls "Buffalo shoal," and which he speaks of as being "the most difficult part of the Yellowstone river." All these rapids are passed every year by the Mackinac boats of the American Fur Company on their way to Fort Alexander Sarpie, and there are probably no obstacles sufficient to prevent them from reaching the point where this river debouches from the mountains.

The valley, all the way to the mountains, is said to be practicable for wagons. Above this point the river is said to be much enclosed by the mountains, which are rugged and difficult, and covered with pine forests.

From Fort Union to Fort Alexander Sarpie, on the Yellowstone, the Mackinac boats are from 50 to 60 feet long, drawing from 15 to 20 inches water, and make the distance, 225 miles, in from 15 to 30 days.

None of the tributaries of the Yellowstone, (Clark's Fork, Big Horn,

Tongue, and Powder rivers,) above their mouths, have ever been visited by any exploring expedition, except those of trappers and hunters.

The Big Horn river is by far the most important of those streams, and has been navigated by the traders in skin boats, carrying their peltries, from the point where it debouches from the Big Horn mountains to the Yellowstone, a distance of perhaps 150 miles. Above where the stream escapes the mountains it is not navigable for anything but the smallest boats, and the gorges by which the stream passes the mountain ranges is impracticable for any kind of land transportation; a considerable detour being required even for pack animals. The portion navigable will, perhaps, according to the opinion of Colonel Robert Campbell, of St. Louis, furnish a depth of water for Mackinac boats, in high stages, of about 18 inches, but he thinks the navigation of this stream for ascending boats could not be used to any advantage. An undue importance has been given to the navigability of this stream from the erroneous position of the Yellowstone, as laid down on nearly all recent maps, except those from this office, as they make its position nearly 100 miles too far south. The manner in which I have been able to correct this is given in my report on the compilation of the general Pacific railroad map.

Powder river.—This stream rises near the southern point of the Big Horn mountains, and flows a little east of north. The route from the Platte to the Yellowstone along the stream is practicable, but as a route for wagons it is difficult, requiring the stream to be frequently crossed, and the banks are very muddy, and the bed is occupied in places by quick sand.

The Little Missouri river rises near the North Fork of the Shyenne in longitude 105° . I have seen the country near its source, where it forms the northern part of the upheaved stratified rocks of the Black Hills, and at the mouth where the lignite tertiary exists. Its general direction is northeast, and its course through the main portion must be in this lignite tertiary formation. From the statements of members of Sir George Gore's party, which travelled up the stream in 1856, I infer that the route along or near its valley is practicable for wagons, though difficult. The valley is one of the great buffalo regions.

The Knife river, Heart river, Cannon Ball river, Grand river, and Moreau river, all rise in the prairie ridge east of the Little Missouri, and they contain but little water in the winter and latter part of summer. I have never seen any of them, except at their mouths, and their lengths on my map indicate their comparative size.

The Big Shyenne is a most important river, and has its extreme sources west of the Black Hills, which its two main branches enclose. These forks are supplied by numerous streams from the mountains, and they unite in about longitude $102^{\circ} 20'$, the river flowing into the Missouri in latitude $44^{\circ} 48'$. In its lower course I am informed there is fertile land on its banks, and there are considerable areas in and around the Black Hills. The Shyenne river can probably be rafted, and the streams that come from the hills could be used to drive the logs down to the river. It must be borne in mind that the pine growing on the Black Hills is difficult of access, and the expense of getting

it out may render this fine supply of timber unavailable to the lower Missouri. The Missouri at the mouth of the Shyenne is in the centre of the Dakota country, and along its valley we have the shortest and best route by which to reach their strongholds.

Bad river, Wakpa Spicha, (sometimes called Teton river,) receives its name from the unpalatable state of its water in low stages, and the difficulty of travelling along it wet weather. It lies throughout in the black shale bed of the cretaceous formation. It is along the sources of its northern branches that the road from Fort Pierre to Fort Laramie is located.

White river, or White-earth river, (Maukisita Wakpa, or Smoking-earth river,) has generally an open, well-wooded valley, with a fine soil and luxuriant grass. The road between Forts Laramie and Pierre follows the valley from its source to the Bad Lands, where the river enters a difficult section bounded with precipices like those on the Niobrara. The Bad Lands extend continuously down the stream to the South Fork, a distance of about seventy miles. Below this, the river winds through a handsome, well-wooded valley of the Missouri. Any one who travels in Nebraska will always feel rejoiced when he reaches the banks of this beautiful stream. It is much resorted to by the Brulés. It has numerous branches, the largest of which is called the South Fork. The pine on White river and its tributaries is nearly equal in extent to that on the Niobrara. This stream has been used by the traders to float down their peltries by means of skin boats from their former trading-house near Butte Cache. I believe it can also be used to raft down the pine timber on the South Fork.

The Niobrara being a stream heretofore unknown, and one in which the people of Nebraska feel much interest, I shall describe it in detail. This river is about three hundred and fifty miles long. From its source to longitude $103^{\circ} 15'$ It is a beautiful little stream of clear running water, of a width of from ten to fifteen feet, gradually widening as it descends. Its valley furnishes here very good grass, abounding in rushes or prele, but is for the most part destitute of wood even for cooking. After flowing thus far it rapidly widens, till in longitude $102^{\circ} 30'$ it attains a width of sixty to eighty yards; its valley is still quite open and easy to travel along, but destitute of wood, except occasional pines on the distant hills to the north. In longitude $102^{\circ} 30'$ it enters between high steep banks which closely confine it, and for a long way it is a complete cañon; here, however, wood becomes more abundant and pine is occasionally seen on the bluffs, while small clusters of cottonwood, elm, and ash occupy the narrow points left by its windings. In longitude $101^{\circ} 45'$ the sand hills come on the north side close to the river, while on the south side they are at the distance of from one to two miles off, leaving a smooth road to travel on along the bluffs. The bluffs gradually appear higher and higher above the stream as it descends until they reach the height of three hundred feet. The sand mostly ceases on the north side in longitude $100^{\circ} 23'$; but it lies close to the stream on the south side nearly all the way to the Wazi honska. Throughout this section, lying between longitude $102^{\circ} 00'$ and longitude $99^{\circ} 20'$, a distance of one hun-

dred and eighty miles, the Niobrara is in every respect a peculiar stream, and there is none that I know of that it can be compared with. It flows here between high rocky banks of soft white and yellowish calcareous and silicious sandstone, standing often in precipices at the water's edge, its verticality being preserved by a capping of hard grit. It is here impossible to travel any considerable distance along its immediate banks without having frequently to climb the ridges which rise sometimes perpendicularly from the stream. As you approach from the north or south there are no indications of a river till you come within two or three miles of the banks, and then only by the trees whose tops occasionally rise above the ravines in which they grow, so completely is it walled in by the high bluffs which enclose its narrow valley. It seems as if it had resulted from a fissure in the earth's crust, and now flows at a depth of about three hundred feet below the general level of the prairie. The soft rock which forms the bluffs is worn into the most intricate labyrinths by the little streams, all of which have their sources in beautiful gushing springs of clear cold water. In these small deep valleys the grass is luxuriant; pine, ash, and oak are abundant. To the agriculturist this section has, however, comparatively little attraction, and that between longitude $99^{\circ} 20'$ and the mouth, an extent of about ninety miles, is perhaps far more valuable. Here the bottoms will probably average a width of a quarter of a mile, are susceptible of cultivation, and cottonwood, oak, walnut, and ash will furnish settlements with all the timber and fuel they will need. The river banks seem to present no good building stone, nor did we, though searching diligently, discover any signs of coal or other valuable minerals.

In describing the tributaries to the Niobrara, I shall begin at the mouth and take the north side first. The Ponka river, which has a very fine, well-wooded, and fertile valley, runs into the Missouri about five miles north of the Niobrara, in latitude $42^{\circ} 48'$ north. Its course is parallel and near to that of the Niobrara as far up as the mouth of Turtle Hill river.

Turtle Hill river (Kega Paha Wakpa) is the main branch of the Niobrara, and is about one hundred and twenty miles long. Prior to the publication of my report and map of reconnaissances in 1855 this branch was represented erroneously as being equal to the main river, in size, above their junction.

I crossed it in 1855, 60 miles below its mouth, and it has a very fine valley one-half to three-quarters of a mile wide, with good soil and a limited quantity of cottonwood timber. The bed of the stream is sandy, and its waters are clear and sweet; width at the mouth fifty yards. The first 20 miles of the space between this branch and the main river is occupied by sand hills.

The next northern branch which joins the Niobrara, in longitude $100^{\circ} 23'$, is named Mini-cha-duza-Wakpa, or Rapid creek. At its mouth it is about eight yards wide, with a valley about a quarter to half a mile wide, and a soil quite fertile, the banks are scantily fringed with small trees. It forms about the eastern border of the sand hills on the north side of the Niobrara, as far as we could see. Its length is about 50 miles.

There are numerous ravines with steep rocky banks, containing springs and running streams, extending out from five to seven miles between the branch and the Keya Paha, at the heads of which occasionally good camping places may be found.

The mouth of the next stream is in longitude $101^{\circ} 18'$; it has scarcely any appreciable valley, flows between high rocky bluffs difficult to ascend and descend; it is about five yards wide, with clear, deep, swift-running water, and is probably about 35 miles long.

The mouth of the next northern tributary is in longitude $101^{\circ} 30'$, and is called White Earth creek; it is about three-fourths the size of Rapid creek, which it resembles in every particular, and is about 25 miles long. The next, in longitude 102° , is a small spring rivulet about 26 miles long, and above this the branches are all small runs coming from the bluffs, generally dry except after rains, with scarcely any valleys to speak of.

On the south side of the Niobrara there are numerous small branches coming in between its junction with the Missouri and the point where it receives the waters of the Turtle Hill river. Three of these are of considerable size, probably 35 miles long, the bluffs along nearly all of them being more or less covered with scattered pine, and their valleys occupied with clumps of cottonwood, oak, ash, &c. The position of the Elk Horn river, about 30 miles south of the Niobrara, prevents any of these southern branches having a length greater than I have stated. From the mouth of Turtle Hill river to that of the Wazi-honska there are still a greater number of short southern branches, all containing springs of water, and abounding in pine and beautiful oak groves.

Wazi-honska means, in the Dakota language, "the place where the pine extends far out;" and this stream, whose mouth is in longitude 100° , is probably 40 miles long, and all its bluffs and side ravines are green with pine. Its valley, though not so wide, is very similar to that of the Niobrara in this part, which has been described.

Snake river, whose mouth is in longitude $100^{\circ} 45'$, is quite a large stream, some 30 yards wide, its bluffs covered with pine, with a narrow valley like the Wazi-honska.

Above this there is scarcely any branch coming in from the south deserving mention.

Niobrara is a very shallow and "swift flowing stream," as the Canadians say "l'Eau qui Court," abounding in rapids in two-thirds of its upper course, and in its middle portion filled with small islands. In the lower portion its width exceeds that of the Missouri river, and is spread out over sand bars. The bed in the broad portions is quicksand and difficult to ford. Its waters rapidly increase in volume through its middle portion, from the multitude of springs and streamlets that constantly flow into it from the foot of the bluffs and out of the ravines.

The traders of the American Fur Company have navigated it with skin boats, carrying peltries from their former trading house near Snake river, and the stream might permit of rafting if the timber should be found of quality and quantity, and accessibility to defray the expenses. I cannot, however, look upon it as capable of furnish-

ing timber for the country on the Missouri, for the reason that much of the pine is too small, crooked, and knotty, and grows in places difficult to transport it from. The species is what is called the Rocky mountain pine, has a yellowish-white appearance, and abounds in resin. The distance on the Niobrara over which these pine ravines extend is about 120 miles.

A road could not be made on the bottom lands of the Niobrara ; it must keep out on the high prairie so as to head the ravines. From the mouth to Turtle Hill river it would take the narrow divide between the Niobrara and Ponka rivers. It should remain on the north side of Turtle Hill river from 20 to 30 miles further, and then cross that stream, as it would thus avoid the sand at the junction of the Niobrara and Turtle Hill rivers, and cross the latter where there is a better ford or narrower stream to bridge. Turning then towards the Niobrara, this river must be crossed in longitude $101^{\circ} 20'$ to avoid the sand hills, and the route must continue on the south side to about longitude 102° , when it should again cross to the north side. These crossings for a wagon road could easily be made at a ford or by bridging, but a proper bridge for a railroad crossing at these places would be a stupendous undertaking ; for, on account of the nature of the banks and ravines, good approaches could not be found so as to descend to the level of the stream, and the bridge would have to be built very high. From longitude 102° west there are no difficulties beyond a scarcity of wood in reaching Fort Laramie, or continuing direct to the South Pass, and in this course abundance of excellent pine would be found near Rawhide Peak.

A preferable road might be found by continuing up Turtle Hill river to its source, and then along the divide between Niobrara and White rivers, striking the former stream in longitude 102° ; but these divides are generally bad for wagon routes, on account of scarcity of water, and it is not certain that we would by that route avoid the sand hills.

I consider the north side of the Niobrara superior to the other for a road for the first 90 miles above the mouth, as the greater number of streams coming in at the south side would occasion considerable detours in gaining good crossing places and approaches. The portion of the river flowing through the sand hill region has the sand on the south side generally for one-half a mile blown away by the wind, leaving a smooth route. On the north side these hills are crowning the very edges of the precipices that rise from the river, and cannot be avoided. The evidence that this difference between the two sides was due to the wind is very complete, and shows that the prevailing winds blow much more from the north here than from the south.

The Elk Horn river rises in about longitude 99° , about 25 miles south of the Niobrara river. Its general course is southeast, and it empties into the Platte. As far up as I have seen it, which is in latitude 42° , it has a broad, fertile, and well wooded valley. Where crossed by Lieutenant Smith in 1855, nearly south from Fort Randall, it is described by him as "a beautiful creek of clear water, with well timbered banks and firm sandy bottom."

The valley of the Loup fork is broad, fertile, and well wooded up as

far as the old Pawnee villages, a distance of about 80 miles. Above this the valley begins to grow sandy and wood more scarce, and about the meridian of 100° becomes worthless. An occasional farm site could, however, be found almost to its head. Near its source it flows through high rocky precipices similar to those on the Niobrara; but its source is in the open and desolate sand hills, a miserable region, impassable for ordinary wagon trains, and by all means to be avoided. The same remark is true of its main north branch and of Calaman's river, and probably of the south branch.

The Platte river is the most important tributary of the Missouri in the region under consideration, and its broad and grass-covered valley, leading to the west, furnishes one of the best wagon roads of its length in America. From its mouth to the forks the bluffs are from two to five miles from the water, making an intermediate bottom valley of from four to eight miles wide. From the forks to Fort Laramie the bluffs occasionally come down to the water's edge, and the road has to cross the points of the ridges. From Ash Hollow to Fort Laramie the road is sometimes heavy with sand. Fine cottonwood grows along the banks and on the islands, from the mouth to Fort Kearny; from here up it is scarce and of small size. Cedar is found in the ravines of the bluffs in the neighborhood of the forks and above. The river is about a mile wide and flows over a sandy bottom. When the banks are full it is about six feet deep throughout, having a remarkably level bed; but it is of no use for navigation, as the bed is so broad that the water seldom attains sufficient depth, and then the rise is of short duration.

The streams of the prairies of Nebraska, below the Yellowstone, flowing into the Missouri river, are none of them navigable to any reliable extent, and as most of them run from west to east their greatest practical value is in affording the land route of communication between our present western settlements and those to be formed in the mountains. Their valleys furnish us the only routes by which to traverse the intervening desert, for here only are such supplies of water to be found as are required, and here, too, is the only soil that can be cultivated, and such scanty supplies of wood as the region produces.

Of all the valleys of rivers running into the Missouri that of the Platte furnishes the best route for any kind of a road leading to the interior, and the best point of starting is the vicinity of Omaha City. An appropriation of \$50,000 has been expended on bridges, &c., on the eastern portion of it, and the only important improvement remaining to make it far superior to any route on the south side of the Platte is the establishment of a good crossing of Loup Fork, either by bridge or ferry, both of which are difficult; the first on account of the width of the stream—1,000 yards—and the latter on account of the shoals and shifting sand bars. The ford is bad, by reason of quicksands. Twenty-five thousand dollars would probably make a good crossing to this stream, as the place is within the limit of the settlements. No road improvement in the west would be of greater value to the emigrant or to military operations; and this once done the route would

not only be the shortest one in this latitude from the Missouri to the mountains, but would not throughout have one serious obstacle all the way to the South Pass. Any route that takes the south side of the Platte river has the South Fork to cross,) which is about as difficult a stream as the Loup Fork,) at a point where bridging it or establishing a ferry is, at this time, impracticable; the road then, along the North Fork, has bad places at Ash Hollow and Scott's bluffs, and has to cross the Laramie river and the North Fork of the Platte by bridges, over which the emigrant must pay toll. The route by the north side of the Platte crossing the Loup Fork is, therefore, of particular value, especially for early travel in the spring, when the streams are generally high.

I have spoken of the locality of Omaha being, in my opinion, superior to any other as a point from which to supply the interior portions of the country along the Platte. This in a measure depends upon the improvements being made of the crossing of Loup Fork. At present Nebraska City is a point presenting almost as short a road, which could be made quite so if bridges were placed over a few small streams, and which could be done at an expense to the general government of not more than \$20,000. A considerable distance of river transportation would also be saved to stores brought from St. Louis by selecting Nebraska City instead of Omaha. Besides, the first mentioned must always be a superior point from which to supply Fort Kearney. The cost of river transportation to this point is about 75 cents per 100 pounds. The distance from Nebraska City to Fort Laramie, by the proposed improved route, is about 525 miles. From Fort Leavenworth to Fort Laramie it is about 645 miles.

The price paid for transportation, by the Quartermaster's Department, on these roads, is about \$1 50 per hundred pounds per hundred miles.

It will thus be seen that the transportation of stores to Fort Laramie, by the route from Nebraska City, would be a saving over that from Fort Leavenworth of about \$1 55 per hundred pounds. The total expense from St. Louis via Nebraska City would thus be \$8 62½ per hundred pounds, and I shall use this route in making a comparison of the advantages offered by any route to the north of it.

The first place which apparently offers a superior route is the neighborhood of Fort Randall. Stores can be delivered at this point from St. Louis at a cost of about \$2 25 per hundred pounds. The distance to Fort Laramie is about 380 miles, which, at the rate of \$1 50 per hundred pounds per hundred miles, would give a total cost of about \$5 70 per 100 pounds, which would apparently indicate a saving over the Nebraska City route of \$2 92½ per hundred pounds, or about one-third. There are two reasons, however, why this great advantage is practically not now attainable: First, the neighborhood of Fort Randall, as a depot for supplies, men, and animals, is not to be compared with Nebraska City; the former being in a comparatively barren country destitute of inhabitants, and where the necessary storehouses can only be constructed at an expense not less than \$100,000. Second, the great difficulties of the route from Fort Randall west. That it is

practicable to take wagons along the Niobrara is shown by our expedition in 1857. The wagons were loaded with about 2,000 pounds, and drawn by eight good mules to each.

Our time of travelling from Fort Laramie to Fort Randall, counting the days necessary to stop to rest the animals, was thirty days. About 100 miles of this route was through sand hills, where I do not think the ordinary transportation trains could have travelled except in the slowest and most fatiguing manner.

The route I have already indicated on the south side of the Niobrara, in my description of that stream, would be preferable to the one we travelled, on account of the sand, but the difficulty of crossing the river would counterbalance the advantage gained by so doing.

The route between Sioux City and Fort Randall is a very good one, and an appropriation of \$10,000 should be made to bridge the Vermilion, for the use of the troops at the fort in hauling supplies from the settlements in Iowa.

This route, and that by the Niobrara, would seem to be the most direct and proper one by which to continue the military road from Mendota to the mouth of the Big Sioux, westward to the South Pass. But the great difficulties of the Niobrara route, and the impracticability of any between it and the Platte, determine me to advise its location direct from Sioux City to the mouth of the Loup Fork.

The road this way, and thence along the Platte valley, will only be about 40 miles longer than by way of the Niobrara. A bridge is required over Middle creek, at a cost of \$5,000; one over the Elk Horn, at a cost of \$20,000; and one over the Loup Fork, at a cost of \$50,000. A good crossing for the Loup Fork could be made for \$25,000.

The next point on the Missouri which claims attention, as one from which to supply Fort Laramie, is the vicinity of old Fort Lookout. A route from this point should keep north of the White river, and intersect the present road from Pierre to Laramie. The eastern portion of the route I have only examined in part, but feel confident that it is a good one, except for about 30 miles through the Bad Lands, in which I have no doubt a route could be found that, with some improvement, would be equal to the corresponding part of the Pierre and Laramie route.

The route west of this would then be the excellent one along the valley of White river, at the head of which a difficult section of about twelve miles needs considerable improvement. This route would be about three hundred and sixty miles from the Missouri to Fort Laramie, and deserves especial consideration as being the proper continuation of the route located between the Missouri and Fort Ripley under the Interior Department, with the design of being continued to the South Pass. Stores can be delivered at Fort Lookout for about three dollars per hundred pounds.

The route from Fort Pierre to Fort Laramie is one that has long been in use, and is about three hundred and twenty-three miles long. Stores can be delivered here for about \$3 50 per hundred pounds. I think it probable, as settlements advance up the Missouri, and

Nebraska and Iowa and Dakota become populated, this route, or the one starting from Fort Lookout, will claim attention.

At Fort Pierre the navigable portion of the Missouri is at its nearest point to Laramie and the South Pass, and above it, of course, there are no competing routes for supplying this section. Neither does the nearest navigable point for steamboats on the Yellowstone or its tributaries offer any route whose diminished length would compensate for the increased river transportation. It is believed that any route which keeps east of the Big Horn mountains is practicable for wagons between the Yellowstone and Missouri, and that the direct route between Fort Laramie and Fort Benton is favorable to military movements.

In consideration of the best routes for supplying the interior, I have mainly had in view the wants of present occupation of the country. When the habitable portions of Nebraska become occupied, as they eventually will, other routes will become important from causes not now operating and that cannot be foreseen; but I believe that those which are now most important will still maintain the ascendancy from the effect of natural causes and the structure of the country. The same routes now most used and best adapted to the wants of military occupation were long before used by the trader, the Indian, and the buffalo, as best adapted to their wants; and when future requirements shall demand increased facilities of transportation and locomotion and railroads shall be built, then they, too, will be found near the main routes now travelled by the trains of the emigrant and the army.

As I before stated, an irreclaimable desert of 200 to 400 miles in width separates the points capable of settlement in the east from those on the mountains in the west. Without doubt these mountain regions will yet be inhabited by civilized men, and the communication with the east will require railroads, independent of the want of an interior overland route to the Pacific. For this purpose the valley of the Platte offers a route not surpassed for natural gradients by any in the world, and very little more is to be done west of the Missouri than to make the superstructure. A cheap road for light trains and engines could easily be built, and when settlements are formed in the mountains will become profitable; and the gold that has been discovered there in valuable quantities may produce this result much sooner than we anticipate. The Niobrara apparently presents a more short and direct route to the interior than the Platte, but its natural features are not so favorable. The direct route from Sioux City to Fort Laramie by the Niobrara would be, for a railroad, about forty miles shorter than by way of the Platte and Fort Kearney.

I do not, however, consider the route by the Niobrara as impracticable, but think that the difficulties in the way of constructing it will overbalance the advantages of being a shorter route from the Missouri. If the route be considered as starting at the city of Chicago, thence *via* Rock Island, Omaha, and the Platte valley, the distance is about the same as that by Dubuque, Sioux City, and the Niobrara; the one large bend which the former makes at Fort Kearney being counterbalanced by the number of small ones of the latter.

A route for a railroad to the Pacific from the neighborhood of St. Paul, by way of the South Pass, would keep on or near the general course of the wagon road lately laid out by Colonel Nobles to the Missouri, at Fort Lookout, and thence along the north side of White river, as before indicated.

Should a route ever be required from the west shore of Lake Superior to the South Pass, it could be located on a very direct and practicable line, *via* Fort Ripley, Lake Traverse, and the Big Shyenne, and deserves examination.

But a route from Lake Superior west to the South Pass would probably not compete in advantages with that examined by Governor Stevens near the forty-ninth parallel. It may, however, be questionable whether one of equally as many advantages could not be found by proceeding directly west from the Bois de Sioux to the Missouri at Fort Clark; thence by way of Knife river to the Yellowstone river at the mouth of Powder river. The valley of the Yellowstone then offers a direct route west to the mountains, where Capt. Clark crossed them in 1856, and thence near the route he pursued to the Bitter Root valley. The more direct route would be down the valley of the Salmon river; but the information we possess of this stream indicates its character through the mountains to be one of great difficulty.

CHAPTER V.

Indians—Military posts—Routes for military operations, &c.

I shall here repeat, with some additions, the account of the Dakotas given in my report of explorations in 1855. The Dakotas are scattered over an immense territory, extending from the Mississippi on the east to the Black Hills on the west, and from the forks of the Platte on the south to Devil's Lake on the north. They say their name means "leagued or allied," and they sometimes speak of themselves as the "Ocheti Shaowni," or "Seven Council Fires." These are the seven principal bands which compose the nation, viz:

1. The Mde-wakan-tonwans, meaning "village of the Spirit Lake."
2. Wah-pe-kutes, meaning "leaf shooters."
3. Wah-pe-tonwans, meaning "village in the leaves."
4. Sisi-tonwans, meaning "village of the marsh."

These four constitute the Mississippi and Minnesota Dakotas, and are called by those on the Missouri "Isanties." They are estimated at 6,200 souls. Some of these on the Mississippi have long been in contact with the white settlements, and having sold much of their lands to the government have abandoned many of their former habits and cultivated the soil. Communities have been formed which have made some approach towards civilization; others of them still live

principally by the fruits of the chase in their primitive wildness, and have of late years occasioned much trouble to the settlers of northern Iowa. It was they who committed the murders last winter on Spirit Lake.

5. Ihanktonwans, (Yanktons,) "village at the end." These are sometimes called Wichiyela, meaning "first nation." They are found at the mouth of the Big Sioux and between it and the Missouri river, as high up as Fort Lookout, and on the opposite bank of the Missouri. They are supposed to number 360 lodges. Contact with the whites has considerably degenerated them, and their distance from the present buffalo ranges renders them comparatively poor. A treaty has been made with them, by which they have ceded most of their land to the United States.

6. Ihanktonwannas, (Yanktonnas,) meaning one of the "end village" bands. They range between James river and the Missouri, as high north as Devil's Lake, number about 800 lodges, and are spirited and warlike, and will give much trouble to the settlers in Dakota territory. They suffered severely from the ravages of the small pox in the winter of 1856 and 1857. A small portion, under a chief called Little Soldier, live in dirt lodges during the summer. From the Wazikute branch of this band the Assinniboins, or Hope of the Dakotas, are said to have sprung.

7. The Titonwans, "village of the prairie," are supposed to constitute more than one-half of the whole Dakota nation. They live on the western side of the Missouri, and extend west to the dividing ridge between the Little Missouri and Powder rivers, and thence south on a line near the 106th meridian. They are allied by marriage with the Shyennes, but are enemies of the Pawnees and Crows. The Titonwans, except a few of the Brulés, on White river, and some of the families connected with the whites by marriage, have never planted corn. They are divided into seven principal bands, viz:

1. Unkpapas, "they who camp by themselves." They roam from the Big Shyenne up to the Yellowstone, and west to the Black Hills; to this band Mato Chiqukesa, or the Bear's Rib, belongs, who was made by General Harney the first chief of the Dakotas. They number about 365 lodges.

2. Sihasapas, Blackfeet. Haunts and homes same as the Unkpapas. They number 165 lodges. These two bands have very little respect for the power of the whites.

3. Itazipchos, (Sans Arc,) No bows. Roam over nearly the same territory as the Umkpapas. They number about 170 lodges. It is difficult to say how these bands received their present names. The Itazipchos being as well provided with bows as any other band, and use them as skillfully.

4. Minikanyes or Minni-kaw-jous, (meaning they who plant by the water.) They number about 200 lodges, and roam principally from the Black Hills south to the Platte. They are generally well disposed towards the whites.

5. Ogalalas or Okandandas. They number about 460 lodges, and are generally to be found on or near the Platte near Fort Laramie.

They are the most friendly disposed towards the whites of all the Titonwans.

6. Sichangus, (meaning Burnt Thighs,) Brulés. They number about 380 lodges, and live on the Niobrara and White rivers, and range from the Platte to the Shyenne. They include the Wazazhas, to which belonged Matoiya, (the Scattering Bear,) made chief of all the Dakotas by Colonel Mitchell, of the Indian Bureau, and who was killed by Lieutenant Grattan.

7. Oo-he-non-pas, two boilings, or two kettle band. These are now very much scattered among other bands. They number about 100 lodges. Some of them are generally to be found in the neighborhood of Fort Pierre.

The Dakotas, on and west of the Missouri, which includes all but the Isanties, are the only ones I have heard estimated. I should think that eight inmates to a lodge, and one-fifth of them warriors, an ample allowance. We would then have—

Name of band.	Lodges.	Inmates.	Warriors.
Ihanktonwans, (Yanktons) -----	360	2,880	576
Ihanktonwannas, (Yanktonais)-----	800	6,400	1,280
Unkpapas -----	365	2,920	584
Sihasapas, (Blackfeet) -----	165	1,320	264
Ituzipchos, (Sans Arc) -----	170	1,360	272
Mini-kan-jous -----	200	1,600	320
Ogalalas -----	460	3,680	736
Sichangus, (Brulés)-----	380	3,040	616
Oo-he-non-pas, (two kettles)-----	100	800	160
	3,000	24,000	4,800

In the summer the Dakotas follow the buffaloes in their range over the prairie, and in the winter fix their lodges in the clusters or fringes of wood along the banks of the lakes and streams. The bark of the cottonwood furnishes food for their horses during the winter snows, and to obtain it many streams have been thinned or entirely stripped of their former beautiful groves. Their horses are obtained by traffic with the Indians further south, who have stolen them in New Mexico, or caught them wild on the plains towards the Rocky mountains; considerable numbers are also raised by themselves. The nation is one of the most skilful and warlike, and most numerous in our Territory, and could they be made to feel more confidence in their own powers, would be most formidable warriors. In single combat on horseback they have no superiors, a skill acquired by constant practice with their bows and arrows and lances, with which they succeed in killing their game at full speed. The rapidity with which they shoot their arrows, and the accuracy of their aim, rivals that of a practiced hand with the revolver. Notwithstanding the destruction of their numbers by small pox and cholera, it is the opinion of some

that they are increasing in numbers rather than diminishing, except where they mingle with the settlements on the frontier.

These Dakotas formerly all lived around the head waters of the Mississippi and Red River of the North, and in their migration to the southwest have been preceded by the Sheyennes, (with whom they are on friendly terms,) who have given their name to the Sheyenne of Red river, to the Big Sheyenne of the Missouri, and to the section of country they now occupy between the Platte and the Arkansas. The Dakotas then lived on much of the land now occupied by the Chippewas, and the Chippewas at that time inhabited the region between the Sault Ste. Marie and Lake Winnepeg, the Crees, their allies, occupying that from Lake Winnepeg and other lakes as far as Kis-iskad-ji-wan (Saskatchamin river) and towards the Assiniboin river. The plains to the south of the last stream were the scene of many contentions and bloody combats, nevertheless, oftener the residence of the Dakotas than of the other two tribes, until that nation was divided into two bodies, originating in jealousy of the women, which ended in their being irreconcilable enemies to this day. The less powerful and flying party took refuge in the rocky precipices of the Lake of the Woods, and received from the Chippewas the name of Assiniboins or Dakotas of the Rocks, under which name they are now generally known to the whites. They however retain, among themselves, the name Dakotas and speak that language. The other Dakotas, in speaking of them, always call them hohe, or enemies.

The Assiniboins then allied themselves with the Chippewas and Crees and forced the Dakotas to abandon all the country north of the Sheyenne, which is now regarded as the boundary between these tribes.

The Chippewas, Crees, and Assiniboins are friendly to each other and united in their hostility to the Dakotas, and it is improbable that any lasting peace can ever be effected between them. The common war ground is the region about Lake Minniwaken to which they all repair to hunt buffalo. The Assiniboins and Crees may yet occasion us no little difficulty, as a large portion of their lands is in the British territory, they both are now well disposed and friendly. I saw them while at Fort Union in 1856, and they were particular to inform us that they did not want to sell their land and could not spare any of what they now occupy.

These Indians have comparatively few horses, and rely largely on dogs, of which they have great numbers, for transportation. The flesh of these animals also serves them as food. The Assiniboins number about 450 lodges or 3,600 souls. They suffered severely from the small pox in 1856-'57. Their country extends from the Red river west, along the Missouri as far as the mouth of the Milk river.

The Absarakos, or Crows, occupy the country about the Yellowstone and its branches, being bounded on the east by the Dakotas, south by the Platte, and west by the dividing line between the waters of the Atlantic and Pacific.

Their country abounds with everything Indian life requires, and

they are generally well disposed towards the whites, but have as yet seen little of them in their country since 1830, when the trappers were so numerous. They were then much dreaded by these adventurers. The Crows are fine warriors; have plenty of horses, mainly derived from traffic with the Flatheads. They live generally in skin lodges, and number about 600 lodges, or 4,800 souls.

Minnetarres, or Gros Ventres. This is a small band of the Crow nation, living in a village of dirt lodges, surrounded by a rude stockade, near Fort Berthold. They raise corn, beans, pumpkins, &c. They number now about 800 souls, but, from a variety of causes, are diminishing.

The Arricariees, or Rees, are a branch of the Pawnee nation, from which they have become separated by the migration of the Dakotas, and by these latter they are both known by the same name, Pedanis.

The Rees live in a village near Fort Clark, in a manner exactly similar to the Gros Ventres, and number about 840 souls. Formerly they were numerous and powerful, and occupied a large village at the mouth of Grand river. This was destroyed during the expedition under Colonel Leavenworth, sent there in 1825 or 1826 to chastise them for the attack on the trading party of General Ashley. The remains of dirt lodge villages all along the Missouri attest how numerous the Indians of this tribe must have been before the invasion of their lands by the Dakotas.

The Minidans live in a village, six miles above Fort Clark, in the same manner as the Gros Ventres. They seem to be the last remnant of a distinct tribe from any of those around them. They have, through the agency of the small pox, rapidly diminished since they were visited by Lewis and Clarke, and now number about 250 souls. They live in constant dread of the diseases which white men have been at times introducing among them, and the main and oft repeated request which they made to the Indian agent when I was there in July, 1856, was that he would keep sick white men away. When I returned there in September, and saw them again a victim of that scourge, the small pox, brought among them that year by the steamboat of the rival company to the American Fur Company, and saw the despair depicted on every countenance, it made me feel heart sick to think what wrongs these poor savages have suffered from the cupidity of my own race. The authors of this calamity, which visited all the tribes in this region, are fully exposed in the report of the Indian agent, Colonel Vaughan, in 1856-'57.

Bear's Rib, the Unkpapa, gave me the following list of persons that died of this disease, from this cause, in 1856 and 1857, that he had heard of, though the disease was still at its work of death in some parts of the Crow country :

	Persons.
Rees.....	166
Hohés	1,500
Big Head's band of Ihanctonowas.....	30
Sehasapas	136
	1,832

It would be safe to assume the following as probable deaths in tribes not included in this list :

Gros Ventres and Mandows.....	160
Absanacos	1,000
	1,160

Making a total of at least 3,000 souls.

Before such blows as this the red race would soon disappear ; no war could be so fatal to them. The government should, by all that is humane, employ some competent person, at a proper salary, to visit them yearly, and vaccinate these Indians, and thus arrest the violence of these scourges.

These three little bands, the Gros Ventres, Mandows, and Rees, are fast dwindling away. They never can work much harm to the whites, and their mode of life at a fixed abode requires them to be peaceful.

They exist now rather by sufferance of the Dakotas than by their own power, for the Dakotas could soon destroy them if they chose, as they did the villages of the Pawnees, on the Loup Fork, in about the year 1836. The Dakotas find it convenient for themselves to permit the existence of these villages, as their produce of corn, &c., forms a valuable commodity of trade between them.

The *Ponkas* are the small remnant of a once powerful tribe, and now live near the mouth of the Niobrara. They are on friendly terms with the Dakotas. The government agents have lately effected a treaty with them, by which a right to most of their lands has been purchased, and a reserve marked out for their location on the Niobrara and Ponca rivers, near Fort Randal. The treaty has, I believe, not yet been ratified by the Senate. They number about —— souls.

The *Pawnees* were formerly one of the most numerous and powerful and warlike of the Indians of the prairie. They have, through the agency of the small pox and their constant wars with the Dakotas and *Sheyennes*, been greatly reduced, and their numbers now do not probably exceed 4,000 souls. They occupy the country on the Platte below Fort Kearney, and on Loup Fork. A treaty was made with them in the winter of 1857, by which they ceded a large portion of their lands to the United States, and agreed to retire to a reserve on the Loup Fork, where were their villages which were destroyed by the Dakotas. This treaty has not yet been ratified.

The *Sheyennes* occupy the country between the Platte and Arkansas rivers, and number about —— souls. These Indians have always been friends with the Dakotas, and associate much with them. During the summer of 1857, while the vigorous expedition conducted by Col. Sumner was operating against them, a number to the amount of 40 lodges took refuge among the Dakotas, in the neighborhood of the Black Hills.

They will probably unite with the Dakotas, in the event of any

general war. Though it is believed, from the great moral effect produced by the march of the Utah expedition through their common country, that they must see the futility of ever being able to contend against the power of the United States.

Of all the aborigines in the Territory under consideration, the Dakotas are probably the ones that have undergone the least material diminution of their numbers since their discovery by the whites. They are still numerous, independent, warlike, and powerful, and contain within themselves means of prolonged and able resistance to further encroachments of the western settlers. Under the present policy of government, which there is no reason to believe will ever be changed, these encroachments will continue and new wars will result. I do not mean to say that a peaceable advance of the settlements westward might not be effected, but under the operation of present causes it will not. All of these conflicts end in the discomfiture of the native races, and they are fast melting away. It is not, as many suppose, that those dispossessed retire further west; this they cannot do, for the region to the west of one tribe is generally occupied by another with whom deadly animosity exists. Hence, when the white settlements advance their frontier, the natives linger about, till disease, poverty, and vicious indulgence consigns them to oblivion. The present policy of the government seems therefore the best calculated that could be devised for exterminating the Indian.

The advance of the settlements is universally acknowledged to be a necessity of our national development, and is justifiable in displacing the native races on that ground alone. But the government, instead of being so constituted as to prepare the way for settlements by wise and just treaties of purchase from the present owners, and proper protection and support for the indigent race so dispossessed, is sometimes behind its obligations in these respects; and in some instances Congress refuses or delays to ratify the treaties made by the duly authorized agents of the government. The result is, that the settler and pioneer are precipitated into the Indian's country, without the Indian having received the just consideration promised him; and he often, in a manner that enlists the sympathies of all mankind, takes up the tomahawk in defence of his rights, and perishes in the attempt.

It is frequently the case that the settlers are unjustly charged with bringing about these wars, and though I feel for the Indian, I cannot but sympathize with the pioneer whose life is liable to be sacrificed to the Indian's vengeance.

The western settlers are now fighting the battle of civilization exactly as our forefathers did on the Atlantic shores, and under circumstances that command an equal amount of our admiration and approval.

We are in the habit of looking on the power of the United States as invincible, but it is far from being so regarded by the savages on our frontier. Many of them have never seen or felt it. There the Indians far outnumber the whites, and if our sympathies must go with the weak they should be with the settlers, who are only able, after all, to maintain their ground by the aid of the army.

One of the chiefs of the Dakotas told me that they had a grand

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council in the summer of 1857, on the North Fork of the Shyenne, and that their hearts felt strong at seeing how numerous they were; that if they went to war again they would not yield so easy as they did before. At that council they solemnly pledged to each other not to permit further encroachments from the whites, and he fully believed they were able to whip all the white men in the world. In truth, they are not without reason in thinking so. They have never seen the whites, except in small parties, stealing through their country, unable to resist them or protect themselves from insolence; or they find them shut up in little trading posts, where for days they dare not, at times, open the gates or show their heads above the enclosure, and where, whenever a band of young warriors wish to have a frolic, they go and shoot their dogs, chickens, cattle, &c., break the windows, and commit any other outrage their fancy may suggest, as a diversion. They have seen the Indian agent, (their father, as he is called,) the direct representative of the President, insulted and abused with impunity by their own race and sometimes in dread of losing his life, and they, many of them, entertain no respect for the power of our government. Numbers of them have never seen a soldier of the United States army, and scarce credit their existence.

Bear's Rib (a great friend to peace with the whites and the most influential warrior in his nation) said his people could not be controlled by him, and that if he should attempt it in some cases his own life would be the forfeit.

There are so many inevitable causes at work to produce a war with the Dakotas before many years, that I regard as the greatest fruit of the explorations I have conducted to be the knowledge of the proper routes by which to invade their country and conquer them. The Black Hills is the great point in their territory at which to strike all the Teton Dakotas, except the Brulés and Okandandas. Here they can assemble their largest force, and here I believe they would make a stand. In the event of another outbreak, a post should be established at the mouth of the Sheyenne, on the north side, from which to operate simultaneously with troops from Fort Laramie. From both of these points wagon trains could move with ease, and supplies could without difficulty be sent thus to the troops in the field. These operations would undoubtedly bring on a battle, where the superiority of the weapons of civilized warfare would secure a victory to us. They will not, I think, permit the occupation of the vicinity of these hills without offering a determined resistance. Driven from these they must go north towards the Missouri, where a still better field to operate against them will be found, as this region is in every way practicable. In this event it might become necessary to establish a temporary post above the Shyenne, and a most suitable and effective location is to be found near Long Lake, on the Missouri.

Those who may take refuge in the ravines and fastnesses along the Niobrara, or in the sand hills, could be operated against from forts Randall, Kearney, and Laramie. Should the Isanties and Ihanktonwans be hostile at the same time as the Tetonwans, they should be operated against from Fort Ridgeley.

It will be perceived that in this plan I have considered a war with all the Dakotas to be on our hands, which at no distant day is probable, and that there will be required a number of columns and a very large force to successfully operate over so much country. These columns need not exceed in any case a strength of 400 men, and these should be subdivided so as to beat up the country as much as possible, and endeavor to draw the Indians into an engagement where they may have some hope of success. With proper troops and commanders we need not even then fear the result.

The movement of large compact columns is necessarily slow and can easily be avoided, which the least military skill teaches the Indians to do. The war once begun should not be stopped till they are effectually humbled and made to feel the full power and force of the government, which is a thing in which the northern Dakotas are entirely wanting.

I believe a vigorous course of action would be quite as humane as any other, and much more economical and effectual in the end. With proper arrangements the Assiniboin and Crows and Pawnees could be made most useful allies in a war with the Dakotas. I see no reason why they should not be employed against each other, and thus spare the lives of the whites.

In giving my opinion of the best way of bringing the Dakotas to submission, in the event of a war, I think it my duty to state that I believe many of the causes of war with them might be removed by timely action in relation to the treaties, which are from time to time made with them, and a prompt and faithful fulfillment of our own part of the stipulations, and it is to be hoped that Congress will afford the means of carrying into effect the treaty made by General Harney in 1856, and those made by the Indian bureau in 1857 with the Ihank-tonwans and Poncas, and that it will provide liberally for those who have been dispossessed of their lands or impoverished by having their game driven off by the approach of the whites.

I have always found the Dakotas exceedingly reasonable beings, with a very proper appreciation of what are their own rights. What they yield to the whites they expect to be paid for, and I never have heard a prominent man of their nation express an opinion in regard to what was due them in which I do not concur. Many of them view the extinction of their race as an inevitable result of the operation of present causes, and do so with all the feelings of despair with which we should contemplate the extinction of our nationality.

This image shows a blank, aged, cream-colored page, likely an endpaper or flyleaf of a book. The paper has a slightly textured appearance with some faint smudges and discoloration, characteristic of old paper. The left edge of the page is bound, showing the stitching and the inner cover material. There is no text or other markings on the page.

Senate documents

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